THE RECRUITMENT OF THE LAND FORCES IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1793-99

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CHAPTER I : POLITICS AND STRATEGY

(a) Introduction

To mobilize the manpower of Britain for war was a task which no eighteenth century government could hope to perform with more than a modest degree of success. The army was disliked and despised by all classes as a danger to liberty and a repository of scoundrels and outcasts. Service in it, moreover, was known to be both unhealthy and degrading. Corporal punishment was too often the mainstay of discipline. Much of the army's duty lay in unhealthy foreign stations such as the West Indies where the ravages of disease were impressive and notorious. Even at home, where the soldiers lived in jerry-built barracks or temporary quarters, the deathrate in the army was twice the national average.[1] It was estimated that very few soldiers lived and survived for as long as twelve years in the service.[2]

Britain was at a serious disadvantage compared with the other great powers. Her army stood much lower in popular esteem. Its service was more often outside Europe and correspondingly less pleasant. The standard of living being higher than on the continent, it was less easy to tempt the lower classes to enlist, while effective conscription - now just beginning to emerge as a significant military factor - was not yet a possibility. Britain's population was small, in any case, to discharge the responsibilities of a great power. In an age of growing armies, she might find herself reduced to military impotence.

Her great strength in war lay of course in her navy and her finances. These both to some extent contributed to reduce her landward striking power.

The navy took a great deal of money and a good many men that might otherwise have gone to the army. The same might be said of the economic activities of the nation. There was a reluctance to take too many men out of employment and so send up wages. There was a passion for economy, a fear of over-burdening those national resources on which all else depended, that caused ministers even in wartime to reduce the strength of the land forces at every opportunity and to refuse at all times to spend enough money on it to make it an attractive service.[3]

From this situation, successive governments sought to escape by various expedients which, taken together, form (apparently by accident) a policy. The basis of them was that the army had to perform a number of very different tasks, each of which could be devolved onto a separate group of persons willing to do that particular duty (often more cheaply than the army could have done it) but not willing (sometimes not able) to share in the rest of the army's work. When a specific emergency arose, the appropriate type of force would be augmented to meet it, while the regular forces, available for all kinds of service, would be concentrated where the need was greatest.

The tasks of the land forces may be enumerated as follows. They had to participate in the campaigns of continental Europe and also in the very different warfare in the tropics, against both whites and natives. They had to defend Great Britain and in the absence of a police force they had to maintain law and order. Similarly they had to garrison India, Ireland and the colonies and keep the inhabitants in submission. Finally, they often had to serve in the fleet. On the outbreak of war every effort was naturally made to increase the regular army which could be used for all these purposes. At the same time, the pressure on it was relieved by the raising of forces for more

limited objects. For colonial and Irish purposes, various corps were raised locally, with which we are not concerned in this study. For home defence there were firstly the Fencibles, a part of the army but differing from the rest in being available for home service only. Then there was the Militia, raised by a compulsory levy of men which was a tentative approach towards conscription. It had the advantage of being permanently in existence without being always in pay. In peacetime, the militia men lived and worked as ordinary civilians and were embodied only for a short period of annual training. They could be called out in an emergency, kept mobilized for as long as the government wished, and sent home when the danger was passed. They were the only true reserve formation in the British service and a partial solution of how to maintain a large force without too much expense.

The foregoing forces all consisted of true soldiers subject to military discipline. For home defence there were also the Volunteers, *i.e.* Civilians trained to arms in their spare time and only embodied when actual service was in prospect. They were especially suited to taking over such military work as was static, such as the manning of batteries round the coast. Apart from this, large bodies could be kept in being to act as an ultimate reserve from which the other defensive forces could be replenished in time of actual fighting.

Police functions could, of course, be discharged if need be by the defensive forces. These were, however, not entirely suitable for the purpose. They were brought into service in wartime and had not the unquestioning submission and lack of contact with civilians that marked the hardbitten regular. Some special categories of Volunteers therefore existed solely or mainly for the purpose of keeping order. They were formed of men of property and their

dependents, who could be relied on for this purpose and who would never have undertaken any other sort of military work.

Such were the main types of force at the end of the eighteenth century. The government expended and contracted each of them as the strategic needs of the moment varied. It added further variations; units were raised for service in Scotland only, for service in Ireland as well as Britain, or for service in Europe but not further afield. There was the choice too between raising forces directly for a given object and releasing existing forces for that purpose by raising other forces. There was finally the possibility of inducing men enlisted for one type of force to volunteer to serve in another type.

Voluntary extension of service was to a large extent an invention of the period under study. It was the lynch-pin of the system. By it, a series of isolated forces became a group of complementary forces, feeding each other with men. This was the only way in which the number of men willing to join the less popular branches of the service could be effectively increased. The underlying principle was that if men could be lured into any line of military life, they would become accustomed to soldiering, its terrors would be lost, and its benefits - the chief of which for the poorer classes was supposed to be pay without work - appreciated. The men would then respond to an appeal to enter on more active and perilous service - especially if the alternative was dismissal and a return to the toil of civil life. Thus forces raised for limited purposes and which seldom fired a shot in anger performed a useful service of national military education. Slowly and painfully they built up a true reserve from which the regulars bearing the brunt of the fighting could draw.

(b) Forces for Overseas Service

We must now show how strategic, financial and political exigences determined the size and composition of the forces raised by Pitt's government in the years under study. The period contains two offensive phases - the eras of the first and second coalitions against the French Republic - with a defensive phase in between. It was naturally during the former that the procuring of forces for overseas service took pride of place. In the years 1793-5 there was a large direct expansion of the regular army by ordinary enlistment. Recruiting activity was greatest in the winter months, the idea being still to have a campaign in summer for which preparations were made in winter.

The beginning was tenative and makeshift. There was an augmentation of the old regiments and a number of independent companies were raised, which these regiments were intended to absorb. In January 1793 the prospects were so uncertain that Pitt and Dundas were arguing as to what should be done if war did not come and the independent companies were disbanded before the raisers had fulfilled their contract.[1] In March the picture was clearer and Pitt told the Duke of Richmond that he hoped to have sent 10,000 men to Flanders by the end of the year and have 15,000 available by autumn for other expeditions. The Duke regarded this as optimistic and said that six months in camp were needed to make a recruit into a soldier.[2] His words serve to indicate the main trouble experienced by a government not able to decide on augmenting the forces until it had decided on immediate action. The Adjutant-General apologized to the Duke of York for the poor quality of the recruits sent out in these early days.[3]

In the autumn, the expected expeditions materialized - to Toulon, Brittany and the West Indies. A strong effort was needed to fill the gaps they left. A paper of September 1793 envisaged a very extensive augmentation of certain regiments, starting at the end of November and producing 200 men per regiment by February. A fresh batch of independent companies was to be raised at the same time, which would yield 2000 or 3000 men by Christmas. These were to be put partially trained into seven regiments which had been sent home from the West Indies as skeletons without any privates.[4] This plan with modifications was adopted for all the regiments of the line. It will be seen that a good body of men was to be raised early enough to receive some training before the new campaign. In June 1793 Matthew Lewis, the Deputy Secretary at War had noted that two months at Chatham gave the raw recruit "habits of cleanliness and feeding" more essential than knowledge of marching and drill.*[5] He was probably the author of the September plan and doubtless bore his own words in mind.

From September 1793 until the following spring a great many new regiments were ordered to be raised. This was an important new departure - only one regular regiment, the 78th, had been ordered in the early part of 1793. Unfortunately no memoranda survive to explain why the step was taken. It points, however, to a further solidifying of the government's ideas about the needs of the war. A paper by the Deputy Secretary at War in the summer of 1794 pointed out that respectable gentlemen were not usually willing to raise a regiment unless there was a prospect of its going into service as a unit.[6] The 79th (August 1793) which started the continuous series of new regiments

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* The main trouble with these men seems to have been sickness through inability to care for themselves rather than lack of training c.f. p.121-2 and the Duke of Richmond WO30/81:10#93 (note 2 ante)

raised at this time contained in its letter of service a promise that the men would not be drafted[7]- which would necessitate keeping the regiment in being for as long as the men's services were wanted. It is fair to infer that by sanctioning a large number of new regiments the government showed it had decided that the war would last some time and that the establishment of the army would have to be augmented on a more then temporary basis. Perhaps the French military recovery in the autumn of 1793 strengthened them in this opinion.

A final measure taken in the winter season of 1793-4 was the ordering of a further batch of independent companies in March 1794. The new regiments and the independent companies ordered in the autumn had done well. 30,000 men were raised between November and February.[8] The augmentation of the old regiments on the other hand was an almost total failure despite extra time[9] being allowed. The new companies were perhaps a hasty substitute.

By the autumn of 1794, the forces in Flanders had suffered heavy defeat and there had been severe casualties both there and in the West Indies. Filling the old regiments was the prime concern and virtually excluded the raising of new ones. In July, Pitt suggested raising some regiments specifically to be drafted, under the patronage of some towns that had offered to help[10] and this was done.[11] A number of other large draftable corps were ordered in the autumn together with a further body of independent companies. The new regiments raised the previous winter were augmented; a good many had to be drafted to fill the old ones and then re-raised from scratch.[12] The defence of our overseas as well as our metropolitan territories was beginning to attract attention. A large body of Fencible regiments were raised whose service extended to Ireland and sometimes the Channel Islands as well as Britain and

which were primarily intended for those stations.

With the year 1795 we reach the end of the first offensive phase of the war. A great deal had been accomplished, in however haphazard a way, to increase the strength of the army. The Secretary at War claimed in February 1794 that 32,000 men had been raised for the regulars in the year 1793 - 10,000 more than in the best previous years since 1756.[13] This record was very greatly exceeded in the ensuing years. The strength of the regular forces in British pay (i.e. excluding the Irish and East India Company establishments and foreign mercenaries) rose from some 35,000 at home and abroad at the start of the war to 130,000 in regulars and Fencibles in the spring of 1795[14] and this despite considerable casualties. The peak of endeavour had now been reached: in the defensive phase of the war which followed the army shrunk to just over 100,000 in 1797-8[15]. It could expand no further and seemed unable even to maintain its ground.

The burdens thrown on it by the changing course of the war made this doubly unfortunate. In January 1795, the government felt obliged to budget for a still larger army owing to the collapse of the Dutch.[16] The policy of conquering the colonies of that and other countries caused an increasing number of troops to be consumed in garrisons. The outbreak or threat of insurrection first in the West Indies and then in Ireland intensified this process. The whole army became locked up in local commitments and there was nothing left for offensive action against the enemy. In June 1798, the House of Lords was told that no regulars could be sent to reinforce the Irish government, which was grappling with rebellion, because it would involve foregoing all possibility of action against the French Coast.[17] In May 1799, Henry Dundas told his colleagues that the army could only get enough men to supply the needs of Ireland and the

colonies.[18] The army had become a weapon large in size but without a cutting edge.

The causes of this failure to expand are very obscure. The commonsense explanation is that the country had been drained of potential recruits and no further expansion was possible. Windham in 1799 thought the existing total of forces of all kinds was the largest that the population could support.[19] Certainly there is evidence from the Highlands of an exhaustion of supply in some areas.[20] Perhaps the tendency to inflation following the suspension of cash payments in 1797 made civil employment more attractive.[21] High wages in the locality are mentioned in 1799 as a reason why many militia men preferred to return to civil life rather than enlist in the army[22].

The financial embarrassment of the government seems to have been an important factor. The Duke of York carried out a great rationalization of the army establishments in 1795, reducing the number of regiments and making them uniform in size. This was done in the name of economy.[23] In 1796 the government managed to save £800,000 by reducing the army.[24] The amoung of bounty which might be given to recruits had been restricted in February 1795[25] and another reform brought in by the Duke of York was the issue of money to recruiting parties by special paymasters under government control. Army Agents complained that the recruiting service was being starved of money. In August 1795, Donaldson told Colonel Moray of the Perthshire Light Dragoons for which he was agent that the government had never been so backward in the issuing of money, especially for the recruiting service. None had been given out for two months. Another agent, Kempt* declared that one officer had raised twentytwo men in the first four months of 1796. Then the system of special paymasters came in and owing to their parsimony in advancing money he only raised six during the rest of the year.[27] In March 1797 when things were at their worst, the Nottingham

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* Not an entirely reliable source. He was a former employee of Donaldson dismissed for irregular conduct. Seaforth Papers LXVII 27.7.94

Fencibles were told that corps of this description had been ordered to cease recruiting because of the difficulty of supplying the army with money.[28]

The government tolerated a deficit of some 50,000 on the authorized establishment from mid-1795 to early 1797.[29] They hopefully set a target which the army failed over a period to reach. In the autumn of 1796 the needs of defence being urgent, they resorted to large compulsory levies. For raising taxes and hiring troops with them there was substituted a direct tax in men. Compulsory service could not well be applied to filling the regular army but a parochial levy was voted by Parliament[30] in which the parish officers were obliged to enlist a certain number of men, the cost of the bounty being met by the ratepayers. This method had been used with success to levy seamen[31] but does not seem to have helped the army much on this occasion. The deficit reached record heights that winter and in the spring the government accepted the position (besides saving money) by scaling down the establishment.[32] A charge made then and now against compulsory levies for home service is that they took away recruits from the regulars. This will be investigated later on - here we must note that the levies of 1796 certainly seems to have embarrassed the army but that they were only brought in after it had been given a fair chance to show what it could do.

While home defence pre-occupied the government, they could allow the crisis in recruiting for the line to continue and concentrate on raising defensive forces. In 1799 there came again the opportunity for offensive action on the continent and building up the regular army again took precedence. It was now that voluntary extension of the limit of service by men enlisted for defensive purposes only was first used with really striking success.

The new device had been developed during the defensive period in response to the needs of imperial defence, particularly of Ireland. The first step was taken early in 1794 when Fencible regiments enlisted for

service in Scotland were persuaded to serve in England. The Fencibles raised for Irish service that autumn were in some cases designed to enlist men from existing Fencible regiments. In the following autumn, individual soldiers in these regiments were encouraged to go into the line and a reduction in strengths was ordered as a means of coercion. This was contemporaneous with Sir Ralph Abercromby's expedition to the West Indies. In 1795 also, acute shortages of seamen and artillerymen led to a first interference with the "constitutional force". A defined number of militiamen were allowed to volunteer for the navy and the artillery.

In 1798 the government felt able to strengthen its financial position by the imposition of new taxes. It proceeded to strengthen the system of defence which had been improvised in the previous year and made renewed efforts to increase the force for overseas service. Invasion and rebellion in Ireland added urgency to these efforts. A new batch of Fencibles was raised in which the limit of service varied from regiment to regiment. Some were confined to the British Isles, some to Europe, some to Britain and North America. The great object was to attract recruits who were afraid of the tropics. Meanwhile, the augmentation to the militia raised in 1796 but left in reserve was embodied and its members were allowed to enlist in the line, their service being also restricted to Europe, and in time to the duration plus six months.[34]

Neither of the above measures yielded many men. More fruitful were the offers of the English militia to serve in Ireland. These, like the first experiment with the Fencibles in 1794 concerned whole units, not individuals. They were unique in that the offers were for short terms of duty (six months or a year to start with) after which each regiment resumed its old status. The initiative was, or seemed to be, with the men themselves.

Parliament probably could not have been got to sanction the measure otherwise. With extensions it lasted almost two years, regiments being persuaded to extend the term of their offers or being relieved by other regiments who were willing to go. Some 12,000 men were added to the forces in Ireland in this way[35] but the system was obviously precarious.

By 1799 the public had been prepared for the step of direct recruiting for the line from the embodied militia. The diminishing danger of invasion made a reduction of the defensive forces in any case both possible and desirable. In July, an Act[36] reduced the militia establishment by one quarter and authorized militia men to that number to enter the line regiments. Some 10,000 men responded. The Helder expedition could now be undertaken (it was assumed that the men would need no time to shake down in their new regiments) and it was at first rewarded by success - the capture of the Dutch fleet. Dundas considered (and convinced his colleagues) that this event made it safe to reduce the militia establishment to what it had been in 1793 - that is by three-fifths.[37] A special session of Parliament was called to authorize this and some 20,000 more men entered the line in October. The rest of the three-fifths was made liable to recall in the spring - a ~~precedent~~ precaution and also a spur to enlist in the line, for it was now harder for them to get civilian jobs.

It was now the turn of the Fencibles. The establishment of a militia in Scotland made it possible to reduce those regiments who still refused to serve outside it[38] and during 1800 their fate was shared by the regiments confined to Great Britain. These corps were encouraged to extend their services to Ireland in order to avoid reduction. The regulars were successfully encouraged to recruit from those that were reduced.

The year 1799 thus broke the impasse into which regular recruiting had drifted. The efforts of 1798 had raised the army a little from the 100,000

mark at which it had stuck. Early in 1800 it reached 140,000 and thus could provide not only the garrisons but an expeditionary force which the government hoped could be launched in the spring at a strength of 57,000 infantry.[39] Strength had increased and method improved. The forces for the Helder campaign had been raised on the spur of the moment, just as had the men for the campaign of 1793. There was not sufficient time for preparation. Yet they had at least on this occasion been raised from a reserve of trained soldiers.

(c) Home Defence : General Principles

Pitt's government has been accused - though not as much as Addington's in the next war - of raising too large a proportion of its forces for home service only. Lord Mulgrave told Windham in 1797 that the defensive preparations "put us somewhat in the situation of King James' description of himself in armour: 'now I can hurt nobody and nobody can hurt me'."[1] Yet if we examine the view which the government took of the national danger, we shall find it supported by weighty arguments and respectable authorities. It is necessary to stop and explore this neglected subject before we can show how the government's strategic views were reflected in the composition of the defensive forces it decided to raise.

The military advisers of the government took the threat of invasion very seriously and thought it much greater than in previous wars. In 1796 a full report[2] on the subject was drawn up by David Dundas, the Quartermaster-General, whose department performed the functions of a modern General Staff. He considered that the revolutionary spirit in politics and war had altered the whole prospect. At home, the unreliable elements had never been so numerous, "methodized" and ready "from the infatuation of the times" to

help an invader. The French for their part had shown themselves willing to take risks that under the old regime they would have shrunk from. Their victory over Holland had given them control of more coastline than they had ever held before. It ought to be possible, by launching attacks from widely separated points, to elude the British navy and get at least one segment of the force ashore. The French, with their great superiority on land, always sought to strike at the centre of the enemy's power. This was their logical next step.

"In no country so much as in this", said General Dundas, "does its fortune depend on that of the capital. While danger is distant its resources and exertions are unexhaustible. If suffered to approach too near, its artificial system may give way to such a degree as to endanger the whole fabric". If the French could get only a few men ashore they might hope to make a dash on the capital. In the ensuing confusion, rebellion might break out and credit would certainly collapse. This in turn would lead to a national paralysis and political collapse. Britain's finances were the source of all her power. If the French could upset them by invasion, even if their entire force was annihilated without making an overt military conquest, they would have won the war.

This thesis is found repeated and amplified in many quarters, high and low. On the political side, Colonel Anstruther, who was Dundas' deputy[3] remarked in a memorandum written about the same time as the above that the French had been encouraged by success to continue the plundering mode of warfare they had adopted. Their rulers would start fresh expeditions to get rid of dangerous generals. At home the people would be discouraged by the loss of allies and the opposition of factious and interested persons would be stiffened by the downright disloyal.[4]

A M!Ogilvy, whose memorandum is preserved in the Windham papers, ventured further elaboration. The masses he thought loyal but change was desired by a few speculative men and debased agitators. London was a centre of profligacy with an underworld population 100,000 strong always ready to revolt. In an invasion, refugees would crowd in while the rich would leave for safer areas. There would be a run on the banks and a repetition of the terrible events of 1780. The French would cheerfully sacrifice 100,000 men if they could secure the ruin of British credit in this way.[5]

When the financial crisis actually came the military factor was not ignored in trying to account for it. In December 1796, a French fleet with an army on board reached Bantry Bay and tried without success to effect a landing. The British navy displayed considerable inertia in failing to stop them. In the correspondence laid before the House of Commons, Pitt concurred with the Directors of the Bank of England in thinking that these events were the proximate cause of the demand for gold leading to the crisis of February 1797.* [6] The opposition touched on this question in the defence debates provoked by the Bantry affair. Col. Wood in particular stressed its importance in introducing his motion for appointing a board of general officers to superintend the defences.[7] Nor was it left out of account in local drives to improve the defences. Samuel Peat, who commanded the Northallerton volunteers, issued a pamphlet on defence in which he called on everyone to help in some way, stressed the danger to credit and contrasted the patriotism of the business community, who carried on their affairs as usual, with the

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* On this subject see E. Stuart Jones "The Last Invasion of Britain" 165-75 and c.f. R. Pares in English Historical Review XI, 441 for a parallel with 1756.

cowardice of farmers and country gentry who demanded gold for their paper whenever there was an emergency.[8]

The political as well as the financial credit of the government needed to be defended by military means. Morale was low and the stirring sight of a national mobilization would boost it. Soldiers advising the government usually pointed out that the English were soft from easy living and unlikely to bear well the rigours of war.[9] Anstruther urged that defensive measures be quickly taken in hand as the opposition and obstruction they would meet with would prevent their becoming effective for some time.[10] Henry Dundas told Grenville in 1796 that in order to win support for the war abroad it would be necessary to come forward at the beginning of the session with a plan of defence.[11] This was done and Fox in the ensuing debates accused the government of creating a scare to win support for its aggressive policies.[12] Ruling a pacific nation always slow to act, ministers has to arouse and exploit enthusiasm as and when they could. A crisis enabled them to raise fresh forces which would be little use for the immediate purpose but would stand the nation in good stead next time.[*]

Also we would recall the function of defensive forces in releasing other forces for the offensive. General Dundas hoped especially to "free the navy to exert itself at a distance on its own element instead of tying it down to the passive guard of a coast". Pitt spoke in the same sense in a debate on the army estimates in January 1795.[14]

To sum up then, we may say that the British generals, like the rest of the upper class, were very afraid of revolution and very struck with its power as a military factor. For reasons part military, part political strong

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[*] Consider especially the case of the Scotch militia p. 166

forces were thought necessary at home. Add to this the fragility of the national finances in those days and it will appear why a threat which seems contemptible to a modern observer was probably not so and certainly did not seem so at the time.

Strategic ideas not only demanded large defensive forces but also caused certain types of force to be especially valued. Forces were required which were effective and which were conspicuous and likely to create public confidence. They had also, in common with the offensive forces, to be as economical as possible. On the one hand, they had to oppose the landing of the enemy. Here the government relied on augmenting the militia and fencibles. There was particular concern to have a large force of cavalry. The enemy could bring few horses with them and it was thought that they could be severely harried by this arm.[15] Cavalry augmentation will be found to be a recurrent theme until 1798.

The other branch of the task was the repression of disorder and sedition and the general maintenance of the authority of the government. To this branch also strategic ideas gave a special bias. Moreover, it was realized that the French would have no supply line to speak of and would live on the country. Therefore a most effective way of opposing them would be to "drive the country": to remove all livestock and provisions, destroy what could not be taken away and evacuate the inhabitants. This great task imposed even heavier burdens on the forces of law and order. The Volunteers often seem very ineffective, considered as a military force, but the importance of the internal functions which they were designed to perform must always be remembered.

Ogilvy declared that the French Revolution had set the poor against the rich and it was necessary for the latter to be well armed and organized if they were to withstand superior numbers.[16] Anstruther thought organization decisive -

an armed and concerted minority could dominate the majority,-even if it too was partially armed.[17] Such was the philosophy behind much of the Volunteer movement.

The government in short wished to hustle a good many men into arms not only to oppose the enemy but to create confidence in themselves; on the vital internal front they opposed the revolution with its own weapons - the Volunteers taking the part of the National Guard.*

(d) Forces for Home Defence

The detailed application of the principles explained above must now be given. At the start of the war, England already had the basis of a defensive system in the militia which from December 1792 was slowly mobilized and brought up to its full strength of some 32,000. Scotland had no militia and for this reason the rhythm of preparation there was throughout the war different from that of England. It was the government's wish to create a militia there and in 1793 they announced a bill but went no further than to introduce it at the end of the session and have it printed. Instead nine battalions of fencibles were raised by Scottish noblemen. The Volunteer movement also got under way, a few artillery corps being formed to man batteries at places like Fishguard and Fowey.[1]

By these means the exiguous regular army was relieved of its tasks at home and set free to act on the continent.

The first great crisis or spasm of activity over national security took place in 1794. The revolutionary government in France had scored its first

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* They were sometimes considered a counterweight to the expanded (plebeian) militia.

successes in the autumn and was preparing for a heavy attack on the allies. These preparations included assembling an army in Normandy and building the first flotillas of landing craft. The history of Napoleon's great design really begins now.[2] In Britain the struggle between government and radicals was at its height; there were Parliamentary inquiries into sedition and a number of famous trials culminating in that of Hardy, the leader of the London Corresponding Society, that summer. The Portland whigs at that point joined the government; even the Foxites were disturbed, Gray inveighing against the anarchy in France and declaring he would resist invasion, were the enemy as enlightened as could be imagined.[3]

On the military side things appear to have started with a paper produced in February at the request of the government by the Duke of Richmond, then Master General of the Ordinance, General Officer Commanding the South Eastern military district and Lord Lieutenant of Sussex. He thought the French might try either a full attack or a smaller one to create alarm. He called for a concentration of force in case of the former and the building of numerous batteries manned by Volunteers to delay the latter until the duly concentrated force could move to the danger spot. Arrangements must also be made to drive the country and for this purpose county meetings must be called and a large number of Volunteers (especially horse) enrolled.

In his own command the regular force required was some 21,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. Over 10,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry would be needed to bring his force up to that strength, leaving only 10,000 men for the rest of England. He suggested therefore that eight new regiments should be exchanged for eight seasoned ones from Ireland and the Scottish Fencibles should be encouraged to offer to serve in England. (They were not bound to do this save in an emergency). This should yield over 4,000 men by June. The augmentation of the militia by compulsion would be too slow and unpopular to be of use but

some said that 6,000 men could be added to the militia by ordinary enlistment. The Duke was doubtful, but they should certainly try. On the other hand, the want of cavalry might be supplied by starting a "horse militia". The cavalry service was popular and in view of the small numbers involved the counties might not mind compulsion.[4]

These ideas are clearly reflected in the government's plans. It was decided to appeal to the country to raise the required force by voluntary efforts. In March a circular was sent to the counties asking them to start a subscription and form a plan of local forces that might be raised with it, through the exertions of the local gentry. The types of force which the government were prepared to countenance were Volunteer Corps of artillery on the coast and infantry in the towns; Volunteer Corps of pioneers; Volunteer Cavalry Corps formed of the gentry and yeomanry of the county (hereafter referred to as Yeomanry); the augmentation of the county militia by voluntary enlistment; and the forming of county corps of Fencible Cavalry - the nearest approach as yet to a horse militia: a county basis but voluntary.[5]

A political battle at once developed over these proposals. The opposition fought them tooth and nail in Parliament and the counties. They denounced them as going behind Parliament's back and raising men and money without the sanction of the legislature. The government secured the passage of two measures legalizing the levies and claimed this had always been their intention.[6] The question of the subscriptions still rankled, however. Francis said that they would not be voluntary as anyone not contributing would be a marked man; a stigma would be incurred by anyone not willing to support the ministry.[7] Lord Lansdowne also thought that few in fact would have any option in the matter.[8] Pitt later on declared the measure useful as making possible a manifestation of patriotism. To this Fox replied that it would suggest that only the rich favoured the war.[9] There were several long debates on the question mainly

turning on the applicability of cases in 1778 and 1782 of similar expedients. The latter gave the government a tu quoque against the opposition.

In the counties, the friends of the ministry commonly took the initiative. Lord Buckingham offered to augment his regiment of militia as soon as the plan was known.[10] Midlothian under the guidance of the Lord Advocate was very speedy in offering a corps of Fencible Cavalry - the reply was that legislation was pending to enable them to do so.[11] There were various ways of bringing the plans before the country. Where they arrived in time, they were laid before the grand jury at the Assizes. This body might then start a subscription, inviting others to join with them in contributing (as in Berkshire[12]) or commend the measure to the county and ask the Sheriff to call a meeting (as in Glamorgan[13]). Elsewhere, it was such a meeting of the gentry that took the initiative. In some counties like Lincoln and Warwick, so many of the leading personages were in town that a meeting in London was necessary to give the lead.[14] In most cases, suitable patriotic resolutions were adopted, a subscription list, headed by persons of weight, was produced and a Committee was set up - which usually might be attended by anyone paying a stated sum - to which the execution, and often the choice, of measures was referred.

Opposition was generally present and had to be circumvented. From Hertfordshire, Lord Salisbury reported that many desired the county to act but no one had ventured to speak at Quarter Sessions and a county meeting was too dangerous because the opponents of the ministry would attend and there was likely to be a riot.[15] In Norfolk this was precisely what happened. The resolutions which were put to the meeting were challenged and as it was too large for orderly debate those wishing to support the government were invited to withdraw to another room, where they started a subscription and set up a committee.[16]

In Essex the Lord Lieutenant was inactive and the opposition strong. The friends of government refused to serve on the grand jury when they saw that

their rivals would be strong there and there was "very little disposition amongst the other jurymen to part from their money".[17] The Hon. John Olmitts, an extensive proprietor in the county, stepped into the breach and a meeting was called at which, despite the opposition of Mr Charles Western, one of the county members,[18] the usual measures were taken. Olmitts recalled that he had warned Pitt of danger from "those permitted to assume direction of the county" but had not been heeded.[19] This case shows well how the amorphous character of county institutions helped the ministry. The opposition received support in some places, such as Surrey,[20] but the plans of the government could not be dislocated.

In Scotland, a significant variation was introduced by the absence (along with the militia) of the organization of the Lieutenancy. With the help of its friends, the government caused meetings to be held in the Scottish counties parallel to the English ones. Dundas, however, induced his colleagues to go further and in April, Lord Lieutenants were appointed throughout Scotland.[21] In a circular of instruction to them, Dundas said his idea was for them to be responsible for both defence and police. They were to encourage Volunteers (horse in particular) according to the government's plan, of which they were sent copies together with copies of the resolutions passed in some English counties. They were also to appoint suitable persons as Deputy Lieutenants (J.Ps. for preference) who were to inquire into the loyalty of the population and invite all who were willing to enrol themselves under a pledge to act under the command of the Lieutenancy in invasion or insurrection as might seem expedient.[22]

To carry out these orders, the Lord Lieutenant called a second series of county meetings throughout Scotland in the summer. The tone was more official and less voluntary than in the English meetings. The new Lieutenancy was the organ of action. An addition to the Cess at a fixed rate was agreed instead

of a subscription, although it was purely voluntary. The resolutions passed usually laid more emphasis on the dangers of radicalism than was common in England. On the other hand, narrower party feeling was perhaps less in evidence. The King noted the need to appoint men of due weight as Lieutenants without regard to party.[23] Dundas said the same in his circular with regard to the Deputies. Some opposition men were brought in, though Dundas declared later, for instance, that had he known Lord Tweeddale would oppose the government at the next election, he would not have advised the appointment.[24]

The results of the government's drive were quite good. Some 6000 Fencible Cavalry were raised.[25] The augmentation of the militia finally yielded over 5000 but in this year only brought in 2700.[26] The raising of Volunteer Cavalry was undertaken by many counties and this is the starting point of the Yeomanry. Volunteers of other kinds also appeared in some numbers. The scheme of enrolment in Scotland seems to have come to very little but there and elsewhere the government had made a useful patriotic demonstration and rallied support for the war.

The next great crisis came in 1796. The defeat of Holland made invasion more probable but also brought home the bulk of the army which made the country safe. By August 1796 the army had dwindled and the victories of Bonaparte made it likely that Britain would soon be without allies. From this period date the memoranda of Lord Cornwallis and Colonel Anstruther which we have already quoted. The former desired a compulsory levy on men to be trained in their spare time and be called up to augment the militia at need. In a grave emergency, they could even be put in the regular army. The latter proposed obliging the counties to recruit volunteers for the army at the rate of half their militia quotas (i.e.15,000 men in all).[27]

In October, Pitt announced in the Commons proposals clearly akin to the above. 15,000 men were to be raised as suggested - half (as we have noticed) for the regulars, the rest for the navy. A "supplementary militia" of 60,000 was to be raised by compulsion like the ordinary militia. It would do twenty days' training, a third at a time, so as not to disrupt production. A force of "provisional cavalry" 20,000 strong was to be obtained by a levy of one in ten on all horses liable to tax (a ballot deciding which owners, with their horses, should serve). A body of sharpshooters would be raised by obliging holders of licences for sporting guns (mainly employers of gamekeepers) to supply a man each - which would yield 7000.[28]

These forces were all to be irregular, with fairly scanty equipment. As they were not to be permanently embodied, it was possible to get nearer to conscription. Pitt said that for the "supplementary militia", the exemption for men with more than one child would be done away with and substitutes to serve in lieu of men chosen would only be allowed if they came from the same locality.

The Opposition declared, as we noticed earlier, that the government was plotting aggression under cover of defence. They attacked the measures of the government in detail and secured the withdrawal of one of them - the levy of gamekeepers.[29] But Fox brought himself finally to concede that the government appeared to be sincere[30] and Pitt declared nin-tenths of the people believed in the danger.[31] The adoption of compulsory measures at this time indicates a strengthening of the government's position. In the course of 1797 the new forces were brought into being without much obstruction - except from the common people.

Measures were also put in hand at this time to prepare the internal defences of the country. The general policy here is most clearly expressed in a paper of August 1796 by Lord Cornwallis, Master General of the Ordnance and

General Officer Commanding the Eastern Military District - the leading military brain in the government.[32] After suggesting a plan for dividing the country and calling out all able bodied men, he pointed to the obstacle of disaffection, helped by apathy, and said that Britain must follow the example of revolutionary France and America by setting up local committees of zealous and determined men to enforce the will of the executive. The Deputy Lieutenants who should perform this task were often feeble or even disloyal: some better way must be found of securing reliable helpers. The committees would function on parish, hundred and county level. When an emergency came, they would arrest everyone known to be disaffected or suspected of so being. They would conduct the evacuation of people and goods from the enemy's path and destroy what could not be removed. In all this work their chief agents would be the Yeomanry and Volunteers.[33]

General Dundas worked our these ideas in some detail. He wanted a "system of vigour" to repress disaffection, keep everyone at his post and cause requisitions for the army to be properly obeyed. "No man ought to remain neuter and the lukewarm should be more than suspected". He was particularly concerned with the capital. Properly led, he was sure that it would prove a source of strength and that enthusiasm could achieve there what it had done in a neighbouring country. He envisaged a complete plan, some of it publicised beforehand, the more secret parts ready as printed circulars to be sent out at need. He later produced a timetable, setting out what was to be done each day after mobilization. Here we find the system of committees (both in London and the provinces) envisaged by Cornwallis. Strong proclamations would have to be issued to secure obedience and striking examples made if necessary.[34]

The government would not permit the Volunteers to expand until the compulsory levies were completed, in order to prevent competition. They then stimulated action in two directions. A circular of March 1797 outlined

one plan. It was for the policing of urban areas. Associations of respectable householders were to be formed in each parish. There was to be no drill and no uniform unless desired but the members were to arm themselves at their own expense and be organized in groups of fifty, each with its own rendezvous and plan of action in case of alarm.[35] These "armed associations" multiplied in the ensuing years. They were barely military in character and little trace of their activity remains.

The plan adopted for driving the country was the result of the local initiative of Dorset; where the Sheriff devised a scheme in virtue of his power over the posse. The magistrates were asked to make returns of men able to bear arms, of the other inhabitants and of live and dead stock. Plans were made and a rudimentary organization created to call out the one and remove or destroy the other.[36] In November 1796 the government sent copies of this plan to the other coastal counties with instructions to arrange to "drive" every area, within twelve miles of the coast. The Treasury would pay compensation to those whose property had to be destroyed.[37] County meetings were held as a result of this circular,[38] and part of the augmentation of Volunteers in the course of 1797 may be attributed to it.

Events in Scotland again followed a rhythm of their own - in fact they reversed the order of events in England because the expansion of the Volunteers came first and the compulsory levy afterwards. The first move was parallel to that for "driving" the English coastal counties. Lord Adam Gordon, the Commander in Chief in North Britain stated the need to arrange for this and also to organize such loyal inhabitants as were willing to bear arms.[39] A circular similar to the English one was therefore sent out in February[40] and resulted in county meetings throughout Scotland. At these an enrolment similar to the abortive one of 1794 was put in hand. Again this led directly to very

little, but as a result and with the encouragement of the counties a great many new Volunteer Corps were formed. Several counties took this opportunity to express their support for the Banks and exhort all to accept their paper in payments.[41] Several also declared that more useful than the present measures would be a Scotch Militia.[42]

The government seem to have been desirous throughout the war of establishing some general national levy in Scotland. The attempts of 1793 and the county enrolments of 1794 and 1797 point in this direction. There was also a plan early in 1797 for a general muster of the Highland clans.[43] From the adoption of new measures in England late in 1796 a serious argument, which will be described elsewhere, began on whether to levy a militia in Scotland. In April 1797, the government stopped the great augmentation of the Volunteers that was going forward except for corps on the coast and in the towns.[44] Soon afterwards a militia bill for Scotland was brought in and passed. The first task in bringing the new force into being - the making of lists of persons liable for service - took place in the late summer of 1797. It was accomplished despite heavy rioting throughout the southern half of the country.

We may sum up the efforts of 1796-7 by saying that large irregular forces had been raised to act as a trained reserve in case of emergency. In the critical state of the nation's finances, this was the most the government could afford. The same system was at long last extended to Scotland. For the sake of symmetry we may here notice that the militia system was also extended to the Tower Hamlets at this time, while the City of London had been brought in in 1794 and the Stanneries were to be in the next emergency of 1798.[45] Mainly for internal purposes a large addition had also been made to the Volunteers. In all this the government was more solidly supported by the upper classes than

before and was able to impose unpopular measures of compulsion both on them and on the poor.

While these preparations were going forward, Bonaparte completed the defeat of the Austrians and Pitt's government was engaged in negotiations for peace with the Directory. The French had made an abortive attempt to invade Ireland and a raid on Wales but this appeared the most they could do against Britain. However, in August 1797 Huskisson told the Horse Guards that Pitt and Dundas thought the Directory were probably only prolonging negotiations till the autumn, when the Channel Fleet would have to go to harbour to refit and the invader would have his chance. They therefore wished to know if the plans which the Duke of York had put before them were going forward and if plans which were too expensive or alarming to be implemented as yet were ready for the moment of danger.[46]

General Dundas replied that the Supplementary Militia had been raised and trained but the attempt to fill the depleted regiments of the line had failed and even the (old) Militia was much below strength. Plans were ready to call out the Supplementary Militia and fill up the existing cadres in an emergency.[47]

In September 1797, the last chance of peace was ended by the coup d'etat of Fructidor. In October, Bonaparte was appointed to command the Army of England and preparations for an attack began on an unprecedented scale. Bonaparte gave up the idea of invasion for the time being in February 1798, but preparations continued and resulted in the abortive expedition of Humbert to Ireland that summer.[48] In 1798 therefore, there was a third period of crisis in Britain. The government took stern measures to improve its finances of which the introduction of the income tax was the most important. The Opposition, on defence questions, gave less trouble, Sheridan even making a

defiant speech against the French in which he included some not very helpful suggestions.[49]

In March 1798, Henry Dundas assumed the direction of the defensive effort. In surrendering Home affairs to Portland in 1794, he had lost control of the militia and Volunteers; as Secretary of State for War he was virtually confined to external forces and operations. In February 1798 he pointed out to Pitt that the depletion of the regular army had left him nothing to do and he should either be given charge of the defensive forces or left with Indian affairs alone, the third Secretaryship ceasing to exist.[50] Accordingly, almost all the military business of Portland's department was transferred to his.

The chief military measure now taken was to turn the irregular forces previously raised into regularly embodied forces. Half the Supplementary Militia was called out in February and either put in the existing militia regiments or (in the larger counties) formed into new ones. The other half was called out in May. Meanwhile, the levying of the Scotch Militia had been taking place and half of this was called out in May and formed into regiments. The other half followed in October. The Provisional Cavalry was not in such good shape as the other forces. It had proved cumbrous to levy and no attempt had been made to train it. Dundas told the cabinet he would re-organize it and hoped to make efficient a fair part of its 10 or 15,000 men.[51] However, there were 16,000 Yeomanry and 14,000 other cavalry now in being. The Generals told Dundas in June that they could use no more.[52] Therefore only six regiments were embodied that summer.

Behind these forces the government proposed to call out the nation's manhood as a national reserve. The plan for a general enrolment and a preparation to drive the country which had been applied in Scotland was now carried out throughout the kingdom. Weight was added to the government's case for

proceeding in this way by the researches of John Bruce of the India Office into the means adopted to resist the Armada. His report lays emphasis on the centring of all preparations on the Lord Lieutenant, responsible to the crown.[53] A Defence Act[54] was passed giving statutory force to the plan that had been adopted, especially to the requisitioning of property, and county meetings were held everywhere (even in Scotland where they duplicated previous efforts) in April.

The government gave far more direction and control to the counties on this occasion. The Generals commanding the different military districts attended the county meetings or sent representatives. There were also Commissaries (from the Treasury department charged with the supply of the army) to explain the methods of driving the country. The printed plans sent out were far more voluminous than heretofore. There was no compulsion upon individuals to serve but the Act did make it obligatory for the counties to call for voluntary efforts. This was a further step forward from the latitude of 1794.

Henry Dundas' circulars to the Lords Lieutenant on this occasion give a clear idea of the sort of Volunteer force the government wanted. For driving the country, voluntary effort was relied on for pioneers, drivers and horses and carts. There were to be corps of guides to assist the army and a new attempt was made to mobilize the gamekeepers on a voluntary basis.[55] The fishermen were to be corps of Sea Fencibles to defend the coast.[56] In arming the lower classes, a clear division was made between the urban and the rural poor. The former were not to be armed on any account. The latter were to be encouraged to enter corps officered by the landlords and farmers.[57]

For the maintenance of order, the towns were to have infantry corps of respectable householders and their nominees, able if need be to take over from the army and free them to fight. In the country, the Yeomanry were to be

expanded as much as possible.[58] The government had encouraged this since the previous year by allowing those liable for the Provisional Cavalry to discharge this obligation by producing Yeomanry instead. The same circulars mentioned the need for a network of committees of zealous individuals (as proposed by Cornwallis in 1796) to organize the driving of the country.

A plan by General Dundas for the protection of London shows how the Volunteers were to be employed. The alarm would be given by bells and rockets. Everyone was then to stay indoors if possible and illuminate their windows. The Volunteers were to patrol the streets accompanied by Justices and seize and summarily execute persons found armed or engaged in plunder. Plotters were to be identified in advance so that they could be seized. Crowds were to be dispersed and the roads kept open. It might be necessary to stop the exodus of refugees. At several central rendezvous there would be large reserves of Volunteers. Small bodies would be stationed at local rendezvous from which a constant series of patrols would radiate. Outside the town the Yeomanry would keep the roads open[59] - the flow of provisions to the capital was of course of vital importance.

1798 was the climax of the government's defensive effort. A large military force raised by compulsory levy bore the main burden. Behind this was a "Volkssturm" of the peasantry raised by laying an obligation on their social superiors. The propertied classes were extensively organized to repress any attempt to upset the social order. In the event, the battle for Britain was won in Egypt and the French were put back on the defensive without calling these forces into play. Next year saw them reinforcing the offensive arm (as we have seen) and as in 1793 holding the fort while the army went abroad. The militia was reduced to its old strength, the surplus "stood down" remaining as a reserve. The Volunteers were extensively formed into battalions and

formed a cheap irregular force for emergencies - like the Supplementary Militia at an earlier date.

We have now explained, as well as may be, the circumstances in which the Pitt government undertook the various augmentations and diminutions of the land forces and their intentions in so doing. The way is open for us to examine the methods by which the men were raised and the relative success and contribution of each in mobilizing the manpower of the nation. First we shall consider the system of voluntary enlistment both for service in the regular army and for service at home alone in defensive forces. Then the expedients in which compulsion played a part will be studied - chiefly defensive forces are involved here, with one exceptional attempt to supply the line. It will then be time to show how each of these very various methods contributed some men, for differing terms and purposes, who could not have been got in other ways. After a parallel treatment of the Volunteer movement, we shall conclude by describing the attempts to supply the regular army or the foreign stations from the forces enlisted for more limited purposes. As has been noted, it is these attempts which to some extent justify our regarding a very mixed bag of forces as a national military system with a standing army and reserves.

CHAPTER II : THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CONTRACTORS

(a) The System of Recruiting Connections

Recruiting in the eighteenth century depended, like politics, on a system of patronage and connections. A landed magnate might sometimes raise a regiment by his influence alone, - but the supply of recruits was so exiguous that a vast terrain was needed to produce a regiment. The normal scheme was to use the little interest of each officer, from Colonel to Ensign, to build up a mosaic, each piece of which represented a few men for the corps to be raised.

There were two sorts of recruiting interest, which may be called "territorial" and "professional". The former comprised first the assistance of relatives. The family solidarity of the Highlanders led them to raise men for the promotion of such of their number as chanced to be officers. The friends of a Lieutenant or a Captain would sometimes make their offer direct to the War Office, asking for authorization.[1] Some officers had contingents raised by their fathers, when these were men of substance. Alderman Long of Canterbury raised a company for his son, a Lieutenant in the West Indies.[2] Dr. Kerr of Northampton supervised the raising of a regiment for his.[3] The possession of land was the obvious source of influence. Richard Burton a half-pay Lieutenant makes an offer because he is a Yorkshire freeholder with interest in the West Riding.[4] Paul Pickersgill, formerly a militia officer, had a small estate near Bristol and thought his local connections would enable him to raise a company.[5] Captain Cuninghame of the 70th sent a beating order* to his brother, proprietor of the family estate at Thornton near Kilmarnock, and asked him to try and get a man or two.[6] Dr. Kerr raised his son's men in the area of his medical practice.[7] Officers taking the waters at Bath tried to make friends who could find men for them.[8]

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* See p. 88

"Professional" connections were those with the various persons, settled especially in the great towns, who made recruiting their trade. Captain Fielder King, who did much of the raising of the 84th made an offer on his own account, mentioning that his personal influence would enable him to secure the best "established parties" throughout Lancashire and the West Riding.[9] A variant on this theme is provided by Lieutenant Budworth who offered to recruit in Lancashire, where formerly he had great success, and succeeded in enlisting all the men who "went with" him in 1778.[10] Of course, each officer tried to amass as many sources of influence as possible. Major Ouseley offered to raise 500 men in 1798. His father was a landlord with some influence; he himself was in touch with military men throughout the country and had already got promises of eighty recruits.[11]

Sometimes the sum total of the recruiting interests by which a corps was raised amounted to a compact provincial connection. Colonel Bernard was able to claim that the 84th was the most provincial regiment in the service as it was raised in Yorkshire, Lancashire and adjacent areas, only two parties going south of Trent.[12] As a rule, though, even individual officers had their interests very widely scattered. A Lieutenant Cameron raising a company in 1793, had one party in London, nine in East Anglia where he was assisted by the "first people", and three under relatives in the Highlands.[13] Captain Campbell, himself at Manchester, had a party at Newcastle under the care of a friend.[14] Larger corps therefore tended to be recruited from everywhere under the sun. When Thomas Graham of Balgowan raised the 90th he called it the Perthshire Volunteers and the magistrates there subscribed towards it.[15] But Hill, his Major, got men through his family connections in Shropshire.[16] Others came from Graham's hunting friends in Leicestershire.[17] Parties were active in Lancashire, Cheshire and other industrial areas. There was too a contract with Hamblin, the most

notorious crimp in London.[18]

Mackenzie of Seaforth also employed Hamblin and hoped to get 160 in London for his Highland regiment.[19] The Manx Fencibles were later rebuked for using Hamblin[20] and those of Angus for employing civilians at Shoreditch were reported to the War Office.[21] The parties of the Somerset Fencibles were spread over a distance of three hundred miles.[22] The Scotch Brigade, recruiting for which was confined by a gentlemen's agreement to that kingdom, had an officer raising men in Worcester where his family lived.[23] Thus even supposedly provincial regiments were often not so; we may add that very many regiments in Britain had parties in Ireland as well and vice versa.

When a corps, of whatever size, had to be raised or augmented, the first task was thus to build up a body of recruiting connections capable of supplying the recruits. What was it that led men to join in the work? For most of those involved, promotion was the goal. All commissions in the Army up to that of Lieutenant Colonel were normally obtained by purchase; it was an easy step to ask for men instead of money. By this expedient all recruiting except the routine replacement of casualties was carried out. It was used equally in the expansion of old regiments, the creation of new ones, and the raising of unattached bodies of men by contract with the government. Almost all the lesser officers engaged in recruiting are thus accounted for. So are some of their seniors who raised whole regiments. The son of Sir James Grant for instance, having been disappointed of promotion in 1799 by the failure of Sir Benjamin Dunbar, whom he was helping to recruit, to get his regiment passed fit for service, offered to raise a Fencible regiment of his own.[24]

The more important and influential personages however, often had motives of a wider sort. Patriotism was one of these. Lord Macdonald who raised a regiment in 1798-9 announced at one point that he had become more conscious

since he started of the need for patriotic endeavour. He had therefore decided to take no money from government for the work.[25] The eldest son of Viscount Hereford offered in 1795 to raise a regiment in Wales. He said that his family had always exerted themselves in the defence of their country since the Norman Conquest.[26]

Family considerations were commonly important. Promotion, if not needed for oneself, might be required by one's military relatives. The Duke of Gordon raised a regular regiment for his son and a Fencible regiment of which his brother-in-law took command.[27] Mackenzie of Seaforth also brought forward a brother-in-law to take charge of his regiment.[28] Lord Buckingham helped to raise one for his illegitimate nephew George Nugent.[29] "There are" said Lord Macdonald "upon all Highland estates descendants and friends of the respective families ..... who look upon a war as a sure means to rise under the auspices of their superior."[30] Sir James Grant wished to augment his Fencibles in order to oblige his friends.[31] Some years later Colonel Macleod made a similar request in respect of his regiment; he was[32] pressed thereto by Macleod of Caelboll, Lieutenant of Cromarty.[33]

The general importance of a family might be enhanced by the patronage which a regiment would give it to bestow. Seaforth wished Mackenzie of Fairburn to be a Major in his regiment and avowed that this was a job to increase his influence (he was then the Member for Ross-shire). As he had served the government well and at great expense by producing men, he felt this to be a fair return.[34] In Aberdeenshire, the Hay family, supported by Lord Aberdeen, contested the electoral ascendency of the Gordons at a by-election in 1800. In 1794, the same combination had challenged their military ascendency by raising a regiment at the same time as the Gordons[35] and seeking the official patronage of the City and county.[36] How they were defeated on that occasion we shall see

in a moment. The Hays had started as clients of the Gordons and built themselves up into rivals by fortunate marriages.[37] Behind them stood the Duffs, to whom they were then connected[38] - traditional rivals of the Gordons kept in amity with them by the persistent efforts of Dundas.[39]

In Scotland, bitter recruiting rivalries existed between the families because more of them had a hand in the business. In the extreme north, Sir James Sinclair and Sir Benjamin Dunbar were constant rivals, sending up bounties by competition. Sir James tried to delay raising the second battalion of his Fencibles till Sir Benjamin had finished his levy - which he thought would take some time as the Mackays, his allies, were working on their own account.[40] Earlier that year (1794) Sir James had been impeded in raising his first battalion by Sir Robert Sinclair, recruiting for his father-in-law the Duke of Gordon. Sir James' recruits were said to be offering their officers money to be let out "to go with the Lady Madelina."[41] It was in the heat of this struggle that that lady (Sir Robert's wife) was accused of kissing recruits, thus originating (apparently) the famous legend that her mother the Duchess had helped the family's efforts in this way.[42] Sir Robert got only a few men however, as he had started work too late.[43] Bounties only rose three guineas against Sir James in the course of the year.[44]

Rivalry in the country was bound to merge in general political rivalry and the hunt for places which went on at court. Lord Mountnorris felt himself slighted by not receiving command of the Wexford Militia and so he proposed to raise a regiment.[45] As it seemed at first that this might not be allowed, he begged his friend Sir George Yonge the Secretary at War to intercede with the King and ask in what way he had given offence.[46] Lord Breadalbane was related to Lord Lauderdale who was active in the Opposition. He asked if the government would be offended if he gave the majority of one of his regiments to a Maitland.[47]

When levies had been decided, the government could tip the scales between rivals or add to the connections of a contractor. Nugent, having got the backing of Lord Buckingham and Lord Grenville, tried for that of Dundas.[48] James Durham, who raised the Fifeshire Fencibles in 1794, wanted Dundas to intercede for him with the Lord Lieutenants of that county and of Midlothian and with the Lord Provost of Edinburgh.[49]

The government's decisions on recruiting questions were often taken with the aspect of patronage mainly in mind. The events connected with the raising of Seaforth's regiment, the 78th, are a good example. Seaforth seems to have had a strong and independent position in Ross-shire but to have led opinion in the county in approving the government's policy at the outset of the war.[50] Dundas got in touch with him through Alexander Brodie, a mutual friend - a "nabob" who represented Elgin, Banff and other Burghs in Parliament[51] - and offered to let him raise a Fencible regiment. Brodie persuaded Seaforth to offer and Dundas to accept a regiment of the line.[52] Seaforth's brother-in-law, Mackenzie of Balmaduthy, thought this an excellent opportunity for him to form a connection with the more honest and patriotic part of the administration[53] and hoped a British peerage would be the final reward[54] (as it was).

Seaforth wanted rather better terms than other recruiters were getting - in particular five guineas a man levy money instead of three[55] and some officers to be appointed who would not normally have been accepted (one was in the marines).[56] Lord Arnherst, the acting Commander in Chief, was recalcitrant. At his elbow however stood Captain Cochrane his A.D.C. - a tool of Dundas whose business it was to drop hints.[57] At one point, Dundas caused Lord Arnherst to be told "if he will not do his Jobbs, he cannot Jobb for his Lordship."[58] Finally the contentious business went through, though Brodie said the transfer of the marine officer was "a difficult job and will probably make a noise."[59] In June,

there were similar bargainings when the regiment was augmented. Brodie recorded a conversation in which Nepean the under-secretary, warned Dundas that the King would reject the proposed new Lieutenant Colonel as too junior in his present rank for promotion. Dundas said that the King was glad enough of the men, that for his part he would not advise Seaforth to accept unfavourable terms and that he was ready to bring the matter before the Cabinet.[60]

Everything has to be paid for. Brodie thought it prudent to give the regimental Agency to one of Dundas' proteges, Humphrey Donaldson.[61] This man acquired a good deal of business among the Scottish regiments and two of Dundas' proteges nearly went into partnership with him.[62] Seaforth was annoyed at the appointment[63] and to appease him Brodie gave up what was to have been his own reward - the regimental chaplaincy for a relation.[64]

It was the ministers who commonly took an interest in who was to raise troops. Pitt asked Sir James Sinclair to do so - the idea came as a complete surprise to him.[65] Dundas enquired of Simon Frazer if he could raise one of the Fencible regiments of late 1794. He at once set to work sounding the clan and produced a scheme and a more suitable man to command.[66] Even the first batch of Independent Companies in 1793 was divided for purposes of patronage between Dundas and the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.[67]

Ministerial interest continued into the later lives of the regiments. The rivalry of Hays and Gordons in Aberdeenshire has been alluded to. In 1795, all new regiments with numbers over 100 were reduced. This included Hay's (the 109th). A great fuss was made because the regiment had been raised under the patronage of the city of Aberdeen and the men were enlisted on condition of being discharged within the county.[68] There were meetings of protest.[69] In Parliament, the matter was aired by two stalwarts for the Opposition on military questions, Generals Fitzpatrick and Macleod.[70] From this uproar nothing of

course resulted.

Reductions of regiments continued, to remove all those above 90. Two exceptions were made - the 98th, under the patronage of the Duke of Argyle* and the 100th, the Gordons. In December 1796, Dundas wrote to Lord Huntly the Colonel of the latter, and said that the regiment had only been saved by urging that the sources on which it drew could not be tapped except by the family connection. It was therefore very necessary to make it more complete than it was. He could not allow it to have any recruits from the parochial levy.[71] Thus two regiments raised in the same area in competition with each other suffered very different fates. The political content of the recruiting system cannot be better illustrated.

It is unfortunately not easy to match these Scottish instances, with their wealth of detail, from English sources. But no-one reading the letters of the English officers to the various ministers can fail to notice that they breathe the same atmosphere. The endless bargaining, the rivalries and the tinge of favour and patronage will receive further illustration in this Chapter and the next.

(b) Old Regiments v. New Corps

The government was swayed a good deal in its recruiting policy by considerations of patronage but there were also theories about the proper composition of the recruiting force which had their influence. The choice lay between the old fighting regiments recruiting, as it were, in their spare time and specialist corps organized solely for recruiting (with which new regiments intended to fight may largely be classed). The case against the former was strong. The shortage of officers was, ~~as the preceeding pages show~~, one of the great

* Not Lord Breadalbane. (Fortescue IV Appendix A.) His was the 116th. See Dunn Pattison's history of the 91st (as it became).

handicaps of the service. Colin Campbell (raising a regiment) declared that subalterns were as difficult to get as privates (1794).[1] The Royal Dragoons was short of its full establishment of Cornets till 1796.[2] Regiments on service had not enough officers to go round. The Adjutant General promised the Duke of York in April 1793 that as many officers as possible would be spared from recruiting for the front.[3] The 29th, when being extensively recruited, was left in charge of the Lieutenant Colonel and the Adjutant alone.[4] Regiments at Hilsea sent out so many officers that too few were left to keep discipline. One proposed to use the Quartermaster, who was suitable for a commission, as a recruiting officer.[5] Another had to have its recruits conducted part of the way to Headquarters by a borrowed party of Dragoons.[6]

Regiments going abroad had to be told to leave fewer parties[7] and Fox the Inspector General of Recruiting was informed for instance that the 52nd in India could spare no more officers for recruiting without damaging its efficiency.[8] Regiments were naturally often reluctant to spare their best officers for recruiting. Gavin Kempt an Army Agent, already mentioned in the first Chapter, said that young, inexperienced officers were normally sent recruiting. They had no success, got their accounts in confusion, and ofter ruined themselves by extravagance.[9] Officers at home on leave from distant stations were also used.[10] They cannot have been too enthusiastic, and anyway were usually at home because broken in health.[11]

Even if the best officers were sent, there was often little chance of success. The officers of a regiment, collected haphazardly by purchase, need not have among them the amount of recruiting "influence" needed to supply the corps; had they been chosen on their merit as fighting men, the same would have applied. The "Scotch Brigade" was formed in September 1793 by the surviving officers of the force of that name in the Dutch service who had left it rather

than break their oath to King George in 1782. The British government had given them half-pay ever since. They were to raise three battalions of 420 rank and file each.[12] By the following June their respective strengths were 80, 94 and 268. They were then given better terms but though the third was complete in October, the others made little progress.[13] A re-organization into four battalions under a Colonel in Chief[14] did not help these first two and in April 1795 they were absorbed into the remainder.[15]

It was a grievance that officers from the half-pay were put into the brigade by the Commander in Chief when the "Scotch-Dutch" officers proved insufficiently numerous. All save one refused to help in recruiting.[16] This was the common experience of new regiments forced to employ more officers of this description than they wished: "no more half-pay officers, mind that!" said Mackenzie of Seaforth, offering his second battalion.[17] In 1793, the cavalry and then the infantry regiments endeavoured to augment themselves. The ambitious scheme of the latter to raise their strength from 600 to 1050 failed despite the incentive of promotion. Ordered on November 1st it was intended to take three months.[18] Not a single regiment completed on time.[19] The following June, thirty-one regiments were allowed to abandon the scheme and stay at an establishment of 600.[20] Fifteen more were established at 850[21] and six were given a year's clothing for than number.[22] Such was the recruiting performance of the regimental officer.

The alternative system was to abstract the officers skilled in recruiting, filling the gaps in regiments from the half-pay and "new entry." The authorities periodically invited officers to come forward (with their Colonel's recommendation and consent) and raise Independent Companies. These varied in size from 20 to 150: in the majority of cases, the officer was allowed to have two

subordinate officers and engage an appropriate number of NCOs. There were three "waves" of Independent Companies in the early years of the war - set going in January and February[23] 1793 and March[24] and October 1794.[25] Advertisements were put in the London Gazette[26] and their officers flooded the War Office with offers, often explaining their recruiting connections and past successes. Officers recruiting for a regiment would often ask to strike out on their own and sometimes caused trouble by trying to take over for themselves men they had collected for others.[27] New regiments tended to start as collections of officers of this kind. Lieutenant Heron for instance had been raising men in Cheshire for the 11th regiment;[28] Graham took him into the 90th to do the same thing in the same place.[29] In November 1793, some letters of service provided that officers for the regiments were to be taken mainly from the Independent Companies[30] (the first "wave" of which would then have been completed and disposed of). From February 1794 an increasing proportion of letters of service specified that officers likely to be useful in recruiting were to be chosen. This provision appears especially in the case of "territorial" regiments, where it was the understood thing anyway, but it was applied more widely than that.[31]

We must not lose sight of the shortage of officers. In September 1794, Agents were told that several new regiments had less than the full number and unless vacancies were filled within a month, or in incomplete regiments within a month of inspection, officers from the half-pay and Independent Companies would be put in, prior to foreign service.[32] It was an advantage of corps intended solely for recruiting that at a pinch they could do with fewer officers; the logical extreme here was reached in the Draftable Battalions which from 1795 supplanted the Independent Companies. J. H. Loft, who as a Captain organized the raising of Prince William's regiment, was given a Letter of Service in December 1794 to raise 4,000 men to be delivered in monthly quotas rising from

400 in January to 750 in May and then falling to 550 in both June and July when the levy was to be completed.[33] They were to go into old regiments. He had the normal complement of NCOs per 100 men, but no officers, although he later asked for, and got, an adjutant and quarter-master.[34] Major Wood in May 1795 undertook a hybrid corps, based as he said[35] on the analogy of the Fencibles in that the officers had only temporary rank although the men were destined for general service and in fact for drafting.[36] They were mainly (but not, it seems, wholly) foreigners. Captain Steele was authorized (February 1796) to raise 1,000 men for drafting, with 30 sergeants, 30 corporals, and 20 drummers. He was to have an acting adjutant, quarter-master and surgeon.[37] Several other corps on this pattern, interspersed with Independent Companies, were authorized in the ensuing years[38] and when the government undertook to raise men for the East India Company (1799) this was how they proposed to do it.[39] Many of these corps were intended primarily, however, to raise men in Ireland.

Now it soon appears that recruiting corps also had their disadvantages. Captain Shaw declared that older regiments could get men at a lower bounty and scarcely any would join "undefined" corps. The regiment was also helped by having an organization behind the recruiting officer and being able to offer him better financial terms and the prospect of employment when promoted. The writer ends by asking that he may raise his Independent Company for service in a particular regiment.[40] Glory and good repute were great assets to a regiment in recruiting; to join a corps that must be drafted was to buy a pig in a poke. The fear of Chatham Barracks "that receptacle of the sons of slaughter" where these corps were disposed of was a hated symbol of this uncertainty. Loft said five men could be got for corps not going there sooner than three for corps that were, and insisted on his men being inspected at Southampton or Plymouth.[41]

Worthy officers aspired, like Shaw, to finish up in a good regiment and

thus the Independent Companies were to some extent self-liquidating. Lieutenant Wilmot sold some men to Lord Charles Somerset because he had no-one to discipline them in Bristol while he went to South Wales where his connections were.[42] He then accepted a beating order from Lord Charles (which was later held to have voided his letter of service),[43] and enlisted men for another regiment. He had the chance of entering two regiments.[44] These deals were mostly with new corps. A common case however, was that of a Captain Campbell who secured leave at the outset to have his men inspected and absorbed by a regiment in Liverpool[45] (he prevailed on the 30th to take them, a month later when his Company was almost complete).[46] Avoiding the long march to Chatham was a strong motive in these cases; the officers usually went with the men.

The officers who remained recruiting tended to be those fit for nothing else. Graham was permitted to keep officers of this kind at their work if he could replace them from his second battalion for active service.[47] The reverse case he met with when Hill (the future Commander in Chief) was refused leave by his regiment (at first) to join the 90th as Major because he was too valuable an officer to be spared.[48] The regiments tended to release officers for recruiting that they were glad to be rid of. Thereafter, isolated from regimental life, they were absorbed into the recruiting service and its corrupt ways. Few men or bad men were the result of their labours.

The last Independent Companies were discontinued because of their lack of success.[49] So were most of the Draftable Battalions.[50] Wood's was stopped because his men were short and unfit,[51] Murray's because his conduct was irregular.[52] Loft was stopped in June 1796[53] - he had not finished a year after he should have done and one in ten of his men were rejected.[54] Many crimes are recorded against his agents; the spectacle of his depot at Louth was said to be responsible for the militia riots in that area later in 1796.[55] In a way, he

was a victim of persecution. Because of the curious composition of his corps, recorded on his beating orders, they were thought forgeries.[56] A regiment had to be ordered to leave his parties alone - while they behaved.[57]

Hostility to professionalized recruiting existed in very high quarters. The King in January 1793 displayed a tentative but decided objection to Independent Companies. Dundas thought it prudent to restrict their number and leave room for an augmentation of the old regiments as well. Lewis said the experience of the previous war suggested that Independent Companies could raise thrice the number of men as the old regiments in a quarter of the time. Sir George Yonge was sorry that the King would not leave it to the Cabinet. His opposition appeared to be due to the influence of certain Colonels of old regiments - perhaps the Duke of York himself - who had objected on a similar occasion in 1790.[58] We shall encounter further instances of the hostility of the military caste to the successful recruiter who won swift promotion by his efforts.

The case for recruiting through the old regiments was much strengthened by the catastrophes of 1795. The Army in Holland had lost heavily during the retreat: the strength of the 12th Foot fell from 815 to 425.[59] The drain of the West Indies reached its peak and remained heavy: in 1796-8 the 13th Huzzars lost 335[60] and the 69th 897[61] - almost their entire strengths. Such regiments were sent home to be re-raised, any stray privates being left behind. (This process was made easier by improved relations with the U.S.A. after 1795; when they were bad, Lord Arnherst thought it necessary to send men out to the officers.)[62] Similarly, in order to keep old regiments in the field, new ones were drafted leaving the officers and NCOs to re-raise from scratch.[63] Thus there was a higher ratio of officers to men and plenty of formations with nothing to do but recruit.

In this fluid situation, the new Commander in Chief set to work. Some

forty new foot regiments were reduced, leaving about a hundred (slowly brought down to ninety).[64] Lord Westmoreland emerges as their defender: he thought that re-raising them would succeed and recruiting by old regiments fail.[65] In the autumn, the remaining regiments were given a standard establishment of 10 companies of 100 rank and file. All regiments were to have five Field Officers instead of three and twenty-one Lieutenants instead of ten. Those in the West Indies were also to have two extra Captains. But the cardinal reform was that all the regiments abroad were to have two Recruiting Companies;[66] after at first deciding otherwise,[67] the authorities sanctioned the same for regiments at home.[68] These Companies each comprised a Captain, two Lieutenants, five Sergeants, five Corporals and four Drummers[69] but no privates.[70] The cavalry regiments each had a recruiting troup of a Captain, Lieutenant, Cornet, Quarter-master, four sergeants, four corporals and a trumpeter.[71] These arrangements were varied to suit circumstances.

In November 1797, regiments under six hundred strong were established at that figure but retained the extra officers[72] - at least till vacancies occurred naturally.[73] Some recruiting companies were abolished:[74] "skeleton" regiments, of necessity devoted solely to recruiting, did not need them. Apart from that, the idea was that each regiment should have an established number of persons recruiting. Fox saw to it that the Troops and Companies of regiments abroad were kept up to strength;[75] and, for instance, the 2nd Dragoons was told (in 1795 but admittedly before the new arrangement) to reduce its recruiting personnel from some fifty officers and men to under twenty.[76]

Better results should have followed from such system! Some regiments made modest progress: the 14th Huzzars (it was easier for cavalry) raised 450 men in 1797-8.[77] But in general the years 1795-9 were poor for recruiting. An attempt has been made in the first chapter to explain why. Good order also

tended to diminish the chances of success.*

The government was thus faced with a dilemma in the choice of method and inclined either way as transitory circumstances dictated. Though recruiting corps predominated in 1793-5 and regimental recruiting in 1795-9, yet the system of augmentation was persisted with in the earlier years in such regiments as would co-operate and some draftable corps and new regiments were raised in the later years. The latter if not raised only to be drafted, had some of the attractiveness of the old regiment for the good officer and man, and so had a better chance than the former. Various accidents caused them to be offered. Macleod of Colbecks, who raised Fencibles in 1798, had offered in 1794, but had left it too late; the desired quantity had been contracted for.[78] Seaforth offered a further battalion in 1798 (which was not accepted) because a great many lads in Lewis who had been too young in 1793 were now fit to serve.[79]

Only one observable and perhaps conscious trend in government policy may be noted, namely the tendency to "nationalize" the recruiting service in wartime. The new corps as we shall see+ were under closer government control than the regiments and their parties. The period when the latter tended to grow in importance was the period when they too were being subjected to more central control. Thus the way was being paved for the centralized recruiting service which was tried in 1807 and towards which Kempt pointed as the solution to the problem in a memorandum which we shall consider in the next section.

(c) The Counties and Towns and The Line

Apart from altering the internal mechnaisms of the recruiting service, the government could also strive to make it more rational and efficient by giving each unit a territory in which to operate. The rivalry, waste of effort by

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* C.f. p. 133-4

+ P. 131

duplication, and difficulty of supervision resulting from everyone operating everywhere at once can well be imagined and will be fully analysed in a later chapter. Could a neat geographical division be substituted?

In the case of the regiments of the line, an order of 1782 had allotted each one to a county, with instructions to cultivate ties with it and so make it a reservoir of men.[1] The official Recruiting Instructions of 1796 required regiments to recruit each in its own county and so acquire "a local interest that may materially assist them in obtaining Men." However, they were also allowed to send parties to any of the manufacturing towns of England and Wales and to all parts of Scotland and Ireland.[2] Cavalry regiments and some foot regiments had no such connections and very few of the new regiments had them.

There was in practice a certain effort to maintain local connections but it did not amount to very much. For instance the 22nd (Cheshire) Regiment had five parties in their county in November 1796 and only one outside. In July 1797, there were three in the county and seven outside, ranging from Glasgow to Norwich and Bristol. That situation continued more or less in 1798-9.[3] The 49th (Hertfordshire) regiment had one or two, occasionally four parties in the county in the period July 1796 - December 1797 but they had other parties in Scotland, the West Riding and Gloucestershire or South Wales for most of that time.[4] The 13th (Somersetshires) had three parties in the county on an average from May 1796 to March 1797. Four more were permanently in Shrewsbury, Bristol, Ireland and Scotland respectively. Devizes, Leicester, Newbury and Nottingham were also visited.[5]

As for the men received by the different regiments, the 14th (Bedfordshires) enlisted 55 men from its county in one period and 28 from adjoining counties out of a total of 633.[6] The 53rd (Shropshires) out of a body of just over 1,000 recruits enlisted in 1795-9 had 38 from its own and 97 from adjoining counties.[7]

Shropshire figures in an interesting episode in January 1795 when Colonel Williams' new regiment had to be drafted. General Cuyler who had inspected it asked for the men to be put into his own regiment, the 69th. This already had many Shropshire men in it and he was well known in the county, having raised the 86th and recruited for the 55th[8] there. He thought the men would like his regiment and Williams said the recruiting service would benefit.[9] This plan was agreed to and Cuyler said that the men were content and the effect on county opinion should be good - it had not been known there that the regiment was being drafted.[10] The regiment raised by Sheffield was drafted into the 65th which was in theory attached to the North Riding.[11] It was apparently the policy of the government to draft what should be Scottish regiments into other Scottish regiments.[12]

New regiments quite often had some county designation but we have seen how little that meant for the Perthshire Volunteers.[13] The gentry of Inverness-shire, in the course of their meetings to organize the defence of the county in 1794, voted their support for the regiment to be raised by Simon Frazer, which took the name of the county.[14] But no action appears to have followed and the slight connection is to be explained by the fact of a Frazer being the Sheriff. Such county connections as existed were wholly a matter of the connections of individual officers, such as Cuyler's in Shropshire. There was no link with any local organization. The gentlemen of Shropshire wished in 1794 to use part of their subscription for defence to find recruits for the 53rd, the county regiment.[15] The regiment did nothing whatever to use the money, so in March 1795, it was applied to the Yeomanry instead.[16] Williams' regiment does not come into the picture.

The government was pleased by Shropshire's initiative and suggested to some other counties - such as Cheshire[17] and Essex[18] - with money to spare that

they should help their county regiments: Dundas observed in writing to the Lord Lieutenant of Cheshire that recruiting for the old regiments had been sadly hit by the onset of new corps. Nothing was done on these lines. The Duke of Richmond said that it was not desirable to propose any such scheme in Sussex because it would lead to a debate on whether to raise troops for foreign or for domestic service. This would end as an argument on the justice of the war.[19]

To build up a sound local connection it is necessary to have a permanent depot in the area. This was precisely what all the regiments of those days lacked completely. The ultimate development of such an institution was associated with the forming of the troops of the line into regiments of two battalions (one always to be in the home county) and their association with the local forces of the county, which were further battalions of the regiment. It is interesting to note the barrier in the way of having regiments of two battalions. There were a few such - the 25th and the 84th for example. Dundas in 1794 suggested dividing all the old regiments into two battalions, each of which was to recomplete.[20] He was told that in both the two previous wars some additional battalions had been added to existing regiments and on their reduction the officers in both battalions were considered as one body for the purpose of deciding which of them, by the rule of juniority, were to go on half-pay. To universalize second battalions would thus spread insecurity throught the service. Officers in an old regiment would find themselves retired through the intrusion of someone senior to themselves into the second battalion, with which there might be no contact or exchange of information.[21] The rules governing seniority would have to be changed - a difficult and unpopular business.

There was in any case no idea as yet of using linked battalions as a way of promoting the county connection. The idea of a connection between regiments of the line and the appropriate county regiments of militia was however to be

broached by the Commander in Chief during the next war[22] and was already in the air. The Worcestershire militia for instance endeavoured to copy the uniform of the regiment of the line allotted to that county.[23] Here however we approach the rather different subject of recruiting the line from the militia, which must be considered separately.

One more or less isolated attempt was made to expedite the recruiting of certain new regiments by attaching them to towns - an experiment already tried in the previous war. In the summer of 1794, Pitt was disappointed at the progress of the new regiments. Noticing that a good many towns were offering to help in the raising of regiments by certain officers recommended by themselves, he suggested that these offers be accepted on the understanding that the regiments would then be drafted to fill the old ones, which were falling behind in the race for men.[24] A circular was sent out to the officers who had been put forward in this way, asking if they were willing to proceed on that basis.[25] One or two town regiments had already been sanctioned and others now followed. In all sixteen were formed in 1794-5 and there were one or two odd ones later.* Almost all were regiments of the line, one or two such as Kerr's (Northampton - 1794) and Rann's (Birmingham - 1799) were Fencibles.

The initiation of these regiments was usually by way of a petition by a number of substantial townsmen naming an officer and offering to countenance him in making a levy. The petition in support of Rann had 109 signatures including Matthew Boulton and was addressed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.[26] A petition from Manchester in 1798 put forward de l'Hoste (who had already raised one regiment for the town) and noted that Manchester had now contributed three regiments during the war.[27] Corporate towns could make their offers in more

* By Aberdeen, Birmingham, Bristol, Chester, Coventry, Exeter, Glasgow, Jedburgh and others, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Northampton, Norwich, Sheffield, Stamford, Wakefield. See (esp.) WO 4/152, 154, Index, "Letters of Service." But see also p. 53

style: at Northampton it was the Mayor who convened the necessary meetings and sent the offer on behalf of the inhabitants.[28] At Birmingham in 1794, two offers were made and the two officers each put an address to their backers in the newspapers, with the text of the official letter of acceptance and a personal pledge of their best endeavours.[29]

The amount of help given by the townsmen varied and is difficult to assess. At Northampton, a committee was set up by the Mayor to help but[30] it was Dr. Kerr the father of the Commandant (who was absent on active service) who raised the men as noted above.[31] In Sheffield, the offer of the regiment was made by the partisans of Lord Fitzwilliam at the time of his joining the ministry "their views being decidedly and avowedly to strengthen the government, which measure is notoriously known to have had the happiest effect."[32] There was an imposing procession through the town to start things off. The regimental colours were carried in front. The Cutlers' Company, the Town Collector and Trustees, the members of the Vestries and the gentlemen of the town and neighbourhood were escorted by the town's Volunteer Corps and the local Yeomanry commanded by Lord Fitzwilliam. With such support, no-one dared to molest the recruiting parties. But D. J. Cameron, the commandant, said the town's zeal was unique in the West Riding.[33]

Elsewhere, the manifesto of the town was often not followed up. The point of the proceedure for the officer who was to raise the regiment was probably to impress the government with the influence that he had behind him and so secure their favour. J. E. Urquhart who raised the Essex Fencibles in 1794-5 was married to the daughter of a burgess of Harwich who was alleged to have turned the scale at the parliamentary election of 1784. He was also a protege of Ferguson of Pitforn, Member (in the Gordon interest) for Aberdeenshire.[34] He secured the backing for his offer of the towns of Harwich, Maldon and Banff.[35]

In the last case, his brother thanked the Corporation for their support but nothing was ever done by them to help raise men.[36]

Political and extraneous considerations are very clearly seen when Hay tried to get the support of the City of Aberdeen for his regiment. His rivals the Gordons, naturally took action to stop this and Professor Copland of Marischall College was sent to interview the Provost. It then appeared that Hay had been distributing bribes and was trying to get a letter written to the Member for Aberdeen and other Burghs obliging him to use all his influence in Hay's favour. The Provost promised his good offices in stopping this and succeeded in getting the letter watered down to a mere introduction.[37]

Where there was a Corporation, there was at least a body that could take action to help. Town regiments often came from unincorporated places and the string of petitioners were unorganized. There is no record of committees. The existence of two Birmingham regiments in 1794 points to confusion, and Matthew Lewis the Deputy Secretary at War said they would be hard put to it in each case to prove any real connection with the town.[38]

It was when the regiments came to be drafted that the commandants tried to capitalise their position as protégés of a town. We have seen how officers did not care to raise corps that were going to be drafted. Lewis in the letter just cited, doubted if respectable gentlemen would raise troops on such terms but the town regiments mentioned, being mere haphazard collections of men, would not object.[38] It seems possible that the government's idea was to use the patronage of the town to counter the unpopularity which a corps known to be raised for drafting would have among officers and men. The commandants however, although told of the intention to draft in advance, took no heed and fought against fate. It is clear too that Lewis was right in predicting that the prospect of drafting would not be mentioned to the men.[39]

D. J. Cameron declared that if the Sheffield regiment were drafted there would be an uproar in the town and Lord Fitzwilliam's influence there would be ruined.[40] Another Cameron, raising a regiment for Wakefield, said that he could not raise an augmentation if his men were drafted.[41] Two regiments, the 105th (Leeds) and the 113th (Birmingham) mutinied at Cork in September 1795 when the order to draft was finally given. They had to be surrounded and forcibly disarmed.[42] A number of the 113th sent in a petition through Mr. Villers, a Birmingham magistrate very active against recruiting abuses. They said that advertisements had promised them a return to civil life after the war. Now they were going into old regiments, never dismissed from service. They had been promised in the handbills that they would not be drafted. Their officers, knowing this, had taken care to get them out of the country quickly. Villers confirmed the circumstances of their enlisting.[44]

The work of the town regiments, honest or otherwise, cannot be said to have advanced the principle of localization. If the towns were small they could not supply a regiment from their own population. If they were large, they were already full of parties from so many regiments that a town regiment only added to the confusion. Anyway, even the regiments sponsored by large towns did not restrict their efforts to them. The Wakefield regiment had parties at ten other places in the West Riding and also at Chesterfield, Uttoxeter, Manchester, Glasgow, Newcastle and Retford.[45] The 113th (Birmingham) operated at Shepton Mallet, Wells, Walsall and Shrewsbury and had a contract with a crimp in Liverpool.[46] Colonel Blair of the Liverpool regiment quarrelled violently with the Corporation of Glasgow over his recruiting activity there.[47] The Sheffield regiment had parties in Lancashire.[48]

The town regiments with a few exceptions were thus gilded versions of the draftable corps already discussed. They were a haven of the professional

recruiters who were often in close alliance. MacDonell of the 113th and Cameron of the Wakefield had both come from one of the regiments formed from the officers of the Independent Companies. The former handed over to the latter a party he had established for their former regiment at Lichfield.[49] The same Birmingham regiment provided a Lieutenancy for the son of de l'Hoste of the Manchester - a boy not yet fit for service.[50] Colonel Rann's officers for the Birmingham Fencibles of 1799 were poorly thought of. One had been a footman.[51]

If these corps made any lasting contribution, it was towards an increased professionalism in the recruiting service as noticed at the end of the last section. Gavin Kempt was the Agent of the 113th.[52] He produced a memorandum suggesting that in each sizeable town there should be a recruiting depot in charge of an officer permanently stationed there and not attached to any regiment. With the countenance and help of the townspeople, he should raise men, give them a little training and send them to join a regiment - preferably the county one.[53] Thus the ideas of a depot and of county connections were growing up side by side; the principles were moulded by the very imperfect attempts at the practice of them.

(d) County Recruiting for Home Defence

The great hindrance to the localization of any regiment's recruiting lay however, as we have seen, in the difficulty of combining within a regiment enough officers possessing recruiting influence in the same area. It was hard enough to scrape recruiting influence together on any basis.

Here was a case where it was easier to achieve results in forces for home service. Gentlemen willing to serve as officers at home only were thicker on the ground. In England the militia, officered by the county gentry, were a nucleus. So the plan of 1794 proposed to raise Fencible Cavalry on a county basis and also to augment the militia by voluntary enlistment. The initial

cost of bounties and horses was to be met by county subscriptions.[1] Forces of this type were raised to the extent noted in the first chapter, and there were also some corps of Fencible Infantry, mostly from Scotland.

The political struggles in the counties over this measure are also described in chapter one. There were some crises which had no real connection with politics. Northumberland and Carnarvon both desired forces that helped the defence of the county in particular. The latter county eventually augmented its militia but many would have preferred sailors[2] and the committee was accused of exceeding its powers.[3] There had been a slow start anyway because the county was poor and the Lord Lieutenant apologised for giving only £100.[4] Northumberland would have preferred something akin to Volunteers but there was a great fear of arming a large body of the people unless they were sent out of the county. The gentry there were mostly absentees and an insurrection of the Methodists and dissenters who ~~thus~~ might come to control the force was to be feared.[5] After discussing various alternatives, the county was finally brought to augment its militia.[6]

Sometimes unsuitable schemes were suggested. The Duke of Richmond proposed that the Sussex Militia be augmented with corps of artillery and cavalry. This was because the county was thinly populated and could only provide a few men, who should be used to the best advantage.[7] The government objected that every militia corps would at once try and diversify itself in this way. Sussex might raise its contingent only as Fencibles but there would be an understanding that the detachments would always serve with the militia.[8] Angus decided to raise Fencible Cavalry, but hearing that enough of these had been offered they switched to Volunteers. Then it appeared that the government would have preferred Fencibles after all, so Fencible Infantry were finally raised.[9] David Scott the County Member took the initiative and was very worried at the effect of the

government's indecision.[10] He held his seat very precariously for Dundas and doubtless feared he would become unpopular. He was ousted at the next election, but that was two years afterwards.[11]

The great point was to get the gentry to come forward as officers and on the whole this was done. Worcester is an example of an exception. No-one there was willing to raise additional companies of militia and so the augmentation had to be made (more slowly) by adding to existing companies.[12] As a rule, though, there were men to step forward and raise the men, while at the same time giving a lead in raising the money. The Duke of Atholl asked Moray of Abercairney to raise Fencible Cavalry in Perthshire. If he stepped forward, the vital support of the active gentry would easily be secured. In such troubled times, those who usually "live in ease, affluence and I might almost add comparative indolence" should exert themselves.[13] In Cambridgeshire, the Grand Jury at the assizes passed a resolution calling for the raising of Cavalry. Its foreman was General J. W. Adeane and it was his son who took command of the corps.[14]

Rivalries and sinister interests were of course not absent. A Fencible Corps raised in Orkney was dissolved in 1796 for inefficiency. In 1798, its unmarried members offered to form a new corps under the Sheriff, their former Adjutant.[15] Sir Ralph Abercromby the Commander in Chief in North Britain demurred because any corps raised there would be an "island job."[16] In Perthshire, Abercairney was challenged for the command by Belsches of Belsches who solicited support by circular. Abercairney's friends would not stoop to canvassing but they put it about that he was standing, which had its effect.[17] In Essex, both cavalry and extra militia were raised. Colonel Burgoyne of the cavalry claimed the final surplus of the subscription for an augmentation, and on behalf of Pitt, George Rose wrote a letter in support of the claim. The

partisans of Colonel Strutt of the militia threatened to oppose it very forcibly in the committee. Olmius, the leader of the whole Essex movement, smoothed things over by referring back to the government; he accused Rose of enmity towards himself.[18] In Dumfries, the government tried to push a gentleman into the Majority of the Cavalry against the wishes of the Lord Lieutenant because he had married the heiress of Lord Home.[19]

The respective spheres of the Commanding Officers and the committees for managing the county subscriptions were not always properly defined. In Ayrshire, the meeting to inaugurate the scheme and the committee set up by it had between them decided to raise two troops of cavalry and had nominated two gentlemen to command them and another to be a Lieutenant. Andrew Dunlop, one of the troop-commanders was nominated to command the corps.[20] On his being appointed he proceeded to nominate the proposed Lieutenant to the command of the other troop instead of the person chosen by the committee. The civilians were considerably annoyed.[21] In Berwickshire, Sir Alexander Don wrote to say that the county had decided to raise cavalry, leaving the choice of officers to the government, and then proceeded to offer himself to command, as the man whom the county wanted.[22] On the whole, the initiative and the work were wisely left to the commandants. Sir William Dick took the lead in pressing for an augmentation of the Midlothian Fencibles and it was stated that the levy of the existing two troops was entirely his work, as agent for the committee.[23]

On the financial side, the committees naturally intervened much more. In Perthshire, the committee said that enough money had been raised for three troops. They fixed a maximum bounty for men of ten guineas and a maximum price for horses of £25. An account of £1,000 was opened for Abercairney at a local bank.[24] Expenses proved greater than had been expected. Abercairney mentioned to the committee the expense of keeping up the recruiting parties, the

high bounties (in his own troop eight guineas for most of the men and more for the rest) and the need to give one or two guineas to the bringers of recruits instead of a half.[25] The committee were not satisfied. In 1796, a form of account was suggested which might cause them to issue more money. It included the items noted above and such things as loss by desertion, legal charges, and certain maintenance charges not met by the government.[26] In May 1797 (three years after the first levy and two after the augmentation) the committee had £3,660:15: 5 in its hands. The officers claimed £4,000. They had originally been promised £2,524:10: -.[27] A compromise was proposed but some accounts were not settled in 1801.[28]

In Cambridgeshire, the Adjutant of the militia was luckier in his calculations for he expected to raise men at six guineas[29] and they cost just over £7.[30] It was possible as a result to raise two troops of cavalry instead of one, as well as the militia augmentation.[31] The accounts for the cavalry were presented in July, only four months after the levy had started. There was then a hiatus because the committee was not very numerously attended and thought themselves not competent to depart from a resolution of a large county meeting by passing the accounts. The departure involved was that the county had sanctioned the spending of £1,500, whereas the accounts came to £1,182:13: 8.[32]

The amount of help, financial or otherwise, which the officers received from the county fluctuated. Burgoyne in Essex told his friends not to subscribe for his proposed cavalry corps but to give their money to the official county project of augmenting the militia. As a reward, he was allowed to call his corps by the name of the county.[33] We have seen what reception he met with in asking for something more substantial. In Cambridgeshire, the cavalry received every help from the militia, being given a number of men to start the recruiting.[34] Of 55 men in Abercairney's troop, 9 were supplied by himself, 15 by his officers

and 12 by various civilians (who would appear to be well-wishers in the county.)[35] A problem presented to the militia with the voluntary augmentations was how to replace casualties[36] - the county funds would not stretch to it and the government, which looked after the Fencibles in this respect, did not feel responsible for recruiting the militia.

That it was upon the gentlemen of the county coming forward as officers that all depended is vividly shown when there was a general augmentation of the Fencible Cavalry in 1795. This was paid for by allowances of levy money by the government. The motive power behind it is shown on a letter of the commandant of the Roxburgh Cavalry. He found some influential gentlemen of the county desirous of joining and so offered an augmentation.[37] In Ayrshire a shortage of persons with military experience and good local connections held up the decision to augment.[38]

From Dumfries came a plea to appoint the officers quickly so that they could help at once with the recruiting.[39] The government's plan envisaged the augmentation of the existing troops first before new ones were added.[40] This meant, as the commandant of the Hampshire Cavalry complained, that new officers could not be appointed till a late stage in the levy.[41] Lord Ancram insisted that the order of the augmentation be reversed.[42] Berwickshire demanded the same terms.[43] In Fife, the prospective officers were fortunately willing to join in the recruiting before they could be appointed.[44]

Although the forces raised by the counties in the way described were small, they were significant. The Fencible Cavalry were a distinct institution in themselves, a "horse militia" with a special place in the government's strategy. The militia augmentation could make an important difference in the force supplied by certain places. It was as large as the quota in small counties like Anglesea and the Isle of Wight, half the quota in Wiltshire and Buckinghamshire.[45] The effort of Lancashire was particularly noteworthy. This county's

militia regiment of 1,000 men was far too small a tax on her increasing population.[46] In the autumn of 1794, it was decided to raise a Fencible Infantry regiment of equal strength under the command of Lord Grey de Wilton.[47] The county bore the whole initial expense except for the supply of arms.[48] That this was regarded as an extra militia regiment is shown by the fact that it alone was given family allowances from the government like the militia when it went to serve in Ireland.[49]

These county levies nevertheless had no very immediate sequel. In 1796, compulsory levies were imposed which took up most of the counties' attention. Lord Buckingham made a stand for voluntary recruiting. He discussed the matter with various militia officers who concluded that to augment the militia by compulsion was impossible, while the use of the ballot was dangerous in any case because dangerous and disaffected elements would be brought under arms.[50] He therefore offered to raise by voluntary enlistment the whole quota assigned to Buckinghamshire in the militia augmentation. After a great deal of shilly-shallying, by which he was justifiably incensed, the government came to the conclusion that he might not do so, the Act of 1794 having expired, which allowed such levies.[51]

County recruiting was destined in the immediate future to take place within the framework of compulsory levies and to supply the regular army for the most part indirectly through enlistment from the militia. The voluntary effort of 1794-5 had nevertheless kept things moving in the counties at a critical point and was not without its effect on the method of raising the militia as will be told in due course.[52]

CHAPTER III : FINANCE AND INCENTIVES

(a) Bargains with the Government

The actions of the govern-ment cannot be entirely understood - still less those of anyone else - without an investigation of the appallingly difficult subject of recruiti ng finance. Promotion (including coming on to full pay) was the real incentive and reward of the officer.* The "levy money" issued to him was mean t only to pay his expenses - a point made especially clear in a letter telling the King's Dragoons that of the £5 a man paid by the government, the recruit was to receive 58/- and the officer 32/- for recruits deserting before inspection and so certified by the commanding officer1 (10/- was the customary expense of the party per enlistment). What happened if there were fewer deserters than expected is another matter, but the intention is plain.

The Independent Compan ies were raised for promotion. In January 1793 Lieutenants and half pay Captains had to produce fifty rank and file for a "step" or full-pay.[2] In March 1794 Captains were asked to raise 150 (some later ones 100) for a step and Leiutenants fifty.[3] In October 1794, the same demands were made and some Majors also raised 100 for promotion.[4] A few Ensigns raised 20 men for step at various times;[5] sundry offers were received to raise men for a chaplaincy,[6] a post on the Staff[7] in India and so on.

Old regiments were augmented in a similar way. In February 1793, Dragoons regiments were augmented by three troops on a plan decided at a meeting of Colonels.[8] The Adjutant General wrote to his own regiment to know which subalterns would undertake the levy.[9] In April, various augmentations of the Foot Guards were consolidated into a plan to raise the company strength to 100 rank and file and add four companies to the first and two to each of the other two regiments.[10] In November came a general plan for the infantry, the

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* See page 35

invention of General Cunninghame.[11] By this the strength but not the number of the companies was increased (from 60 to 100) but an extra Lieutenant-Colonelcy and Majority were created in each regiment. The existing Major was supposed to succeed to the former and the two eldest Captains to be promoted, vacating two companies.[12] * (This plan was later extended to the cavalry when they were willing to adopt it.)[13] Each vacant troop or company meant promotion for a Lieutenant and an Ensign (o r Cornet) and vacancies for two Ensigns (or Cornets) entering the army.

The new regiments were raised on the same principle, by contracts between the raiser, and his officers, as we shall see. (It should be noted that Rank in a Fencible regiment like this did not carry the right to half pay and was proportionately less valuable). The letters of service of the Town regiments of 1794 mentioned that officers were to be assigned quotas and they are specified as 100 for Field rank, 50 for a Company and 20 for a Lieutenancy.[14] The Commandant of a new regi ment expected, like his officers, to be recompensed by his rank, and many and bitter were the disputes which this aroused.

Such was the reward; to achieve it the officers must spend much money, and as the demand and so the price of men rose they were permitted an increasing supply of it from various sources. These were mostly closely connected with the systems of promotion outlined above. When an officer was promoted as a result of raising men, the commission he vacated commonly reverted to the government, which sold it to recoup itself for the levy.[15] As the war progressed, officers were increasingly allowed to receive part of the price, not only of their own commission but of the other commissions vacated in

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* See Fortescue IV 211

consequence of each promotion. Captains raising for a step in March 1794 received £1100 from the various officers thus promoted in succession.[16] Conversely, officers promoted as a result of recruiting might be called on to pay part of the price of their new commission to the recruiting fund. In this way officers with cap ital and officers with recruiting experience could form a part-nership. This was the system of the Guards' augmentation of 1793.[17] and the formal of Cunningham's plan. In the latter, the regimental fund received £4650 from the offi cers involved.[18] In new regiments, the bargains between the raiser and his of ficers would similarly include money as well as men as convenience dictated.

As a rule the undertakers of levies (including Independent Companies) were permitted to choose their own officers but, sometimes letters of service forbade them to receive money (as opposed to men) for the appointments[19] and usually limited their choice. At first, officers usually had to be taken from the half pay of the rank they were to hold.[20] As this source dried up[21] or when undertakers were in difficulties, they were all owed to sell certain stated commissions to officers of the rank below - which was more lucrative.[22] Field Officers were sometimes increased in a regiment so that the new posts could be sold.[23] The undertaker usually had the patronage of Ensigncies and the regimental staff, where questions of seniority did not arise.[24] In many Fencible and Draftable Battalions he was allowed to "recommend" the promotion of an officer or officers who had no ostensible connection with his regiment.[25] This perhaps was rather a reward than compensation for expense.

The direct issue of levy money was varied in its amount according to the other resources allowed to the officer, so as to keep the various undertakers

at the same determined rate or rates. In January 1793 the issue was three or five guineas a man varying inversely with the amount of patronage and directly with the size of the levy.[26] The Independent Companies of March 1794 were mostly at five to seven guineas on the same basis,[27] and the cavalry augmentation was charging eight by the end of 1793.[28] But Cunninghame's plan marked a decisive change. Added to levy money at five guineas for the 450 men, the payments by officers gave a total of £6,900 or £15 a head.[29] To this rate and more, other corps gradually came to approximate £15 levy money (ten guineas for Fencibles) was almost a standard issue by 1795 but fluctuations (plus the fact that although intended to cover all expenses, they were the same as the maxima payable to recruits) show these figures were not the whole story. An officer was told in August 1795 that only ten guineas was allowed when the undertaker named the officers.[30] On the other hand the Draftable Battalions got 25 guineas and Loft was specifically told that five of this way in lieu of appointing officers.[31] (Grey considered that bounties actually paid had reached 25 guineas by the end of 1794.)[32] Lastly it must be noted that undertakers received £1.5/- a man to provide slop clothing and Dr. Kerr (for instance) hoped to recoup his losses by having the payment for his regiments' full clothing antedated.[33]

The last case brings us to some devices used to strengthen the credit of the recruiting officer and protect him against loss. The subject is conventiatly introduced by the request of four Scottish Colonels of new regiments that their off-reckonings and assignments (payments for clothing and so forth) should be paid quickly, as the manufacturers in their region gave only short credits of three or four months.[34] Levy money was usually advanced from time to time as the Agents of the undertakers requested it. In the case of augmentations under

Cunninghame's plan, the government advanced money to the regiment up to the total of the proposed recruiting fund and collected the money from the officers when the levy had finished and the promotions taken place.[35] The commissioning of officers normally took place after the inspection of new corps, but the dates of the commissions (from which pay began) were sometimes made the same as the letter of service.[36] This was mainly to promote the supply of subalterns to the new regiments.[37]

The officers' best safeguard against financial loss was "intermediate inspection". This first comes to the fore in connection with the augmentation of November 1793. Regiments were told that recruits could be provisionally approved by a Field Officer of the regiment or by the commandant of Chatham if it was abroad. The full bounty would be paid for men who deserted after this.[38] The men had still to be finally approved and those rejected or deserting after intermediate approval could not be counted in the number required for the promotions,[39] as the 29th found to its cost.[40] A concession on these lines was greatly sought after. Some Draftable Battalions[41] and every few Independent Companies[42] had the privilege of having their men "finally" inspected as they were raised, without waiting for the completion.

When the Permanent Superintending Field Officers got to work* the system could be more generally adopted. In October 1796, it was ordered that they should intermediately approve all recruits raised for general service and certify that they had received two guineas in cash and one in necessaries towards their bounty. This sum was paid for deserters, together with subsistence from attestation to desertion if Fox (who suggested the scheme) thought there had been no delay in sending them for final approval.[43] In 1799 the Fencibles were ordered to have all their men inspected by the Superintending Field Officers unless they were less than thirty miles from Headquarters. In that case full statistics were to

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* See page 130-131

be sent to the nearest such Officer.[44] Thus the system was a powerful aid to centralization. Men rejected as unfit normally received pay from the date of their attestation. A final concession was the inspection of certain regiments (Graham's for instance)[45] intended to be 1000 strong when they reached 600. This was a combination of most of the advantages referred to above, besides being a great aid to discipline.

Such were the means at the government's disposal to encourage or indemnify the recruiting officer. What considerations guided them in the use of those means? Generally speaking, whenever a particular class of recruiter was seen to be less successful than oth ers he was given better terms. There was a sort of handicap system. The old regiments found themselves, for reasons which we have explained, at a bad disadvantage in the early years of the war. In September 1793, the 77th was saying that higher bounties were the only cure.[46] The augmentation that November, with its great increase in bounty, was in effect the answer to this plea. The Scotch Brigade, which for this purpose counts as an old regiment, was stated to have been given this same rate in levy money because its officers showed themselves bad at recruiting. The Independent Companies meanwhile were beginning to suffer from the competition of new regiments, and it was proposed to grant these who asked for it an increase of bounty to five guineas.[48] This was done in October 1793[49] A more signal mark of favour at the same time was the formation of several regiments to be officered by those lately employed in these Companies. By the sale of certain commissions to officers not in this category, they were to have le vy money at the new £15 rate.[50]

We have mentioned that a cause the army had much at heart was the restriction of the power of richer officers to break the order of succession and get ahead of those senior but poorer. The insistence on the employment of half-pay officers was a consequence of this feeling. In October 1793, half-pay Captains

raising independent companie s were all given seven guineas bounty money instead of five. From the following year, officers were commonly not allowed to recruit for promotion unless they had a certain degree of seniority. In the Town regiment the officers raising for the rank of Captain and above had to be of three, sometimes four, years standing in their then rank. If they were of six years' standing they got eighteen guineas levy money; if less, twelve.[51] The officers who undertook the Independent Companies of October 1794 were mostly eighteen guinea men[52] and othe rs who were eligible were put up to this figure.[53] Others protested when they were not. Lieutenant Antrobus (twelve years' standing) had finished raising his quota at eight guineas when the new order came in.[54] Colonel Podmore wanted as Lieu tenant Colonel of his regiment an officer who was already one by brevet. He was to have eighteen guineas if he had previously been a Major for six years.[55]

Finally it may be noted that a longer time was allowed for the levies of meritorious cases. Three months was almost always the time for a levy of whatever size, but the Scotch Bri gade had no time limit[56] and Independent Companies were occasionally given more time.

The new regiments, with the exceptions noted, got the least sympathy. As a class they were strong in territorial connections, rich civilians and organization and needed it less. Eventually the help given to everyone else caused even them to feel the pinch and this was especially so when they were drafted and had to be re-raised from scratch. They were usually offered an augmentation on Cunninghame's plan,[57] and when they had been drafted they were allowed to use its terms to finance recompletion to 600 - which involved acquiring officers for 1000.[58] This was in 1795 and clearly foreshadowed the new arrangement in the army. Many of them closed their lives that year; on the whole probably without sufficient recompense to the Colonels.

In arriving at its policy, the government was of course governed not only by considerations of equity but by what the market would bear. There was a constant process of bargai ning, as described in the last chapter in the case of Seaforth's regiment. So me interesting memoranda taken into consideration in late 1793 - early 1794 (wh e n the old regiments were being augmented and the raising of new ones got under way) throw light on the process. A paper prepared for Lord Amherst in the War Office showed that the old regiments were being driven out of the market by the new corps and could not increase their resources by an augmentation in which they would only sell the Ensigncies to civilians. The price of these was low and there were few purchasers. Independent Companies were declining in popularity (the high War Office had reported even in the spring that only Cornets of a few weeks' standing would undertake them) and so anyone, however junior should be allowed to raise them. Many officers who would not engage in new levies might recruit for promotion in their own old regiments and there should be a scheme to accommodate them.[59]

The plan associated with General Cunninghame of augmenting the old regiments and providing incentive and finance by adding a Lieutenant-Colonel and a Major to each now came into view. It needed much pounding into shape. The strongest argument behind it was that vacant Majorities were scarce and the market price was £1600 or £2000 even in a new regiment compared with the regulated difference of £1100. Two Captains in each regiment were to raise 200 men each for the two majorities, selling their commissions and getting five guineas levy money from the government. Assuming the recruits to cost fifteen guineas each, a Captain would have to pay £600 out of his own pocket towards promotion - a very favourable price.[60]

In subseq ent conversation in October 1793 between Pitt and Sir George Yonge, the Secretary at War, it was thought that the Major who was to be the

second Lieutenant Colonel sho uld pay £1000 - £100 more than the official price but less than the market price - because he would not be able to do any recruiting work and so should make up for this in money. The elder of the two Captains should have to raise more than the other because he would be the eldest Major and almost immune from reduction at the peace. Two days later, Sir George inclined to think these later refinements might be overdone. If the scheme was to work the terms must be generous, must seem in fact a special favour.[61]

In a paper suggesting the new regiments to be formed by officers formerly of the Independent Companies it was proposed to supply most of the finance by the promotion of Field Officers who would sell their existing commissions. There were few Lieutenant Colonels who would be ready to join in such a scheme but its success was expected from the great number of Majors wanting promotion.[62] Thus the testing of the market went forward and terms were so modified as to bring out the officers to act.

The dilemma of policy in choosing the best type of recruiting force is clearly reflected in this business of granting terms. So far from reducing competition, the authorities intensified it by making it more even and promoted an inordinate rise in bounties. There is little doubt that this resulted from the predilections of the senior officers who were consequently ill-placed to oppose abuses. It is true that when the first four regiments to have £15 levy money (as mentioned above) were got going, the Colonels were summoned to a meeting to agree on a maximum bounty.[63] A similar step was taken by four Scottish colonels.[64] But this was a drop in the ocean. The Board of Ordnance, which might have made some objection, contented itself with periodically enquiring what level levy money had reached in the Line and increasing what was paid to Artillery recruiting officers to follow suit.[65]

So we come to 1795 and the advent of the Duke of York, the advent also

of signs of shortage of two vital commodities - seamen and money. Circulars were sent out in February and March 1795, limiting bounties to fifteen guineas for general service and ten guineas for the Fencibles. They specifically refer to the bad effect high bounties were having on the recruitment of seamen and the second one ordered all seamen in the army to be turned over to the navy.[66] That year an Act of Parliament made each locality raise a quota of men for the navy; Greenock having complained of military competition in carrying this out, the War Office was able to assure the Admiralty that the new maximum bounties were below what the commissioners there were offering.[67]

The desire for economy had always been important. Brodie told Seaforth's brother in law that the insistence on the use of half pay officers was due to a desire not to increase the number of persons receiving pay.[68] In proposing his draftable corps, Wood spoke of the saving of having no officers to be added to the half pay list.[69] Fielder King spoke to the same effect in offering a regiment of Fencibles[70] and Windham in Parliament stressed this advantage which the Fencibles had.[71] Here then we have more reasons for the eclipse of the Independent Company and the new regiment, and the perfecting of a more orderly (but less successful) recruiting service. Much was doubtless due to the wisdom of the Duke of York; but something also to the pressure of Admiralty and Treasury on a reluctant army.

(b) The Contractors and their Subordinates

Having made his bargain with the government, the recruiting contractor was in a position to borrow the cash for his operations in anticipation of his reward. Brother officers were sometimes resorted to. Lieutenant Aske was offered help by Colonel Howe and he asked the War Office if money from the promotions (it was an augmentation he was concerned with) would be forthcoming soon

or not till the quotas were completed.[1] Lieutenant Antrobus was financed by one Armstrong who at one point was threatened with ruin by the Lieutenant's ill luck.[2]

The Army Agents, however, were the proper and normal source of credit for the recruiter. Graham is commiserated with by his second in command for being "so deep at the Agents"[3] and this was a common enough trouble. Naturally too great a generosity was no t in the interest of either party. Some officers were faced with ruin through the bankruptcy of their Agents.[4] Cox and Greenwood advanced half the money promised to Lord Huntly for the levy of the Gordons as soon as the letter of service was issued. The other half was advanced when half the men had been raised.[5] Donaldson told Abercairney to draw forty-day bills on him wh ich would be accepted as cash in Edinburgh.[6] He later complained that one officer was drawing bills for a longer term. Owing to the irregular way in which money was then being ordered by the War Office, this involved heavy discounting. When the Corps was properly established it would probably be paid more regularly and issues could be anticipated more cheaply.[7]

A year after the 113th had been raised, and a month or so after its drafting, Lieutenant Colonel MacDonnell was on bad terms with his agent Kemp. £2000 had been advanced by the latter and was outstanding. So on the other hand was money for the sale of certain commissions and a year's off-reckonings for the regiment's clothing during service in Ireland. With these taken into account MacDonnell would be solvent.[8] It will be seen how valuable was every effort by the government to pay its contractors in advance or backdate their remunerations.

The Agent acted as guide, philosopher and friend to the contractor, especially if he was an inexperienced civilian. Donaldson told Abercairney to buy his regiment's clothing mainly in London because only there did orders for

uniforms reach a volume enab ling firms to specialize in the business and execute large orders. On the other hand, he passed on a tip from Colonel Graham to buy the necessaries (i.e. underwear and so forth) from local shops, as better quality would be ensured.[9] The Agent also had to see to it that his client's interests were properly pushed in the intrigues at the government offices

The Contractor had of course to come to terms with the officers taking part in the levy with him. He issued them with Recruiting Instructions containing the gist of the terms on which his corps was being raised. Specific quotas of men were usually laid down. Dr. Kerr stated that his Field Officers raised 80 men for their rank and the Captains 60.[10] In the Breadalbane Fencibles the quotas were 35 for a prospective Captain, eight for a Lieutenant and six for an Ensign.[11] In Grant's the Colonel was to supply 68, the Lieutenant Colonel 65, the Major 55, Captains 40, the Captain Lieutenant 23, Lieutenants ten, Ensigns eight, the Adjutant and the Quartermaster sixteen each, the Surgeon and the Chaplain ten each and the Surgeon's Mate six. Sir James thought the first two quotas too high but in proportion to the dignity if not the value of the rank.[12]

On the other hand, Lord Breadalbane for his third Battalion of Fencibles laid down no quotas but merely pointed out that the success of the levy depended on the officers'exerting themselves.[13] The 98th raised under the auspices of the Duke of Argyle is an exam ple of another variant in which men and money were both required. Ensigns could give two men or £200. Captains (who were brought in from civil life) had to pay for their anterior steps as Ensigns and Lieutenants and give fifty men. Lieutenants gave £300 and fifteen men.[14]

Some system of compounding for men with money was needed. Dr. Kerr made his officers pay two guineas for every man short at the inspection.[15] Lord Breadalbane made the same charge in his Fencibles and was prepared to pay the same sum for every man supplied by an officer in excess of his quota.[16] The efforts

of officers might be very uneven and Seaforth complained that he had raised 400 out of the first 600 of his regiment[17] - he was very dissatisfied with his officers as we have seen. There also had to be an agreed way of passing on the money allowed by the government and advanced by the agent. Lord Breadalbane asked his officers to draw regular sums, noting each time how the previous sums were spent.[18] In the Perth Highland Fencibles, Captains were allowed to draw £100 at a time but Subalterns only £50.[19]

The whole business of bargaining was repeated by the recruiter with his officers in just the manner that the government had gone through it with him. He had to test the market and judge the fairness of offers received; as for example when James Horne wrote to ask if his brother might raise a company for Seaforth in return for the bounty and the right to nominate the Ensign.[20] The government always disclaimed any power to interfere in these agreements[21] and told a regiment engaged on the augmentation of November 1793 for instance that the officers must sort out the charge among themselves.[22] All did not run smoothly. Officers sometimes failed to keep their bargains, either by not paying their due or not helping in the work of recruiting.[23] This was perhaps especially true of the augmentation just mentioned where the promotion was being bought by some but the work was being done by others.[24] The partnership was a desirable but not necessarily a happy one and is a further factor in the failure of this levy.

Nevertheless, many bitter contentions between officers came to public notice. A Captain Farquharson was the centre of a series of claims and accusations concerned with the Loyal British Fencibles (Colonel Sir Robert Stuart). The Captain claimed to have been promised and deprived of the Lieutenant Colonelcy, other officers recommended by him sharing this fate. He said the Colonel refused to assemble the regiment in order to prevent it going abroad, issued too little

money for recruiting, dismisse d the Agent and clothier appointed by himself and threatened him with a legal action to recover money.[25] The Colonel replied that the Captain had tried to usurp the Lieutenant Colonelcy by signing documents in that style; that he had recommended officers as having recruiting connections who did not pretend to have any; and that they had raised few men and were in his debt. Farquharson he discovered was known to the War Office and in Edinburgh and Berwick as a scoundrel.[26] The War Office certainly ignored the Captain's letters.[27] The Colonel, whose regiment was never very good,[28] was probably unbusinesslike.

MacDonnell was slow in settling with the officers of the 113th. In particular, Lieutenant Thomas Evans still had a claim for £900 in respect of the raising of 130 men three years after the regiment had been completed and almost two after its dissolution. At one point he demanded this sum and suggested that 200 guineas of it might be settled by procuring an Ensigncy for his brother. By 1798, the debt, although not extinguished, had been reduced to a small amount.[29]

Seaforth had several epic struggles with his officers. When one of his battallions was augmented in 1794, the two officers who were to be the extra Field Officers were told to deposit the price of these commissions. For some reason they did not feel themselves obliged to do so and Seaforth considerably out of pocket, was still trying to get his money in 1798.[30] A Captain Stewart went to law with him over some men for whom he declined to pay. Apparently his refusal was because Stewart had not completed his quota in time and ought therefore to take a lower sum. Seaforth was reminded by his lawyer that the men had eventually be en delivered and had come in handy because there had been an augmentation.[31] He thought more money should be offered to impress the Court.[32] Apparently Seaforth lost the day.

Was recruiting a sphere in which the rich and powerful lorded it over the poor and deserving? Of course the possession of more capital confers an ascendency in any trade. We have seen too how politics often obtruded even in matters of detail. A relation of the Lord Chancellor had his offer of a corps laid by that personage before the "Privy Council"[33] (the cabinet perhaps). A supporter of the government was given a Lieutenant Colonelcy when he had been promised a Colonelcy. He wished to see Dundas privately about it, so as not to make trouble.[34] On a humbler scale there are, for instance, persons able during the augmentation to purchase promotion over the heads of their seniors, who had the first option but could not always afford it.[35] On the other hand, politics might cut the other way as we have also seen. The reduction of Sir Watkin Williams Wynn's regiment was attributed by some to the dislike of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland for his kinsman the Marquess of Buckingham.[36] Wealth without experience merely meant that the officer was fleeced by the wily Sergeants and crimps.[37] The brother of Lord Uxbridge raised men for a Captaincy "so that my name will look better in the lists".[38] He paid £21 a man, which he was told injured other corps. He was willing to compound for the rest of his quota at that figure.[39]

Patriotic Thomas Graham was denied permanent rank because he had only entered the army at the beginning of the war; yet he had suffered heavy financial loss and was rendering distinguished service in the field.[40] He was also given trouble by Colonel Ferrier, an old professional soldier of the Scotch Brigade, who accused him of embezzling £200; after much work with old recruiting accounts, he was able to refute this.[41] "Soak the rich" was the policy of the higher ranks in the army. The military caste, led by the Duke of York, were incensed at the disruption of the customary order in the service by the needs of expansion, as witness their opposition to the Independent Companies in 1793.

The rule of seniority was pro-tected by giving better terms to officers of longer standing in their rank who we nt recruiting. It was the cry of the Opposi tion also, voiced by Generals Tarleton and Macleod in Parliament that wealth was ousting merit through recruiting activity.[42] In fact, public money was being spent to prevent this, thereby adding to the cost of the service which the Opposition of course denounced as excessive.

What are the facts? General Small the Governor of Guernsey had no private income but thought th at if he were allowed to raise a regiment he could improve his financial posi tion.[43] Fielder King, who had organized the raising of the 84th and then offered a regiment on his own account, said he was a "soldier of fortune" and could not purchase promotion but he could raise good men sooner than anyone else.[44] "Soldiers of fortune" too were the officers of Sir William Johnstone's Fencible regiment raised in 1798.[45] They worked on such a narrow financial margin that when the authorities demurred about making a further advance of pay they were told that many of the officers would be forced to leave the regiment and live with friends to economize, with bad effects on regimental efficiency.[46] They duly got an advance.

MacDonnel of the 113th (Birmingham) regiment is an example of an old officer who rose by recruiting. He had served in the Seven Years' War and been a Captain since that time (though he had been a Colonel in the Portuguese service). He achieved the rank of Major by recruiting in the spring of 1794 and became temporary Lieutenant Colonel by raising the 113th; although he failed to get that rank made permanent, it would give him the full pay of Lieutenant Colonel during the war.[47] He attempted a draftable corps in 1796 and offered a regiment of riflemen. He died in 1798.[48]

The officers of the Hebrides could not afford to purchase promotion but could raise men cheaply in that poor and populous area.[49] In Ross-shire Macleod of Geanies wrote to Seaforth to complain of the onerous terms under which he was expected to supply men for his son. The members of the wealthy families of England could spend what they chose to "climb to the top of their profession". It was difficult for "the younger son of a little Scots laird". In spite of all this, he said he was going on recruiting in the expectation that the terms would end by being better.[50]

Possession of capital in short did not count for everything. The talented officer with at least the value of his commission behind him[51] had every chance to rise in the world through recruiting. The critics were right in suggesting that the recruiting specialist was often a bad officer; but it was the corrupted professional, not the wealthy gatecrasher, who deserved the most criticism.

CHAPTER IV : THE PROCESSES OF VOLUNTARY ENLISTMENT

(a) Terms offered to the Men

The upper ranks of the recruiting hierarchy and the problems that were especially theirs have now been described. It is time to turn to the humbler figures and to the actual work of getting men. A final element in the bargaining between government and contractor must now be mentioned - namely the terms of service which might be offered to men willing to join.

Senior military officers had very definite ideas about why men enlisted and so about what terms it was worthwhile to offer them. The Duke of Wellington's famous remark is wildly echoed by Colonel Grey, who had superintended recruiting at Nottingham for fourteen years, writing to Castlereagh in 1809. The motives for enlisting which he gives are "predeliction for that life, quarrels with masters and farmers, love of novelty, irksomeness of trades, the pressure of the times on some particular branches of manufacture, love of what is frequently regarded as comparative idleness" and lastly, to escape charges of bastardy. Only unsuitable material in the form of "trafficking, calculating manufacturers" were influenced by the financial inducement of a high bounty.[1]

Lord Chatham in 1804 declared that the motives of recruits were irrational and it would not be possible at once to increase the number of recruits by more favourable terms of enlistment.[2] Lord Mulgrave and General Craig hoped by this latter means to induce respectable families to send their black sheep into the army.[3] In short, only disorderly elements would join and the attractions were glamour and idleness. No wonder Hewett, the Inspector-General of recruiting, thought there was no possibility of increasing the supply[4] and Sir John Moore agreed.[5]

They despaired the more because they thought the soldier's life a very eligible one, offering the recruit a good bargain. He was enlisted for life (strictly speaking, for as long as His Majesty thought fit) and although many

people already thought this servitude, it was argued that security was what the poor man desired. After twe nty years, when he would still be only forty odd,[6] he would be confined to light duties in an Invalid Company or even put on a pension. Chatham stressed the need to make the pensioner's lot desirable, to attract men. He was echoed by Hewett and by Fox, a former Inspector General.[7] The flaw in the argument was that few so ldiers, it was admitted, lasted beyond twelve years.[8] The pay seems to have been th ought adequate, especially after it was raised in 1797. In that year the Duke of Buccleuch issued a proclamation to quiet the fears aroused in the Lothians by the establishment of a Scottish Militia. In it, he claimed that army pay was now better than that of most day-labourers and many skilled men.[9] The upper class felt that soldiers were the idle servants of an extravagant household. David Dundas, in the memoranda of 1804, said that a soldier was unfit and unwilling to earn his living by working.[10] This was the usual view.

Improvements in the te rms of service during our period were not as a rule intended primarily to increase the total supply of recruits. There was a drastic increase in bounties, but as far as the army was concerned, this was to suit the officer rather than the man. Pay was doubled in 1797, but this was a result of the naval mutini es. (In 1795, it had been proposed, in order to allay the discontent caused by rising prices, to pay the troops in bread instead of money.)[11] Pay as an incentive to join was only considered (indirectly) in the case of the officers. In November 1793, the price of Ensigncies and Cornetcies was decreased by the Commander in Chief to 700 guineas because of falling demand.

The early years of the nineteenth century saw a great controversy over the limitation of service to a term of years. Many officers were in this case prepared to concede that an alteration of the soldier's contract would increase

the flow of recruits. Battle was really joined with the reports of 1804 on this problem contributed by various senior officers, which have already been extensively quoted. The scattered beginnings of the argument are visible in our period.

Fencible regiments, limited in the area of their service, were universally known to be a wartime expedient destined to disappear at the peace. Recruiters for these regiments sometimes held out, therefore, the inducements that service in these regiments would be for the duration only, although in theory this was not the case. In December 1794, Dr. Kerr complained (with the support of the municipality of Northampton who were helping to raise his regiment) that the Loyal Leicestershire Fencibles were advertising for men to serve for the duration and estimated that this gave them an advantage of five to one against him.[13] The War Office at once ordered the offending regiment to desist and sent a circular to the other Fencible regiments forbidding this practice and requiring an answer.[14]

These answers all protested innocence[15] though there were vague allegations against others.[16] The truth of the matter was probably given by Colonel Leith of the Aberdeenshires who said that advertisements of the kind complained of were issued by civilians, who replied insolently to his complaints. It was a pity there was no means of disciplining them as the practice was likely to lead to mutiny.[17] It was probably a fear of giving the soldier more claims against the government that led the War Office to crush what might have been an interesting experiment, despite its improper beginnings. The only regiment that seems to have got away with it for a time was Sir Watkins Williams Wynn's which was attested for service for as long as the militia should be embodied. The augmentation of the regiment however (after the prohibition) was raised without this limitation.[18]

The coming of war was a cruel blow to the recruiting service of the East India Company's army. In 1792 it raised 1601 men; in the next two years together only 1228. (Its annual requirement was estimated to be 835 or ten per cent of the force). The detestation of the Company's service* combined with the Company's inability to match the government in raising bounties (in peacetime it had given £5.9.2.) combined to produce this result.[19] The standard of height was brought as low as 5'1" for lads under 20 in an endeavour to bring in men not wanted by the army.[20] Finally, in 1797, the government withdrew the Company's licence to recruit;[21] in 1799 after protracted argument, the Company agreed to let the government raise men for it and an Act of Parliament was passed to allow this.[22]

Even in 1794, Lieutenant Poyntz who had formerly served in the East suggested that the correct policy would be for the Company to enlist lads under twenty and give them the option of coming home after five years.[23] In 1798, the Company insisted that whoever raised men for its service must enlist them to serve for ten years;[24] otherwise adequate numbers would not be got. The Chairman explained that the King's regiments had the prospect of returning to Europe as they were relieved but the Company's soldiers did not come home till they were worn out. Consequently (the lower orders being of a roving disposition) there was much stowing away on home bound ships and desertion to native princes, who were anxious to attract Europeans. Enlistment for a term of years was needed to stop these practices and counterbalance the eligibility of the royal service. He suggested that to obviate confusion the draftable corps that were to raise men partly for the Company should raise the rest on the same terms for the royal regiments in India.[25]

The army did not like being associated with the Company's service in any case,[26] and for some recruits to be given better terms than the rest was

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* See pages 44 : 97

intolerable.[27] The Commander in Chief finally proposed a compromise which was accepted.[28] All recrui ts were to be enlisted to serve without a time limit but the Company's officer receiving the men drafted to that service at Chatham was to give them a certificate that they were enlisted for ten years and would then be brought home at the Company's expense unless they re-engaged.[29] In this roundabout way enlistment for a term of years was brought into use; as much it seems to improve discipline as to promote recruiting.

The great advocate am o ng the politicians of enlistment for a term of years was William Windham, who worked for it in and out of office in the early 1800s. While Secretary at War during our period he was already (though not very actively) in favour of it. A letter which he wrote to Grenville in February 1798 suggests that his interest in emigres and hence in foreign corps in British pay, which all had peculiar terms of service, may have led him to the views he adopted. He protested against the Commander in Chief's decision to disband Rolle's (Swiss) regiment unless it would undertake to serve for the duration or for life. Attri buting the decision to a "restless desire" to get rid of all corps who would not serve in the West Indies he noted the bad political effect likely in Switzerland and argued against the opinion that enlisting for a term of years was prejudicial to discipline. The French and much of the Austrian army, the British militia an d some even of the regulars, were enlisted on this basis without prejudicial effect.[30] In May 1799, the plan to recruit the army from the militia drew from him a rival memorandum. Declaring that the limit had perhaps been reached of the force which the population could produce, he agreed that the militia should be greatly reduced in strength in order to get men for service overseas. Both militia and regulars should be raised by voluntary enlistment and in both cases for a term of years. The abolition of the ballot would result in a great fall in the size of bounties, which could be reduced also by the

offer of annuities and widow's pensions and the freedom on dismissal (enjoyed already by the militia) to practise any trade in any corporate town. A more respectable class of men would, he hoped, be brought in. They would be encouraged to re-engage by a further bounty and the difficulties of regiments abroad would be met by compelling time-expired men to serve a short extra period with higher pay and ships trading with the different stations to carry small bodies of men out and home at a fixed charge. He mentions that he had discussed details with various persons and clearly a well thought out policy had matured in his mind.[31]

It was however the militia that was the true pioneer of a limited period of service. It first appeared in the field of ordinary recruiting in the augmentation of the militia in 1794, when the men were enlisted in effect for the duration.[32] It was enlis ting from the militia and Fencibles that finally made the idea seem important. Windham was surely influenced by the important memoranda of Colonel Anstruther and the Duke of Gloucester on this subject to be found among his papers[*]. Dundas in 1798 suggested a number of the "skeleton" regiments to recruit men to serve for three or four years only and to get as many as possible from the Fencibles.[33] It is to the chapters on enlistment from the Militia and Fencibles that this subject really belongs.

Geographical limitation of service was, unlike a limit-ation of time, a well established means of encouraging enlistment. The Fencibles were kept to a lower bounty than the line and yet succeeded in keeping as full at ten guineas as the regulars at fifteen. The (supposed) effect of this type of limitation on recruiting is shown in the Letters of Service of a batch of Fencibles raised in 1798. Some regiments were to serve in Europe and for them the levy money

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[*] See pages 311 and 315

was ten guineas. Others were confined to the British Isles and for them it was eight.[34] Again it is wi th extension of service that a further treatment of this subject belongs.

A guarantee against drafting was greatly desired by all regiments and especially those with terri torial connections. It was of course the interest of a recruiter to preserve his regiment if he could and his plea was that if the regiment was drafted, the prospect of future recruiting would be injured. Several instances have been gi ven in a previous chapter of the drafting of local regiments and of the argument and trouble involved. The Highlanders were so touchy on the subject, so fearful of being separated from their own leaders, that Seaforth said that if his second battalion was raised as a separate regiment and not with himself as Colonel he would be "gibetted" as a jobber who "sold" his neighbours.[35] The Gordons had to promise that the men enlisted for their line regiment would not be d rafted, although there was nothing in the letter of service to warrant this.[36] Frazer urged strongly that his Inverness-shire regiment be preserved, as the men were neighbours, but had to admit that recruiting in his case would not be seriously impeded by drafting.[37]

The only regiment of the Line that was guaranteed against drafting in its letter of service was the 79th (Alan Cameron's).[38] Notwithstanding this it was nevertheless drafted i n the West Indies in 1797; the officers and NCOs were sent home to re-raise i t. Cameron was a man of violent temper and there is a famous story of how when a similar threat was made in 1795 he bearded the Duke of York and declared that he and his men would never obey the order to be drafted, were it given by the King himself.[39] However that may be, his letter to Dundas on the subject was equable enough. He said that his sergeants would take a long time to re-raise the regiment after this episode and it would be much better to preserve it an d send to it 500 recruits collected for the 42nd

which was 600 strong and could spare them for a time. This party of recruits included some of his clansmen.[40] In cases of this kind the authorities, as we have remarked, usually trie d to put the men into other Scottish regiments, or accommodate them in some way as when the second battalion of the 78th was drafted into the 37th but the officers went with the men.[41]

The importance of abolishing drafting as a means of increasing regimental loyalties and giving the recruit confidence in the service and a feeling of "belonging" was as well unde rstood then as it is now. Windham, in his report on limited service already qu oted, made the abolition of drafting a cardinal feature of his scheme, and because there had been so many promises on the subject and so little performance he proposed to do it by Act of Parliament.[42] It was only in the case of th e Fencibles however that an effective promise was generally made and stuck to.[43] For the regulars the abolition of drafting has been and remains an unattainable ideal.

A promise that could be made more readily was that the men, if dismissed from the service, would be reduced in their own county. This again was usual for Fencible regiments and it was a stipulation for those of the Line raised with local or territorial support. The idea behind it was that the men were not to be swallowed by the army for ever but returned to civil life; it was thus a roundabout way of conceding service for a term of years. Thus Mrs MacNeil of Barra wrote to Captain Cameron of the Gordons that if the recruits she was sending him were reduced he was to send them straight home and dissuade them from enlisting in other regiments because their families had only let them go at all as a special favour.[44]

The promise was departed from in the case of the partial reduction of some Scottish Fencibles serving in England early in 1796. From the West Lowland

regiment it was reported that 76 men had agreed to this arrangement without protest and it was expected th at they would enlist on the march home.[45] A party of discharged men was found destitute in London and sent home by sea[46] - doubtless they would have enlisted otherwise. It was the general request of these regiments that the men should march or sail to Scotland as a body under discipline and be discharged there. The Glengarries in particular were afraid of the effect on recruiting if this stipulation was not observed.[47] Concessions were made in most cases: the Northern (Gordon) Fencibles for instance were sent by sea to Dundee and discharged there.[48] In the case of Line regiments the government showed greater consideration. When they were drafted, a promise was made that the individual members would still be discharged at home if the corps into which they were put were reduced.[49]

Thus it will be seen that a few tentative efforts were made, mainly in connection with the attempt to localize recruiting, to improve a little the terms of the soldiers' contract and lessen the gulf which existed between him and the citizen and civil life.

(b) Professional Recruiting Personnel

This section is concerned with those who made recruiting their trade, and of their relations with the regiments and officers who employed them. In theory, strict military discipline prevailed. The War Office issued "beating orders" to the comman der of each corps authorizing him to raise men by beat of drum anywhere in th e kingdom and ordering the civil power to assist.[1] Those of the old regiments were issued annually, expiring with the Mutiny Act on March 25th. Those for new corps were valid until the corps was complete. Copies of the beating order were issued by the commander to each officerrecruiting

enclosed with his name. The officer similarly gave a copy to each sergeant in command of a party, endorsing it with the sergeant's name. Thus there was a proper chain of command. But the scattering of parties made real control difficult and even the appearance of discipline was not always well preserved. Major Syer, recruiting for the King's Dragoon Guards, was stationed at Ludlow and in command of parties at Leicester and Nottingham.[2] The magistrates of both towns objected to the beating order of Sergeant Higginson, in the former case wrongly because it was signed by the Commanding Officer and not the Colonel of the regiment;[3] in the latter, rightly because it was not endorsed to the sergeant.[4]

The recruiting sergeant was thus a fairly independent personage. All the more reason for choosing men specially fit for the work, and we find, for instance, the 25th asking that its parties may be formed from the part of the regiment serving as marines, as most of the NCOs experienced in recruiting are afloat.[5] Pensioners and Invalids were often asked for, as likely to be experienced;[6] one officer got into trouble for taking some Invalids from the Plymouth garrison without proper authority.[7] Regiments borrowed from each other - Bernard promised to lend his sergeants to the 58th if not called on to raise more.[8] Regiments abroad were often allowed to hire parties when they could spare no NCOs from service.[9] Thus sergeants proficient at recruiting tended to stay at it, working for various employers and many who were fit for nothing else were retained in the service for this purpose.[10] Moreover Scafarth was reluctant to send any sergeants of his Militia regiment recruiting because they would be completely spoiled for further work and would acquire a skill little needed in the Militia.[11]

These recruiting tradesmen tended to strike root in a particular area and there build up a "goodwill". David Gibson operated at Glasgow and claimed to

have raised 375 men in three months, for two local regiments besides some for the "Edinburgh Volunteers". He asked for a direct contract with the War Office, stipulating for himself the pay and "Euniform" of a sergeant.[12] Dr. Kerr reported that his sergeants and drummers refused to be attested and had to be paid respectively a guinea and upwards of half a guinea a week;[13] a man named Berry, who was attested, complained of a broken promise when made to march away with the regiment.[14] Many sergeants were enlisted in the first place as such because of their recruiting potentialities - we even hear of one who was a landowner.[15] The whole class seems to have expected considerable profit from their occupation and some were more ambitious. Sergeant Wilson of the 82nd had joined in the hope of a commission but after two years and heavy losses by recruits deserting had not obtained one.[16] Sergeant Frazer had been taken from the 71st by Colonel Hay to recruit for the 109th. He was later offered a commission in the Drummond Fencibles but Hay refused to release him.[17] (Hay declared that this was because of the man's insolent conduct).[18]

The twin summits of this recruiting career were a commission and a public house. Ensign Busby, formerly a sergeant, kept an alehouse at Manchester; he was suspected of embezzling bounty money.[19] A Lieutenant, likewise promoted and recruiting at Bridgewater, left the work in charge of his wife.[20] Lieutenant Wheatley, of whose proceedings the magistrates of Newbury complained, turned out to be a publican;[21] the Duke of York proposed to take away his commission, though it was represented that he had sold his inn when he had become an officer.[22]

We do not hear much about how sergeants were paid, but illicit gains are often reported. They often exacted small fees from the recruits they enlisted. This was forbidden in 1796.[23] They handled quite useful sums. One of Graham's helpers was prepared to give Sergeant Newton up to £50 - he was to hand over the attestations of the men he got. It was suggested that direct payment by the

regimental Agent would be more convenient.[24] Some men used their opportunity merely to riot. Sergeant English of the 11th got into debt with various tradesmen at Warrington where his party was, and was finally court martialled.[25] Others were more cunning. One, Allison, styled Lieutenant and perhaps only a crimp, had recruited for three regiments in Lincolnshire. Before the war he had been a journeyman weaver but he was said to have made £1000 mostly by the improper sale of discharges and to have bought an estate.[26] Sergeant Page of the 82nd was sent an attestation of a man he had got, to give to the officer commanding the party. Instead he gave it and the man to another regiment - doubtless for a consideration.[27] Sergeant Marsh, who absconded from the headquarters of the 133rd without settling his accounts was reported to be purchasing an Ensigncy.[28] Promotion from the ranks was rare in the eighteenth century; this means of obtaining it is not usually mentioned and certainly it does the army little credit.

Normal military life had so little hold over the lower members of the recruiting service that it was natural that many should escape altogether and ply their trade in the freedom of civil life. This was sometimes innocently done. A Captain Palmer had been employed by the firm of Lawrie to recruit for regiments of which they were the Agents. He had served in the American war and since been on half pay, but because he was not attested for the regiments employing him, he fell under the ban on civilian recruiters of March 1795. He appealed to the War Office without success against the taking away of his livelihood.[29] James Fletcher recruited for Bernard at Bolton and quarrelled with the sergeants there. Angry at the charge of being no soldier he declared he was twice wounded in America and invalided out of the 33rd.[30] Sometimes a useful recruiter could not be taken into the army; a Collector of Customs worked for some corps at Hull until rebuked by his superiors.[31]

What usually happened however was that on the completion of a corps, a man would retain his beating order and go on recruiting as if nothing had happened.[32] In course of time, he might amass several. It was easy to procure them and alter the names and dates to fit.[33] He would call himself Lieutenant or Sergeant and wear some sort of uniform. Infamous individuals were often at work. Colquhoun, one of the London stipendiary magistrates, reported that theives, coiners and receivers were active in recruiting. One individual who styled himself Lieutenant was a coiner who drove into town from a secret lair and disposed of his produce in an open market. He had latterly escaped conviction through a technicality.[34] Such men raised recruits on any terms and by any means and sold them for whatever they would fetch. The gullible officer in a difficulty was their prey.

The more respectable workers were injured by the operations of these men. Colonel Bernard wrote in July 1794 on behalf of several officers recruiting at Sheffield to protest against the activity of unauthorized half pay officers and of pensioners and hired sergeants who were in the pay of London crimps. Usually possessing several beating orders, they were raising men to be sent to Chatham where they were sold for 30 guineas.[35] (This would be to replace men rejected as unfit at the inspection. Officers raising a quota for promotion might be ruined if they could not re-complete it within the time limit). The recruiting officer was outbid by the racketeer, and the reputation of the service was ruined by the public picture of "crimps" kidnapping men for the army. Civilians also suffered, as when a man bought a uniform and other goods to the value of £30 by means of a bill drawn on a fictitious "superior officer".[36] Yet there was little the War Office could do about it, as they told Bernard. The beating orders were difficult to keep a check on. Even a person so military as an out-pensioner could only be deprived of his pension. The zeal of the civil authorities was all the army had to look to.[37]

The lowest rank in the recruiting service consisted of men to put on a show for the populace, carry on the work of persuading individuals (any member of a party with a proper beating order could legally enlist men) and look after the recruits when got. There were two main species. Smart young soldiers were needed to represent the glamour of the army and drill the recruits, and also to show the good quality of the recruiting regiment. An officer of the 90th recruiting in Wales was allowed to take a man with him who had previously joined him there, to show that the men he got were not "sold" but went into a good regiment.[38] On the other hand, there were wily recruiters of the professional type, with the same sort of history and doubtless hoping to make enough money to start on their own. A Drummer employed by a (bogus) Lieutenant Napier had been given five guineas by the 88th and told to consider himself enlisted if he did not bring a man within a given time. He recruited for the crimp in the disguise of a Sergeant of the Militia.[39] Reputable parties also employed such persons; a deserter useful in recruiting is allowed to be kept by the regiment using him if the regiment from which he deserted agreed.[40]

The tale is completed by Drummers and musicians hired to add to the military aspect of the party. How little military they might be is illustrated by the case of a boy of thirteen taught the fife by his father and engaged to play it for a party while it was at Worcester. The Sergeant of the party got him to enlist by making him drunk with cider and was opposed by the magistrates in an attempt to smuggle him away without the necessary formalities.[41]

(c) The Routine of Recruiting

Even at the best of times recruiting was an ill-conducted affair. The baseness of the motives appealed to and the looseness of the organization combined to lower its tone. Intoxication is the central theme; the associations

of the recruiters and the precautions of the magistrates alike direct our attention to low public houses and disorderly celebrations. John Clarke got drunk at the Green Dragon during a fair at Swineshead in Kesteven. A few days later a party was sent to his master's farm to tell him that he had enlisted for the 84th.[1]

Lieutenant Wheatley (mentioned above) brought a man before the magistrates on a Wednesday who had been enlisted on the Monday at a "revel". During the intervening period he had not been to bed, had drunk fairly solidly at the revel and the Lieutenant's public house, and was still not sober. Wheatley refused to release him unless he paid back £4. 13.6. allegedly given him as bounty money. This the magistrates disallowed, saying that as the man had been in the custody of the party the whole time he could not have spent it - yet he had none on him.[2] It was not only the intoxicated who were imposed on. The enlisting shilling was slipped into the hand or pocket of an innocent by-stander who would then be told that its reception made him a soldier whether he would or no.[3] A sergeant even claimed a toll-collector at Worcester, having given hima shilling for a halfpenny due and refused the change.[4]

The law was on the side of the recruit. The Mutiny Act provided that when he had enlisted (the act being symbolized by the receipt of a shilling) twenty four hours must be allowed to elapse before the next stage in the proceedings - attestation. At the end of this time he was taken before a magistrate and had then the opportunity to "dissent" to his enlistment. He then had to repay any bounty he had been given, plus twenty shillings "smart money" for the expenses of the party. He had a further twenty four hours in which to pay this. Those still agreeable to serve had to take an oath of attestation before the magistrate. Until 1799, the exact wording was decided by the regiments, although uniformity was encouraged. A printed form of the

oath with a clause certifying that it had been taken, would be produced. This the magistrate filled up with the man's name and signed. The man's height, age, trade or other details might be entered, and also how much bounty he had been promised a d what had been paid in goods and kind. The man had to swear that he was a Protestant, not ruptured or subject tc fits, not an apprentice or a member of the forces and that he had agreed to serve during his majesty's pleasure, to obey the articles of war, and so forth. The Attestation was kept by the regiment (usually by the Agent). The appearance before the magistrate could be postponed up to four days from the enlistment; if a recruit absconded before being sworn he was a deserter.[5]

The recruit should therefore have had every opportunity of changing his mind, understanding the nature of his engagement and complaining to the magistrate of sharp practice. Unfortunately the complexity of the law hindered its being either understood or enforced. Even the stipendiaries of Marlborough Street were willing to swear a man within 24 hours of his enlisting if he was sober.[6] The magistrates of Newcastle declared they would always do so in wartime to expedite the King's service and were perturbed when one such enlistment was voided by the King's Bench.[7] An officer challenged the correct interpretation of the law of smart prevailing at Dumfries. Elsewhere he had found the view accepted that smart must be paid within 24hours of enlistment, not attestation.[8] Many officers asserted that a man could, at his own request, be sworn before the 24hours were up.[9] Less innocent were recruiters who avoided the more meticulous magistrates. Thomas Holbeck was one such, living near Bromesgrove. He reported that a party t ere preferred to take its men to Birmingham by post-chaise to be attested.[10] Much worse is a Scottish case in which an officer and a magistrate invited a man into the house of the former, plied him with drink and attested him on the spot.[11]

The norm in recruiting appears to have been sharp practice with the

appearances preserved. There was also more blatant illegality. Kidnapping occurred. An elector of Newbury was put in a cellar by a crimp and taken to Chaltham - one of the Members for Berkshire wrote for his release.[12] The Rev. Abdy Abdy reported on orgy of violence around Epping which threatened to drive the people to riot. Four militia Privates had been found assaulting and carrying Thomas Kiernan, whom a London crimp had refused to take from them because his enlistment was so patently underduress. . A farm servant was seized at an inn and held at the point of a bayonet until released by his master's landlord.[13] At Leytonstone, Mr. Bosanquet refused to attest a man into whose hand Sergeant Warwick had forced a shilling. The Sergeant vowed to have him and brought some men from London to carry him off, whom the constables prepared to resist by force with the help of the enraged inhabitants.[14]

An offence that was quieter and safer was enlisting men merely to let them go again for "smart". This was illegal when they were not taken before a magistrate to declare their dissent[15] and is a practice reported from all the large towns. Probably the legal sum alone was usually asked but Allison (already referred to) charged John Clarke seven guineas; then shaking hands on the bargain he slipped him another shilling, had him properly attested and for his discharge charged him thirty. A variant reported from Wolverhampton was a lunatic turned in by a crimp as a deserter for the sake of the 20/- reward.[16]

Competition was inevitably fierce. No corps had an area exclusively its own and the big towns attracted parties of every kind. Apart from straightforward salesmanship and offering higher bounties there were several underhand ways of opposing competitors. One was slander. Captain Houghton of the 53rd complained from Newcastle under Lyme that a Sergeant Ball was telling the parents of his recruits that the regiment was in a dangerous place and their sons would be killed.[17] "Lieutenant" Napier's "Sergeant" at Chelmsford seduced recruits by telling them their regiments were going to India.[18] This station and the

possibility of being "sold to the Company" were the particular dread of recruits. A memorandum of 1799 regards recruiting for the Company by the King's officers as something likely to damage the royal recruiting service.[19] Chatham barracks, where the "selling" took place, was regarded with special dread; the recruits of the 42nd were promised from 1787 onward that they would not be sent there but would go to the regiment direct from Fort George.[20] Such was the material for lying tongues.

The other main branch of improper competition was facilitating the movement of a recruit disgusted with his corps into one he like better. It was quite proper for a recruit to break one engagement by paying "smart" and then at once enlist in another corps.[21] Parties sometimes offered to pay the smart money for a man who consented to transfer to them. This was strongly contested by several officers[22] but the opinion of the War Office does not appear to have survived. As the payment of the bounty and the deductions from it aroused many grievances in the mind of the recruit, it was a very useful weapon to have. Actual seduction of properly enlisted soldiers was probably confined to crimps. The commandant of the Windsor Foresters told the Town Clerk of Windsor to prosecute two men for inducing two of his soldiers to desert and enlisting them for other regiments.[23] The 1st Devonshire Militia were warned against crimps recruiting for the East Indies who persuaded men to get themselves discharged "by promises they cannot perform, for purposes they dare not avow".[24]

Recruiting parties, needless to say, did not always behave with decorum. Ensign Gilmer was told to stop beating up after dark with lighted torches at Newark, though he protested that complaints proceeded from private spleen.[25] No relief appears to have come to the unfortunate tailor of Stamford, the room under whose dwelling was used as a guardroom. Two complaints were sent via the War Office that he and his wife were unable to sleep.[26] Mr Nicholas Keane of

Cheltenham and Attorney General of St. Vincent had the unpleasant experience first of having his coloured servant abducted from his own house with a magistrates' warrant, of being assaulted and pushed out by the sentry and another man. He took a fever as a result.[27]

Not only the individual civilian but the civil power itself was defied; Sergeant Hill was told by the Mayor of Devizes to stop beating up (it was 9.30 at night) whereat he drew his sword on the Mayor and told the Drummer "to beat on and bid the boys halloo". He was finally arrested and taken to the "blindhouse" by the bailiff and constable, helped by a sergeant of Militia. He was convicted of assault at the next Quarter Sessions.[28] Lieutenant Topp was approached by the master of an apprentice he had enlisted. Despite a magistrates' warrant and the presence of the constable he allowed the man to be put in the local gaol and the master to be run out of town with the threat of a beating.[29] Lieutenant Talbot found that at Brewood near Wolverhampton the Justice had forbidden the traditional baiting of a bull at the fair. He, therefore, bought a bull and had it baited to coin popularity for his recruiting efforts. When the magistrates objected, he made a sharp reply. He later defended himself by saying that he had not realized that magistrates had legal powers to prevent bull-baiting.[30]

Even the military power was sometimes flouted. Lieutenant Mitchell of the Marines had a quarrel with Sergeant Hobson of the 70th at an inn in Devizes, in the course of which the former found himself in the fireplace. Hobson was arrested by Mitchell's party and (it was said) buffetted and collared by Mitchell while in custody. The Officer Commanding Hobson's party took up his case and there was a long correspondence in which each side accused the other of being drunk. The affair was only ended by an enquiry by a Field Officer. Hobson was released and both sides were told to let the matter drop.[31]

The recruiters were not alone in their wrongdoing; they had frequent cause of complaint against the civil population. Riots against crimps were common and reached serious proportions in London in 1794.[32] William Wickham reported from Whitechapel that Lewis Harris, who had lately opened a "rendezvous house" in Smithfield, should be put out of business. The people hated him as a crimp and as a Jew and the diseffected were stirring them up. Later on there was danger when cries were heard in the night from the house of Noble, a crimp, and the constables, on breaking in, found three men who had been tortured to make them consent to attestation.[33] The Magistrates had to assure the populace that the government did not countenance such practices.[34] It was inevitable that the mob should suspect certain actions even of honest parties. When deserters were imprisoned they were sometimes forcibly released.[35] One of Graham's agents was badly mauled when trying to arrest one.[36] Parties were occasionally lynched at races and fairs.[37]

The populace sometimes tried to set the recruits against their officers. At Warrington, the men of a new regiment being collected there were told not to march unless their bounties were paid in full.[38] The people of Newcastle caused a mutiny by telling men of the 111th they had been "sold" to the Indies.[39] An officer refused to march his recruits through Banbury as Colonel Roberts lost fifty men there by the persuasion of the inhabitants.[40]

Magistrates were often hostile. Like the mob, they had an understandable tendency to think the worst of the recruiting service. An officer unable because of a riding accident to attest a recruit within the legal time limit was threatened with gaol by a zealous magistrate.[41] Perfectly legitimate parties were refused billets and put in prison on suspicion of having forged beating orders.[42] At Manchester the magistrates were only available for attesting

recruits on Wednesdays and Saturdays.[43] Out of their number, a clergyman named Griffith, came drunk to the Inn which Captain Cameron of the Wakefield Regiment used as his rendezvous. He accused him in the presence of his recruits of being a scoundrel and a crimp and of imprisoning men. Disdaining the protection of his cloth, he accepted a challenge but when the Captain sent his second round next morning , Griffith was sober and thought better of it. His real grievance was seemingly that Cameron attested his men before other justices, who were "puppies and apprentices" compared with his experienced self.[44] The ignorance of the law of attestation which so often prevailed did not always help the recruiter. Magistrates sometimes refused to regard absconding recruits as deserters and would not authorize their arrest.[45] At least one such deserter was taken under a magistrate's protection.[46]

Obstacles of a litigious kind were encountered. N.C.O.'s and recruits were often committed on charges of bastardy and had to be left languishing in gaol pending a financial settlement.[47] Parties deprived of their N.C.O. in this way were a prey to indiscipline.[48] The enlistments of workers hired by the year (chiefly farm servants but also colliers in Durham[49]) was sometimes challenged by their masters who on this or other pretexts withheld their arrears of wages. Local legal opinion usually[50] upheld them and the War Office doubted its power to help.[51]

In meeting opposition, violent or otherwise, the recruiter had one fatal handicap. He must maintain his interest. He could not afford to incurr the hostility either of the magistrates or of the populace. Often absconding recruits were allowed to escape[52] and unfavourable [53] judgments acquiesced in to keep the goodwill of the neighbours.

The recruits themselves were not a whit better than those who engaged them.

Their abuses can mostly be put under a single heading: multiple enlistment. The great object was to receive as many bounties as possible. Desertion was a major evil in the army at this time and thirteen thick volumes of War Office correspondence in our period are taken up with it.[54] A large proportion of the deserters who were caught were claimed by two or three regiments and the War Office had to adjudicate between them by sending for the attestations and comparing the dates. It was recognized that this involved injustice, as recruits often absconded without attesting from one regiment but were later attested by another.[55] Aliases complicated the disputes still further.

Catching deserters had in the past been left to the common informer, who would report them to a magistrate in the hope of a reward; if the Justice saw fit to have arrested and then to convict the suspect, the government collected the man and paid the money.[56] In 1794, the effects of desertion on the recruiting service caused the War Office to adopt a new method. It caused regiments to send in returns of all deserters, specifying their birthplace, where they deserted, and their trade and giving a full personal description (clothes included) of each man. These details were published in the "Police Gazette" of the time, the "Hue and Cry", and this was circulated free to every recruiting party. No officer was to have a man attested without consulting his back file of the paper.[57]

It was obviously a losing battle. Major Passingham enlisted two men, who later brought a third, said to be a cousin of one of them - their name was Williams. The Major suspected the third man and found, with the help of the "Hue and Cry", that he was John Conner who had deserted from the 5th Light Dragoons six weeks before. In that time he had moved from Uxbridge to Chester. His "cousin" was less suspect because he had seemingly never had a regimental haircut. The remaining man had, and also signed his name in two different ways.

The Major was sure he was Healey, advertized just above Conner. He confined all three and sent "likenesses" of the two he suspected to the War Office - where unfortunately they do not seem to have been preserved.[58] This incident shows the size of the task; no less of a handicap than the absence of photography was the poor state of medical science. The infirmities of recruits were often not discovered till they had served some time or until they had been inspected by a very experienced surgeon at a big military centre. They would then be discharged - and would promptly reenlist, confident of being again discharged, (They were usually careful to spend all their bounty money first.[59])

Unfit men from various regiments congregated in the Channel Islands, should, it was recommended, be kept in the army for the sole purpose of preventing their thus defrauding recruiters.[60] A man was committed as a deserter at Manchester, though known to be unfit, because he absconded from a party with £1. 3. 6. bounty and later enlisted in two other regiments.[61] The simulation of illness was a kindred abuse, extending the above principle. Regimental surgeons naturally got to know most of the tricks, but one cavalryman escaped active service and very nearly got a discharge by simply claiming that he could not bend his knees.[62] Discharges sought for these and other reasons are often declared by officers to be a mere prelude to re-enlistment. The crowning instance is of a turbulent individual reported as having enlisted twice and expected to do so again before reaching home. But he would always be discharged - he was a clergyman![63]

Loss of bounty and goods given to deserters was the heaviest expense a corps recruiting had to sustain. Graham claimed to have lost £6000 this way in raising his second battalion;[64] the 107th, to have lost £3000.[65] Perhaps

the recruits should not be blamed too much. Against a man in Bertie's regiment who confessed to having deserted from two others, who was worthless and bore the marks of punishment on his back can be set (in the same letter) a contrite corporal, anxious to serve but driven to desert by brutal treatment in his old regiment.[66] Sir Henry Dalrymple had great difficulty in persuading a court-martial at Chatham that it was neither legal nor proper for soldiers sent home from the Continent to be invalided out to be re-enlisted at once without even waiting for their discharges.[67] "Diddle the doctor" was too often the motto and if recruits were a low type of men, they had a low example set them.

(d) "Territorial" Recruiting.

Of what we have called "territorial" recruiting, the Highlands of Scotland provide the most striking cases and the system in use there must now be described. It was often referred to at the time as "feudal" and certainly was so if that term be taken to mean primarily the connection of land tenure with military service.

Each landlord had the men of his estate "enrolled in your statistical lists" as Brodie said to Seaforth.[1] A list of January 1798 shows the inhabitants of the parish of Ness, which belonged to Seaforth; the families in each township are shown, with the number of persons in each.[2] The Countess of Sutherland, when a regiment of the Line was to be raised in 1799, caused a census to be taken of the men on the estates and then called for a proportion of them to come forward.[3] This was the basis of the whole.

Nevertheless, it was not a matter of simple conscription but rather of steady pressure and inducement from above. A vital part of the work was done by the members of the Chief's family and his other clients. We have seen how

each clan contained many army officers who would be brought forward and gain promotion from a levy.* Brodie hoped that Seaforth would find many Mackenzies on the half-pay list fit enough to serve.[4] Such men would be (or would be related to) the smaller landed proprietors in a Clan district and the tacksmen, factors and other estate officials who stood between the big landlord and the peasant cultivators. The interest and influence of the middle element was thus firmly engaged. A tenant in Lochaber was willing to get men for the Gordons to secure promotion for his son, then in the 79th.[5] One Mackenzie was described as a good Highland recruiter, popular with his tenants who would be happy to bring him forward by giving some of their men.[6] One of the Gordons pointed to the need not to allow too many gentlemen to engage in any one district - there would be great competition and bounties would rise.[7]

The Honourable Eric Mackay provides an example of a variant on the above theme, for he sent out circulars not only to the tacksmen of the estate of Lord Reay, but to at least one minister, who was to "enforce from the pulpit" the plan of raising a regiment to fight the enemies of religion.[8] Lord Breadalbane succeeded in gaining the support of the town of Cupar by a judicious present of coals for the local poor. The Town Council agreed to give extra bounty money to men who were raised in the neighbourhood.[9]

It was the peasantry who occupied the holdings and tilled the soil who had actually to supply the men. This might involve bringing forward their own sons and servants or simply hiring recruits or helping to pay for their hiring. One of Seaforth's tenants in Lochalsh hired a man in Skye at £21. He received the five guineas levy money but bore the rest of the expense.[10]

The Duke of Gordon's tenants in Kirkmichael and Strathdown advertised in the Aberdeen Journal that they would give five guineas additional bounty

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* page 35-36

to men going with certain officers who were enlisting in defined areas.[11] Six farmers gave a man each to Sir Robert Sinclair.[12] The Duke of Gordon's tenants in the Aucht and Forty agreed to double the bounty being paid to recruits and to organize entertainments to help in the work in order to remove the Duke's "umbrage ".[13]

In the Breadalbane papers, there are numerous accounts of men supplied by tenants. A list of 151 men enlisted at Taymouth in April 1793 shows 76 supplied by their fathers, mothers or brothers. 36 were described as "volunteers": most of these were regarded as serving for a particular place and some were marked as serving "for himself" or "for himself and " some relative. One man was supplied by a schoolmaster, his father.[14] Another list includes a man supplied by a vintner and another provided by Duncan Phippen described as a Hermit.[15] A paper among the accounts shows Alex. McPhie brought by Peter Brown but his bounty paid by Lord Breadalbane, while William Munro was brought and paid for by Donald Clark; for two other men, the cost was shared by the bringer and the Earl.[16]

The proceedure in making a levy was to call a meeting of the tenantry in each area and threaten and cajole them into making proper bargains. Major Mackenzie stayed the week-end with the minister of a (seemingly recalcitrant) village, attending Sunday service. On Monday, he called a meeting of those not formerly coming forward, but only got one man. On Tuesday, a meeting at another village produced eight; and on Wednesday, at a rendezvous on Lochcarron, the recruits he had got in various villages came to meet him by previous arrangement and were marched off to Fort George.[17]

Mackenzie of Fairburn, a small landowner, started off with a manifesto threatening ruin to such tenants as would not help him. He then brought in

Colonel Baillie, an acknowledged expert in negotiating with Highlanders. He promised them remission of a year's rent and the payment of bounties to the men brought forward.[18] At Castle Brahan, Seaforth's principal seat, the factor had great trouble with the tenants when the first battalion of the 78th was augmented. The most eligible men were already enlisted and several tenants with suitable sons had moved away. Discussions were held and the factor reported he was gradually break-ing the ice.[19] For the original levy at a meeting about the renewal of leases, he had asked point blank for men. He was received with silence. After the meeting, he was told that the men would permit their sons and servants to enlist but would not bring them forward themselves. The factor said Seaforth's presence was indispensable to further progress.[20]

The Chief indeed had to do much of his own work, despite the help of subordinates. Lord Macdonald said there were "a thousand stipulations on such occasions about land when they shall return and an interim accommodation for their fathers and mothers", which only the Chief could satisfy them on.[21] Seaforth said that he had personally raised 364 out of his first body of 600.[22] The Duke of Gordon made a progress through his estates in 1793, when raising Fencibles. At Glenfiddick, he received deputations from the outlying areas. At Tomintoul he was heckled by one man who afterwards apologized through the minister and begged to be enlisted. Twentyone men joined him at Badenoch, 58 in Lochaber and six in Huntly.[23]

A fallacious belief held even at that time is exemplified when Brodie writes "I trust that feudal attachments still existing among the Mackenzies will induce them to follow their Chief without any greater pecuniary consideration than what may be wanted to furnish them with necessaries.[24] Stewart of Garth strikes a similar note and is anxious to deny that promises of tenure of land on favourable terms were used to induce men to enlist.*[25] Enough instances have

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* The case against Garth is made by Bulloch xxx

already been quoted in this section to show the falsity of such a view.

Even Garth was prepared to admit that the men were promised land on return from the wars. Eric Mackay stated the matter thus: "when from the advantageous terms offered by the government, joined to precedence and the means they will have to make savings, should they, as it is possible, be ordered to that cheap country Ireland, the men may be enabled and disposed to take farms on the Reay estates, they may be assured of a preference over those who did not engage or to any others upon equal terms".[26] Lord Huntly in his recruiting advertisements also promises a preference in allocating plots on the Gordon estates.[27]

What such promises might mean to the land-hungry Highlanders is shown by the petition of Patrick McIntyre to Lord Breadalbane. His father had been made to give up part of his plot to John McIntyre a man of poor character and no capital. John was said to rest his claim on the services of his brother with the Argyleshire Fencibles in the war of 1778, but that man's services had been rewarded by a plot on the farm of Stonemillichan and anyway it was Patrick's father who had got him to enlist. John should be given part of the plot of another man who had never supplied a recruit.[28] Another petition to Lord Breadalbane, from a post-runner, said that he had enlisted on the promise of a croft with the Chamberlain of Glenorchy. That gentleman having died without heirs, he had lost his protector and had not yet been rewarded.[29]

The conferring of land was not confined to the recruits themselves. For supplying his son(still at school) for the Gordons, Thomas Macpherson asked a half eighteenth part of land, free of services. He suggested two places where this might be, one of which was considered more suitable as the other farm was already saddled with two "pensioners". The tenantry at another place would doubtless make room for his eldest son, who was also to receive provision.[30] As Lord Macdonald said, stipulations in respect of relatives

were common. George Gordon, a man of good physique, had been turned out of his croft. He enlisted on promise of some sort of provision after the war and meanwhile a holding for his wife.[31] Peter Gordon, a tenant, enlisted because his younger brother would not go. He asked that his wife and "orphants" should have their holding enlarged, for it was unbearably small.[32]

Were abatement of rent given as a recruiting reward? The offer made for Fairburn to his tenants of a year's rebate of rent had already been quoted. Seaforth's factor mentioned in 1794 that if rents were raised it would put an effective stop to recruiting. Promises were made on the Gordon estates that rents would not be raised.[33] In a list of terms required by some Breadalbane recruits, there is frequent reference to their parents holding their crofts at the present rents and without being disturbed, and also to their being given free grazing.[34] In this age of intensifying pressure by the landlord on his tenantry, such promises were worth a great deal.

Money payments to the recruits were on no mean scale. Sums paid on the Gordon estates rose from ten guineas in March 1794 to £21 in May and June, though some were paid only fifteen guineas at that time. In Badenoch, ten men got from £13 to £21, ten more £12.18/- each, six others twelve guineas and five were content with five guineas to £10.16/-. Peter Gordon mentioned above was given two guineas but his wife got eighteen.[36] Neil McMillan got eight guineas and his father twelve.[37] One man was given eight guinwas to start with, and, on two subsequent occasions, seven and five guineas more.[38]

Having struck bargains with most of the tenantry, the overlord turned to the coercion of the reluctant few. Mackay desired the tacksmen to send lists of men who did and also of those who did not join.[39] In the Breadalbane papers, there are several lists from November 1793 of tenants with sons fit to

serve who had supplied none. Thus in Borlich there were twelve such persons with sixteen sons between them, in Ardeonaig 22 with 31, in Deshair 17 with 30.[40] From 1794 there is a "list of persons warned for not giving their sons as soldiers Seventeen persons on the list are noted as having given a man ; the other fourteen apparently remained obdurate.[41] A "list of disguising persons in the officiaries of Lawers, Crauich and Mornish" included some that "dispises them that intend to save your lordship" and one group that had supplied one man when they should have given five or six.[42] "A just account of the most ungrateful tenants in the officiacy of Lawers when his Lordship raised his regiment in the Spring of 1793" identified the former group more closely. They included the two sons of a wright who said they could not be made to go and he would rather leave the estate than submit.[43] No doubt the fate of these resisters was often unpleasant.*

Recruiting could be linked with the general discipline of the estate. A further item in the Breadalbane papers is ominously headed "wood steallers (sic) warned". Of thirteen persons named, six gave man, three more gave their sons and four were marked "togo".[44] On the Castle Brahan estate disenssions on recruiting were in some way mixed up with discussions on illicit stills.[45]

The lords, however, were not unmerciful towards their tenants. A man was discharged from the Breadalbane (on finding a substitute) when his father died leaving no-one to manage the farm.[46] A list of men in Fernan who might be serving Lord Breadalbane noted that some were the sons of widows or frail men who could not run their farms without their help.[47] Men were expected to offer but might not be taken. Private William Munro wrote to ask Lord Breadalbane to get him out of a detachment of pioneers because his companions said all Munros were rogues especially General Sir Hector Munro.

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* See page 253

"I offered my service to your Lordship at the raising of the regiment but your Lordship was so kind as to pass me, but afterwards I was ordered to enlist by Mr James Campbell, your Writer".[48] John Crerar's eldest son was "passed from" by the Earl because he was the only one old enough to help his father on the farm; wages were so high that Crerar would have to give up unless he could do without hired men. He wrote later to ask that the exemption be continued.[49]

The tenantry did not always submit tamely to the levies. Those on Fairburn's estate, after listening to the threats and offers mentioned earlier, came together in a body and made a collective offer to supply his needs if he "gave them £400 a year down of their rents and grant leases". These were regarded as exorbitent terms but they were the last word, and no men could be got from the estate.[50] Seaforth was opposed at Stornoway by a regular insurrection. A body of men fortified a hill above the town and forced others to join them, smashing the farm implements in villages which refused. The magistrates went to parley with them and assured them that no man would be taken against his will. They demanded a written undertaking that none of them or their friends would be taken. The government was alarmed and naval forces were asked for.[51]

Resistence was generally more passive. When Seaforth augmented his first battalion in June 1793, the men of Lewis fled from the farms. The wives of men who had enlisted were finding it difficult in any case to work their land and now threw up their leases. The threat of a general Press by the navy added to the panic.[52] At Banff, the men "do not like going to be killed, they say".[53] Those on Sir Robert Sinclair's estates fled to the hills, but he said the same had happened to Sir James Sinclair and Lord Caithness.[54]

Such was the system of recruiting in the Highlands. How widely did it extend? Even in the Highlands it tended to weaken. The rivalries of the great

personages and the conflict between clan solidarity and the claims of the feudal superior whose territories might cut across clan divisions were disintegrating factors. Donald Cameron was Captain of a company of his clansmen in the Northern (Gordon) Fencibles. His behaviour was insubordinate and he felt safe in this because he thought his men would obey no-one but he. His bluff was eventually called and the men were taken from him and put in other companies; in six months they had forgotten their clan loyalties.[55]

A tie, rather stronger than the average and which may have had its parallels elsewhere, was that of Roman Catholicism. The theoretical prohibition of their enlistment in the ranks was not ended till 1791 in England and 1793 in Scotland.[56] A body of them entered Frazer's Fencibles in 1794 and aroused the suspicions of the Ministers that this was a war to restore the old religion in France.[57] The company of Macdonnells who entered the Grant Fencibles and later formed the nucleus of their chief Glengarry's regiment were a fanatically clanish and disorderly body.* Isolated by such suspicion the Catholics might be expected to have a similar solidarity in more southerly regions. There was certainly a project for a Catholic gentleman in Lancashire to raise a body of soldiers from his neighbours;[58] but offers by Catholics were likely not to be publicised as such.✓

The Highland system is found in Ireland[59] and may have been general there since the condition of the tenantry was analogous. There is at least one instance in Wales. Sir Watkin Williams Wynn was confronted in 1795 with attempts to make the men of his regiment of the Ancient British Fencible Cavalry enlist in the regular army. He protected against this, because he would never be able to persuade the peasantry of his estate and neighbourhood that he had not sold them.[60] When a proportion of the regiment was disbanded

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* See page 290-291

✓ See page 272

at the end of the year, he demanded that they be first marched to Wrexham, lest they be enlisted on the way.[61] This is the authentic Highland note.

We should no doubt think of territorial recruiting in England as a very different phenomenon. The social status of the tenantry was totally dissimilar and they could hardly be hectored in the same way. That territorial recruiting existed in England and the Scottish lowlands, that such influence was possessed by high and low from Lord Buckingham and Lord Uxbridge downward is not in dispute. But no direct evidence of it seems to be available; we can merely infer something of its working from the study of county connections and the militia. Perhaps it is to the position of the local worthy or magnate as a purchaser of local goods and an employer of labour that we should look, rather than to his standing as a landlord. The tradesman of Huntly who expressed the hope that clothing for the Gordons would be made in the town from which their commander took his title[62] is the last clue that can be provided from the material of this section.

(e) Peculiar Sources of Men

Besides the main orthodox methods of territorial and professional recruiting, three queer devices remain to be noted - the enlisting of boys, convicts and prisoners of war.

(i)

"Boys" for military purposes includes all persons under sixteen, but a better definition is perhaps 'young and under 5'4"'. There were a good many such in the various levies. Lord George Lennox for instance complained that the Independent Companies coming into Plymouth were made up largely of weakly boys.[1]

Some were not weakly and had their uses; special permission was sometimes given to recruit them as Drummers for recruiting.[2] The most that could usually be claimed however was that they would soon grow and be ready for service.[3] The Duke of York, desiring some Fencibles for for immediate service, said they must have no boys in them. In disposing of such as were got, the East Indian station was the obvious solution. The voyage took upwards of six months during which the lads had time to reach the proper height.[5] Others were sent to Gibraltar to grow.[6] "Skeleton" requirements could also use them. The 15th, it was suggested, could get plenty of boys of 15-16 from 5'1" upwards who would be fit in nine months; the regiment was so weak that it would not be sent abroad before then.[7] Considerations of this sort must have prompted the setting aside of six regiments (the 9th, 16th, 22nd, 34th, 55th and 65th)[8] and later three more (the 4th[9], 32nd[10], and 52nd[11]) to recruit boys only. The order of December 1797 expressed the hope that there would be a school, turning out the more intelligent as good NCOs. The maximum age was eighteen. Those under sixteen could be as short as 5'1" but must be "long in the fork". The bounty was five guineas. Fusils instead of firelocks were the arms. Each lad was to be certified by his parish not an apprentice. Six grown men per company were to be kept as NCOs.[12] Others were enlisted as regimental tailors.[13]

Some progress was made - the 65th rose to over 500 in December 1799 and from being a skeleton now wanted only five to complete.[14] But other, quicker methods were being tried. The 4th,[15] 16th[16] and 52nd[17] gave their boys to the others and turned to recruiting from the militia. The remaining regiments grew up and went on service; the experiment never came to anything. Grey incidentally was against enlisting boys. He said they contracted bad habits and many died. Most would still enlist if left until grown up.[18]

(ii)

Pardoning criminals on condition that they joined the army was a very old device and all that remained of the policy of conscripting vagabonds - abandoned but harked back to regretfully.[19] There were three types of such pardons. Soldiers convicted by Court Martial petitioned the Commander in Chief[20] (or sometimes their officer did so[21]) and were sent to serve abroad for life or a term of years.[22] Sometimes the Court Martial itself imposed this sentence.[23] The regiments receiving these and other convicts were chiefly the 60th[24], the 20th Light Dragoons (permanently in Jamaica) for cavalry,[25] and the New South Wales Corps[26] (convicts guarding convicts). These men concern us in two instances. Many were deserters who were shovelled out of the country wholesale to where they could plague the recruiting service no more. Many were Fencibles and Militiamen who thus found themselves extending their service and reinforcing the line. This was the fate of some of those concerned in the mutiny of the Breadalbane Fencibles in 1795.[27] Men in this position are also found in the next type of case - soldiers sentenced in the civil courts and again pardoned if they would serve abroad. Three members of Hopetoun's Fencibles sentenced to death for rape were allowed to pass into Hay's new regiment.[28] Another time, three more men of that regiment convicted of stealing a gown from a strumpet, petitioned to go into the Scotch Brigade.[29]

Civilians convicted in the courts had usually to petition the Home Secretary[30] who procured a pardon for them if the army would accept them. Sometimes the court took the initiative; a magistrate discharged a man convicted of stealing timber on his undertaking to join the army and turn king's evidence.[31] Sometimes the Sheriff[32] or other prison authority contacted the army. In February 1795, fortyone men in Newgate were allowd to go to the 60th[33]. The gaoler had them attested[34] and they were taken by water under guard from Billingsgate to

Chatham.[35] The Surgeon General soon afterwards examined all the men in the prison to see who else could be taken if pardons were issued.[36] Local recruiting officers were sometimes approached. Dr. Johnstone, whose son was recruiting for the Scotch Brigade at Worcester, wrote in support of a petition of a prisoner there to serve therein.[37] Officers were however sternly forbidden to go and recruit in prisons.[38]

Owing to the state of the penal law, quite honest men could be got for the service in these ways. Three men asked to enter the 58th who had been sentenced to transportation for stealing a goose.[39] But on the whole they were a sorry crew. It was remarked about a draft for the New South Wales Corps that owing to the type of man it was difficult to say how fit they were for duty.[40] A battalion of the 60th was warned that a batch of deserters coming out was likely to fain illnesses in order to get home and special care would be needed in medical examinations.[41] A man who asked for a pardon was described as a thief and an incorrigible offender and was ordered to be discharged with ignominy rather than inflicted on another regiment.[42] Another man was to be punished as an example; no regiment would want such a creature.[43] The Duke of York reacted strongly when a marine was sentenced by Court Martial to serve in the New South Wales corps; it was neither legal nor right to make service in the army a punishment for the other forces.[44] A magistrate opposed the entry of four convicts into the army because they would leave large families to burden the parish.[45] Sir Abraham Hume who had interested himself in a convict was told that they were a nuisance to convey from confinement to the army and the soldiers of the regiment into which they were put felt "discredited".[46] Despite the good service of the 60th[47] the government was not prepared to fill the army on any scale from the prisons.

(iii)

There was a different feeling about one category of prisoner. From the fall of Toulon, an increasing number of prisoners of war, mainly seamen, came into British hands. The setting up of emigré corps in the latter half of 1794 enable advantage to be taken of this. The Comte d'Hector was commissioned to raise a corps entirely among the prisoners of war[48] and mainly among the "cannoniers" of the French fleet who were all royalists.[49] He was to have first pick, but the other corps had already been at work several months[50] when he was given this priority in December 1794.[51] Their officers descended on the prisons at Plymouth[52] and at Porchester[53] and Bishop's Walham[54] near Portsmouth. Hector stressed the necessity of separating the "meneurs et furieux" from the "bons et indécis" who could be worked on by visiting priests and their own officers.[55] Another officer wanted separate prisons for royalists, moderates and the republicans who were dominant even in prison.[56] A third noted that many royalists were afraid of their comrades and the "Tribunal". They ought to be removed quickly.[57] Severe weather was responsible for the enlisting of nearly 300 at Porchester in the mid-winter of 1794-5.[58] Among all this flotsam of war we hear the circumstances of Jean Rouc[illegible]airon captured when returning from India by an English privateer who joined the corps because he found an uncle was a sergeant in it.[59]

Troubles were not absent. Neither the military nor the prison authorities were very co-operative;[60] but then General Cuyler said the French officers at Portsmouth were ill-behaved.[61] The scoundrelly Charmilly gave the gaolers a guinea per man supplied and thus cut out the honourable Hervilly.[62] The officers did not trust their men; they wanted them transported on warships for fear of mutiny.[63] Three were alleged to have asked for repatriation with the object of setting fire to the ship that took them;[64] some were found to be Jacobins and had to be put pack in prison.[65] More remarkable was the decision

to disband Charmilly's regiment and repatriate the men (1796) pending which some four hundred, whose loyalty was not particularly suspect, were put back in Porchester prison.[66]

The conquest of Holland by the French led to the arrival of many Dutch and German prisoners and deserters and on them attention is concentrated after 1795. They differed from the French (and Spanish) in two ways. Firstly they were more "loyal"; even the prisoners had often been captured already from the Austrians.[67] Secondly, the 60th regiment could enlist them, whereas it could not take Frenchmen[68] (not that that had stopped Captain Walker, recruiting for an augmentation of one of the Battalions.[69]) Recruiting them was therefore confined mainly to British officers[70] and was seemingly more decorous. Dutch emigre corps existed[71] but did not reach large proportions till 1799.

The ordinary British regiments were in theory forbidden to enlist foreigners. But Colonel Campbell of the Dumbartonshire Fencibles, having exhausted his local terrain, proposed, rather than go to London, to bring over 500 Prussians. He had lived in Berlin and spoke German well.[72] His was not the only Fencible regiment to try and violate the territorial provision on which they were based thus drastically.[73] The crimps were also at work; Cuyler reported that some Jews in Portsmouth were enlisting refugees from Toulon and elsewhere and hurrying them to London for new regiments.[74] Nor was the government entirely adamant. In at least two instances prisoners of war or foreign soldiers were offered to a native regiment.[75] A final odd case was when Lieutenant Munro was allowed to enlist Blacks at Portsmouth for the West Indian regiments because he said they could be got cheaper there than at home.[76] Such were the various efforts to round up the foreign elements that strayed within our shores; a strange case both of scraping the barrel and of the international brotherhood of arms.

CHAPTER V : MAINTENANCE AND SUPERVISION

(a) Care and Disposal of Recruits

When the men had been enlisted, they had to be housed, transported to their regiments and there absorbed into military life. Each of these stages aggravated the evils of the recruiting system. The scattering of parties meant there was always a long march to the headquarters of the corps. Desertion was always worst on the march. Two Independent Companies of recruits marching from Chatham to Portsmouth had already lost six when they reached Guildford.[1] Though the men were now in a body under the eye of an officer or sergeant, discipline remained bad. In a new or temporary corps the officers had not yet received their commissions and it was not possible to hold a court-martial. There were mutinies. A party of Fencibles being marched to Chatham by a corporal refused to go beyond St. Albans, saying they had been "sold".[2] Another party at Rickmansworth had to be assured by the Justices in the name of the government that it would not be sent to the Indies.[3]

New corps concentrated at their headquarters were a terror to the local inhabitants. The sheriff-depute of Perthshire asked that Graham's men should not be feasted on the King's birthday but on the next day; he seemed to fear that their participating in the general rejoicings would turn them into a riot. The letter was not received in time, and the banquet was held without ill effects.[4] The 114th, brought from Ireland to be inspected at Abingdon, excited the wrath of the magistrates of Berkshire. They asserted that the publicans and populace had been terrorized into giving a favourable report of the regiment's conduct to the inspecting officer and asked the Commander in Chief for an inquiry - preceded by the removal of the regiment.[5]

To return to recruits on the move; billets were a source of dispute with the civil power. Beating orders replaced the usual "marching orders" as

authority for billetting; as they did not specify a route they were more open to abuse. The High Constable of Finsbury found that parties went from inn to inn collecting money which the innkeepers would rather pay than carry out their obligations. They thwarted the constable's control by having several beating orders. If he endorsed on one that they had been billetted they showed the publican another. Recruits enlisted two days after a party had arrived in a place were not entitled to billets. The parties therefore kept the attestations of men who had deserted and used them for new men. Ordinary troops with "routes" made things worse by pretending to be recruiting parties and acting likewise. A small staff had to be employed to supervise billetting, the Constable himself controlling those who had beating orders and not "routes".[6]

At Kidderminster stationary parties had been billetted for seven days (the maximum time) at each of the inns in turn. A new bailiff (a former publican) upheld the law by making them live (in the same place) as troops in quarters.[7] He also refused billets to men who had been on forays and returned - the law was that a party could not be billetted a second time in the same place during a period of 28 days.[8] These examples display the common abuses of billetting The ill-feeling which resulted is shown in the case of a party at Bristol which was refused billets because certain members of it had already received some and had therefore to hire quarters. This spread the injurious opinion that they were agents of the East India Company.[9] The offence of the Sergeant in charge in cursing and threatening the municipal clerks is thus understandable. At the request of his officer the margistrates forgave him and the party was billetted after all.[10] Some fared worse. Recruits of the 106th marching from Norwich on the way to Ireland were refused billets at Barnet.[11]

Parties on the march gave trouble in other ways. Some villages like Godalming[12] on the way to Portsmouth and Holmes Chapel[13] on the way to Chester

(and Ireland) were perpetually overcrowded with them. Sometimes they were stranded through the NCO in charge improvidently spending all his money and being unable to pay for billets. The civil power had then to come to the rescue. A party of Graham's regiment at Bedford was unable to move unless the magistrates advanced their subsistence - which they were unable to do without guarantees.[14] 140 men of the same corps had to be fed and lodged by the town of King's Lynn - in this case because the unsoundness of the ships in which they were going to Southampton made it necessary to land them.[15] We hear more of the grievances of the townships than of the hardships of the parties, but George Frazer reports that a party was once marooned by a snowstorm and six recruits froze to death.[16] Some men of the 13th were found destitute by the Sussex militia which therefore "enlisted" them. They were allowed to stay there.[17]

Marching recruits thus presented insoluble problems. The basic element was perhaps the shortage of persons able to keep discipline. Kempe in his plan for the reform of recruiting* hoped to achieve great things by moving the recruits to their destination in large bodies and teaching them discipline on the way.[18] One new, unestablished regiment, that of Leatherhead, did this.[19] But Captain Copson, for instance, who was sent to Chatham with 200 boys from Eling (near Southampton) complained that instead of six officers he was given one to help him. His NCOs had, he feared, pocketed the money given them to pay the billets. He did not sleep between Eling and Guildford and almost despaired of arriving at his destination.[20] No wonder Major Barrette, in command at Eling, preferred movement in parties of 30 and 40, which preference was endorsed by the War Office.[21] But this meant scattering and a loss of control from above, with the results we have seen. Sometimes corps organized purely for recruiting

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* See page 56

and not for service were allowed to have their men inspected in several local centres and put into established regiments on the spot.* This device was of limited application, served mainly to prevent loss to the officer by desertion, and was not liked by the authorities as lessening their control over the quality of recruits. The real answer to the problem was transport by sea.

To be allowed the expense of sea transport (half a guinea a man)[22] was a privilege greatly sought after. Desertion was prevented and discipline made easier. Chatham, Southampton and Plymouth were the army's main points of concentration. Recruits and raw regiments could easily sail thither down either side of Britain. From Fort George,[23] Leith,[24] Berwick[25] and Hull[26] (for the West Riding) they would go to Gravesend and march to Chatham. From Scotland[27] and from Chester[28] (for Lancashire and part of the Midlands) they went to Barnstaple[29] and then marched to Plymouth. The use of the Channel Islands as a sort of dumping ground for recruits is related to this use of shipping; it was similarly agreed to send Irish recruits to the Isle of Man.[30] There were drawbacks. Graham's men were kept waiting some time (and delay always meant loss) because the transports were not ordered up from Leith to Dundee. "The Public Offices do not seem to understand each other's motions". The soldiers' wives had to be exhorted to preserve cleanliness, and so health, on board.[31] A party going from Gravesend to join the Mackay Fencibles in the north was stopped by an embargo on shipping.[32] An officer was almost ruined when his Independent Company was captured at sea by the French.[33] These tribulations were however a small enough price.

Clothing the recruits was often a serious problem. When enlisted, each man was given necessaries and slop clothing, i.e. underwear and a temporary

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* See pages 68, 67.

uniform; when he reached his regiment, he got a proper uniform. As Fox, the Inspector General of Recruiting, pointed out this system worked badly in wartime.[34] Regiments were mostly abroad and often took their clothing supply with them so that their recruits were only supplied when they at length reached the foreign station. Corps used only for recruiting were not responsible for clothing; the men were only supplied when they were put into a fighting regiment. Regimental agents were supposed to send clothing to these drafts and to men going overseas if the regiment had not taken it with them.[35] They were negligent is doing so.[36] Slop clothing had thus to suffice for quite a time. It consisted only of linen trousers and a jacket-waistcoat (they often failed to meet)[37] and neither recruits nor parties had greatcoats.[38] From November 1795, a flannel waistcoat and drawers were part of the issue,[39] but recruits took some time to learn to take care of their clothes and wore them out at a great rate.[40] This was why regiments were reluctant to supply their men too soon.[41] Dishonest recruits also sold their necessaries - which presumably did not show.[42]

Recruits were thus insufficiently clad. Sir William Pitt spoke of one lot at Southampton as "ragamuffins".[43] Sir Hew Dalrymple reported that the many drafts at Chatham Barracks were "half naked and in rags filled with vermin and filth".[44] Disease was an inevitable consequence. Desertion was encouraged and also made easy since ragamuffins were not readily identified as soldiers.[45] It was difficult for depot commanders to step in as there was no sure way of recovering expenditure from the regiments.[46] Recruiting parties, especially in new corps which had no stock of clothing also suffered from the parsimony of the government. Colonel Treen declared that he could not complete his regiment unless his ragged sergeants were reclothed;[47] add what could the effect have been on discipline and public opinion, when a sergeant of the 30th had "only a pair of regimental trousers to show his connection with the army?!"[48]

The last stages of a recruit's career as such were his inspection and the settlement of his accounts. He then began his ordinary service, sometimes with the corps which enlisted him and sometimes with a regiment into which he had been drafted. The settlement of accounts was chiefly necessary because the full bounty promised was never paid at the time of the enlistment. Dr. Kerr gives one reason for this in complaining of a man who would not march unless he was paid; if this was done he would desert.[49] But the main reason was to ensure that the recruit had a balance in hand to meet the cost of equipping him - as was then the system in the army. Charges, regulated by royal warrant, were deducted and the recruit was paid the balance of his bounty and of his pay, which began from the date of his attestation.

Whenever soldiers were drafted, it was the aim of the receiving regiment to see that they were not in debt to their old officers nor these officers to them. The receiving regiment would in one case have to pay the debt, in the other to exact payment, in each case assuming the old officer's place viz-a-viz the man. The War Office often prevented a tangle of this kind by sanctioning a "bounty" of 1½ guineas a man to settle debts.[50] Regiments receiving recruits from another corps were on their guard for it was a notorious source of trouble.[51] The 43rd refused to accept men from Stribling's regiment because no money was forthcoming to settle with them.[52] Graham reported receiving men with arrears of bounty owing, especially from the 124th.[53] The General limitation of bounties was probably opposed for reasons of this kind. The War Office noted that men lately enlisted at a high bounty (£15 was the legal maximum at the time) should not have debts exceeding £1.[54] There are curious cases in which an officer who had enlisted some men by an offer of less than the maximum sum was made to pay the maximum by his superior officer.[55]

The War Office thought that even quite a small body of men joining a regiment for service should be attended by an officer and two or three sergeants to settle the accounts.[56] Recruiting officers however were unwilling if not unable either to attend or to pay up. It wasted their time and strained their credit. The sudden death of the Colonel found Stribling's new-raised regiment at Plymouth without any officer present save the Paymaster. Even he had no money with which to settle with the men - an ugly situation.[57] Sir William Pitt had to appoint an officer to look after fragments of new corps that had accumulated at Southampton, who riskily allowed pay to some of them, but was unable to correspond with all the Agents, so that their accounts were in confusion.[58] General Hyde reported that some recruits who had been placed in the 19th with their officers had been promised the payment of their account before embarkation. The date of this had been put forward and the men were nearly naked but the officers refused to pay up until their own accounts were settled and the regiment said that they were not authorized to advance the money. The War Office replied that on the contrary they had been so authorized - a very suggestive state of affairs.[59]

When there was a mutiny in the 118th at Birmingham, the magistrates put it down to the accounts not having been paid and the officers not being present with the regiment to do it or take care of the men.[60] Thus endless trouble was caused and the haphazard way in which the matter was finally dealt with might cause more still. Bernard sent a sergeant round the different regiments into which his men had been drafted.[61] Colonel Fullarton had to defend his new cavalry regiment against a charge of being mutinous. He said that because of an Election, orders came to march to Kilmarnock and settle all accounts. The regiment was short of officers and the Agent had to pay the accounts and complete the task in thirty-six hours. Hard drinking followed and one man who had not been fully paid refused to go on parade. His example was not followed

but there was an alteration lasting a quarter of an hour.[62] Thus the recruit passed into the army - neither well disciplined nor well cared for but gloriously drunk.

(6) The Superintendence of the Recruiting Service

Regimental independence was still greatly respected at this time and it was to the Colonels and commanding officers that control of recruiting was chiefly left. But we have seen how the conditions of the service loosened ordinary military discipline and both the Secretary at War, responsible for "law and finance" and the Commander in Chief responsible for the efficiency of the army found it necessary to interfere. For the former, the magistrate was the natural agent. The extensive connections of the Justices with the recruiting service will be apparent from what has gone before. It was the policy of the War Office to support and encourage their intervention in the interests of order and legality. This was partly for political reasons. Ordering a discharge asked for by a Mr Athorpe who lived near Sheffield, the War Office declared that it was desirable to stretch the rules in order to encourage an active magistrate living in a very unsettled area.[1] Mr Eyton wrote from Shropshire to complain that a Lieutenant Campbell, applied to to release an apprentice, had publicly insulted first his clerk and them himself. He suggested "that in this populous and manufacturing district, the authority of the civil magistrate should be upheld, against the military in perticaler"[2](sic).

This note was frequently struck by complaining magistrates and the Secretary at War responded with protestations of his resolve to uphold the civil power. But this policy was thought justified even from a military point of view. The Mayor of Stratford on Avon was told that Rann's corps then (1799) quartered in the town[3] was amenable to military law but the officers were not

commissioned (it was a new corps) and the Secretary at War's private opinion was that sich a "parcel of recruits" could only be kept in order by the enforcement of the known laws by the magistrates.[4] The Mayor of Richmond (Yorks) was assured that no harm came from magistrates disciplining a party that had offended them. Officers were too scarce to allow of one commanding each party and the army's reputation would suffer if it was thought there was no other control.[5] Because of the riots against crimps (1794) officers recruiting in London were told to inform the nearest Justice what houses they had hired to receive their recruits, so that he might occasionally inspect them.[6]

The War Office acquired a body of regular correspondents among the Justices in the chief recruiting areas. With the various Stipendiaries in London there was constant contact - notably with Colquhoun of Shoreditch who suggested (among other things) a plan to suppress illicit beating orders which was promised earnest consideration.[7] Athorpe in Sheffield, Haden, Hicks, Villers, and Holbeck in the Black Country, Richardson, Baily and Griffith in Manchester could not have written more if they had been paid agents. Information and plans flowed in. Dozens of magistrates wrote occasionally and were replied to with decisions of cases and definitions of the law. Officers were told to respect their judicial decisions; even in doubtful cases the magistrate was supposed to have done what he thought his duty.

Those who disobeyed suffered severely. A Mr Maxwell was raising men for an Ensigncy in the 113th (Birmingham) Regiment at Bromyard in Herefordshire. He was assisted by his father, a surgeon-apothecary who had brought in a "notorious fellow" to help.[8] They trepanned several men who however were released by the two local Justices who were asked to attest them. At last young Maxwell

furious, told his sergeant in the magistrate's presence to carry off one of these men as a deserter and he was taken to the regiment, where he finally attested in despair.[9] The populace were angry, their loyalty was shaken.[10] The War Office when told ordered the man's release and advised Lord Amherst that Maxwell should never be commissioned.[11] Despite the intercession not only of his colonel, who collected evidence on the other side and pleaded the rashness of youth in mitigation, but also of the two magistrates (both clergymen)[12] the War Office refused to forgive Maxwell un-til the Justices declared that the salutary effect of his disgrace would not be weakened thereby.[13]

One of the few instances on the other side may finally be given. Mr Coltman (whom we shall meet in another chapter) complained on behalf of the magistrates of Lindsay of the insolence of a Captain Holmes.[14] The War Office, though reluctant to believe ill of an experienced officer, finally decided they were right and ordered him to apologize.[15] But there had been a delay because Holmes had been sailing from Hull to Southampton[16] when complained of and had lost some relevant papers in a storm. The magistrates (whose letters have not survived) were apparently annoyed by the delay and the terms of the apology. Annoyed in turn by their discourteous tone and the suggestion that he should condemn men unheard, Windham refused to take the matter further - which he would otherwise have done.[17]

The Commander in Chief's main check on the efficiency of regiments was the periodic inspection. A newly raised corps was inspected when complete by a General Officer (a Field Officer if it was a small body) assisted by a surgeon. Each man was examined and those unfit or not up to the standards prescribed by General Orders and in the Letter of Service authorizing the corps were rejected. The inspecting officer had a copy of the Letter of Service and a list of the clothing which the men were supposed to have. He had to see that

they were properly supplied and that the instructions which the commandant had issued to the recruiting officers were in accord with the Letter of Service.[18] His report comprized statistics of the age, size and nationality (English, Irish, etc.) of the men and some remarks on the quality of the regiment.[19]

The Process was probably none too efficient. The regimental surgeon was very properly not employed[20] - a civilian was usually hired for ten or twelve guineas which was charged to the regiment.[21] There were no instructions to guide him[22] and his ideas of the medical standard required by the army must have been imprecise. Men were usually required to be 5'5" tall (5'4" in the case of growing lads).[23] As for age, the line (but not the Fencibles) were limited to men between 18 and 35.[24] But even when the Colonels had not been given greater discretion by their Letters of Service,[25] the inspecting officer claimed great latitude. Major Farquhar defended his superiors at Chatham against the complaints of a regiment abroad for which they inspected recruits. He thought they could deviate from their instructions if there was five or seven years' service left in a man; if the boys and older men were rejected, only a third of the men would be left. One-eyed men, though unsightly, were efficient; a man reported unfit was not so when medically examined.[26] Experienced officers were doubtless the best judges, but the remarks, (a few lines on a single sheet of paper) suggest snap decisions. Men are "mostly good", NCOs. "good looking", officers "seem zealous".[27]

Inspecting officers were often too indulgent and even in league with the recruiters. General Leslie inspected the 78th though it was not quite complete in the hope of relieving the officers of their financial burden. He dined with the officers afterwards and, they "took a hearty glass". He confided the contents of his report to the commanding officer and said that he hoped to obviate any further inspection.[28] General Whitelocke was a very good friend of Sir William

Johnstone whose new Fencible regiment he had to inspect in April, 1799. A month before, he showed him his official instructions and an adverse report that had been made on Tyndale's regiment, thus prompting him on what to avoid.[29] On the other hand, some inspections seem to have been both thorough and unpartial. General Garth said that he was "shut up" for three days from nine till five examining men of Sir Thomas Dunlop'sFencibles at the same time in 1799.[30]

Some abuses were checked. The worst men were weeded out; the commandant was often able to replace them at once from a surplus of recruits above the stipulated number. Disputes arose of course. General Douglas, Colonel of the 99th, complained of the rejection of some ninety men by General Musgrave.[31] His main objection was that they had been dismissed before he could appeal to higher authority. He said some were only a fraction too short and others had merely declared they were over age.[32] The War Office supported Musgrave.[33] Incorrect, if not fraudulent, meansurement of recruits was frequent; Sir Hew Dalrymple even said he wished the real sizes of the men "had some resemblance" to those in the record.[34] Perhaps the most useful service of the inspecting officer was to see that the accounts were paid and trouble averted. Sir Ralph Abercromby was told by Sir Benjamin Dunbar that he had no money to pay the men. He caused the money to be advanced and warned the War Office to look closely at Sir Benjamin's accounts.[35]

The recruits of regiments already on the establishment were inspected by the Colonel or his deputy. In these cases the Commander in Chief had only an indirect control through the annual inspection of each regiment at which proceedings were similar but defective men (because they could not instantly be replaced) were less easily got rid of.

Inspections were a clumsy instrument; the Commander in Chief made at this time an important attempt to improve on them by instituting a system of control. The beginning of this was the so called Inspector General of Recruiting,

already established in 1793, who was in charge of the recruiting parties of regiments abroad, except when their Colonels undertook to supervise them.[36] The commandant of Chatham barracks had an analogous relationship to the large mass of companies and corps organized solely for recruiting because almost all of them were sent to him to be inspected and disposed of.[37] In July 1794, these two offices were conflated on the death of Inspector General Townshend[38] (and after an attempt to transfer his functions without his title and emoluments)[39] and were held successively in our period by Sir Hew Dalrymple,[40] H. E. Fox,[41] (brother of Charles James) and S. Hewett.[42] There were two other slight interventions by the government to regulate the dispatch of recruits abroad. Men raised by the East India Company were inspected by an officer from the Horse Guards.[43] In 1796 a cavalry depot was established at Worcester (later moved to Maidstone) to train recruits going to the West and East Indies.[44]

In the provinces, General Officers had occasionally intervened to control parties. General Balfour ordered all parties to leave Newcastle in May 1795 because they interfered with raising the town's quota for the navy.[45] The Commander in Chief in Scotland inspected those corps which in England would have gone to Chatham[48] and his letters show an active interest in recruiting conditions in his command.[47] In 1796 he arranged the division of it into four recruiting districts and the stationing of a Superintending Field Officer in each.[48] These Superintenders were the great innovation of the Duke of York. In each main recruiting centre there was now an officer in correspondence with the Inspector General.[49] They were assisted by a Paymaster and a Surgeon; two staff sergeants were also allowed[50] and clerks could be hired - a regular bureaucracy for a military unit in these days. They were the Commanding Officers of all the parties i their districts, sole channel of correspondence between them and the Inspector General and fully responsible for the maintenance of discipline. They inspected recruits, received weekly returns and could order Courts Martial.[52]

They were not perhaps a very active body. The one appointed to Bury St. Edmunds in 1796, lived in Ipswich and went to Bury on Mondays to see recruits. If he managed to let his house, he proposed to move to Bury for the summer. In the absence of another Drummer to inflict the lashes, he felt he could not hold a trial of Drummer Berryman and proposed to send him to Chatham.[53]

Such was the personnel. How powerful could they be made? The Inspector General was accustomed to draw up Recruiting Instructions for the parties under his command in which the restrictions of Laws and Orders on the service were embodied. In this he merely did what each Colonel did for his regiment. In 1796 we find a new set being drawn up by Fox in consultation with the War Office and Commander in Chief.[54] The latter himself issued the instructions of small recruiting corps. In December 1794, the War Office sent copies of the Inspector General's instructions to a number of new regiments. Observance of these would obviate the difficulties found by certain officers in the settlement of accounts. A standard attestation form was also sent, henceforward to be obligatory.[55] The financial screw was something few officers could oppose; abuses and lack of form would diminish if they meant pecunuary loss. A standard attestation was recommended to the Fencibles in November 1794,[56] and the recruiting instructions to some at least of the old regiments at home.[57] The Superintending Field Officers watched for irregularity; they had among other things to report to the War Office any cases where they thought a civil prosecution desirable at public expense.[58] Suchaid was often desired by an officer involved in a dispute and threatened with loss. As noted above and for reasons already explained* they provisionally inspected many recruits before the march to Chatham or their regiment. The strengthening of their informal grip did not go unopposed. The Foot Guards objected to being told to conform to the

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* See page 67-68

recruiting instructions and the Adjutant General had to negotiate with the Duke of Gloucester.[59] But doubtless the urgency of wartime helped on the process; from the beginning of the war the government had been able to insist on direct weekly returns from all recruiting parties.[60] At any rate, the War Office and Horse Guards had between them the makings of a solid system.

Its utility is to be doubted. Shortly after the Duke of York became Commander in Chief an attack was made on two evils. A circular to new regiments of February 1795[61] restricted bounties to a maximum of fifteen guineas for "general service" and ten for Fencibles. Another in March[52] repeated this and also prohibited recruiting by civilians; any recruits raised by a person without a proper beating order were to be released by the magistrate asked to attest.* The "Public Offices" of London were sent the circular[63] and also asked to confiscate the beating orders of persons who were not attested soldiers.[64] The control of bounties was implied in Grey's report of 1809[65] to be the raison d'etre of the Superintending Field Officers. Certainly the best check was the issue of money to the parties via their Paymasters, which was the rule for instance for regiments in the Channel Islands.[66] Kempt, as we have seen, accused the Paymasters of being niggardly in their advances and cited an officer who had raised twentytwo men in the four months before becoming dependent on them and only six in eight months thereafter.[67] Major Cunninghame recruiting for the 70th at Swaffham had a balance in hand of £3.7.1½. at the end of 1795 which had jumped to £92.0.11½. in October 1796 and was still £82.13.11¼. the following June. In December 1797, he was owed £21.6.11¾. At that point he seems to have started drawing money through the local Paymaster and in the six months following he spent £121.7.6. more than he received. The Paymaster wrote and promised a large draft.[68]

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* See page 72

See page 9

The elimination of civilians also had its drawbacks. Many were innocent and useful - examples with a hard case have already been given. A hardish case the other way was Lieutenant Lyston who had to give up raising men for promotion because he had gone an active duty leaving the work to be done by a civilian, now disallowed.[69] Major Campbell of the 132nd considered the withdrawal of civilians a great blow to recruiting.[70] Nor can prohibitions impress one when earlier a sergeant in London, dismissed on the direct order of the War Office, continued work as a crimp from a public house.[71]

Rather half-heartedly, an attempt was made to diminish competition by controlling the movement of parties. The Inspector General could of course order the movement of parties under his own immediate charge, but also the commanding officer of the 22nd, for instance, was told (1797) to inform Fox where he sent his parties and advised to send them to the county with which the regiment was supposed to be connected.[72] When Manchester was reported overcrowded, Fox was told to order some parties away.[73] But the War Office refused to order parties to move at the request of each other[74] or even, when they were doing well, at the request of a magistrate.[75] They disclaimed the power and referred enquiries to the Colonel. The situation of regimental Headquarters was strictly controlled but that was to prevent overcrowding.[77]

More frequent inspections were an adjunct to these attempts at increased control, and much trouble they caused. Preparing and waiting for an inspection was an aggravation. Dr. Kerr had to call in his parties when recruiting was at its peak. After a long wait in idleness, the regiment was moved to Ireland and inspected a second time, when 260 men were unexpectedly discharged and grave financial problems caused.[78] Graham's second battalion was inspected twice and more men were got rid of the second time - there had been a good deal of fever in transports and billets.[79] When the Loyal British Fencibles were faced with a

third inspection, the commanding officer pleaded that no more men should be rejected; otherwise it would be "a business without end" as all inspecting officers had different opinions.[80]

A Middlesex magistrate declared that in the recruiting service "irregularities, when not very excessive, have their advantages".[81]. Grey, himself a Superintending Field Officer, thought that if only bounties were cut by a reduction in the issue of money, order would return and his own office would be unnecessary save in the largest cities.[82] Thus the Superintenders distrusted themselves and indeed it seems that reform too often meant quality at the expense of quantity and regularity at the expense of incentive.

CHAPTER VI: COMPULSORY LEVIES: THE MILITIA AND ITS AUGMENTATION

(a) The Militia System in Theory

In describing the recruitment of the regular army and kindred forces, it is possible to take for granted a generally accepted picture of their organization. So little attention has been devoted to the structure of the militia however, that it may not be out of place to indicate in passing something of the general character of this force. The present chapter will therefore be slightly more discursive than those preceeding it.

The constitution of the militia in our period was laid down in the General Act of 1786.[1] This was a consolidating measure, embodying the progress of ideas from the first revival of the militia by the elder Pitt. It was closely copied in the Acts for augmenting the militia in 1796-7.[2] The system comprised a compulsory levy of men from each county proportionate to the number of men therein who were deemed fit and liable for military service.

The organization by which the levy was assessed and raised was very closely parallel to the civil institutions of the county. At its head was the (Lord) Lieutenant appointed by the King and usually identical with the Custos Rotulorum, or head of the magistracy. His agents were the Deputy Lieutenants, appointed by himself subject to the King's disapproval, who were almost always chosen from the Justices of the Peace; some of their duties could be done by the Justices.[3] At county level, the main business was done by the General Meeting of the Lieutenancy, corresponding to Quarter Sessions; subordinate to this were Divisional Meetings of Deputies, corresponding to the local sessions of Justices. The orders of these bodies were executed by the constables of the hundreds and parishes. Both the General and the Divisional

Meetings had an official Clerk.[4]

There was one great difference from the civil system. Boroughs were included with the counties in which they stood for militia purposes. The Lords Lieutenants appointed Deputies within them who were subordinate to the county Lieutenancy. In certain cases however, the chief borough magistrate was to be allowed to appoint Deputies for the town because custom allowed it.[5] There were a good many special provisions in the Acts - to take account of local custom or autonomy.

Fit men aged eighteen to forty five were held liable for service unless included in several categories of exempt persons. These were peers, members of the regular forces (including garrisons), officers serving or who had served for four years in the militia, members of either university, the clergy (including dissenting ministers and teachers), peace officers, articled clerks, apprentices, sailors, workers in the royal docks and arsenals, Thames Watermen and poor men with more than one child born in wedlock.[7] An Act of 1794 added members of Volunteer Corps.[8] The Acts of 1796-7 restricted the exemptions by making liable (for the augmentation) peers, non-resident members of universities, persons entering Volunteer Corps after October 20th, 1796 and poor men with up to three children. A child now had to be under ten or infirm to count towards exemption.[9] Thus broadly speaking those liable were the younger section of the lower class and most men in other classes. For the augmentation, part of the older section of the working class was brought in.[10]

To assess the obligation, the General Act ordered a General Meeting each year on The Tuesday after October 24th. This ordered Divisional Meetings on stated dates and issued precepts to the constables of hundreds to order the parish constables to make lists of men between eighteen and

forty five, stating their trades and whether infirm. These lists they had then to take to the Divisional Meetings, having posted a copy on the church door at least three days before. At the Meeting, anyone wishing to do so had to appeal for exemption and after the Deputies had decided these cases the lists were amended accordingly and the numbers sent to the Clerk of the General Meeting. At the next county Meeting the returns were examined and the quota of men to be levied by the county was divided between the hundreds on the basis of these figures. The following Divisional Meetings would further divide the burden between the parishes.[11]

The original county quotas were stated in the act.[12] The General Meetings were obliged each year to report the total of men liable in each county to the Privy Council which was empowered to alter the apportionment of the stated national total according to population changes.[13] The returns were made but the Privy Council did nothing and by 1796 the burden was very badly distributed. The augmentation was therefore so apportional that when added to the existing quotas it corrected this disproportion.[14]

Having settled the parochial quotas, the Divisional Meeting gave notice through the constables of a further meeting to choose the stated number for each parish from among the men liable there by means of a ballot.[15]

There were now several ways in which the men required might be obtained. The man chosen might serve himself. He might produce a substitute who had to be from the same or an adjoining county, to have not more than one child (for the augmentation from the same county, but he might have any number of children) and to be approved as a fit person by a Deputy. Failing this, the principal was liable to a fine of £10 (£15 for the augmentation) or else was compelled to serve.[16] The Deputies were empowered to recruit

men with these fines.[17] Finally, the General Act empowered parish officers with the consent of the Vestry to recruit Volunteers to serve as substitutes and recover bounties paid to them to the extent of £6 each by levying a rate.[18] For the augmenatation, it was provided simply that men might be brought forward at the local Meetings and ballotting might be postponed in certain cases to allow the whole quota to be completed in this way.[19]

Special provision was made for Quakers who chanced to be drawn. The Deputies were empowered to provide substitutes for them and recover the cost, by distraint if necessary. There was also special provision for distraint on Quakers refusing to pay the rate for the levying of volunteers.[20]

A ballotted man choosing to serve in person was sworn in by the Deputies at the next local Meeting after the ballot. (Until 1797, he had to swear that he was a Protestant). If he did not so choose, the substitute or volunteer had to appear and be sworn instead. Ballotted men in the old militia had to serve for five years. Substitutes and volunteers also had to, but with the addition that if embodied for service they had to go on serving until disembodied.[21] The entire augmentation was liable to serve for the duration of the war plus one month. Time-expired men might be enlisted for a further term as volunteers by the regiment.[22] Militia men were not to serve outside Great Britain.[23]

Ballotted men whose assets were worth less than £500 were to be paid a bounty of half the price of a voluntary recruit, at the expense of the parish.[24] This provision was omitted from the first augmentation

Act but put in without retrospective effect when most of the force had been raised.[25] Once ballotted, a man ceased to be liable until his turn came round again (if ever) unless he only paid a fine, in which case he was exempt for five years. Persons ballotted for the old militia were not liable for the supplementary force.[26] A ballotted man's rights were not diminished in any way if he served by substitute.

The men having been found, a system was needed for drawing them into service. For this purpose each county contingent formed a regiment or regiments; the Act laid down in general terms the establishment appropriate to regiments of different sizes and the contingents of the smallest counties might be combined.[27] The Lord Lieutenant appointed the officers, subject to the King's disapproval, and also to a complicated scheme of property qualifications, which were lower in boroughs and various other places than elsewhere.[28] The Lieutenancy was empowered at five-yearly intervals to discharge up to a third of the officers if others expressed a desire to serve.[29] In contrast to these amateur soldiers, there was a full-time Adjutant from the army with a small staff of permanent N.C.O.s. They looked after the arms and stores of the regiment in peacetime, which were kept as a rule in the county town.[30]

In peacetime, the militia was only called out for twenty eight days' training each year. For the rest of the time, they were civilians and not under any military jurisdiction. The civil authorities had the job of calling out the men and punishing those who did not appear. The General Meeting fixed a rendezvous for the county and notified the parish constables (through those of the hundreds).*[31] The Act of 1786 provided

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* When the force was embodied for actual service, the constables had to notify each man personally (26 Geo.III c 107§68)

(as a measure of economy) that only two-thirds of the whole body were to be trained; the rest were to be sent home again and used only to fill any vacancies that might happen during the training.[32]

The King could embody the militia for actual service at any time. He was obliged merely to notify Parliament within fourteen days, calling them together if necessary for the purpose. When embodied for service or training, the militia were under military law and were paid and clothed as infantry.[33] Pay and clothing were provided by the national authorities. A "marching guinea" was given for each man called out on actual service, to provide him with necessaries. This came from the funds of the local Receiver General of the Land Tax. A further guinea was paid for the same purpose after every three years of active service.[34]

When the regiments were serving, the replacement of men promoted to be N.C.O.s, or dying or deserting or found unfit became an important question. Vacancies were filled by the Divisional Meeting holding a ballot of the men liable in the parish for which the man dropping out was serving. In the case of deserters, the regiment could only ask for a replacement after a lapse of three months and the deserter, if caught, still had to serve the full term as a supernumerary. In the case of men whom the regiment thought unfit, two Deputy Lieutenants had to confirm the discharge before a ballot could take place.[35] The general Act prescribed a minimum height for the service of 5'4" but for the Supplementary Militia this was lowered to 5'2".

For the purposes of this study the militia may perhaps be described as a tax on manpower laid on each locality, payable in men and preferably

in local men. How far it was from conscription is finally demonstrated by some clauses at the end of the General Act which envisage the failure of counties to raise their quotas. On Christmas Day each year, the Lieutenancy had to send a return of the county militia to the Clerk of the Peace for submission to Quarter Sessions. If there was no return, the Justices had to raise by a rate on the county a sum equal to £5 for each man of the county quota. This sum, paid into the Exchequer to be applied as Parliament might direct, discharged the county's militia obligation for the year.[37] These clauses were not brought into play during our period; but it was only recently and under safeguards that the counties had been willing to accept a fixed obligation to supply men.

(b) The Militia System in Practice

Against the framework provided by the laws it is possible to make intelligible the very haphazard information that has come down to us about how the militia were actually raised and called into service.

The general conduct of business resembled the civil side of the county government in being happy-go-locky and adhering only in a general way to the law. Lords Lieutenants varied somewhat in zeal, as did their Deputies. The complaint is sometimes heard that there were too few of these.[1] When the militia was augmented in 1796-7, some counties enormously increased the number to ensure there were enough always active. 84 were created in Derbyshire at one swoop, 30 in Essex and 29 in Leicestershire.[2] In the Forest Division of Berkshire, for which the Minutes for 1786-95 survive, two or at most three was the usual attendance -

two individuals doing most of the business - although as many as six turned out on occasion.[3] The only permanent officials were the Clerks at Divisional and County level, and their number could be reduced by pluralism. The Clerk to the General Meetings of Bedfordshire in 1798 for instance, was Clerk also to two Divisions comprising two-thirds of the county.[4] There is some evidence of defective clerical work. The Cambridgeshire Militia complained that even in 1795, two years after embodiment, the county had supplied no roll of the men who should be serving with the regiment, and the Adjutant was unable to say which parishes had failed to produce men.[5]

Inefficiency apart, there were a few disputes on questions of jurisdiction. The Corporation of Newcastle, for instance, claimed the right to appoint the Deputies to serve within the borough (a right granted in the General Act to Berwick). The Secretary of State gave his opinion that there was no precedent for this.[6]

Of the various branches of business, the adjusting of county quotas was neglected, as we have seen, by the Privy Council. The enlarging of the militia in 1796 and its reduction in 1799 gave an opportunity for complaint of which some advantage was taken. Carmarthen on the first occasion found itself likely to be overburthened in the new levy because three parishes had been inadvertently included in the last county census which belonged for militia purposes to Pembroke.[7] (The law was that a parish lying in two counties belonged to the one where its church lay).[8] The Members for Somerset similarly complained (March, 1799) that their county's quota was too large because part of Bristol had been included in it that really lay in Gloucestershire and so too had all the visitors to Bath and their servants.[9] The complaint could be the other way.

Dorset's quota was reduced more than the common proportion in 1799, to take account of the shift of population. The Lord Lieutenant was upset, because this would entail a reduction in rank for some of the militia officers.[10]

In the assessment of the burden within the county, the interpretation of the law was not strict. In calling for returns of men liable, the Lieutenancy of Lancashire told the constables that men who were exempt (a list of the grounds of exemption was included in the precept) might be left out, although those merely unfit were to be included.[11] Probably most of the sifting of the lists was done at parish level, where the circumstances of each man would be known. The The Minute Book of the Forest Division of Berkshire contains no claims for exemption for several years. Furthermore, many people did not trouble to claim their exemption unless they were actually chosen in the ballot. This was not legal but was apparently tolerated. The Cornish Clerk to the General Meetings suggested to the Home Office that they should be subject to a small fine.[12]

Various contentious cases did arise, which the Divisional Meetings had to decide. A Meeting in Cambridgeshire had over eighty cases brought before it at one time. Eighteen appeals succeeded on the ground of short stature and eleven because the applicant had two or three children (in one case two and the wife about to lie in). Various assertions of lameness in the legs or arms were made - some were accepted, some rejected, and sometimes a medical certificate was asked for. There is not enough detail to show if the Deputies were

dealing justly. Still, the man with a hare lip whose appeal failed was doubtless jealous of the man who was excused because he had been knocked on the nose, while the three one-eyed men who were made to serve seem unjustly treated. In all, twenty one appeals were rejected.[13]

The ground of appeal that appears to have caused most trouble was membership of a Volunteer Corps. Successive changes of policy made the position in this matter very complicated and Deputies sometimes failed to do justice to Volunteers for this reason. At the same time, many felt that the Volunteers were being let off too lightly. Lord Bateman the Lord Lieutenant of Herefordshire opposed the formation of a new Corps because it would increase the burden on the rest of the county.[14] The Duke of Northumberland, Lord Lieutenant of that county, would give no support to the Volunteers because they would be the ruin of the militia.[15] The reply made in Herefordshire was that the Volunteers were composed of men who would never serve in person and whose obligation as Volunteers was greater than what they would face under the militia laws. Full consideration of this question must be deferred till the chapter on the Volunteers but meanwhile we may safely accept the last view.[16] The absence of true conscription and the restricted number of the Volunteers made the matter a financial one rather than a fight for men.

Roman Catholics were debarred by the oath from personal service in the ranks of the militia. They had to serve by substitute whether they would or no. A complaint was made on their behalf by Lord Hawke[17] and the law was amended as we have seen. It is doubtful if this amendment made any great difference - few wished to serve in person.

The burden of the militia seems in general to have been accepted

by this time without much complaint and despite the considerable augmentation in this period. This is in striking contrast with the Provisional Cavalry, a compulsory levy which was an innovation. We shall record some outbursts of popular anger but there were only a few protests from the literate. To stand for these, here is the complaint of a group of Cornish Yeomen. The sum of half the average bounty for recruits paid to each militia man was assessed on his parish, those who had previously been drawn from the militia being exempt from the rate. These exemptions had raised the sum payable each time to £5 for each rate-payer. Soon there would be only one or two left, with a burden likely to make them bankrupt.[18] The cost of the militia to the landed interest is something that should not be lost sight of.

The assessment having been made, the men had to be raised. How were they in practice provided? Very few of them were "principals". In 1793, the War Office decided to make an ex-gratia payment of two guineas to substitutes who had been due for discharge but because of embodiment must now serve for the duration. The militia regiments had been circularized to know how many substitutes there were in each. The answers have not for the most part survived but in a circular acknowledging receipt of them, the War Office stated that most of the men were shown to be substitutes.[19] Returns of this period show 143 out of 560 in the Leicestershire regiment were ballotted men;[20] 69 out of 216 in the Monmouths;[21] 11 out of 477 in the West Middlesex.[22] The Nottinghamshire regiment had only 14 principals[23] and the substitutes outnumbered them by six to one in the Worcestershire.[24] Principals who did serve were often men who might have enlisted; like the one in the

Lancashire militia who wrote to complain that his family had not received their allowances and said he was an old soldier who had served at the siege of Gibraltar.[25]

For those who could not afford to hire a substitute by themselves, the commonest device to discharge their obligation was probably a Militia Club. The men of a parish who were liable would join together and raise by subscription a sum to be given to those on whom the lot fell, to pay for substitutes. From Atherton in Lancashire, there survives a rough paper (unfortunately without date) the phrasing of which suggests an uneducated writer, in which 166 men engage to subscribe 7/- each, yielding (after deduction of 2/- "paid for warming") £58. If none of the subscribers were chosen in the ballot, the money would be refunded. If it proved insufficient for its purpose, the ballotted man had no further claim on the subscribers.[26]

Informal arrangements of this kind could of course be commercialized. A "Militia Society" advertising in a Worcester newspaper in November, 1795, offered for a subscription of 5/6d. to get a substitute for anyone drawn before November 1st next year. It had agents in Evesham and Kidderminster and customers could also send their subscription through their newsagent.[27] An army officer reported that at Salisbury the Postmaster (who was also the printer of the local paper) sold the prospectus of an insurance society.[28] Later we shall find Lord Seaforth having trouble with the companies in Scotland. Charity as well as commerce might step in, however. In Scotland, also, we find societies of gentlemen formed to hire substitutes for the poor of the locality.[29] The Duke of Buccleuch declared this to be the normal

English practice.[30]

With the help given him by the legislature the poor man was probably able as a rule to comply with the law without excessive hardship. In one Division of Cambridgeshire, a Deputy was astonished after the ballot for the Supplementary Militia to find that many who could ill afford it were paying ten guineas for a substitute without a murmur. A few who had not found men were given a day or two more to do so.[31]

The arrangements so far described were better adapted to supplying money than to getting the men when it was supplied. For this also, collective effort tended to be substituted for the action of the individual ballotted man. In the Linton Division of Cambridgeshire, where almost all the parishes had subscriptions to provide substitutes, the men were hired by the Clerk of the Division. The Deputies approved of this practice, since ballotted men could hardly wander about the country searching for substitutes and were not good judges of whether the men they found were fit to serve. The Clerk expected some remuneration for his trouble but was not out for profit. In raising one batch of nineteen men, he only made three guineas for himself![32]

Collective effort was stimulated as the war went on because an increasing proportion of ballotted men preferred to pay the statutory fine rather than find a substitute. Lord Hardwicke in 1798 explained why. When the Act of 1786 had been passed, the £10 fine was much higher than the price of a recruit. Bounties had risen so much since then that the fine was now a soft option - a fact recognized by making the corresponding

fine for the Supplementary Militia £15.[33] Beside this opinion may be set the experience of Lord Radnor in Berkshire as early as 1794. Men were paying the fine in preference to finding a higher sum for a substitute and the upshot was that the money paid in was not enough to hire the number of men wanted. Lord Radnor asked the Home Office if it was legal to hold several ballots for each vacancy until either a substitute was produced or the accumulated fines grew large enough to complete the regiment.[34]

There was something to be said for the prevalence of fines. They were a check on the further raising of bounties by the militia themselves. A well-to-do ballotted man or a "militia club" had no objection to paying out a heavy sum once and for all. Recruiters for the army complained from the start of the war of the high prices paid for substitutes. Fifteen or even twenty five guineas was mentioned - more than for overseas service. The Worcestershire Regiment was offering the former sum in 1795,[35] when the competitive increase of bounties had been forbidden in the other branches of the service. The limitation of the bounty that might be given to militia men was considered by the Commander in Chief and his advisers in 1797, but the idea was abandoned as impracticable.[36] By limiting the liability of the ballotted men to a sum of £10 - almost the same as the maximum bounty payable by the Fencibles - or at the most £15, it might be possible to do by inducement what could not be done by compulsion.[37]

Left with the fines on their hands, the Deputies came increasingly to call on the county regiments to enlist men for bounty just like the army. The General Act forbade militia regiments to beat up for recruits

under any circumstances.[38] The augmentation by voluntary effort in 1794 was done in this way in some places however and it was legalized in 1795 for the replacement of men who had volunteered to leave the militia and go to the artillery or navy.[39] In Cambridgeshire, a General Meeting of September, 1796, fixed the responsibility for filling the deficit in the county regiment on the appropriate parishes and advised all concerned, in view of the shortage of substitutes, to pay the price and let the regiment find them.[40] A memorandum in the Home Office papers which appears to date from early in 1799 noted that Deputies were everywhere encouraging this practice with the result of divorcing the ballot from the actual raising of the men. All the business of the county might be complete, but the regiment would have not men but a balance in its funds.[41] This view is given point by a Court Martial on Colonel Colby of the Pembrokeshire Militia in 1800, when he was accused among other things of failing to raise two men in place of two who had entered the navy five years before. It was found that he had not raised the men, although he had not embezzled the money.[42]

It was the constant wastage of men from the militia when on service that regimental recruiting was used to counteract. There is no suggestion anywhere that the major work of raising the county quotas for the augmentation was done in this way.* The subject of the deficit was a source of constant friction between the county and the regiment. Under the conditions of that time, regiments lost a fair number of men by disease and desertion even when they saw no fighting. Men also had to be

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*Except for Lord Buckingham's proposal of 1796, which was refused (p.62). But he was Lord Lieutenant and a territorial magnate as well as Colonel of the regiment.

replaced when promoted and Lord Hardwicke noticed that parishes were reluctant to send good looking men to the regiment in case they were chosen to be sergeants and had to be replaced. He suggested that the county as a whole should replace promoted men.[43]

The main battle centred round men who were unfit. Regiments tried to purge their ranks of short or unsightly men[44] and refused to accept some of the men sent to fill deficits. Deputies disagreed about what constituted unfitness to serve as a recruit or a serving soldier. In Cambridgeshire, they refused to concur in the discharge of a number of men who were afterwards pointed out to an inspecting general. He agreed with the regiment and I noticed especially two men who were lame and one with a growth on his neck.[45] One recruit was sent back at once with an expression of astonishment that he had been passed by an experienced Deputy.[46] One parish flatly refused to replace one discharged man and got two Deputies to sign a letter to that effect, although they afterwards declared they did so only after a false promise to delete the offending passage.[47] Noting that twenty six of the Supplementary Militia newly joined were unfit, the Lieutenant Colonel of the Cambridgeshire said that the men of the Suffolk were much better and inferred that the Deputies there were much better supporters of their regiments.[48]

A memorandum of 1799 in Dundas' papers suggested that a penalty should be imposed on Deputies not filling vacancies within a certain time - some had failed to act after three or four years.[49] Another letter noted that men enrolled in the county were not given any peremptory order to join but stayed at home for a month or two before doing so. They nevertheless received back pay from the time they were enrolled - a "bounty for a species of desertion."[50] Scattered instances could be multiplied

of friction and hostility. It will be observed that some of the trouble, though by no means all, would be obviated by letting the regiments recruit their own men.

It is not surprising to find a permanent deficit in the militia, with a tendency to grow. Even in March, 1795, a return showed fifty two regiments were together short of 1207 [51] men and the Duke of Portland sent a circular to sixteen (each more than twenty five short) exhorting them to complete speedily.[52] In April, 1796 the deficit of all sixty six corps was 1832 (the effective strength being 35,333)[53] and appropriate orders were again given.[54] Early in 1799, there was apparently a feeling that the Supplementary Militia either could not or need not be completed. Lord Salisbury noted in July, 1798 that Dundas had led some to believe that the government did not wish the deficit in the augmentation to be made up.[55] The memorandum of 1799 quoted earlier on the subject of recruiting by fines was written to show the injustice of an idea of Dundas to stabilise the militia at the numbers then reached - the counties who had done most would then bear the heaviest burden.[56] Wilberforce wrote in the same sense in support of one of the Colonels of the West Riding Militia. He was disturbed at the prospect of counties who had found their share of the existing aggregate obligation of 104,000 having to maintain all their men when the total was reduced to 82,000.[57] Soon after this, the reduction of the militia to fill the line regiments robbed the problem of its urgency.* The militia had never apparently risen above 80,000.[58]

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*Severe measures were nevertheless adopted in 1799 but their importance for us lies in their effect on the opponents of recruiting the line from the Militia. See p. 321.

(c) Problems of Mobilization

The militia men, raised mainly by a civilian organization, were of no use until they were fitted into a military cadre. Both the "old" militia and the augmentation were conceived of as a reserve of trained men who could be quickly assembled at need and as easily dispersed. For these reasons it is unwise to discuss militia recruitment without showing how readily the men could be made available in the various crises when their services were called for.

The method of forming regiments and appointing officers has been explained. The officers were of course drawn in the first place from the county families and much of the smooth running of the system depended on this. In Lincolnshire, the Lord Lieutenant wished to appoint officers for the Supplementary Militia as soon as possible because resistance to the augmentation there had largely come from the feeling that the gentry should step forward first and lead the people, not merely coerce them.[1] The militia was essentially a product of what we have called "territorial recruiting connections", though in a roundabout way.

From the military point of view, the system had its drawbacks. The county corps were of very unequal size, ranging from two companies for Rutland or Anglesea to five regiments (in 1798-9) for Lancashire or the West Riding. Where there were several regiments, they were completely independent and presented no problem except for the one that comprised the leavings after making the rest a proper size. The average county might supply a single regiment, but no two were the same size. The officers were only half soldiers and tended to want a good deal of leave to attend to their private affairs - especially the senior ones who were

men of wealth. When the militia was embodied for any length of time, these amateurs tended to resign and leave a gap that could not be filled. Special acts had to be passed to give pecuniary encouragement to those willing to act as militia subalterns[2] and regular officers on half pay were asked to come forward in the emergency.[3]

What with odd-sized units and absent officers, the militia might well lack both efficiency and discipline. On the whole, however, it seems to have been a well trained force, thanks largely to the devotion of the ex-regulars who served as Adjutants. Striking instances to the contrary served nevertheless to keep disquiet alive. A serious mutiny of the Oxfordshire Militia in April, 1795, during which they seized grain and sold it cheaply to the poor, was attributed by the Mayor of Hastings to the absence of two thirds of the officers.[4] In 1798, the militia of Cumberland and Westmoreland were in a mutinous state - it turned out that no Field Officer had been present with either since 1793.[5]

There was a very strong consciousness of the position of the militia as the "constitutional force". The militia estimates were prepared by a Committee of the House of Commons, not by the War Office.[6] The government was as chary of giving orders to the counties on military as on civil matters - they often did by legislation what they might have done by executive action and consulted the Lord Lieutenants and officers at every turn. The senior militia officers, especially those in either House of Parliament, were members of a Militia Club which met during the Session in London and gave their opinions on all questions. They were the authors of the scheme for gratuities to subalterns already mentioned[7] and we shall see them consulted over family allowances and the recruiting

of the army from the militia.[8] With such men as Lord Fitzwilliam, Lord Hardwicke and the Marquess of Buckingham at their head, they formed an "interest" which the government could not ignore - which they never showed any signs of wishing to do. Thus for political as well as military reasons, the militia tended to be a source of trouble or at any rate preoccupation for the planners.

Such were the general conditions in which the militia was brought into service. We can now turn to the successive crises or calls to arms which the civil and military branches of the organization had to face. The initial call out began in December, 1792 and took until March. The first regiments to be called out were those of counties on or near the south or east coasts.[9] The two thirds that had been drilled in 1792 were first called for, and then the rest.[10] Gradually other counties were called on, working across to the west until the Welsh contingents were brought in.[11] The War Office had to get the Lord Lieutenants to appoint agents for the regiments and send details of the numbers of men to be paid;[12] the Treasury had to be informed.[13]

The counties had to cope with several problems. In Cambridgeshire, and probably in most counties, the quota had been allowed to run down towards two thirds the proper strength - the number which the county was obliged to train - and the deficit had now to be filled.[14] Whereas some counties ballotted for a fifth of their quota each year, others replaced the whole at once and the service of all the men ended at the same time. In Buckinghamshire and Hertfordshire this was at the end of 1792. It was thought fairest to disembody the former and re-enlist such of the men as were willing, replacing the rest by a ballot.[15] In

the other case, Lord Salisbury galvanized his Deputies into action and said that there were plenty of substitutes and it ought to be possible to get the regiment together without any postponement.[16]

Elsewhere, the Deputies were left the choice of dismissing time-expired substitutes and holding new ballots or making them save for the duration.[17] * In the latter case, it was decided to give a bounty of two guineas at the government's expense, and likewise in future to substitutes having to serve beyond five years.[18] The former mode caused trouble in the North Riding where the price of substitutes had naturally risen in the emergency and there was a demand that the bounty of half the price of a volunteer should be raised also.[19] In Lincolnshire a complaint was that men failing to appear had been replaced by ballot while those who came were made to serve.[20] These problems, and the matter of the families treated in the next section, were overcome and the militia was 32,000 strong by the spring - though not at full efficiency.

The augmentation of 1797 was impeded in some places by the riots described later on. A little trouble was caused by failure to observe any distinction between meetings held under the old Act and under the new, and making the same do for both. This was illegal. In Lincolnshire it was one cause of the riots.[21] In Northumberland, the Deputies felt themselves unable to carry out the provisions of the Act because the annual lists of men liable were made before they had cognizance of it and did not contain information (for instance as to the size of families) needed to decide on appeals for exemption from the new levy. The Act did not

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*Fortescue (IV 83) implies that the militia had to be reraised from scratch - surely a gross exaggeration.

empower them to call for new lists and so they had reached an impasse.[22] They wrote to the Duke of Portland who criticised their lack of initiative and referred them to the amending Act.[23] They refused to be convinced until June 1797, six months after the levy had been made elsewhere. A strong protest by Portland to the Duke of Northumberland[24] resulted in their consenting to act, though sure that it was illegal.[25] Portland asked as late as November what progress was being made.[26] The Duke of Northumberland was both contemptuous of his Deputies and angry with Portland for having answered them in the first place.

Legal difficulties such as this were evidently widespread for the amending Act[27] is mainly a measure of clarification. Nevertheless it is clear that the new levy was smoothly and expeditiously made for the most part. General Dundas could say next summer that the force in all but six counties had not only been raised but trained.*

The duty of organizing the training of the whole levy for twenty days as soon as possible was laid on the Lieutenancy, as in the case of the peacetime militia. They were to fix the time and place and could divide their county contingent into several sections to be drilled separately. Clothing and arms were to be supplied as they thought necessary.[28] The existing militia regiments were to supply officers and NCOs to train the men as far as possible but additional officers might be appointed if necessary.[29] The amending Act allowed the use of Chelsea pensioners.[30]

The General Meetings duly made arrangements and reported them to the government. February, March and April 1797 were the months when most of the training was done.[31] There was a little difficulty over supplying instructors (as the use of Chelsea pensioners suggests). Lord Bateman

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* See page 28

feared that any officers sent from the militia would use the occasion merely as an excuse to go on leave.[32] Absenteeism among the men to be trained was also a problem; Lord Radnor was not sure of the way to impose fines on these people and order their replacement if they could not be found.[33] But complaints were not numerous. In Cambridgeshire the enthusiastic Adjustant Wale found the first division very willing to learn and made good progress despire falls of snow. Some of the men became desirous of entering the old militia and going on service at once. Wale thought the whole body fit enough to be added to fully trained units without inconvenience. Only one man absconded and in order not to disturb the goodwill he was recommended to mercy when caught.[34] The main problem arising (with subsequent divisions) was lack of specie to pay the men.[35]

The embodiment of the Supplementary Militia in 1798 was a more difficult matter. Rough plans for doing this had existed from the beginning.[36] General Dundas later proposed to embody a third of the force for some months and then disembody them and embody another third, and so on.[37] For this he thought legislation would be necessary. IN January 1798 he advised the government, since the necessary Bill would not be opposed, to order the Lords Lieutenant to go ahead at once and have all completed by a specific date.[38] The government did this, sending also the heads of the Bill so that the Lieutenants could suggest amendments.[39] The pace was too rapid. The first Bill (passed on February 20th) specified the assembly of all the men by February 28th,[40] though General Dundas had pointed out the need for more time in remoter counties, where the instructions would be later in arriving.[41] Within three days an amending Bill became law changing the date to March 10th.[42]

The earlier measure provided that when the men were assembled (by subdivisions) one half were to be chosen by ballot and told to go to a county

rendezvous appointed by the Lord Lieutenant.[43] The remainder were to be sent home. All were to be paid for their attendance.[44] Militiamen might volunteer to join the embodied portion in lieu of others on whom the ballot had fallen.[45] An Act passed at the same time enabled the army to recruit from the Supplementary Militia and the Lords Lieutenant were told by circular to keep the embodied half at the rendezvous for a spell while the regulars tried to enlist from them. After eight or ten days, those who did not enlist were to be marched off to service.[46]

The physical task of organization was great. The men had to be sent as a rule to regiments serving at a distance from their own counties and General Dundas stressed the difficulty of marching 20,000 men about the country in all directions at the same time.[47] The regiments had to spare some of their scarce officers and NCOs to conduct them. Where this was impossible, the inexperienced officers of the Supplementary Militia had to be used. Lord Lieutenants were told to appoint a full quota of these (one for every thirty men was the guiding principle) but it was not easy to find them.[48] When new regiments were set up, the problem of command was naturally acuter. It was met in part by sending some NCOs and steady privates of the old militia to be the NCOs in the new battalions. An equal number of recruits was sent in exchange, to keep up the strength of the old regiments.[49]

Needless to say, there were wraggles between regiment and county about the quality of the men. The Colonel of the existing North Riding regiment insisted that the recruits be divided between his and thr new regiment on the basis of their taking alternate men as they came up, The Lieutenancy protested against the imputation that the men were inferior.[50] Deserters sometimes presented a problem. The new Act put in force the provisions for

punishing and replacing deserters already in use for the old militia.[51] The Lieutenancy of Cambridgeshire had the ingenious idea of allowing persons ballotted to replace deserters a limited time in which to try and catch the man they were to serve for. If they succeeded they were discharged.[52] This was not legal under the general Act but appears to have been so under the new one.

The most controversial problem was whether the new levy was entitled under certain conditions like the old to half the price of a volunteer. The second of the two acts of 1796 specified the assessment of this sum by the Deputies, but for the purposes of the General Act.[53] The embodying Act said that it was to be given only to men ballotted thereafter.[54] There was a violent legal controversy about the due of the rest.[55] When the question first came up, at the time of the drill in 1797, the government declined to give an opinion and said that if informal agreement among the Deputies was impossible someone should bring an action in the Court of King's Bench. They seem later to have come down in their own minds against the men. In Lancashire, the Deputies paid the money and were then unable to compel the parishes to reimburse them.[56] In Lincolnshire, the money was refused to the men, who accused the Deputies of withholding their rights.[57] By that time, the government could answer with the view incorporated in the embodying Act.[58]

No sooner had the first part of the new militia been digested than the rest was called out (April 1798). The embodying Act empowered the King afresh to do this,[59] so there was no further legislation. On this occasion the work seems to have gone ahead without much trouble or complaint.

The final crises within our period were the two reductions of part of the militia in 1799. They formed part of the schemes for getting militia men to enlist in the line. The plan of July envisaged reducing militia quotas

by one quarter. A circular instructed Lord Lieutenants to fill any deficit there might be before this was done and to eliminate any surplus left after men had gone to the line by discharging unfit men and men with large families.[60] Thus there was a straightforward purge by the regiments of undesirable elements, without the need to quarrel with the parishes about replacement.

In October things were more complicated. Three-fifths of the quotas of July had to be reduced, and those who did not enlist were not to be discharged but to remain militia men, subject to recall. Casualties in the militia were to be replaced from this reserve, which was to be kept up by the counties to one fifth of the July quotas. Men enlisted for the augmentation of 1794 were not to be disembodied, as they would not be liable to recall. There was no other restriction on who might be released. Where there were several regiments, the Lord Lieutenant had to arrange and co-ordinate the work: in some counties the number of regiments had to be reduced.[61]

In these larger counties, the Lord Lieutenants had a difficult time. Lord Derby in Lancashire feared in the earlier reduction that through lack of co-ordination too many would be discharged and the county would refuse to replace them.[62] For the second occasion he got the two regiments to be done away with to send a third of their strength to each of the other three regiments, the reduction being made from these aggregates.[63] Even then, one regiment complained that it was sent all the bad men, and the share of another had to be marched to it, having already participated in one disbandment.[64] Lord Fitzwilliam decided to adopt Lord Derby's plan in the West Riding and also to disband firstly men with families, then those serving as principals and then by lot. In general, family men were let out first.[65]

The disbanded men were marched home in a body and given two weeks' pay and their uniform. Full lists (showing for whom each man served) had to be sent to the Clerk of the General Meetings. The officers who became redundant retired and received a gratuity of six months' pay. A certain number might be kept on as supernumeraries or with lower rank. There were similar arrangements for NCOs.[66] A good deal of trouble was caused by the jealousies of the officers on this occasion, the Colonels and Lord Lieutenants making valiant attempts to be fair. It will be seen that disembodiment was a regimental rather than a county affair and no doubt better done in consequence.

Such was the way in which the national reserve force responded to the needs of the hour. It was, considering its cumbrous constitution, remarkably efficient in doing so, and its value as a recruiting instrument lay not least in being able to produce men when asked and to keep them in store.

(d) Militiamen's Families

The soldier of this period was not normally a married man. If he was, his family either lived in squalid conditions with the regiment or stayed at home, usually on poor relief.[1] If a "citizen army" was ever to be created, this would have to be changed. Here the militia led the way and in so doing made part of its contribution to widening the field of recruiting. The development of policy at this time is not without interest from our point of view.

The militia acts of the mid-century had made provision for the families of ballotted men serving in person, but by an oversight the consolidating Act of 1786 was silent on the subject. A meeting of the "Militia Club" in December 1792 called Dundas' attention to the subject and he promised legislation. The main purpose of this would be to shift the financial burden from the parishes where the families were "settled" to those for which the men served.[2] The question at once arose - were the substitutes to be included?

Lord Euston (Lord Lieutenant of Suffolk) said that men would be disinclined to serve if the matter was left to the discretion of magistrates.[3] From several regiments including those of Suffolk, Devon and Somerset came reports of neglect of the families by the magistrates and murmurings among the men.[4] Dundas decided to refer the case of the substitutes to the cabinet.[5] The Act as passed covered them: Dundas said it did not fix the sums to be given in the case of substitutes' families but it is by no means clear that he was right.[6]

The system established was that the wife of a militia man and each lawful child under ten years old unless they followed the regiment were entitled to a weekly sum each equal to a day's labour at local rates which was to be paid by the parish in which they lived. The parish for which the man served would reimburse the sum involved on the order of two Justices. If the respective parishes were in different counties, the reimbursement was made via the two county treasurers.[7]

The inclusion of the substitutes was not an innovation but dated from the previous war.[8] A weighty case was made out against it nevertheless by quite important people. Lord Buckingham said that this was the heaviest burden of the farmers in the late war. Men with large families would not be engaged in their own localities but would go to other counties where the facts were not known and thus impose themselves on the public. There should at least be a limit of 5/- a week to what each family might receive as of right.[9] Sir Charles Willoughby, Chairman of the Quarter Sessions of Oxfordshire, also spoke of the burden on the poorer farmers and the need to conciliate them for political reasons. Egged on by their officers, men were demanding 2/- a week for a wife, even when the parish offered to find her work. Sir Charles complained of the power in Parliament of militia officers and Lord Lieutenants who promoted these expensive measures - interesting evidence of a "militia interest" at work.[10]

The general working of the system need not concern us. An unsuccessful attempt was made to confine allowances to children born before the man entered the service[11] (it must be remembered that substitutes were supposed not to be allowed if they had more than one child). Quarter Sessions seem to have taken the lead in making scales of allowances which they recommended the Justices to adopt in interpreting the act.[12] Various anomalies came to light and were corrected by later acts.[13] In particular, NCOs. were brought within the scheme. There were occasional quarrels, such as whether the families were entitled to allowances when the regiment was in its own county. The Law Officers in 1799 concluded that they were.[14]

The question remained whether family allowances might be extended to other parts of the forces. There was a considerable controversy over the status of the families of men who had been added to the militia by voluntary enlistment (the plan of 1794). Volunteers in lieu of part of the quotas were included in the scheme and specially mentioned by one act of 1795.[15] This was held not to apply to the men of the augmentation. Apparently a sudden discovery of the state of the law was made by some authorities. The overseers of Birmingham, which supplied men for all the surrounding counties, reported in 1797 that the various county treasurers had stopped paying for the volunteers' families.[16] Something similar happened in Cornwall.

Considerable burdens were thrown on the places whence the men had come. On behalf of Kidderminster, where the poor rate had risen from £70 to £100 a year as a result of this, a local M.P. requested legislation in 1798.[18] There were other similar requests at this time.[19] The counter-argument was that an unlimited liability would be imposed on the county.[20] Nevertheless, the first act for the reduction of the militia in 1799 ordered provision for volunteer's families at the expense of the county.[21]

In the offers of the militia to serve in Ireland lay a new opportunity to extend the provision for families. The men had always to be reassured on this head. For instance, the officers of the Bedfordshire militia promised that if the regiment went to Ireland they would use their influence with the magistrates to see to it that the families were generously provided for.[22] On the other hand it was reported from Hampshire that the parsimony of the magistrates had made the men unwilling to renew their offer to serve.[23] The government decided to help out. Orders were given to the Commissioners of Taxes to pay 8d. a week to the wives and children under ten of men going to Ireland. Payment was to be through the overseers as a rule but families following the regiment were to receive the allowance - this marks an advance on the statutory provision.[24] Families of volunteers were however left out, as they had been at home.[25] One county regiment of Fencible Infantry - the Royal Lancashire Volunteers - also received this allowance, being regarded as almost an augmentation of the militia.[26]

Within the militia, allowances had by 1799 been given to men raised by voluntary enlistment and men serving abroad. This invited comparison with conditions in the regular army and when the enlistment of militia for the line was planned, the question was raised. Dundas, in the memorandum of May 1st 1799 in which he presented the idea to the cabinet, proposed that allowances should continue at the government's expense for the families of men who enlisted. He said that there should also be an annuity of 40/- for the widows of men who died in service and that this should be extended to the whole army, which would encourage recruiting. The soldiers were jealous at seeing provision of this kind made by voluntary subscription for sailor's families.[27] Lord Spencer replied that such provision was made only when seamen were killed in action: if the soldiers got something better, the seamen would demand

reciprocity. Grenville agreed with this.[28] Windham[29] thought the idea of pensions a good one.

The idea of pensions was not followed up. The provision of family allowances in the case of militia men entering the army was opposed by Colonel Elford[30] (for instance) because it would make the other soldiers jealous. A suggestion was made that the bounty for the militia volunteers should be regarded as partly compensation for loss of the allowances and that half of it should be paid to the family.[31] In the end nothing was done and militia men entering the army forfeited the allowances - with results on the work of recruiting them that we shall notice in due course.[32]

The problem of these families is part of the financial problem involved in expanding the forces. A large part of the active manhood of the nation could be drawn on only at an increasing cost per man. Compulsion moreover, which might diminish bounties, was here leading to increased recurring charges in their stead.

(e) The Extension of the Militia to Scotland

Owing to the fear of Jacobitism, Scotland had not been included in the revival of the militia in the time of the elder Pitt. We have noted the abortive Bill of 1793 which got only a first reading.[1] News of it had reached Scotland: a Selkirkschoolmaster told Dundas that the idea was unpopular and the Duke of Gordon said he could raise no Fencibles till the militia has been completed.[2] The project then slept and in November 1796, at the time of the new English levies, Dundas told the Duke of Montrose, "you might be overrun with half-a-dozen invasions before a Scotch Militia Bill could be agreed upon, formed, passed and put in train for execution."[3]

A similar conclusion was reached at some meetings of influential personages in Edinburgh in March 1797 which were the subject of a report by Colonel Dirom* to the Lord Advocate. They considered a militia on the English pattern unsuitable for Scotland because the middle class there was too poor to afford substitutes. It could not be more than about 5000 men and to levy it would cause trouble and tempt the enemy to invade. An irregular force like the English supplementary militia would be the thing and they should try to build up the Volunteer movement in imitation of this, ultimately devising a militia law which would build on the basis of the volunteers. Meanwhile they advised an augmentation of the Fencibles and the enlisting of men by the "skeleton" regiments to serve for a limited time.[4]

Others were now taking a different view. Some of the county meetings called to consider the raising of volunteers - those of Berwick, Fife and Inverness for instance[5] - declared that the institution of a militia would be preferable. At the end of March, the Duke of Atholl was in London and gathered from Portland that a militia bill was to be brought in. Dundas showed him the correspondence on the subject and said that the Lord Advocate was drawing up a bill but the opinion of the Scots themselves would decide the matter. Returning to Edinburgh, Atholl found conflicting opinions: the Lord Advocate had gone to London to report and the government had delayed a decision till he arrived. Atholl himself favoured a militia but inclined to think it a long term measure which should not interfere with the Volunteers.[6]

The government finally decided in favour of the militia, suspended the augmentation of the Volunteers and brought in a Bill which was passed without much difficulty in the course of the summer.[7] In executing its first main pro-

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* Author of two complete treatises on the defence of Scotland prepared in 1797 and 1803 at the request of the Quartermaster General. Watson 1754.

vision - a census of men between nineteen and twenty-three years of age - the authorities were obstructed by the remarkable riots which will be described in the next section. Having weathered that storm, they were bothered with fresh doubts as to whether to call the force out. The Lord Advocate wrote to hurry things up in November.[8] The ballots were held and half the force was embodied in May 1798 without opposition. Yet even in the autumn of that year, Atholl desired a fresh start and a new act before calling out the rest. He proved to be alone.[9] The Duke of Montrose pointed out that legislation would so delay the levy that the men would not be trained in time for the start of the campaigning season of 1799. Futhermore, it might occur to Parliament to grumble at the smallness of the force and the confinement of its service to Scotland. After the war there would be time for a new act to remedy these defects.[10] Thus the debate closed and the rest of the new militia was brought into service.

The character of the force may now be explained. The main Act of 1797 followed the English pattern in the main, varying it to suit Scottish conditions. Six thousand men were to be raised. This number was to be apportioned between the counties by the Privy Council, to which each was to send a return of the number of men liable.[11] The work of taking the census was to be done by the village schoolmasters. The men liable were those aged between eighteen and twenty-three.[12] Among the exempt were men with two children, schoolmasters and professors.[13] An attempt to get university students exempted as English ones were apparently failed.[14] An Act of 1799 widened the liability to include men aged nineteen to thirty.[15] Service was for the duration of the war plus one month and was confined to Scotland. Substitutes had to be unmarried.[16] By the Act of 1799, ballotted men chosing to pay the fine and being again ballotted were exempt from further liability on paying £5.[17] Previously, a fine seems to have carried no exemption.[18]

In embodying the force, the Act envisaged counties supplying a company of man or less. In the former case, the Lords Lieutenant were to appoint all three officers of the company, in the latter they were to share this patronage.[19] Although county regiments were provided for,[20] the clauses allowing the combination of small units into regiments[21] were to have an importance they seldom had in the English act.

In considering the application of the law, it will be convenient to explain first how the force was called out and formed into regiments. The census having taken place in August 1797, the quotas were apportioned by Order in Council in March 1798[22] and the ballot followed. At the same time, the government announced their intention of calling out half and adding the rest later[23] and an act was passed similar to the one calling out half the supplementary militia.[24] The two halves were embodied by Orders in Council in May and November.[25] They were formed into ten regiments. Perthshire and Lanarkshire had one a piece and the rest were formed of groups of counties.[26] The plan was probably the work of Major Dundas Saunders, a relative of the Dundases.[27] The government appointed the Field Officers and the grouping of counties were probably decided by considerations of patronage. Dundas said that if he had known Lord Craufurd wished to command a regiment, he would have put Fife and Stirling in different regiments instead of the same one. As it was the Duke of Montrose (Lord Lieutenant of the latter as Craufurd was of the former) had an overriding claim.[28]

The appointment of the inferior officers was a source of some trouble. The property qualifications laid down in the Act naturally differed from those in England, having to be expressed in terms of Scottish land law. Confusion was caused by the absence of precedent and the doubt as to what constituted the Scottish equivalent of a freehold.[29] The Duke of Buccleuch reported also

that the chance dating of commissions by the various Lords Lieutenants had settled the seniority in his regiment in a very arbitrary way.[30] Lord Seaforth also complained of this and was anxious that seniority should go according to previous service.[31] He was also anxious that promotion should go by seniority and persuaded all the Lord Lieutenant who appointed officers in his regiment (except the Lieutenant of Caithness)[32] to leave the filling of vacancies in his hands.

It will be realized that the link between counties and regiments was tenuous compared with the connections in England. This made the chief difference when it came to raising men. Lord Garlies reported in May 1799 that as a result of the counties sent any man who was not too obivously unfit and the regiments rejected any man who was not above average in quality. There was no spirit of give and take. Many ballots had been held to replace men whom the regiments rejected and soon there would be no men left to be ballotted.[33] The Lord Advocate commented that the General Officers Commanding might be asked to arbitrate in such cases.[34] Lord Garlies was an optimist in supposing that the problem was absent in England but the tone was certainly harsher in Scotland. Lord Seaforth had quite a sharp misunderstanding at the outset with Brodie the Lieutenant of Nairn (no enemy of his) over who was to arrange for the men of that county to march to the central rendezvous of the Northern regiment.[35] He complained that the counties sent him no proper returns of officers appointed or men ballotted. Men arrived with only scraps of paper bearing their names.[36] In 1799, he was still grumbling at dilatory way of doing business in the Highlands and trying to lay down standard forms of correspondence.[37] He had a first class row with Morayshire which tried to oblige him to accept men under the regulation height. The regiment, he said, must be the judge of whether a man was fit for His Majesty's service.[38]

It will have been noticed that the ballot was very quickly followed by partial embodiment. With the regiment in existance to recruit, the counties were tempted to leave the work to them after providing a nucleus, thus immediately adopting the current English practice and making the ballot less of a reality than, for instance, that for the English Supplementary Militia. The Highland nobleman at the head of some of the regiments were much better able to recruit than the counties. The duke of Atholl had to be told to hold a proper ballot in Perthshire for the deficit in his regiment and not fill it merely by voluntary enlistment.[39] Seaforth got the men for his own county of Ross, receiving the fines from those liable to serve.[40] He consented later to raise men for other counties supplying his regiment on the same terms.[41]

Energy on the part of the regiments was matched by slackness in the counties. Caithness took no notice of Seaforth's demand for its quota of men and then offered to pay him fines for them. He agreed to find men for the second half of the quota, ordered to be embodied in November, but insisted on the county producing the rest.[42] Much earlier on, Dumfries, Orkney and Clackmannan had failed to send in returns to the Privy Council and[43] and special act was needed in February 1798 to enable the quotas of the rest to be apportioned without them.[44] Dumfries had been held up by the riots but the other two had no excuse. Finally all carried out the law except Orkney,* which sat tight and did nothing, apparently on the ground that almost the entire male population were seamen. Seaforth was furious at this. He said the inhabitants of Wester Ross were as much seamen as the Orcadians - that is to say, both groups were inshore fishermen. The Lieutenancy of Ross had ruled that they were not to count as seamen, and there was much discontent at what had happened elsewhere. Seaforth noticed that Orkney had been equally successful in avoiding a "hot press" on that coast some years before.[45]

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* Shetland was excluded from the Act.

With the counties backward, the working of the local ballot was not always smooth. The devices used in England to spread the financial load were at once adopted. The gentry in Kincardineshire started subscriptions to hire substitutes for those who could not afford them as soon as the first census had been made.[46] The insurance companies were active even in the Highlands and caused Seaforth much trouble. Men who were ballotted took no action, expecting the Company to do everything. Seaforth said that if they did not produce a man or a fine, they would be proceeded against as deserters and made to serve if caught. Their agreements with the insurers were nothing to him. Nevertheless, he asked the Lord Advocate to warn the companies not to evade their obligations.[47] One firm said that the fault was all with the men, who had neglected to notify their being ballotted,[48] but there is some evidence against this.[49]

For the rest, Seaforth was troubled by men absconding without attempting to join. A strong circular was sent to the Deputies of Ross calling on them to catch the deserters and if not found, to replace them by a ballot in the same parish.[50] In Lewis, the brothers of some deserters offered to serve instead. They were to be taken, if fit.[51] The fact that so many Highlanders bore the same name led to at least one case where the identity of a ballotted man was disputed.[52] The authorities could be obstructive. The Factor of Harris shielded a deserter.[53] The Deputies of one region refused to act.[54] Four constables were in prison at one point in 1799 for refusing to carry out orders; their fines were paid for them.[55]

The history of the militia in Scotland in these early years shows the nation being accustomed for the first time to a compulsory levy. The size of the force raised may not have justified the effort, but the government, by its perseverance in the face of opposition and even insurrection, had created an important new militiary institution from which posterity might be expected to derive the main benefit.

(f) Resistance to the Militia Laws

The government was successful in greatly augmenting the English militia and creating a corresponding force in Scotland. That it came fairly near to the maximum which the nation would bear and showed some courage in pressing its policy home is suggested by the forcible resistance which it met with when the new laws were put in execution.

The levying of the Supplementary Militia in November 1796 was the signal for serious riots in the Eastern counties and a few elsewhere. Lincolnshire was the county most troubled. There were several reasons for this. Lists of men liable had been ordered to be made, not at the normal General Meeting on the Thursday after October 24th but at a special General Meeting on September 30th.[1] This made the people suspicious and when the new plans of government were announced they scented a plot.[2] The Duke of Ancaster, the Lord Lieutenant, was an inactive man and so were his Deputies. The Subdivision Meetings appointed to receive lists from the constables at Lincoln and Gainsborough were not held on the appointed day owing to the Deputies failing to attend.[3]

In the rest of Lindsey (the northern half of the county) there was violent action against the Deputies who did attempt to do their duty. The first meeting to be held was at Caistor. A mob of 500 or so gathered there, seized the lists from the constables and forced the Deputies to adjourn.[4]
A few days later, another meeting was held at Horncastle. It was November 5th - market day and Guy Fawke's Day - and young men had been coming into the town in some numbers. Pickets were set up on all the roads to the town and as the constables came in to deliver the lists they were stopped and made to give them up. Those who objected were made to comply by being lifted up by the ears. The mob then assembled in the town and began a demonstration where the Subdivision Meeting was being held. In order to avoid a riot, the Deputies adjourned.[5]

Alford was the centre of a third Subdivision. In view of the violence which had happened elsewhere, it was decided not to attempt a meeting there.[6] A mob nevertheless had assembled and was not satisfied. A Deputy who arrived for the meeting in ignorance of the postponement was given his horse and told to go. The men then went to the house of a gentleman who was thought to have the warrant for the meeting though in fact he was not even a Deputy. Failing to get the warrant, they started to levy a contribution of 5/- from each person of property in the neighbourhood. It was all peaceably done, but the Vicar feared the worst when night came, if the men started drinking.[7] Money had also been demanded at Horncastle.[8]

In southern Lincolnshire, a mob tried to interrupt proceedings at Boston, but were frustrated by the Yeomanry.[9] In Norfolk the General Meeting itself on November 15th was disturbed by the Norwich mob. They clustered around the carriages of Lord Townshend and the Deputies and would not let them enter the Courthouse until a public session was promised.[10] Once inside, the leaders of the mob were given copies of the Act and it was explained to the people. The leaders proceeded to reply and kept the meeting in uproar. Finally, the Lieutenancy adjourned to a private room and there made orders for Subdivision Meetings and a further General Meeting.[11] At Lalinford, considered the most riotous Subdivision, a ballot for vacancies in the old militia was stopped by the mob.[12] Several gentlemen of the county concluded that the new militia could not be raised and a Mr Adair wrote to Lord Townshend on their behalf, stressing the change of arming the people at all in present circumstances.[13]

In Northamptonshire, there was considerable insecurity. At Wellingborough there was a riot which was put down by a speech from one of the magistrates and the arrival of the Yeomanry. At Kettering, the Subdivision Meeting was forced to adjourn and the lists were destroyed.[14] At Northampton there was

a noisy demonstration and the mob invaded the room where the Meeting was being held, but the Deputies succeeded in serving the lists, finishing the business elsewhere and dispersing the mob, all without the help of the Yeomanry.[15] Parts of Buckinghamshire were affected by this commotion. The Subdivision Meeting at Wing was dispersed and the lists destroyed.[16] There were seditious leaflets issued at High Wycombe.[17] One Subdivision Meeting in Cambridgeshire was so numerously attended that it was thought prudent to have a troop of cavalry stationed ready just across the county border.[18]

There were scattered incidents in other parts of the country. In Warwickshire and Gloucestershire there was some murmuring and at Stow on the Wold in the latter county there were signs of an attempt to organize resistance.[19] Meetings were interrupted and lists destroyed at Oswestry, which was the centre of a turbulent industrial district,[20] at Bala,[21] and at Ulverstone in Lancashire.[22] At Penrith, it was the ballot that was interrupted, later on, in December. A mob seized the records and burned them. The Deputies called on the principal inhabitants to appear and help to keep order, but none came. The mob threatened to set fire to the building if the Deputies did not disperse, so they adjourned.[23]

On receiving news of the trouble, the Home Secretary ordered more troops to be sent where necessary. The Lord Lieutenants were told to hold large meetings of Deputies and others to enforce the law which everyone of any weight or influence should be got to attend.[25] The ringleaders were to be arrested as soon as it could be done without fear of their being released by the mob.[26] These instructions were carried out and in a short time peace was restored and the law executed.

In Lindsey, the work was done by Mr Coltman, the Chairman of Quarter Sessions, and Sir Joseph Banks, President of the Royal Society. They laid plans for imposing meetings at which Ellison, one of the county members was to attend.[27] When the troops arrived, a series of night raids was made to catch the leaders, some of whom had fled.[28] Informations were heard at the normal meeting of Justice at Spilsby and then special meetings were held at Alford and Horncastle on the two following days to hear more. Three men were sent under guard to Lincoln and the informations were sent to the government with a view to prosecution at the expense of thetreasury.[30] On November 19th Ellison reported that all was quiet, though the farm servants were still restless and there was need for the presence of troops.[31]

In Norfolk, the second General Meeting to receive lists from the Subdivisions was held without incident. The Magistrates of Norwich who had been supine on the previous occasion, pledged their assistance. Special constables were sworn in. An imposing body of troops was drawn up in front of the Castle. The mob contented themselves with burning Pitt and Dundas in effigy.[32] In Northamptonshire, the magistrates decided that the troops ought to be in attendance at all the Subdivision Meetings. This was done. At Thorpe in the south-west of the county, Mr Wodhull, the local Deputy, refused to allow them to attend the meeting or to give them billets in the area. They were given lodging by some sensible farmers and only thus, it was thought, was a riot prevented - the populace was only waiting for them to leave.[33] Mr Wodhull resigned in protest at this unconstitutional interference with the functioning of the militia laws.[34]

Lord Buckingham was anxious to restore order in his county himself. The Aylesbury Yeomanry Troop went to the help of the magistrates at Wing and he followed with the Buckingham Troop. They attended several subsequent

meetings there to overawe the populace and chased and caught several ring-leaders. The people of Chaddington fought a rearguard action with them to protect the retreat of one or two. Trials were planned, again at the expense of the Treasury.[35] Elsewhere the disturbance had been small and order was soon restored.

Was the movement seditious in character and origin? A good deal of provocative rumour lay behind it. In Lindsey the story had been that the cost of getting substitutes would be two or three guineas for every man liable.[36] In Warwickshire, the people were told that they would be sent to the East Indies.[37] In Northamptonshire it was thought that the people had simply been misled.[38] Efforts were made to explain the scheme by means of advertisements explaining that the levy was for home service under local officers and the number required was a small proportion of those liable. Lincolnshire had one of these[39] but they also appeared in counties like Worcestershire[40] where there was no trouble. In Carnarvonshire, the proceedings of the various Meetings were wisely translated into Welsh.[41]

A certain amount of organization lay behind the demonstrations. The Crier of Spilsby had gone about on the Monday before the Horncastle affray reading a notice that the young men going thither were resolved neither to pay nor to serve. This had followed a meeting in the churchyard the previous day. Oaths were taken.[42] The rioters both at Horncastle and Alford wore blue ribbons.[43] The democrats at Nottingham tried hard to exploit the new situation. Abandoning a meeting to call for peace, they organized one in the town (where the magistrates were friendly) to protest against the new law.[44] A Pistol Club was formed and loyal citizens were terrorized by shots fired into their houses. The government were warned to send a force of infantry when the ballot was held - cavalry could be stopped by stretching chains across

the narrow lanes. Proper measures would seem to have been taken as nothing further was reported.[45] It appears that the radicals were ready and able to make capital out of popular misgivings, but that little came of it when the government had fully informed the people and at the same time shown willingness to use troops.

The protests of England were puny compared with the rebellious convulsion which swept across Scotland at the end of August 1797. As Sir Gilbert Elliot, not long home from the turbulent Mediterranean put it "Scotland went stark mad as if it had been bit by Corsica".[46] The occasion was the holding of Subdivision Meetings to make lists of men liable under the new act. Trouble started in Berwickshire. On the 17th, Lord Horne reported that Meetings had been interupted and Deputies assaulted and forced to resign.[47] Mobs had gone through the country forcing all to join them and one Deputy had had his ricks burnt.[48] The movement spread to Roxburgh, where the women were very active in making trouble.[49] There was a violent set to between mob and Yeomanry at Jedburgh, a Captain being severely wounded.[50] At Selkirk, the Deputies were run out of town by a mob from Galashiels.[51] East Lothian was in confusion - there were riots at Gifford and Haddington.[52] Elliot said that the schoolmasters were everywhere being intimidated and refusing to act.[53] At Canonby in Midlothian the young men seized the parish registers and their elders could not calm them.[54]

Meanwhile, on the 23rd, the Duke of Montrose had arrived in Edinburgh in the middle of the night to say that mobs in Stirlingshire were obstructing and terrorizing both the Deputies and the schoolmasters.[55] There was no general disorder; the Stirling Volunteers were called out and the various meetings were adjourned.[56] At Forfar, the sheriff and magistrates were forced to suspend their proceedings and give an undertaking that they would go no further.[57]

In Fife, there was widespread trouble and destruction of lists;[58] In West Lothian, riots at Linlithgow and Bathgate.[59]

It was in Lanarkshire and Dumfriesshire that things were worst. In the former county, the Duke of Hamilton was an inert Lord Lieutenant and few Volunteers had been raised. The Duke had unsuccessfully asked for more troops to be sent.[60] The method of opposition favoured there abouts was to threaten Deputies in their houses. Mr. Grierson in Dumfriesshire had held a Meeting peacefully but the mob came to him and forced him to agree to do no more.[61] Mr. Lockhart was at the house of a friend when the mob invaded it, looking for him. He argued with him for some time and finally signed a noncommittal statement.[62] He was an old man and was so upset by this experience that he resigned his Commission.[63] Mr. Brown, having been forced to take an oath at his house in the sense desired by the mob, got the Duke to suspend the act in his district. He was very anxious that an attempt at legal proceedings be made: the law would be made; the law would be flouted further.[64]

The Provost of Lanark, finding himself abandoned by his burgesses, gave the mob the desired undertaking.[65] In the north of the county, at Cadder, the mob searched the Deputies for papers when they arrived and kept them prisoners for an hour, trying to make them swear an oath.[66] The schoolmaster there had had his papers takem from him the previous night by a mob led by two men with blackened faces and women's clothes. He had had to flee the parish. His family had been living in dread for a fortnight.[67] At Kilpatrick, near by in Dumbartonshire, a mob coming largely from Cadder chased away the Deputies who took refuge in the house of the Lord President of the Court of Session. The mob was afraid to attack the house. The volunteers and some troops hurried out from Glasgow and dispersed them with bloodshed.[68] Such was the character of events that the Duke of Hamilton finally concluded that the Act could not be executed and suspended it throughout his jurisdiction.[70]

In Dumfriesshire, the schoolmasters were everywhere the subject of violent threats and the Deputies and the various meetings were forced to promise to stop. Only Dumfries was quiet, thanks to its Volunteers who also marched out to protect the house of one Deputy.[71] At Moffat, the people locked the Deputies in the church, burned all the papers and paraded through the streets behind the town drum.[72] The Duke of Buccleuch reported that the whole of Annandale was terrorized.[73] In Ayrshire, Beith in the north and Ochiltree in the centre were centres of trouble. The people of New Cumnock, near the latter place, almost killed their schoolmaster by ducking him in a loch. Large meetings at night were reported to be held on Galston Moor near Kilmarnock. The Deputies of Galston had made improper promises to their charges.[74]

At New Galloway in Kirkcudbright, the meeting had got through its business in peace when three cheers were given and a crowd rushed in and seized the papers, trying to extract an oath from the Deputies.[75] In Wigtownshire, finally, the Act was not executed in half the county as a result of a preposterous incident when the Deputies at the meeting at Wigtown were shut up inside their meeting place with a body of troops drawn up outside. The mob was able to prevent them giving any signal to the troops, who were therefore unable to take any action against the mob.[76]

The government showed itself resolute amid the surge of revolt. Responsibility mainly lay with a small group in Edinburgh - Lord Adam Gordon, the Commander in Chief, the Lord President of the Court of Session, the Dukes of Buccleuch and Montrose, Lord Adam wrote for reinforcements[77] and there were also letters to the Home Office from various Lord Lieutenants. The Duke of Portland at once gave orders that General Musgrave, commanding in North East England, was to reinforce Lord Adam whenever asked.[78] He instructed the Lord Lieutenants (as in the troubles of 1796) to rally the weighty inhabitants,

overawe the people by their authority and by military force, and arrest the ringleaders when it could safely be done.[79] Dundas was at once consulted in view of his special knowledge, and he suggested putting printed notices on church doors to inform and convince the people.[80]

On the 27th the Lord Advocate who had been in the Highlands, was back in Edinburgh. He found a party of waverers, led by the Solicitor-General,[81] which he proceeded to squash. He was sure that firmness would secure obedience and noted that in the south-east, where trouble had started it was already subsiding.[82] The Duke of Hamilton received orders from both London and Edinburgh to rescind his suspension.[83] In view of the danger in Lanarkshire and Fife, the little group in Edinburgh supported Lord Adam in requesting 3000 men from General Musgrave.[84] The Lord Advocate's confidence inspirited London. Dundas wrote on September 4th that he was clearly taking the right steps and there should not be a cabinet meeting on the subject as that would dramatize the situation.[85] Portland told the Lord Advocate to make the propertied classes conscious that this was a dangerous radical revolt; to enforce the Act first where it was easiest and at a later date in the more difficult counties: and to inspirit the Yeomanry and Volunteers by having parties of regular troops to support them and protect their homes - as in Ireland.[86] Portland throughout was insistent on the need to bring forward the Volunteers against the mob.[87] The political good sense of this is obvious.

Before this time, on August 30th, the Lord Advocate had written to say that the upper classes were now realizing their danger from the radicals. But the gentry were cowed throughout the south west and in West Lothian the Yeomanry were demoralized by the threat to their barns. He had two fears: that adequate reinforcements would not be sent and that the gentry would continue to allow themselves to be intimidated.[88] This was his nearest approach to pessimism.

His later letters contain both bad and good news through most of September, but he always inclines the balance on the favourable side.

The authorities would seem to have succeeded in quietening the fears of many of the people. Proclamations were issued by such Lord Lieutenants as the Dukes of Buccleuch, Hamilton and Montrose.[89] They all took much the same line, with variations. The levy was not an onerous one and family men were largely exempt. The honour of Scotland demanded that they should have a militia. The English had resisted its introduction there in former days but were now reconciled to it. Substitutes were allowed by periodical subscriptions. (Montrose gave £40 to one of these). Service would be limited to North Britain and the pay and privileges (including the right after dismissal to practice a trade anywhere in Great Britain) were explained in detail and recommended as very eligible. The Sheriff of West Lothian's[90] poster was thought to be especially cogent, and copies were sent for distribution to the sheriffs of allthe Highland counties.[91]

What could be done by good organization and careful preparation of the public mind is seen in the case of Renfrewshire. Mr McDowall, the active and zealous Lieutenant of the county, had begun by putting a very thorough explanation of the Act in the newspapers. He coupled it with a stern warning against disobedience, making special reference to the Acts against combinations based on the taking of oaths. He "staggered" the Subdivision Meetings so as to be able to attend each one in person.[92] On finding a schoolmaster who had failed to make a list, he gave him a sharp order to comply with the law and was obeyed. At one place, he found nothing done because even the factory owners were disloyal - an unusual situation. He proposed to demand from them lists of all their employees and post these up as the lists of men liable, leaving the matter to be adjusted by appeals.[93] Thanks to his vigour and good sense, the turbulent industrial county of Renfrew was perfectly quiet throughout the riots.

Elsewhere, the appearance of troops heartened the gentry who proceeded with the business as soon as they were able. The South-East was the first area to be quietened. The alarm had first been raised there and the capital was near at hand, so that it was easy to order and to send reinforcements. By the beginning of September, Berwickshire and Roxburghshire were quiet.[94] In the latter county the Duke of Roxburgh desired the troops to remain in support of the Volunteers - the farmers who made up the Yeomanry were busy harvesting and the Infantry were not mobile enough. The work of taking precognitions against those who had intimidated schoolmasters was going forward - not very easily because the schoolmasters accused everyone indiscriminately.[95]

In West Lothian, the Volunteers attended the meetings at Linlithgow and Bathgate and prevented further rioting. They were supported by a body of regular cavalry.[96] In Fife things had quietened down and precognitions were taken in villages where lists had been destroyed, new lists being ordered.[97] In Midlothian, the entire Volunteer force of Edinburgh was mobilized by the Lord Advocate and ready to march in support of the Lieutenancy.[98] Proceedings there were carried through without interruption.[99]

The black spot in the south-east was the violent affray at Tranent, in East Lothian on August 29th. The Deputies went to hold a meeting at that village accompanied by detachments from two cavalry regiments. Tranent then consisted of a single long narrow street and the place of meeting was a public house about half way along it. The troops escorted the deputies thither and then stationed themselves at either end of the street. A mob now came and demonstrated in front of the inn, driving away some soldiers who were sent to guard the door. The deputies barricaded themselves in. The cavalry galloped down the street but were driven out with two hurt by the hurling of bricks from the roof tops. The Deputies were also bombarded and the people went out into the fields to attack them from the rear. This was their undoing. The cavalry

went round and scattered them and then opened fire with their pistols at the men on the roofs. The mob scattered in the fields and there was a general chase.[100]

This chase was the cause of much trouble. The officers lost control of their men - apparantly because the bugle calls of one regiment were not intelligible to the men of the other - and the exasperated soldiers hunted their opponents across country, killing 11 and wounding 13 - some of them at least innocent[101] bystanders. The Public were much upset and began to talk of a "massacre".[102] The government considered a public prosecution of the soldiers; a private one was started under the auspices of Opposition lawyers.[103] The affair blew over but was frightening while it lasted.

In the counties further out the return to normal was slower. Operations in Stirlingshire and Lanarkshire were postponed till the end of September.[104] By then the ferment had subsided and little trouble was experienced. There was need for a considerable military demonstration at Falkirk, where the manager of the Carron iron works was called in to help to keep his men in order.[105] In Dumfriesshire the Act was not fully executed by the end of the year.[106] Ring-leaders however were arrested and some meetings were held.[107] At Moffat, the troops clashed violently with the people as they had at Tranent.[108] The south-west was less disturbed and the arrival of troops put things to rights. In Ayrshire, the Lord Lieutenant, with the help of some of the volunteers, visited the more troublesome villages demanding submission. He agreed to intercede for the pardon of the young men of Beith on condition of a full admission of guilt and prompt execution of the law.[109]

The great fear now was that the Highlands would [illegible] the Lowlands and give trouble. The Duke of Portland was more afraid of that than of a serious rising in the industrial areas.[110] Lord Adam Gordon said that cavalry would be

useless in the Highlands and it would be difficult to subdue them but he did not expect trouble.[111] There were in fact only two outbreaks early in September. In the Aboyne district of Aberdeenshire, a mob assembled and insulted a Deputy and a Minister. The Subdivision Meeting had already been postponed to allow a broadside sent out by the Duke of Gordon to circulate.[112] The Duke visited the area himself and reported all clear at the beginning of October.[113]

In Perthshire, the Duke of Atholl behaved very weakly. Before the business began, he had already agreed with the Deputies that proceedings should stop if the act was resisted.[114] He was himself confronted by a mob at Blair Atholl and after reasoning with them in vain he consented to a suspension in the district.[115] Other deputies also met opposition and he wrote round to them giving permission to stop if they wished.[116] In the Highland part of the county there was a total suspension and in the lowland area things were little better. A good deal of violence was offered and this may have saved the day, for the Duke's tenantry turned out to protect his person and were very active in helping to arrest ringleaders. Troops were now coming up and quiet was restored.[117] The Duke wished to hold up the business further while he induced the people to raise recruits by ordinary enlistment and thus supply the force required.[118] But the Lord Advocate was told early in October that a proper census could safely be held,[119] and the Duke was urged in that direction.[120] With this episode the revolt may be said to have closed.

We must again enquire into the character of the revolt and whether it was a seditious movement. The authorities were all certain that it was a Jacobin plot because there was simultaneous outbreaks everywhere.[121] This is much more likely to have been due to the holding of Subdivision Meetings everywhere at much the same time; a real revolution is seldom well planned. The people

had certain grievances. The raising of a very small force of militia after offers to raise a very large body of Volunteers had been refused, looked suspicious.[122] The restriction of the levy to those aged nineteen to twenty-three had been meant as generosity but was the reverse for those on whom the burden fell.[123] The people had not been properly informed and Haldane of Gleneagles said that they now expected to have everything explained to them "so far as the spirit of democracy prevailed". He also thought they remembered the fate of the Scottish Fencibles, bullied into serving in England against their original terms of service.[124]

There was no need to postulate sedition, and reports of it must be to some extent discounted in view of the prevailing panic. An example of this may be given: Mr. Forbes of Callender arrived in Edinburgh in a great hurry from Stirlingshire and said that he had personally witnessed the mob burn his mansion to the ground. It subsequently appeared that they had not come nearer than fifty yards down the drive and had not so much as broken a window.[125]

Nevertheless, the seditious, as in England, worked to turn the situation to account. The Minister of Campsie described how they created discontent out of nothing by spreading rumours and jeering at the young men as priest-ridden and sellers of their birthright. Parties of young men then went through the district intimidating the rest.[126] In this area north of Glasgow, many who were not natives - including many Irish - took part in the riots.[127] In Perthshir there were a number of itinerant agitators and it was a large body of strangers at Blair Atholl who encouraged the local tenantry to the point of resisting their Duke.[128] There are plenty of cases of intimidation to increase support, as for instance in Berwickshire.[129]

At Strathaven in Lanarkshire, the young men met and elected leaders. It was proposed to petition the authorities in Edinburgh against the Act but the

villagers were dissuaded from this scheme by a local lawyer deputed to help the schoolmaster.[130] At Dalry in Ayrshire, the people planted a Tree of Liberty.[131] These democratic strivings were surpassed in Fife where sixty-one villages elected a delegate each to a central body. A meeting of thirty of them was visited by some magistrates with a party of Yeomanry. They were told that they might continue their meeting (they too were drawing up a petition) but were warned of the likely consequences to themselves.[132]

From Lanarkshire it was reported that the Act was making the government's natural friends - the country people - link up with the townsfolk in opposition.[133] There are few signs of more respectable elements fishing in troubled waters. McDowall in Renfrewshire reported a number of persons of substance (besides the factory owners mentioned earlier) as hostile to the Act.[134] A deputation interviewing one Lanarkshire Deputy called for the abolition of the horse tax[135] - which suggests that there were persons with some property in the movement. There is little doubt that the mass of the people were loyal - nor was it supposed otherwise - but the authorities were surely right in believing that if they yielded in this matter, other grievances would be brought forward and a most fruitful ground for agitation opened up.[136]

CHAPTER VII : COMPULSORY LEVIES : SPECIAL FORCES AND CASES

(a) Problems of Urban Areas

The last chapter describes the levying of a force in a country that was predominantly rural and then the raising of a similar force in a fundamentally similar country. In this chapter, we shall describe what happened to the county military institutions, when they were set to work in a different milieu and when they were given the task of raising forces of a different kind.

It is a commonplace that the eighteenth century system of local government worked tolerably well in the countryside but broke down in the more urbanized areas. The same thing applies to the system in its military aspect. In Birmingham, for instance, the overseers considered it impossible to take a census and conduct a ballot in the normal way. The county agreed to assume that their fair share under the General Act was 109 men and this number of volunteers was raised at the expense of the parish rates.[1] The second Act relating to the Supplementary Militia ordered a special return of men liable to be made from thence to the Privy Council which was to fix the town's quota direct instead of leaving it to the Lieutenancy of Warwickshire.[2]

The two areas which appear to have given most trouble by reason of their urban character were Greater London - especially Middlesex - and Lancashire. The Middlesex regiments were the worst in the militia. In August 1793, one regiment was still ninety below strength. The Lieutenancy had done nothing to supply men but they had picked up some going through Essex.[3] In November 1798, Colonel Lord Mansfield complained that even the "old" establishment of his

regiment was ninety short. Of the Supplementary Militia, the War Office had led him to expect 700. Only 120 had belatedly arrived and half of these were unfit. After five years of war the Deputies had still not sent rolls of the men who were supposed to be serving, showing for whom or where they served. Among other things, this made it impossible to certify that certain men were entitled to a small bounty for length of service.[4]

A report on the Westminster (Middlesex) regiment in 1799 stated that there was a deficit of 745 men. Of the Supplementary Militia for the regiment only 355 had been supplied instead of 745. The effective strength was only 120 Privates of which only 80 were fit, the youngest of whom was sixty. There were only five active officers. The inspecting officer suggested the discharge of 34 unfit men and was astonished to find that the drill was as good as it was.[5]

This report, though the worst, is not untypical. The Surrey Militia was also thought poorly of. In 1799, the first regiment was described as a poor one. The Lieutenant Colonel was inactive and of the two Majors one was frankly undesirable and one too old.[6] It is unusual to find officers inspecting the militia disapproving of both the officers and the men.

Lancashire did not suffer so much in the matter of quality. The county quota of 1786 was probably too small in relation to population, since in 1793 Lancashire had one regiment, in 1798 this was raised at a blow to five and in 1799, when the scale of force of 1793 was reverted to, she still had three.[7] When called upon to bear her share of the augmentation, however, she fell short in quantity. In November 1798, the 5th regiment was 600 short and the government proposed to give up the struggle and disband it. Lord Derby the Lord Lieutenant demurred and promised that it would be 500 or 600 strong by Christmas.[8]

The first source of the trouble lay in the volume of work required in organizing a ballot. In 1795 the Lord Lieutenant of Middlesex told the government that the vast population made the ballot of slow job and a quick filling of the deficit was not to be expected. In 1798 he was saying the same of the efforts to fill the gaps in the Supplementary Militia and emphasizing the strain on the patriotism of the Deputies of so much work.[9] Mr Stable's accounts for his expenses as Clerk of the General Meetings and also to the Divisions of Westminster, Holborn and Finsbury give a good picture of the volume of work. For the Supplementary Militia, these divisions supplied 4987 men out of the county total of 5820.[10] In 1796-7 for raising the Supplementary Militia, lists and tickets for the ballot had to be made in these divisions to the numbers respectively of 25,801; 23,311; and 9,310. Ballots followed not once but repeatedly, in an effort to fill the deficit and replace absconders. In 1797 the three divisions had twenty-three, eighteen and twelve ballots respectively. The numbers chosen to serve were seldom under a hundred, usually over two hundred and often four hundred or more.[11] In 1798 there was new lists and tickets to be made and ballots totalled eight, eight and five. In 1799 they rose to fourteen, ten and eighteen - all on a very large scale. In the latter year the Clerk had to attend 137 meetings in Holborn alone.[12]

Each time a batch of men were drawn to serve, they had to receive individual summonses through the constables. The following table[13] indicates the size of this task in some individual parishes.

St. Giles in the Fields	2901	summoned	(1798)
St. George, Bloomsbury	480	"	(1798-9)
St. Margaret's, Westminster:-			
Dean & Sanctuary Ward ...	193	"	(1797-8)
Petty France Ward	173	"	"
Milbank Ward	340	"	"

The numerous but very incomplete accounts of the parish constables from which the above sample is taken make it clear that several constables were functioning in each parish and perhaps the number was increased for this purpose. This did not redeem the system from clumsiness; the attendances of constables at Meetings make impressive totals. Meanwhile the pluralist Clerk in his "General Meetings" capacity had to make rolls for the use of the regiments and inform them of the progress made. We do not know what staff he had but he noted that making a roll of the force for Henry Dundas was a very troublesome matter.[14]

In Lancashire, the Lieutenancy had to re-arrange the apportionment of the quotas for the Supplementary Militia three times on receiving reports from sub-divisions that their original returns of men liable had been wrong. The Clerk of the Liverpool Division reported that he had originally returned 3000 men liable but the Deputies had been dissatisfied and twice ordered the whole work to be done again. The third list showed 4800 able to serve. The Clerk justified himself by reference to the difficulty of the work in a big town and by the fact that even the original 3000 were many more than had ever been returned from Liverpool before.[15]

The shortcomings of the personnel are very apparent in Lancashire. The Clerk of the General Meetings was past his work for some years before his

replacement in 1798 by a more active man.[16] There was a shortage of Deputies; in the Warrington Division, not a single one was normally resident when the militia was embodied - they were all officers.[17] The lower parts of the organization were therefore liable to go astray. The returns of men liable in 1799 were not in the hands of the General Meeting in December, although they ought to have been sent in by October.[18] In 1792, so it was discovered, the constables of Blackburn and Rossendale had left two or three hundred who were liable off the list in each place.[19] In 1798, it was found that no return had been made the previous year by the constables of Preston.[20] The General Meeting eventually had one before it which it considered defective and a full enquiry was ordered at a session which the Corporation, the Vicar and the local J.Ps. were invited to attend.[21]

Apart from the inefficiency of the levy, the ease with which the men could abscone in urban areas was the main problem. Nathaniel Conant, a stipendiary magistrate, considered that as the inhabitants of the urban part of Middlesex, especially the poorer sort, were not personally known to each other in the manner of a country district, it was fatally easy for the men to desert. Substitutes behaved, it seems, just like ordinary recruits in going off as soon as they had their bounty and in this way would hire themselves out many times over. Conant singled out the Irish in London as notable offenders.[22] When the Supplementary Militia of Middlesex came to be drilled, only 70 attended out of the 485 of the first section called for. Lord Titchfield, the Lord Lieutenant, said those that came were a very poor lot and could see little use in continuing the training.[23] In 1799, when the militia establishment was reduced and the men released made liable to recall, he said the measure was impossible in Middlesex. If the men they had collected were ever let out of the service, they would never be seen again.[24]

Conant estimated that some 3000 men had deserted from the Middlesex Militia during the years 1793-9.[25] But the anonymity of a great city protected the balloted men no less than substitutes and a great many chosen simply ignored the summons to serve or find a man. Stables accounts record that after every one of the numerous ballots a long list of such defaulters had to be called on to show cause why they should not be proceeded against. He said that 5000 such summonses had been issued in the period 1796-9. He did not note how many of the offenders were brought to book.[26]

In Surrey the Croydon Subdivision raised 500 men out of a county "supplementary" quota of 2460 at a cost of £5000 and more. Nevertheless, the Third regiment was 800 short when the force was embodied and Croydon's share of this deficit was 200 which would cost £2000 more. They hoped to escape the burden of putting the disused local Provisional Cavalry into the militia.[27] As in Middlesex the fruits of so much effort had wasted away by desertion.

In Lancashire, it was likewise found that men would engage as substitutes and desert the next day. In Liverpool and Manchester, seamen often engaged in this way and were off to sea again before they could be sent to serve.[28] During the drill of the supplementaries, 250 were absent from the body trained at Wigan alone.[29]

Lancashire also had trouble in calling outher supplementary men to be embodied. When the second hafl of the force was ordered out, the Deputies were slow in informing the Lord Lieutenant what rendezvous were considered suitable. It was therefore difficult to imform the regiments soon enough when and where to collect the men.[30] As a result some 600 men arrived in Manchester to find no officer to receive them and no means of paying them. The local Deputy was absent; the Justicestwice ordered them to be billetted but this was not sufficient and many went home, till 150 were left, almost starving. The magistrate

wrote to the War Office, noting the imprudence of treating the poor so inconsiderately at this time.[31] Thereupon an officer recruiting for the line was ordered to subsist the men.[32] A militia officer finally arrived and a re-assembly was ordered.[33] The muddle may account for the weakness of the county's junior regiment which was supplied from here. In June 1798 it had only received 173 men out of 990 and the Deputies were doing nothing to remedy this.[34]

In Middlesex there was seemingly no similar trouble but in the Borough Sub-division of Surrey, the Deputies in February 1798 found that 300 had attended instead of 1000 and concluded wrongly that they were supposed to take half the number actually appearing, instead of half the quota.[35] A re-assembly was ordered, but to have neglected an opportunity to impoundthe few still willing to serve was asking for trouble.

The general state of confusion finally prompted extraordinary action. In Lancashire, a special General Meeting was held in July 1798. The deficit then existing was analysed and accounted for as follows:

Dead	33
Discharged, promoted, etc.	230
Deserted or not found	549
Enlisted in the line	412
Too ill to join	31
T O T A L	1,255

The first four regiments were 161 short. The rest of the deficit was concentrated on the last. The county's quota was 5160.

The meeting ordered the sub-divisions to take immediate action to replace the missing men. The local Clerks were to make lists of deserters and try to prosecute. Proper certificates of the men enlisting were to be got, which would exonerate the county from replacing them.* Medical certificates

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* See page 314

were to be sent every fortnight to each sick man till he died or joined. New man were to be apportioned between the regiments by ballot. There was to be a drive against defaulting constables and insufficient returns. The law on bounties for Supplementary Militia men was to be explained to the people.* In another sphere, lists were to be made of people not joining in voluntary activities under the Defence Act.[36]

A good deal of activity followed this meeting. Lord Derby the Lord Lieutenant at once reported that he hoped soon to complete all the regiments except the last.[37] A new and energetic Clerk of the General Meetings was setting his office in order and trying to make the local Clerks keep him properly informed of the state of the ballot. He hoped that a General Meeting in October could be got to order each regiment to maintain an officer permanently in the county to collect recruits before they could desert.[38] The difficulties of the situation are clearly seen when this Meeting had to be adjourned in the absence of a quorum. An advance that was made at this time was to divide the Manchester area into two sub-divisions.[40] In November, the county Clerk estimated that the deficit had been reduced to 237.[41] The junior regiment totalled 371 rank and file at that time.[42] In July 1799 (not counting a detachment from the first regiment) it was 476 privates strong.[43] As the reduction of the county quota by enlistment in the line in 1798 had fallen on it, this was much as it should have been.✓

Surrey like Lancashire held an important General Meeting in the summer of 1798 which did something to get things moving.[44] Middlesex proved to be in too bad a way to be redeemable by administrative vigour. In May 1799 Lord Titchfield

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* See page 159

✓ i.e. 990 less 412, which Lord Derby suggests was an incomplete figure - page 314

declared that the militia laws operated well enough in the country but would never work in Middlesex. He presented to the government the report of Mr Nathaniel Conant already mentioned.[45]

This included a draft bill (with some notes by Titchfield) which would make principals whose substitutes deserted before joining liable to take their chance in a fresh ballot. They could gain complete exemption by paying a sum not to exceed ten guineas adjudged to be the price of a volunteer. The money would be transmitted to the regiment which would recruit with it, rendering accounts to the county. The recruits would be assigned as substitutes to those who paid the bounties, in order to ensure their entitlement to family allowances. The census of men liable to serve was to be done by the constables requiring householders under penalty to make lists of the appropriate members of their households.

These reforms were embodied with little change in an Act[46] made applicable to Surrey and Middlesex. The ballotted men who paid the bounty were enabled to receive half of it at public expense as if they had found a substitute. Lord Titchfield had been insistent on the new census system which Conant was shy of putting forward. The only substantial modification of it was that constables were empowered to make the returns themselves in the case of certified Quakers.[47]

The payment of the fine by persons ballotted now became universal, and apparently the regiments were assigned districts of the county in which to recruit with these.[48] This system was farther than ever from conscription but did make more practicable an effective lever from local sources.

Pitt's government had already reformed the civil government of Middlesex by extending the system of stipendiary magistrates. They now began, under the guidance of one of these, a reform of the military side, calculated to adapt this too to the unusual conditions of urban life.

(b) The City, the Tower and the Stanneries

These three populous franchises had all been excluded from the measures of the elder Pitt's time and since, reinvigorating the militia. Subject to older acts, they had in fact no militia at all. Respect for their privileges doubtless accounted for this, but it was clear too that the danger of arming the industrial working class would have to be faced if a levy were to be made there.

The City of London Militia was reconstituted by an Act of 1794[1] amended by another in 1795.[2] Both were repealed and replaced by a consolidating measure the following year. The general framework of the national militia laws was reproduced with some radical differences. Instead of a Lord Lieutenant, there were commissioners of Lieutenancy, who also corresponded to the General Meetings elsewhere. They were an institution of long standing whose composition did not have to be defined in the Acts and were made up of civic dignitaries. They appointed the militia officers, who had to be Freemen or their sons, and not bankrupt.[4]

Twelve hundred men divided into two regiments was the force to be raised. In 1794, individuals and corporate bodies were made liable to provide men according to their Land Tax Assessment. The Wards were obliged to provide quotas according to the totals of these assessments within each and then the quota was supplied by ballots in the ordinary way. Only clergy and those who had served were exempt.[5] The Act of 1795 did away with the ballot and caused the Wards to line recruits for a bounty (maximum £10) to be raised by a rate. In default of a man, the War could pay this sum as a fine. The two regiments were now to be attached to and supported by the east and west halves of the City respectively.[6]

Substitutes under the first and recruits under the other Acts had to be residents of the City or the area within three miles of it. They were not to be men with more than one child. Those under the former Act had to serve for as long as the force was embodied. For the rest, the term was five years in all circumstances.[7] Even when embodied, half the force always had to stay in the City; the rest might be ordered out, but not further than twelve miles.[8] The Lord Mayor might call out the militia to assist in keeping order.[9] The men were entitled to family allowances; the later Acts provided for their payment by the Wards according to the size of their quotas.[10]

There existed in the City an old levy called Trophy Tax, for the defraying of militia expenses. The Commissioners were empowered to levy one month's assessment of this each year - that is to say £4666.13.4. - and to apply to the Receiver General of the Land Tax if they needed more money than this.[11]

The origin of all this legislation is obscure. In 1799, the Common Council claimed that it had taken the initiative.[12] The measure of 1794 was seemingly drawn up by the Lieutenancy and Common Council in co-operation and then put through with government support.[13] Sheridan attacked the Bill of 1795 which he said was contrary to the City's charter. It was defended by Alderman Lushington.[14] Next year it was said that the Lieutenancy had brought in a further Bill without consulting the government.[15] The Honourable Artillery Company objected to a clause giving the force the rights of the old trained bands. This would have given it the right to share the Company's parade ground. Their opposition was not successful, and an acrimonious controversy between the two bodies ensued.[16] However, there are small incidents, the absence of more suggests careful consulting of interests.

The force now raised was subject to all the inconviences of the Middlesex Militia and a few more. The very restricted limit of service was intended to encourage the respectable citizenry to join, but Peter LeMesurier an erstwhile Lord Mayor, reported that no ballotted men had ever enrolled and the regiments were made up of the relatives of the mob.[17] Colonel Newnham, an officer in the force and a member of the Lieutancy, said in 1799 much what Lord Titchfield was saying about the impossibility of executing the militia laws in urban conditions. He found that as the Wards were not penalized if their men deserted, they did not care whom they hired and would supply Irish labourers who absconded after a few days. If the regiments were to be disembodied, not half the men would ever be got back.[18] His words are given point by a return from the West regiment showing that 89 enrolled men never joined and 87 deserted in 1796-9, though admittedly the number fell from 45 in 1796 to 8 in 1798.[19] In April 1798, the force had a deficit of 378.[20]

As a large part of the force was at home, it was virtually disembodied. The men were paid extra in lieu of being given quarters and apparently lived with their families. Colonel Newnham thought that only lucrative pay and allowance could keep the force together under these circumstances.[21]

Money questions were a scurce of strife between the Lieutenancy and the Corporation. The Trophy Tax was difficult to collect. Over £700 of the Tax of 1793 was still owing three years later. The Lieutenancy gave up the tax of 1794-5, evidently to smooth the passing of one of the acts, and for a time lived from hand to mouth.[22] In August 1795, the City Militia was got ready for embodiment but the order was delayed because it was feared that Parliament might have to be specially summoned for fourteen days after its issue. The Commissioners had raised 500 men and spent £4000 on bounty. They had only £1000 left and men were clamouring at the Guildhall for pay (they had been temporarilyembodied for

annual training) and the rest of the bounty.[23] From 1796, things improved because money for the embodied force was issued by the government. In 1799 Trophy Tax to the amount of £7365. 8.10. was owing from the previous two years.[24].

The Commissioners in 1799 made an effort to improve the efficiency of their force, corresponding to those in the previous section. It brought them into head-on collision with the Common Council, again on the question of money. Early in 1799, they adopted a draft bill containing various provisions of which two were controversial. The replacement of deserters was made a specific responsibility of the Wards for which they served. This had been left vague in earlier acts and deserters had not in fact been replaced. As compensation, vacancies from other causes (death and promotion) were to be filled by the Lieutenancy, out of the Trophy Tax. Families in future were to be relieved at a specified rate and only if they lived within the City or three miles thereof. For men enlisted in future, an allowance would be paid only for one child.[25]

The Lieutenancy thus hoped to get the City to raise its full number of men by diminishing its obligations in other ways. On March 13th a deputation conferred with Dundas who agreed to make the measure a government one. The Common Council was now informed. They set up a committee which took exception to the proposals and suggested amendments. The Commissioners in turn disagreed with these and deputations from both sides waited on Dundas.[26] Evidently he was disconcerted by this conflict for at the end of May the Commissioners asked if he intended to introduce a measure that session.[27] He made up his mind to do so and they then appointed some of their members to assist him in the house.[28] The committee of Common Council thereupon reiterated their opposition and resolved to petition the House of Commons on the subject.[29] This must have made Dundas climb down: the bill was modified in the City's favour.

The City's main demands had been that all deficits should be filled by the

Commissioners at the expense of the Trophy Tax and that the families belonging to the regiment inside the City should not be supported; for the rest, support should be confined to one child even for those already in the militia. In support of their first point they quoted Huskisson, Dundas' deputy. For the second, they had a legal opinion of the late Serjeant Adair - we have noted that this was a bone of contention in the militia in general. As concessions they offered to fill the existing deficit by a general rate levied by the Common Council and to allow men who were dissatisfied by the reduced provision for families to be discharged.[30] The Act[31] as passed settled the question of the families entirely as the Lieutancy had proposed but adhered to the Common Council's distinction between the existing deficit and the future replacement of deserters. The former was to be filled by the Lieutenancy's method of impositions on defaulting wards.[32] The latter was to be a charge on the Trophy Tax.[33] The Wards therefore might escape responsibility in future as they had in the past.

The quarrel ended acrimoniously. Colonel Newnham spoke angrily about the totally inadequate contribution of the City to defence and suggested that if they refused to support their regiments properly, the men should be disbanded and the City thrown open to the quartering of troops as a means of pressure.[34] The Corporation carried hostility further than threats. The new act made it necessary for the Lieutenancy to produce accounts of the spending of the Trophy Tax before they could draw on the Receiver General of the Land Tax for more funds, and the accounts had to be passed by the City Justices before more Trophy Tax could be collected. In December 1799, the Recorder and some Aldermen sitting as Justices refused to sanction the accounts, which threatened to bring business to a stop. The Commissioners defended the various items that had been questioned and were sure that malice alone was responsible because the Justices in question were all members of the Lieutenancy and had raised no objection to the accounts

when the Commissioners had discussed them.[35] Altogether, the City militia cannot be said to have made striking progress in our period.

The Tower Hamlets comprized much of the East End of London - the industrial and dock area. It was Patrick Colquhoun, the most distinguished of the stipendiary magistrates who drew the government's attention to their military possibilities in 1794. He said that there had been no militia raised in the district for thirty years because the act of CharlesII's time which still governed it only provided for four days exercise a year and it was not worthwhile to spend money on such a force. The government seemed to have forgotten the area, yet its population was probably equal to the City's. However, a large part consisted of seamen (always exempt) and silk weavers,so only a modest proportion should be called for, Colquhoun suggested 500 men (which he thought would be 1% of those liable) to be raised like the other militia but not serve outside the district save in invasion or insurrection.[36]

Nothing was done at this time, but in 1796, further memoranda on the subject appeared and in November Lord Cornwallis, who was Constable of the Tower among other things, sent a draft bill to the Home Office[37] which was passed into law with some alteration the following month. The Act[38] extended the militia laws to the Tower Hamlets and established a quota of 1120 (the original draft said 1000) which was divided between the parishes explicitly by the same clause. Special qualifications were established for the officers and Deputies (this had not been in the draft). The Constable of the Tower took the place of the Lord Lieutenant. As with the City, the traditional power to levy Trophy Tax was maintained and the force was divided into two regiments, one to stay in the district one to go if desired up to twelve miles outside it or to the nearest camp beyond.

The act was at once put in force and in March 1797 the authorities were relieved to report that the census had been made and appeals heard without riots.[39] In May, the Deputies told Cornwallis that the force was raised and should be

called out. Experience in raising the parochial levy for the army had shown that men would desert if not collected as soon as their bounty had been paid.[40] A one-clause Act was passed soon afterwards.[41] The Deputies also said that the burden on the parishes of paying half the price of a volunteer to the poorer ballotted men would lead to discontent.[42] It was proposed at one time to make this bounty payable to men with not more than £100 worth of possessions instead of £500 but nothing was done.[43]

The Tower Hamlets Militia suffered all the trials of the other urban forces. Down to 1799, 6064 men had been ballotted to serve and £20,000 had been spent, but there were only some 750 men to show for it instead of 1120. Nineteen ballots had been held everywhere. Of some 25,000 men of the right age, 8,300 were exempt: there were many seamen and in that poor area many were let out by being undersized or being poor men with families. The request was made that the Tower Hamlets should participate in the general reduction of 1799.[44] To this they had no right, having previously borne less than their share. The force that resulted from these efforts does not seem to have been too bad. One regiment was willing for a time to serve in Ireland.[45] The officers are stated to have been largely government officials.[46]

The Stanneries, at any rate for militia purposes, comprised not an area but a group of people, the tin miners of Devon and Cornwall. There was a project to raise a body of Fencibles among them in 1796 by a member of the Pellew family which was opposed locally on account of the low standing of the proposers and the danger of arming the turbulent miners.[47] Then the Prince of Wales seems to have made one of his periodic attempts to enlarge his military stature by asserting a right as Duke of Cornwall to call out and array the miners. His agents conferred with the government in March 1797.[48] In September, the Law Officers having declared that legislation would be necessary, it was suggested that they should co-operate with those of the Prince in framing a bill.[49]

The matter then slept until the government apparently decided that through being exempt from the militia the Stanneries had inadvertently been exempted from the Defence Act.* They therefore determined to settle the question and asked the Lord Warden to find out if the local gentry would now be willing to raise Fencibles.[50] He replied that they would prefer a militia act - partly to avoid supporting what they had once opposed and partly because recruiting would then be spread more evenly over the area and the miners, being liable to be ballotted for replacements, would not encourage those who joined to desert.[51]

The Law Officers undertook the drafting of the measure and of orders to bring the Stanneries under the Defence Act which he was to execute unless there were local objections.[52] The bill was passed in June 1798 and the new force was ordered to be embodied the following month.[53] The Act placed the Local Warden in the position of the Lord Lieutenant. Under him were to be Special Deputy Wardens, qualified as Deputy Lieutenants.[54] Nine Subdivisions were set up by the Act - five in Cornwall and four in Devon.[55] The Deputies were to conduct militia business in the usual way and through the ordinary officers of the hundreds and parishes. As a check on the figures received, they might call on the Captains of the mines and the Agents of blowing and smelting houses for lists of the workers there.[56] The size of the levy was not specified in the Act - it was to be one seventh of those liable.[57] The Solicitor General suggested this rather than the national average of one sixth because the men involved were almost all poor.[58] There were to be two regiments if the number exceeded 1200.[59]

The Act when it had been put in force aroused complaint from the gentry of Cornwall. In April 1799, there was a proposal to augment the force.

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* Though the Warden and his officers were required (S13) to apply the Act to the Turners.

Quarter Sessions complained that the Act has proved unpopular and was difficult to execute. Cornwall as a whole was now overburdened and a great many of her men were exempt as seamen. Bounties were rising and increasing the expense to the parishes. Miners' wages had gone up 40% since the war began and the farms were being denuded of men. The system of deep mines using steam engines resulted in high wages and the new Act made matters worse.[60] The new force was not augmented but the Royal Miners were a permanent gain to the militia establishment.*

(c) The Parochial Levy of 1796

This measure is for us an isolated incident, but there were attempts in the following war to make the parishes raise men for the army, while the scheme of 1796 was an extension of some measures to raise seamen, the results of which had proved encouraging. It was a complete failure and ended such attempts, for both services, for some time.

Two Acts passed in the autumn of 1796 regulated the levy in Scotland and England respectively.[1] They defined the quota of men to be raised by each county. In England, each county was ordered to raise men either for the army or the navy: the army was to get 6525 and the navy 6142. For Scotland, the apportionment was not made in the Act.[2] General Sessions of the Justices were to be held in each county and were to be attended by the Justices of the boroughs within the county. They were to apportion the quota between the parishes. In England, the apportionment was to be based on the number of houses assessed for window tax, as certified by the Treasury. In Scotland, valued rents or alternatively the Land Tax assessment were to be the basis.[3] The men were to be raised by the overseers who with the consent of the vestry and principal inhabitants might levy a rate for the purpose. In Scotland, the heritors and

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* Though the Act made the men liable to serve only for the duration (cl.12)

Burgh Justices were to do this work.[4] The men were to be handed over to officers of the appropriate service sent to receive them. They were to receive one third of their bounty at once and the rest was to be remitted via the County Treasurer to be paid when they arrived at their ships or units. They were to serve for the duration plus a month or until arrival in Britain.[5]

In England, meetings of the Justices in Petty Sessions were to hear appeals against assessments. They were also to decide cases in which the receiving officers refused to take a man as being unfit. Men provided had to be between sixteen and fortyfive years of age and fit for service. They were not to be articled clerks or apprentices and in England poor men with two or more children (other than sailors) were excluded.[6] For each man not provided, the parish had to pay a fine. In Scotland, this was to be £25, paid out of the rates. In England, it was to be £10 more than the local price of a recruit and Petty Sessions were to decide whether it was to be paid by the overseers personally or added to the rates.[7] Petty Sessions might engage volunteers with the fines if any offered. Fines not spent by Easter 1797 were to be paid through the county to the Treasury.[8] In England in the first instance, parishes were to be given three weeks to make the levy, and might be given a fortnight more. In Scotland, they only had fifteen days.[9]

The system thus resembled that of the militia but it used the civil machinery of the county. The personnel being much the same, this was not a vital distinction. The law made assessment simpler in England than in Scotland and some questions of assessment as between Scottish counties and certain burghs within them had to be decided by an amending act.[10] In Ross-shire, complicated tables were prepared showing the valued rent in each parish and apportioning quotas to the nearest man. The surplus of each parish was added to the next in the list in the effort to arrive at round figures[11] and apparently there were money payments between parishes to adjust the assessment.[12] There was a com-

plicated argument between Ross and Inverness as to which county contained the estates of the Lovat family, liability for church rates being apparently the only precedent.[13]

In the raising of the men, the urban areas were probably better placed than the rural, in contrast to the situation in the militia. The floating population of a town held plenty who would enlist* and in a "once for all" levy such as this, their quality need not worry the county. Middlesex managed to get 420 at least of its quota of 428, of 54 supplied by Marylebone three were born in Surrey, two in Kent, two in Essex, 23 in remoter British Counties and one in Denmark. The bounty usually paid was £21 but 112 received other sums ranging from eight guineas to £26-5. Parishes often paid different sums to different men.[14] Some doubt is thrown on the quality of recruits from urban areas by the experience of the 65th Regiment which received 145 recruits - 131 of them from the West Riding - in January 1797 and within a month had discharged 142 men. As its strength had only been 76 to start with, a fair number must have been recruits.[15]

As to the methods of parochial officers, the four parishes of Bedford were combined for the purposes of the act and set to raise seven men. Four of these were raised by a Sgt. Nadan of the 4th Dragoons. The cost for all seven was £110-16 (average £15-6-7 each) and Petty Sessions therefore adjudged the parishes to pay £3-3-4 in lieu of the 11/52 of a man by which their quota ought to have exceeded seven.[16] Atherton in Lancashire (where the men were for the Navy) appears not to have employed professional recruiters, though various men were employed to guard the recruits or help in other ways. The three men enlisted had to be marched to Liverpool. The parish officers prudently did not give them even the first third of their bounty till they reached Warrington, but they gave

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* c.f. p. 223

them ale at the start of the journey and ale and rum on the way.[17]

On the army side, certain regiments* were appointed by the Commander in Chief to receive the recruits. They were all regiments that had come back as skeletons from the West Indies and each was to have the men of certain counties. (For some reason the apportionment of counties was completely reshuffled a little later.) A party was to be sent to each county, of a size proportionate to the quota. The Officer Commanding each party was responsible for approving the men forthcoming and was to send them to the regiment in bodies under the command of NCO's. A Field Officer was to supervise all the parties of each regiment. The officers were urged to cooperate with the civil power and treat the recruits with kindness.[18]

The question of where the recruits should be handed over perhaps caused the most bother. At first, the counties were each asked to appoint a single rendezvous for handing over the men.[19] Certain Counties such as the West Riding and Oxfordshire[20] then asked that officers should attend the Pe tty Sessions and collect the men there. At Halifax the recruits of 48 townships were collected and already the disloyal were raising a cry against the extra expense involved in bringing them so far. When the receiving officer at Pontefract refused to come and collect them where they were, the magistrates felt obliged to adjourn and send the men home, hoping that the government would give different orders. The men, it was noted, refused to march unless they were paid the whole of their bounty at once.[21] As a result of complaints the government finally gave way and ordered the officers to attend the Petty Sessions whenever possible.[22]

Desertion was very prevalent and undoubtedly lay at the root of the above problem. An amending Act was found necessary for England as well as Scotland and its main provisions were that parishes must replace men who deserted before

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* These seem to have been the 2nd, 9th, 10th, 11th, 15th, 16th, 22nd, 25th, 29th, 36th, 43rd, 46th, 49th, 52nd, 58th, 61st, 65th, 68th, 76th and 77th Foot. See Note 18.

the receiving officers had collected them.[23] Parochial officers were furthermore given the duty of themselves transporting the recruits to their regiment or to Chatham if they were too late to be taken by the party.[24] Another omission rectified by this Act was the regulation height of recruits which was now stated as 5'4" or 5'3" for growing lads.[25] Thereafter, the churchwardens of Newbury for instance could be told that they could not supply men of whatever height they chose.[26] The Justices were empowered, furthermore, to order the payment of one guinea a man besides the bounty for the purchase of necessaries. The officers had been optimistically told to try and get the men to give up some of their bounty for these.[27]

No separate returns seem to exist of this levy but to judge by the surviving returns of the receiving regiments, it was a total failure. The following made notable additions to their strength in the first three months of 1797:-

The 10th Foot	- 153	The 46th Foot	- 156
" 11th "	- 162 (inc.April)	" 61st "	- 471
" 15th "	- 172	" 65th "	- 176
" 16th "	- 318	" 68th "	- 110
" 43rd "	- 278	Total -	1818

[28]

The 9th, 22nd, 25th, 29th, 49th, 58th and 77th made small gains.[29] The fortune of the other four regiments is not known. All in all, a poor attempt to reach the figure of six or seven thousand (including Scotland) that was set. Some Counties such as Worcestershire and Warwickshire failed to raise any men at all.[30]

What was the explanation? Some counties said they would have been able to raise sailors but could not produce soldiers - Pembroke and Carnarvon for instance.[31] It was not possible to alter the obligation without fresh legislation. A plan was mooted for transferring all the Welsh quotas from the army to the navy but it came to nothing. Lancashire was to have been transferred in the opposite direction as compensation.[32]

In all probability, the main cause of failure was that no attempt was made to enlist the sympathy of the counties. Anstruther, the advocate of the scheme, had pointed out that the militia was not a real conscript force and was vitiated by bad officers. To raise a smaller body by parochial levy and put it under good army officers would do as well as an extensive augmentation of the militia.[33] But the interest felt by the officers in their militia regiments and their influence in the county was what brought the men forward. On this occasion they were not brought in - there were for instance no circulars to the Lord Lieutenants asking their help. The 16th Regiment, whose good progress will be noted overleaf, happened to be the Buckinghamshire regiment. At Lord Buckingham's suggestion it was assigned that county's quota of 152[34] and in view of his exertions on other occasions* it is fair to assume that he took steps to get some men.

Anstruther may have learnt his lesson for we shall see him next an advocate of recruiting from the militia.[35] Others retained some confidence in parochial levies. A.M'Ranby, whom the Home Office regarded as a trustworthy authority thought in 1799 that they would produce men if the fine in case of failure was big enough.[36] Unfortunately they were listened to, and further disastrous experiments were needed to convince the authorities that here was an expedient which would not work.[37]

(d) The Provisional Cavalry.

The Militia was an infantry force. There were never wanting those who desired to set up a H orse Militia and in 1796 the government made the experiment. Although for various reasons they were mistaken in doing so, quite a large body of horse was raised by compulsion which could have been made effective had it been desired.

The Provisional Cavalry was set up by an Act of November 1796, amended by another the following month.[1] It was a levy of a man and a horse for every ten horses on which the Horse Tax was paid. The Lieutenancies were responsible for

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* c.f. in particular p. 62

making the levy, which covered the whole of England and Wales. The General Meetings received statistics from the Revenue Authorities and transmitted them to the Subdivision Meetings. The Deputies at a first meeting arranged the owners of less than ten horses (or with a fraction of ten above ten or twenty or some round number) into "Classes" each containing ten horses.[2] At a second meeting one member of each class was chosen to serve (with his horse). Persons owning ten horses or a multiple were of course liable straight off. If the horses in a Subdivision were not a multiple of ten, the odd ones were to be joined with those of other Subdivisions before the ballot. At a third meeting, men were sworn in to serve: substitutes were allowed who were to be from the same or an adjoining county.[3]

The clauses declaring who was exempt are obscure. Persons who were unfit to be soldiers, or aged less than sixteen or over fifty, articled clerks, apprentices and members of the forces were apparently debarred from serving in person. Members of the forces and garrisons, resident members of the universities, ministers of religion, medical men if specially exempted by their Subdivision Meeting, articled clerks, apprentices, sailors, workers in the royal docks and arsenals and Thames Watermen were all exempt in respect of one horse; if they had a second or more horses, they would be liable on account of those. Commissioned Officers were exempt in respect of all their horses, whether publicly or privately owned. Inferior excise and various customs officers were exempted in respect of a horse kept for performing official duties.[4] The amending Act restricted exemption for apprentices and articled clerks to those who had been so before October 20th 1796 and also exempted persons who joined the Volunteer Cavalry by January 15th 1797 in respect of up to three horses.[5] The Subdivision Meetings were the sole judges of the elegibility of appeals and were also responsible for exonerating people who ceased to keep horses or kept fewer.[6]

The financial provisions of the Acts were also complicated. The individuals ballotted had to supply clothing for their man and horse but were

reimbursed by the public.[7] Those who did not have a horse suitable for service were to be supplied with one by or at the expense of the class: this was to be considered public property when the force was disbanded. A substitute might if necessary be provided in the same way.[8] If a substitute or horse became unfit, the principal had to replace them, receiving help from the public in the latter case.[9] When the force was embodied, the bounty paid to substitutes was to be reimbursed to the limit of £10.[10] There was a scale of fines up to £25 for not providing clothing, men, and horses, for not replacing unfit horses and (on classes) for not providing horses for ballotted men who had none suitable. The various allowances from the public were financed by these fines and by a quarterly assessment added to the liability of all who paid Horse Tax.[12]

The Provisional Cavalry was to be officered in the same way as the militia and might be embodied for active service at His Majesty's pleasure. It was not to serve outside Great Britain. If horses died on active service, their owners were to be compensated.[13] Unless embodied, the force was to meet only for Musters which could be ordered by the General Meeting with the King's consent. While unembodied, substitutes might resign at any time, repaying any bounty they might have received.[15] The principals had to replace them. Only when a principal serving for himself was found to be unfit was there a fresh ballot.[16] Any surplus of fines or the quarterly assessment was to be used to fill deficits.[17]

There was a certain amount of dilatoriness in carrying out this levy, partly because there was soon an option of raising Volunteers instead. Shropshire hoped to have all its new levies completed by January 1797.[18] but only two thirds of the Provisional Cavalry had been ballotted for by the following October. The County had rejected plans to raise Volunteers instead in Janua ry, but canvassing for them continued in the different localities and in May there was much doubt about whether to continue the levy. In March 1798, there were still districts in the County where the ballot had not been held.[19] From Durham in April 1797 came a report that there had been no ballot in the Darlington Ward Subdivision and none was intended.[20]

The Amounderness Subdivision of Lancashire took no action until April.[21]

The complexity of the law caused trouble and delay. The passing of an amending Act so soon is a sign of this. Lord Radnor said the first Act was completely unintelligible (which is not far from the truth).[22] Even much later, in the summer of 1798, the Attorney-General had some questions from the Lieutenancy of Suffolk about the meaning of the Acts which after three months he was still unable to answer.[23] Mistakes were made. In Carnarvonshire, the Deputies granted complete exemption to the clergy instead of exemption in respect of one horse.[24] There and elsewhere there was doubt about the liability of women.[25] (As this was essentially a levy on property, they were in fact liable; nor does there seem to be anything in the Act to prevent their services in person). There was doubt too as to whether a man was liable in the place where he was assessed or where he paid his Horse Tax.[25] Lord Dynevor also pointed out that if he was assessed for the expenses in London where he paid, it would be hard on his neighbours at home in Wales where he served.[26] In the matter of where to serve, the Acts gave a wide choice to the individual.[27]

Matters were made more confused by a printer's error in the published version of the first Act which made it appear that persons enjoyed exemption not only if they were but if they ever had been articled clerks or apprentices.[29] The government received may queries about this and some Subdivision Meetings were postponed till the answer was received. All in all, the government grew very tired of the spate of questions on the Cavalry Acts and told the Deputies that it was entirely their duty to interpret the laws which Parliament had made.[30]

The further working of the Acts caused some perplexities and a further amending Act in 1798 dealt with them in part.[31] It was not clear to, for instance, the Deputies of Norfolk what was to happen if a principal died.[32] Colonel Burland in Somerset thought that in that case the horse was no longer liable to serve but a substitute who had been sworn in was. He suggested that

the substitutes should be released and a completely new man ballotted.[33] It was apparently the custom to pay substitutes only a small part of their bounty to start with, as a "retaining fee".[34] The rest was to be given him only when he was called out.[35] The government approved of this system and the new Act permitted a certificate by the Deputies to be sent to the Receiver General stating what sum had been promised. The Receiver General, on the embodiment, would then pay this sum to the regiment and so the principal was relieved of the charge further than before.[36] On the other hand, he seemingly had to go on paying for the upkeep of the horse until it was called out, which was a burden if it was one got specially for the force.[37]

Classes had apparently got together in many cases to share all the charges of the levy. Burland asked that their agreements should be made free of stamp duty and the amending Act ma de it possible to escape theassessment for expenses in this way and to enforce the agreements by appealing to the Justices.[39]

In the Spring of 1798 the government was embodying its defensive forces and took stock of the Provisional Cavalry with a view to doing the same. This enables us to judge of its Condition. In February 1798, twenty-six counties had sent returns showing that they had raised 7960 men.[40] Dundas told the cabinet that there were probably 12-15,000 in all and with some reform a force could be got out of them.[41] He sent a circular to the Lords Lieutenant calling on them to muster the force and send returns.[42] An abstract of forty two replies in April shows 12,410 men available.[43] As many counties had availed themselves of the opportunity allowed them of raising Volunteer Cavalry instead, this was a fair way towards the 20,000 which had been envisaged as the probable yield of the levy.

Ten counties appeared to have appointed no officers.[44] Almost all had held musters. These were by Subdivisions - which was the mode envisaged by the Act and the circular - and not assemblies of the whole force of each county.[45]

There was general agreement that if the force was to continue as it was, there should be some means of training it. The Marquess of Salisbury said that the musters were unsafe, the Deputies having far too little authority over the men.[46] As early as November 1796 the officers appointed for the Cheshire force lamented that they were unable to train the men.[47] Colonel Burland and the Deputies of Norfolk thought there should be four weeks of it each year as for the militia.[48] The amending Act of June 1798 went some way to meet this case. It enabled regiments to be exercised in a manner to be laid down by the government if the men were willing to do this in return for a bounty of two guineas. Lists were to be made and the men were to be called out by the constables, just like the militia.[49]

The main question in June 1798 was whether the Provisional Cavalry should be embodied or not. A scheme of establishment was drawn up[50] and a circular prepared to instruct those concerned how to mobilise the force.[51] There was much argument in which Lord Westmoreland defended the Provisional Cavalry[52] and Pitt and Dundas were divided on the subject.[53] Finally, as we have seen, the matter was decided by the generals who said they had enough cavalry.[54] In consequence, only the six most forward regiments - those of Somerset, Suffolk, Kent, Northumberland, Berkshire and Worcestershire - were embodied. They totalled some 1500 privates.[55] Nothing was done to train the rest and in March 1799 the final decision was taken and an Act was passed dismissing the unembodied portion of the force and doing away with the machinery of ballots and classes.[56] The six regiments in service were to be assimilated to the Fencible Cavalry and maintain their strength by ordinary enlistment.[57] Thus the Provisional Cavalry did not survive the improvement in the nation's military fortunes. The remnants that did went out of existence like so much of the Fencible Cavalry in 1800

As the Provisional Cavalry declined, the efforts to use it as a means of

encouraging enlistment in the Volunteer Cavalry were intensified. It had been the amending Act of December 1796 which first permitted counties to exonerate themselves in this way. If Volunteer Cavalry to the number of three-quarters of the quota of a Subdivision were raised therein, the Deputies might suspend the ballot altogether. If a le sser number came forward, they might elect to serve in lieu of individuals or classes. The Deputies might postpone the ballot till January 15th 1797 to allow time for offers and the Privy Council was empowered to postpone it further. The Volunteers who came under arms in this way were to receive the allowances for clothing which would otherwise have been paid to the Provisional Cavalry and which were to be obtained in the same way by an assessment on those liable and who had been exonerated.[58]

An Act of July 1797 empowered counties where the Provisional Cavalry was not yet raised to continue substituting Volunteers in the above ways till October 1st 1797.[59] The Act of June 1798 laid down the sums to be paid, and made the Lord Lieutenant responsible for certifying what was due to the Secretary at War, who would see that it was assessed.[60] It also enabled the Privy Council to suspend the Cavalry Acts in any county where volunteers to the number of three quarters of the quota had been raised between January 14th 1797 and August 1st 1798.[61] Individua ls ballotted or liable in their own right to serve in the Cavalry were furthermore allowed to discharge their obligation by providing a man for the Fencible Cavalry.[62]

The most useful result of the Provisional Cavalry legislation was the help thus given to Volunteer Cavalry and it is in a further chapter that this must be discussed.

The demise of the Provisional Cavalry is associated with some interesting apologetics on the subject. Lord Westmoreland pointed out in June 1798 that a great deal had been spent on the force and the Yeomanry was designed for a different

function. There was no reason why Voluntary offers should not go forward as well as the compulsory levy.[63] The Hon. John Villiers suggested that the force should be called out a section at a time, each section drilling for three months.* This would cost £375,000 a year as compared with a million and a half if the whole were called out. The officers were mostly confident that an efficient force could be got this way. The Yeomanry were well trained but could not be moved far and he felt that a large mobile body of horse was needed on the east coast.[64]

In the previous December, Colonel Burland had ventured to suggest that the Provisional Cavalry should be a permanent Horse Militia, trained for twenty days a year with help from the regulars. It could be easily called out and would make it unnecessary to raise Fencible Cavalry which cost more and competed with the army for recruits.[65] No one seemed interested in this idea. In March 1799, Colonel Dundas of the Berkshire regiment was all for turning the remnant into Fencibles, as was done.[66] He was one of the most zealous men in the force but expressed no interest in it as an institution. For the rest, there were schemes to use it to drive the country, to turn it into horse artillery, even to arm it with spears.[67] It had reached "white elephant" status.

The Provisional Cavalry was extremely unpopular, and did not become any less so when it appeared that it was never to be used. Dundas was warned that this might happen even in 1796[68] and among others Colonel Cocks of Worcestershire made it an argument in favour of calling out the whole. He spoke of the "jobbing and cheating" connected with the measure and said that a General Meeting in his county had only consented to a muster by a majority of one.[69] His words are confirmed by a printed broadside issued by one of the Deputies who thought the

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* c.f. page 157

majority (depending on the vote of a borough magistrate) was not a true one and railed against his colleagues for imposing on the people a burden at once oppressive and unconstitutional.[70] In Shropshire, the muster cost the county £1000 and it was said that the measure had never been popular.[71] A great many people there had been forced to register horses on which they had hitherto evaded the payment of tax: with the publication of the assessments for the purposes of ballotting, their deceit would have become clear and they would have been denounced for failing to bear a fair share in the levy.[72] The original act had envisaged this situation and gave an amnesty in cases where false declarations were amended.[73] All this was not likely to command the measure.

Lord Rous said the measure was much disliked by the farmers and middle orders.[74] Samuel Seymour thought that its abolition would conciliate the men of middling fortune, say £300 to £1400 a year who were the strongest support of the constitution but were being alienated by the weight of taxation.[75] A local Deputy wrote in to say that poor tradesmen with one wretched pony who only paid tax because they could not swear that it was never used except for carrying goods were hard hit.[76] Thus the cavalry Acts were detested high and low. A correspondent of the Chairman of the East India Company said at the time when the amending measure of 1798 was under discussion that "everyone was best off who parted with the least cash", that it was a "pickpocket piece of business" likely to rouse more anger than any tax.[77] Windham was later to epitomise the confusion of it all by speaking of "a pleasant conceit to make everyman ride another's horse."[78]

The career of the remnant that saw actual service is no more than an appendix to the story of the Provisional Cavalry. Three of the regiments formed clearly owed their excellence to an enthusiast. The opinions of Colonel Burland in Somerset have been explained. He had been an officer in the county's Fencible Cavalry regiment. Colonel Cocks in Worcestershire had previously organ-

ized the county Yeomanry. He brought forward the force as we saw against strong opposition. Colonel Dundas in Berkshire exerted himself to such effect and was so well supported by the Lieutenancy that the regiment was mustered before many counties had completed the ballot,[79] the men were mostly young and good and the officers eager to serve.[80]

Vestiges of their origin clung to the regiments and gave them some affinity with the militia. The men's families were entitled to family allowances.[81] The men received the "marching guinea" when called out.[82] The horses and original clothing supply had been provided by the balloted men. The clothing of the Kent regiment was very bad and of the Northumberland it was reported that the horses were inferior and their furniture very defective.[83] Colonel Burland had a controversy with the Deputies of Somerset about defective horses. He claimed that the Deputies should replace them. The solicitor advising the Lieutenancy thought the responsibility lay with the principal to whom the defective horse should be returned. Burland pointed out that the Colonel and the Deputies had equal authority in deciding which horses were defective and might not agree.[84] How men were to be replaced was not at all clear. It was as well that the responsibility for finding horses, men and clothing was taken from the counties in March 1799.

The transfer to a Fencible basis excited opposition only in the Northumberland regiment. The men of two troops petitioned one of the county members (Grey) on the advice of their wives and friends, asking him to intercede.[85] The regiment was mutinous for a time until brought to reason by two severe court martials. An inspecting officer's comment was "the men seem to know their own qualifications for they are certainly better adapted for cow drivers than soldiers in their present state."[86] This regiment however was typical neither in spirit nor quality.[87] There were good reports of the Berkshire and Kent regiments. The Worcestershire regiment apparently consisted of men enlisted at the expense

of those liable to serve and mostly just before embodiment.[88] They were therefore nearer to ordinary recruits than to militia men privately provided. This regiment extended its services to Europe and was sent to Ireland.[89] The Berkshire regiment was ready (at least in part) to do the same.[90]

The fate of the unembodied men of the force was sometimes hard. Those of the Norwich area begged to be embodied because they found it difficult to get work - they could not guarantee that they would not be called away.[91] From Worcestershire it was reported that a body of very good men had been raised who ought to be called into service. Officers could not be found but that was merely because no one would join a force which might never serve.[92] Croydon had to watch five hundred cavalrymen go to waste while desperately striving to make good the deficit in the militia.[93]

The Provisional Cavalry was the Pitt government's biggest blunder in the recruiting field. To try experiments that failed was inevitable when an effort was required on an unprecedented scale, but in this case, a force was called for which the government later found it did not want. Unduly complicated methods were adopted in providing it and no way was indicated of training it. There were reasons for all this: the high view of the importance of cavalry noticed in the first chapter and the peculiar view of cavalry as a genteel force and even a relic of chivalry that will be mentioned later on. For the present we must notice that the Provisional Cavalry, with the parochial levy, took to its furthest extreme one of the principles pervading the militia - that of a tax on property payable in men.

CHAPTER VIII : COMPARISON OF YIELDS

(a) The Line : Normal Yield

The different methods by which regularly embodied soldiers were brought into the service have now all been examined. It will be as well as this point to consider what reason there is to suppose that by adopting a variety of systems, involving very different terms of service, it was possible to secure significantly more men than could be raised by the routine activity of the Regular Army. Let us first consider what sort of men were enlisted by the originary regiments of the Line and recruiting corps and then make comparison with other branches of the service.

Were the generals* right, and the "scum of the earth" the only source of recruits for the Line? Plenty of examples support their case, modifying it slightly. We find wastrels and failures in business: such were George Frazer, a grocer of Inverness ruined by "the ladies and the bottle"[1], or John Graham, who came to London from his native Ulster to set up in business, failed, ended up destitute at Bath and under "inexpressible necessity" enlisted.[2] More sinister is the case of one Mears, committed to prison for an offence for which, if he chose, he might compound with the prosecutor and with that end in view left at liberty for a few days. Allowed this indulgence because he was of good family, he responded by enlisting with a sergeant who told him that the commitment would be broken thereby.[3] Representative of a very different group is James Morris, a midshipman of the East India Company who, returning to England after a long absence, heard of the death of his mother. Deranged by his grief he was enlisted by a crimp of Gravesend.[4] Lastly, let us notice a case of Reform. John Hawkins, unruly son of a gentleman with a large family, enlisted in the 29th. He repented

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* see pages 80-81

of his action and prior conduct. His commanding officer gave him a good character and granted him many indulgences. As he had been apprenticed to a surgeon, a relative wrote to ask the War Office to let him serve as a surgeon's mate in the navy.[5]

The only type of recruit easy to survey in the mass rather than from individual instances is the runaway apprentice. Few soldiers could write and not very many were written about, but the War Office's correspondence on apprentices grew so much that from 1796 it is bound in a separate series of volumes.[6] The War Office abided by Lord Camden's opinion (so called, though dating from 1760) that an apprentice was incapable in law of enlisting himself without his master's consent.[7] It was therefore willing to order their release on the properly authenticated application of the master. He had to write in person,[8] enclosing the indentures. (Trouble arose when the signatures on the two documents did not tally,[9] or when the master was illiterate.)[10] Discharge was a matter of favour[11] and was refused when the master had also applied to the civil courts[12] or when the apprentice deserted[13] or had enlisted a second time. Borderline cases were frequent. Apprentices were bound for less than seven years,[14] they were rebound to other masters (especially common in the Birmingham district)[15] or they were employees of members of the Sheffield Cutler's Company, which had a special status.[16] Finally, the regiment could sometimes prove that the master had consented to the enlistment,[17] in which case the army kept the man.

Until an amendment to the mutiny act in 1805 the apprentice enlisting and making the prescribed declaration that he was not one, was not guilty of perjury.[18] He could, however, be prosecuted for fraud. In 1797, for instance, an apprentice who had joined the marines was prosecuted at Warwick Assizes for obtaining money under false pretences and sentenced to six months' hard labour and three public whippings in Birmingham.[19] Cases are cited in which the master

allowed the apprentices to join in order to save them from being thus punished.[20] From 1796, the War Office encouraged regiments to report cases suitable for prosecution, which if sanctioned would be undertaken by the regiment at the government's expense.[21] Among other things, the War Office wished to establish by test cases whether further legislation was needed to stop the abuse.[22] A letter to Fox, then Inspector General of recruiting, in January 1798 seems to indicate its conclusion. It refers to a lad who wished to be a soldier and hoped to get out of reach before he was claimed. He is contrasted with those who enlist merely to get the bounty and in the expectation of being claimed. In the former case, the court might not convict and would never impose a heavy sentence[23]; in cases of the other sort, the result would be satisfactory.

We have now sampled all the evidence which comes more or less from the point of view of the recruit. It mainly concerns members of the artisan and shopkeeper class. Now the Description Books (of which more anon) giving the previous occupations of recruits, show that not more than a quarter or so belonged to this class. A good half are always "labourers" and a large part of the remainder "weavers". The motives of this dumb proletarian element can only be inferred from the comments of the officers engaged in recruiting. It is natural to wonder if they were more strictly economic than those postulated by the Generals and displayed by the middle class wastrels. There is little evidence, certainly, that raising the bounty brought in men who would not otherwise have joined. The effect was mainly to cause men to enlist for the bounty and abscond (as above) and to draw them from one regiment to another.

There are cases in Scotland admittedly of weavers at work on "webs" for which they had been paid in advance of being enlisted - it was necessary in such cases not to send them to the regiment until they had fulfilled their contract.[24] This may be claimed as a case of the army outbidding the civil employer. But we find one such man neglecting his web, enlisting and then being put in prison by

the civil authorities.[25] This looks like another case of a wastrel try-ing to escape.

Grey had referred in passing to unemployment as a reason for enlistment. Sir John Moore in the reports of 1804 thought that only a recession could materially increase the supply of recruits[26] while Craig mentioned the high price of labour as the chief adverse factor.[27] The easiest aspect of this question to study is the effect of the harvest. Here are some Description Book figures:-[28]

Recruits raised in:	18th Light Dragoons	29th Light Dragoons	14th Foot	1st Btn. 28th Foot
Jan. - March	155	259	117	36
April - June	163	238	66	61
July - September	170	165	79	27
October - December	342	277	124	17

Analogous is the report that recruiting for the Manx Fencibles had declined because the Island was having a good fishing season.[29] On the industrial side, we can only say that the recruiters made for the big towns. Dr. Kerr told Graham who was raising the 90th that Northampton was "perhaps the worst recruiting town in England as we have no manufactory of consequence". When raising men in peacetime for his son's promotion he had been forced, despite his local influence, to complete the quota by sending the sergeant-major of the local militia to recruit in Birmingham.[30] That town and its environs were spoken of by a local magistrate as "this populous and trading part of the country (the grand nursery for soldiers and sailors)".[31] Even in 1793, the Colonel of the 77th reported that there were so many competing parties there that his regiment could not get a single man.[32] The same tale is told of Manchester, Leeds, Glasgow and London. The Description Books and records of apprentices show a preponderance of men coming from industrial areas.* It could be simply that they were the most populous, but the crises in industry and the unsettling effect of life in the new towns seem to have predisposed men to enter the army.✓

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* But c.f. page 225 : ✓ c.f. E.Halevy, Histoire du Peuple Anglais, etc. 2nd ed. I.73-4

What was the physical standard of the recruits? The Description Books so often referred to, were supposed to be kept by each regiment to answer this question. They record when each man joined, his age and height, his birthplace and former occupation. An innovation of the period under study, they were carelessly kept and only a few have survived, mostly with some columns blank. Some figures of age and height may be of interest:- [33]

	Under 20	21-30	Over 30	Under 5'5"	5'5"- 5'7"	Over 5'7"
20th Light Dragoons	603	627	51	124	621	432
29th Light Dragoons	416	262	17	206	322	157
14th Foot	156	421	145	214	238	246
42nd Foot (Black Watch)	294	937	246	377	502	518

The age columns speak for themselves. The minimum height laid down for recruits was 5'5" but growing lads might be taken an inch shorter. [34] Actually, plenty of men shorter than this were taken, sometimes with the leave of the authorities, but a good many were lost to the service through being too short. [35] An officer recruiting at Aberdeen had to refuse 204 men of 5'2½" - 4½". Major Sparrow, recruiting in Suffolk, desired the standard to be lowered by an inch because the men of that county tended to be short. [36] Seaforth obtained this concession when recruiting in the Hebrides for the 78th [37] - the Highlanders were far from being as tall as we sometimes picture them. * The standard was waived entirely for certain regiments raised on a territorial basis [38] - which may partly explain why more of the army was not so raised.

The recruits of the average Line regiment were thus a body of young unstable men in which the ratio of the different classes was much as in civil life. The motives of these men seem to have been largely psychological. On the other hand the tendency for recruiters to concentrate on urban areas suggests that it was the conditions of life in towns that usually drove the poor man into the right frame of mind. The fact remains that only a minority -

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* Bulloch 394-6

further reduced by the choosiness of the army - was so driven. The vast majority everywhere considered any fate better than military service. A great consequence of this as noted earlier was that it was usual to raise each regiment from very widely scattered areas and compact local connections were very unusual.[39]

(b) County and Territorial Regiments

We must now see if the forces raised on different terms and in different ways from the regiments of the Line were able to tap fresh sources of supply. To succeed in recruiting within a given area would be in most cases equivalent to doing this, in as much as ordinary recruiting concentrated on certain localities and there was need of a counterbalancing effort to sweep methodically through the countryside in general. If novel methods can be shown to have produced fresh men, the policy of having various forces besides the line will be shown to have been a success.

The regiments (whether regular or for home defence) with the most indubitable local connections were those of the Highlands. Not that they contained no men from elsewhere. Even Seaforth had a contract with the notorious crimp Hamlin of London[1] and 85 of his men out of the first 600 were English or Lowlanders.[2] The second battalion of the Rothesay and Caithness Fencibles contained only 350 men from the northernmost shires where Sir James Sinclair's territory lay.[3] The Breadalbanes recruited actively in the Lowlands, as for instance at Haddington and Glasgow.[4] To some extent they were still recruiting Highlanders. At Dumbarton, a factory was laying off men at one point and it was proposed to enlist the Highlanders who had formerly been attracted to work there.[5] An analysis of the 79th regiment in 1799 shows that 50 had been born in Inverness-shire but only 19 enlisted there, and 105 had enlisted in Glasgow. Fortythree men born in Scotland had enlisted in London.[6] This last case suggests that

Seaforth's men from there, or the thirty got for the Mackay Fencibles and held up by a shipping embargo on the way north[7] may have been Scotsmen.

The Gordons procured 150 Lowlanders for their Fencibles but 300 came from their own estates and 300 from those of their dependents.[8] Three quarters of their line regiment came from their own estates and the rest from Aberdeenshire.[9] Sir James Grant's Fencibles, 590 strong in June 1793, contained only seven rank and file who were not Scotsmen. There were 80 Grants, 41 Frazers, 94 Macdonalds and Macdonnells, 128 other "Macs" and 44 with such names as Gordon or Cameron.[10] The Regiment of the Isles (Lord Macdonald's) raised in 1793 contained 455 Highlanders (200 Macdonalds) 103 Lowlanders and 92 English and Irish. Its contemporary the Clan Alpines had 293 Highlanders 154 Lowlanders and 153 from outside[11] - this at a low ebb in recruiting when the Highlanders had been drained.

It is impossible to think of the Highlanders being recruited on a large scale save through their chiefs. Gordon of Coynachie, having secured some men to serve, said that he must be brought into the regiment or else they would not go, and he had not troubled to attest them because they would go with no one else.[12] Colonel Baillie wrote to offer the government a Fencible regiment as the nominee of the Mackays who alone could bring forward men from the district of Strathaven.[13] Apart from anything else, only the chief could override the claims of agriculture. Eric Mackay gave orders that if need be the efficiency of the estate must be disregarded in the drive for men.[14] Grant induced the farmers to denude themselves only by agreeing to leave the men on the farms until the spring sowing had been done.[15]

The Highlander had very strong hopes of returning to civil life after a period of soldiering. Various stipulations which are noted elsewhere were asked of the government to secure his rights and his links with his patrons.

The Highlands raised many regiments of the line but they produced many more of Fencibles, and without the immunity of these from being swallowed by the regular army, the chief's task might have been harder. Seaforth would have preferred to raise Fencibles.[16] The Highlanders had a lively fear of going abroad and being "sold" and some of the Fencibles raised for the very limited service of Scotland refused as we shall see to go any further. Thus the government was limited in its choice of agents for recruiting in the Highlands and to some extent also in its choice of terms under which the men would enlist.

How do the regiments with county connections compare with this? We have shown already that only the Fencibles and militia augmentation have a claim (apart from the militia proper) to be considered county forces. The limitation of such forces to home service was probably inevitable if the local gentry were to be brought forward in adequate numbers as officers. Was the government rewarded for making this limitation?

Certainly there were county corps that belied their name. Colonel Countenay of the Cheshire Fencibles said that his regiment should never be sent to Ireland because of the many Irishmen it contained. He also hoped to get recruits from the Isle of Man.[17] Yet he at least made the claim that his regiment was raised, if slowly yet without the help of crimps. He hoped that men afraid of the operations of these criminals would join his corps.[18] Very much the same was said by Colonel Morrison of the Fifeshire Fencibles.[19]

Various incidents suggest a genuinely local origin for these forces. The Cambridgeshire Fencible Cavalry was not to be stationed at Cambridge because the men were natives and would immediately engage in the Town and Gown riots.[20] The Norfolk Cavalry was not to go to Norwich because the men came from there and would not be reliable against their friends.[21] The portion of the Somersetshires ordered to be disbanded in 1795 was first sent back to the county.[22] Some men of the Devon and Cornwall Infantry coming home from Ireland for the same

purpose were (improperly) discharged when the ship touched at Barnstaple because it was near their homes and the Officer in Charge was running short of money.[23] Sir Alexander Don asked that the Berwickshire Cavalry be sent out of the county where it had just been formed. Disciplineand training were impossible when the men were still with their friends and always able to go home.[24]

Sir George Thomas who raised the Cavalry in Sussex got 27 men in a week for his first troop from his own neighbourhood. Two more were proposed to be raised locally, later in 1794.[25] Next year, augmentation was easy because the young men all knew him and came in at the rate of three a day. Midhurst and Petworth soon had no quarters enough to hold them.[26] Colonel Burgoyne of the Essex Cavalry complained when stationed at Exeter that it was difficult to recruit - he could only get men in Essex and Bedfordshire.[27] Adjutant Wale of the Cambridgeshire Militia actually asked if he was permitted to recruit for the augmentation of 1794 outside the county. In the end he had three parties inside it, at Cambridge, Wisbech and Ely and two on the borders at Royston and Newmarket.[28] Localized recruiting was here a reality.

(c) The Militia

The county forces of enlisted men form a good introduction to the militia, to which the same limitations applied and which was based in the same way on the local gentry. The militia too was by no means entirely localized. It was said that Warwickshire with its industrial areas supplied half the recruits of each of its neighbouring counties.[1] The accounts of family allowances kept by the County Treasurer of Middlesex show that men with families living in the county were serving in the militias of twentyseven other counties while the Middlesex Militia in turn contained men whose families lived in thirtyfour other shires.[2] But the tenendcy was the other way.

The law required, as we have seen, that militiamen should come from the same county as they served for, or an adjoining one. In Cambridgeshire a magistrate pointed out that one defaulting substitute brought before him was from another county and should not have been enrolled in the first place.[3] Of 723 men of the militia who enlisted in the 82nd regiment in 1799, all but 191 had been born in the county for which they were serving, and half the remainder were serving for counties adjacent to their own. The regiments from which these men came included the Durham, East Riding, Shropshire, Carnarvon, Gloucestershire, Somerset, Hampshire, Berkshire, Kent and Middlesex Militias.[4] Of 739 men who joined the first battalion of the 52nd from the regiments of some twenty counties no less varied, only 223 had been serving for counties other than their own and again half these had come from adjoining counties.[5]

It was the general rule to station the militia regiments outside their own counties[6] - a sure sign that they had local ties with the people and could not be trusted to act against them. Adjutant Wale was anxious that the Supplementary Militia Training of 1797 should be done at central county rendezvous and not in the Subdivisions by which the respective bodies were provided. In the latter case, the men would be laughed at by their friends for awkwardness in drill, discipline would suffer because they would be able to go home in the evenings, and attempts at punishment would mean for the officers the "risque of being knocked on the head by old women and their families - I assure you, I fear these viragos ... more than I do the invasion of the French".[7] When the Supplementary Militia was raised in 1796, Lord Buckingham was displeased that his regiment, being at Bristol, could not do any recruiting.[8] Such signs as

these indicate that the militia was a truly local force.

The militia brought under arms many men unlikely to go into the line. We have seen that few principals entered the service, though there were always some and they were always borne in mind. The Duke of Richmond asked that the Sussex Militia should remain as one regiment when augmented in 1798 because the better sort of people in the force, who served for themselves, liked to be sure beforehand under whose command they were to be.[9] The citizens of Westminster sent a petition to the Lieutenancy asking that the Supplementary Militia be drilled locally. If it went to any distance, those who might otherwise serve in person would refuse to do so. Any men who went would be rendered unfit for ordinary work afterwards and agitators were being sent by the London Corresponding Society to enlist and corrupt them.[10] Principals were especially rare in forces from urban areas. In Lancashire the following details exist of men enlisting from the militia in the line in 1799 - admittedly an unsuitable sample.[11]

The 2nd Regiment : 134 of which 13 were principals

The 3rd Regiment : 202 of which 18 were principals

The 5th Regiment : 83 of which 1 was principal

However, the substitutes and volunteers might not be ordinary recruits. Thomas Berry had left the Cambridgeshire Militia to work for his old employer in Uxbridge (Middlesex). But he felt an attachment to his old regiment and offered to come back when the war started, imagining there would be a demand for substitutes.[12] Edward Smith had apparently been induced by Lord Hardwicke to offer his services and had been given a retainer. Unfortunately, the county clerk was out when he called and he could not find a magistrate or anyone else who was looking for a substitute. His wife now appeared uneasy at the thought of his going and he wished to withdraw. Nevertheless, he was willing to abide by Lord Hardwicke's decision.[13] Men like these do not sound accessible to the ordinary recruiter.

In terms of groups rather than individuals, the militia was the means of bringing forward men who were settled and with families. Regular soldiers were on the whole men without families, though there were many exceptions.[14] The militia contained an important married element, as the agitation over family allowances bore witness. Out of over 900 Privates in the Cambridgeshire Militia in 1799, 282 were married, together with 39 N.C.O.'s. Of these men, 22 had no children, 120 had one, 93 two, 61 three, 21 four, three had five and one had six.[15] Of a body of Middlesex militiamen with families outside the county in 1796, 65 were without children, 88 had one child, 47 two, 27 three, 5 four and three had five -[16] it is interesting to note the ratio between families of different sizes. It was found in Worcestershire that the shortage of men, besides causing an influx of boys, meant that many principals with large families had to serve in the Supplementary Militia.[17]

It was the Supplementary Militia that most demonstrably consisted of men who would never have gone into the army. It will be recalled that this force was originally raised without any idea of sending it on permanent duty. A letter to the Duke of Richmond pledged the government in the strongest terms not to call it out unless invasion was immediately in prospect.[18] It was analogous to the Volunteers. When in 1797 it was called out for drill, there were demands in some places such as Lincolnshire that it should be formed into distinct battallions to allay fears of being sold to some other service.[19]

To show the distinctive temper of the Supplementary Militia men, it is necessary to refer to the enlistment of militia men into the line in 1799. All the men, whether "old" or "supplementary", had the same opportunity to enlist, and if they did not they were faced with the disembodiment of some part of their number, without any distinction between the two categories as such. Yet Dundas in September 1799 said that in July, during the first reduction of the militia, the "old militia" had p roduced the bulk of the recruits for the line, the "supplementary" but few.[20]

The Durham regiment gave few to the line and this was put down to its being mainly composed of supplementary men. Lord Derby's reports suggested that in the Lancashire militia the same distinction obtained.[21] Colonel Eliot feared that few of his Staffordshire regiment of Supplementary Militia would enter the line - they had not been willing to do so when given the chance at the embodiment in 1798 when they knew only the good side of soldiering - trying on uniforms and drinking the bounties.[22] The Supplementary Militia had been less ready than the "old" in 1798 to go to Ireland - the 300 of the Leicestershire for instance who stayed behind were mostly new men.[23]

The immediate reason for the difference would seem to be that the Supplementary Militia was composed to a greater extent of family men (family allowances ceased once the men had entered the army) and men who wished, like the Highlanders, to return to civil life at the end of the war. 1799 was a period of full employment: Colonel Patten of the 5th and youngest regiment of Lancashire Militia said that his men would prefer disbandment owing to the demand for labour at Manchester where they could earn ten guineas in a few weeks.[24] From the corresponding regiment of the West Riding it was reported that the men were industrial workers tempted in by the high bounties offered by the parishes urgently needing to complete their quota at the embodiment. They were now eager to return to civil life and take advantage of the high wages. When the scheme for enlistment into the line had been announced, their families had swarmed in from all over the Riding to dissuade them from doing such a thing.[25] The demand for their labour is illustrated by the Lord Lieutenant's request that equal numbers should be disembodied from each regiment. Each was supplied with men by one area, which would gain the advantage of extra labour if its own regiment alone were reduced.[26]

The ultimate reason for the difference between the two sorts of militiamen was however that the "old" men had become used to soldiering and unfitted for anything else. Such at any rate was the opinion of the time. We have seen how

at Westminster this result was expected to follow from twenty day's drill.[27] A memorandum of 1798 suggested that furloughs without pay should be given to the "old" men, batches being let out for six months at a time. This would enable them to revover (before peace and disbandment) the habits of industry and feelings of duty towards their families which they had lost. The supplementary men, the writer thought, still had these feelings in full mearure.[28] After disembodiment, many of the West Somerset Militia were expected to enlist, since they would not care for "hard labour and poor living" after "better fare and an easier and more idle life".[29] A person with experience of recruiting in the West Riding thought even the Supplementary Militia had been soldiers long enough to dislike work.[30] But naturally the longer a man had been in, the greater his desire to stay. Of the 723 militia men who went to the 82nd regiment, 248 had served for less than two years and 360 had served for more than four.[31] Of the 739 men going to the 52nd (first battallion) only 56 had served as little as two years and 149 had served more than ten.[32]

It will be recalled that the officers reporting on the limit of service in 1804 regarded the soldier's life as a free and easy one which unfitted him for anything else.[33] Further examples of this view will be given when elistment for the line from the Militia is considered - it was the basis of much of the confidence placed in the measure. Interesting evidence that it had become part of the common stock of ideas is provided by the fourth part of Cowper's poem "The Task" (1783)*. The poet speaks of the corruption of rural manners through the growth of sophistication and wealth.

> "But faster far, and more than all the rest,
> A noble cause, which none who bears a spark
> Of public virtue, ever wish'd removed,
> Works the deplored and mischievous effect.
> 'Tis universal soldiership has stabb'd
> The heart of merit in the meaner class.
> ....the clown, the child of nature, without guile,
> ....is balloted, and trembles at the news:
> ....that instant he becomes the serjeant's care,
> His pupil, and his torment, and his jest.
> ....he yet by slow degrees puts off himself,

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*Quoted in Holden 48.

Grows conscious of a change, and likes it well:
....and, his three years of heroship expired,
Returns indignant to the slighted plough.
....to swear, to game, to drink; to show at home.
By loudness, idleness, and sabbath breach,
The great proficiency he made abroad;
To astonish and to grieve his gazing friends;
To break some maiden's and his mother's heart;
To be a pest where he was useful once;
Are his sole aim, and all his glory now."

The Militia then, and espicially the Supplementary Militia, brought men into the service who would never have entered the army. If they were kept in service long enough, they would not wish to leave and would prefer the army to a return to civil life. This was well understood on all sides - not without misgivings about the social consequences, for to be a good soldier was yet to be combined with good citizenship.

(d) Cavalry Forces.

What has been said already is fully applicable to the various types of cavalry force, but they had certain characteristics in recruiting matters that were peculiar to themselves. Broadly speaking, they had a much easier task. Major Grey in 1809 reported that the cavalry were popular because of the attraction of having a horse.[1] Lord Cornwallis thought much the same in 1804 - the cavalry, he said were not short of men.[2] Late in 1795, an officer who had been recruiting for an infantry regiment at Glasgow was transferred to a cavalry regiment. He wished to go on recruiting and said that the people preferred the cavalry. A party with horses was necessary.[3] In October 1794, when the infantry was being allowed 15 or even 18 guineas levy money for each recruit, the cavalry was only getting 12.[4] The spring of 1795 however saw infantry bounties at their peak, and the Colonel of the King's Dragoon Guards declared that a draft from his regiment would have to be made up by another from the infantry, as the high bounty offered by the new regiments precluded ordinary recruiting.[5] Thus glamour (plus, it must be said, a slightly higher rate of pay) was very slowly outstripped by the financial power of the infantry levies.

The cavalry could not only get men more easily but could aim at a better class of recruits. This is most conspicuous in the case of the corps raised for home defence. The New Rommey Fencible Light Dragoons were only to enlist men of known residence.[6] At the musters of the Provisional Cavalry, one or two gentlemen appeared in the ranks, serving for themselves. William Colquhoun, M.P. did so in Norfolk, and in Cambridgeshire a Mr. Bendyshe turned up who was the only man in uniform.[8] Doubtless they would have dropped out had their regiments been permanently embodied, but in Berkshire it was reported that many gentlemen would be willing to join the Provisional Cavalry for the period of an emergency only.[9]

Thus it was in the cavalry, if anywhere, that personal service could be called for from respectable individuals. This made it a most suitable field for the activity of the county. It was also possible to bridge the gulf here between the embodied forces and the Volunteers. The Fencible and Yeomanry Cavalry of 1794 were paralled levies by the county action. The Provisional Cavalry and the augmentation of the Yeomanry in 1796-8 were made connected levies, one being a means of strengthing the other. There was an indefinable feeling that a gentleman ought to be ready to serve as a horse-soldier. It was this that led strength to the drive for cavalry at this time and resulted in one of the most systematic and enduring growth of the period - the Yeomanry, the local and personal force of the county gentry and their middle class adherents.

Chapter IX : The Volunteer Movement.

(a) Government Initiative and Policy.

The Volunteers, like the militia, have not been explained or described as the army has and there exists no generally accepted picture of the force as a whole. It has again seemed worthwhile to digress a little in order to explain the framework within which recruiting was carried on. In particular, without a short account at the end of how effective the Volunteer forces appear to have been, it is impossible to appreciate the degree of success attending the augmentation of force in this way. Nevertheless, this chapter is not a complete account of the Volunteers but only of how the men were got in and kept in.

The government might have set up a uniform national Volunteer force like the present Home Guard. It thought it safer and more practicable to stimulate offers of independent corps from individuals or groups with influence enough to bring men forward. The size and composition of the force was regulated by stimulating or discouraging offers and by discriminating among those that were made. It is the government's policy as revealed by such action that is discussed in this section, which amplifies what has been said in the first chapter.

The first line of policy was laid down in a paper sent by Dundas to Lord Amherst as early as February 1793. Dundas said that a number of people on the coast had offered to be trained in the use of arms, for which there were precedents in 1779. The plan was for corps to be offered through the Lord Lieutenants whose recommendations would be necessary for acceptance. Officers would be commissioned by the King and one at least in each corps would be an army officer from the half-pay. The men would be drilled by N.C.O.'s borrowed from the regular army. Companies of sixty men manning artillery on the coast were mainly envisaged, but the possibilities of having Volunteers inland and of organizing them into regiments were allowed for.[1] The plan of March 1794 included companies of this kind and also corps of cavalry raised in each county from the gentlemen, yeomanry and substantial farmers.[2]

An Act[3] of that period gave validity to the arrangements made.

Within this frame, the Volunteers operated till 1796. They were few in number. Some artillery companies began in 1793 and a good few were raised in 1794, together with infantry companies in various inland towns. Many of the counties raised corps of Yeomanry in 1794; there had been offers from Kent even in 1793.[4] The unmounted corps were essentially local. Their service was usually limited to five miles from their place of formation and they were intended to guard specific points of importance: Fowey, Penzance, and Fishguard were sites of the earliest corps.[5] The Yeomanry were obliged to serve in their county if called on by the civil authorities to suppress tumults and also to serve in adjacent counties for the same purpose. In invasion, they could be ordered to march anywhere by the government.[6] These earlier corps were fairly close to the army. Those of 1793 were formed by order of Lord Amherst which caused some confusion later.[7] (From 1794, it was the Secretary of State who controlled the militia who took charge of the Volunteers). There was permanent paid N.C.O.'s with both cavalry and infantry corps who might be billetted like other soldiers.[8] The Volunteers were subject to military discipline when called out, though not otherwise. The general tone of the papers of corps at this time suggests that they felt themselves a good way towards being soldiers rather than men who occasionally came under arms.

In 1796, the government held up all offers of Volunteers till the compulsory levies had been made.[9] It then consented to respond to the great increase of enthusiasm which the increase of danger had called forth. The Volunteers now ceased to be a fragmentary auxiliary doing a few odd jobs for the army and became a movement of some size. The government diversified it accordingly. A printed scheme was sent out for a new sort of body, much less military than any hitherto. It was to be composed of householders and their dependents organized into bands of fifty without uniform and doing no drill (unless these things were desired by

its members). These bodies were designed for police work in populous areas and acquired the name of Armed Associations.[10] Their services were naturally very localized. The infantry corps that were formed at this time, on the other hand, were less local than most of their predecessors. Their services tended to be available for the whole county in which they were situated and they could therefore play a part in the more general work of defence. The Cavalry formations were much as before but encouragement was given for corps of pioneers* and organizations to transport stock out of the enemy's reach by voluntary provision of carts.

In 1798 the danger was again greater and the desire to arm more general. It was then that the government was busiest in canalizing the enthusiasm. The Defence Act provided for a census of all fit men between fifteen and sixty and among other things the lists had to specify how many wished to join the Volunteers. The King was empowered to order the Lord Lieutenants to appoint officers to exercise these Volunteers[11] and all who were enrolled under the Act were to be obliged to serve under the General Officer Commanding the Military District only in an invasion or when called on to help drive the country.[12] Dundas said that the Act had been left vague so as to give latitude to the people in making voluntary offers,[13] but he proceeded to restrict that latitude by administrative action. A circular in March promised the Lord Lietenants an account of the tasks to be entrusted to the Volunteers, distinguishing particularly between defence and police.[14] In April came the circular quoted in the first chapter which defined by social composition the corps to be raised for these two purposes and in the same way implied what types were inadmissible.[15]

The main design was, while increasing the Armed Associations and cavalry corps for mainly internal functions, to get a large body willing to go to the limits of the Military District to oppose the external foe. The Defence Act

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* included in the plans of 1794 but none apparently formed.

See p. 20

hinted at this by referring to the General Officer Commanding such districts, the circular of April specified that corps not raised purely for police work must accept such an obligation, and circulars in March asked the counties to find out which of the existing corps were prepared to go that far; the Lieutenancies were also to estimate what force needed to be kept in the county to maintain order while the rest went off to fight.[16]

The response to those invitations and directives was so good that the government found itself obliged to limit the force raised. A shortage of arms had appeared. A circular to the Lieutenants in May told them that they were to get a ration of arms equal to their militia quotas in the case of maritime counties and the City or half their quotas for the rest. They were to give two-thirds of the arms to corps willing to serve in the Military District and the rest to local corps. Although not all who wished it would have arms, the force so provided would be enough.[17] Another circular instructed the Lord Lieutenants to decline further offers of Armed Associations when they thought they had enough in the county. The government would not in any case accept such offers when the town concerned had fewer than 2000 inhabitants unless the corps would serve throughout the county or unless it was specially recommended by the Lieutenancy.[18]

The government thus provided itself with a force of the size it wanted and composed in the right proportions, as far as could be judged, of troops for defence and for local police. There was also an extensive organization of pioneers, stock drivers and transport, and specialist bodies such as riflemen and Sea Fencibles. Local circumstances at all times influenced the governments' decisions. Scotland was a permanent special case owing to the absence of the militia. It was she who led the way in developing infantry corps willing to serve throughout the county or even beyond. They appeared in some numbers even in 1794. In 1797, the prospect of a militia led the government to lay it down that no more Volunteers were to be raised there save on the coast and in large

towns.[19] Scotland none the less joined in the growth of Volunteers in 1798, when England in a way caught her up.*

Finance played an important part in government control of the Volunteers and their expansion. Though at first it had been hoped that there would be almost no expense,[20] in 1794 all the corps were receiving (besides their arms) the pay of the N.C.O.'s sent or hired to train them and those that were not mounted received in addition their clothing (by an allowance)[21] and two day's pay a week for that amount of drill - a day meaning six hours.[22] The further expenses of the Volunteers were met by public subscriptions ot by the individuals. In the years that followed, the subscriptions tended not to be received and the burden on individuals grew heavier. The government had to give pay and clothing to more of the corps than at first. In September 1797, the War Office noted that £30,000 had been voted to clothe the Volunteers but the sum was not yet apportioned by the Treasury.[23] There was trouble when it had been, for the War Office had inadvertently ordered more money to be issued than had been voted.[24] Retrenchment became necessary.

The government had provided the means to some extent when it started to differenciate between police and defensive corps. The Armed Associations cost nothing beyond their arms. The government drew this distinction with increasing firmness, so that in 1798 corps could be faced with the alternative of serving the full extent of the Military District or losing all their allowances.[25] These were however lessening in amount. The government in January 1798 cut the allowance of pay from two days a week to one. There was a corresponding reduction in the amount of drill expected. Corps formed before these orders were allowed to keep to the old arrangement if they wished.[26] The amount of drill done for a

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* For examples of the differing types of corps offered in each period in England and Scotland, the reader is referred to HO50/330-56 where the offers from each county are preserved in chronological sequence.

day's pay had somehow been reduced in the case of newer corps from six hours to three. By way of compensation, the older corps were allowed to draw pay without drilling if they could produce favourable reports from inspecting officers at proper intervals.[27]

When the counties were allowed to compound for their quotas of the Provisional Cavalry by raising Yeomanry instead, a good financial backing was given to the new cavalry corps by the assessments levied for the expenses of the original force and now made over. The Provisional Cavalry Act of June 1798 fixed the allowances at three guineas a man serving each year for three years; the clothing allowance at this period for infantry was only 13/4.[28] It will be seen how finance was made to favour the government's favourite schemes of a large body of cavalry and a large force ready to serve at a distance. It also suitably damped or sustained enthusiasm as the case might be, while itself limiting the number of Volunteers which the government wished to have. A further Act of that session[29] allowed Volunteer Cavalry going on manœuvres at a distance to be billetted as soldiers and recover some of their expenses from the Receiver General of the Land Tax.

The government showed a certain degree of policy in the use of the exemptions which it allowed to the Volunteers. The Act of 1794 allowed all Volunteers raised under it exemption from ballots for the old militia.[30] The Supplementary Militia Act allowed this only for Volunteers who were such on October 20th 1796.[31] (The Armed Associations probably could not be regarded as coming under the Act of 1794, so their position was doubtful). An Act passed early in 1799 gave exemption from the Supplementary Militia to all corps whose services extended to the Military District.[32] Another passed four months later in May gave a complete exemption from the militia to all the Volunteers, even those in local corps.[33] Perhaps the government had tried to carry out its policy and been overruled or perhaps

the new act was connected in some way with the impending reduction of the militia. Exemption from the Provisional Cavalry is explained elsewhere. Volunteers were exempt from the tax on hair powder[34] and, in the case of Cavalry, from duty in respect of the horse they rode and from toll on the roads they used when going on manoeuvres.[35]

Pitts' government is commonly regarded as having been very haphazard in its encouragement of Volunteers. It had in fact a tolerably clear idea of what it wanted and sought to get this by suggestions and by varying its financial and other inducements. It was careful too not to let the Volunteers stand in the way of such compulsory forces as it was able to raise - with the exception of the Provisional Cavalry which it finally decided it did not want. If circumstances like the shortage of arms and money affected its policy, that is always likely to happen with a force like the Volunteers which is last in the queue.

(b) The Initiative and Control of the County.

The government relied on the county authorities to tell it what Volunteers were needed for local purposes and what offers were trustworthy and in general to encourage and direct local effort. Generals Commanding in various areas sometimes took the lead, as when General Balfour encouraged the inhabitants of Sunderland to form a corps of artillery[1] or Lord Mulgrave did the same at Scarborough.[2] These were exceptions. It was only in 1798 that the Generals took a large share in calling for Volunteers under the defence Act and then they did so in concert with the counties. Sir Charles Grey had for some time been urging the people of Kent and Sussex (where things were of course especially urgent) to give him certain help. There were now a number of meetings at which he stated his needs to the Deputies and gentry and reports were made of the work going forward.[3]

Down to 1798, the amount of work done by the counties and the degree to

which they were organized depended very much on fluctuations of local enthusiasm. The Lord Lieutenant was responsible for scrutinising all offers of service and making his comment to the government. He was also the person most able to give a lead when such offers were wanted. Some Lord Lieutenants would not coöperate. Lord Derby, Lord Lieutenant of Lancashire, told the Duke of Portland that his political views precluded his giving any help beyond transmitting papers to those interested.[4] In 1795, he said he had never had anything to do with Volunteers in the county.[5] The Duke of Northumberland in that county disliked the Volunteers as we have seen because they interfered with the militia.[6] His Deputies were a feeble body[*7] and the government had to make private enquiries through the Solicitor-General to find out if certain offers from Berwick upon Tweed were made by reliable people.[8]

The Lord Lieutenants were troubled with various boundary disputes. The Mayors of Newcastle[9] and Cambridge[10] laid claim to be Lieutenants in their own right, the better to dominate their local Volunteers. The Lord Provost of Edinburgh made such a claim and it was more or less conceded; he seems to have shared authority with the Lieutenant of Midlothian.[11] Lord Seaforth in Ross was troubled by the "pendicles" of Cromarty and Nairn within his county to which his authority did not extend. The Lieutenant of Nairn ceded control of his pendicle for this function.[11] In a generous spirit, the Lieutenant of Inverness thought his county too large and tried to get a separate Lieutenancy set up for the Hebrides, which was to be given to Lord Macdonald.[12]

Below the Lord Lieutenant, the most active bodies in the English counties were the committees set up to administer the voluntary subscriptions of 1794. It will be recalled that they were for the most part simple meetings of all who had subscribed a certain amount.[13] Some have left little sign of activity but in Devon for instance, the committee, under the energetic chairmanship of Lord Clifford (who as a Catholic was doubtless excluded from more official positions)

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[*] c.f. p. 155-156

set up sub-committees in every locality and did practically all the business of the Lieutenancy in this sphere, subject to the Lord Lieutenant's approval.[14] Cornwall also had a committee that seems to have been very active in the general organizing of the defences:[15] these two exposed counties obviously had more interest in the matter than most.

In Scotland, the Lieutenancy from the start was ordered to organize voluntary offers, and having nothing else to do it sometimes became active in this sphere. Inverness was divided into nineteen districts each under a Deputy who busily occupied himself in bringing forward the people of the area.[16] Sometimes the Deputies were too active. Those of Kirkcudbright tried to insist not only that the offer of the inhabitants of the town of that name should be submitted through them, but that their right to command the corps be admitted as a condition of their forwarding it. They accused Lord Daer of going to the government behind their backs and he accused them of a partizan and secretive way of doing business and failure to call publicly for offers.[17]

Volunteer business certainly did tend to be in the hands of that faction of the gentry in each county which believed in the Movement and had supported the government in 1794. That was why the Defence Act served a valuable purpose by making the whole Lieutenancy responsible for bringing forward the Volunteers. It stirred up the slothful and put everything on a public and proper basis.

The work of the County in the Volunteer movement consisted firstly in advising the government on the eligibility of offers. The Lord Lieutenant tendered this advice but usually needed the help of underlings. Lord Fortescue in Devon referred all offers to the county committee, since he could not know much about everyone who came forward, and they in turn went for advice to the Sub-committee for the area from which each offer came.[18] In Warwickshire, the offers of well-to-do individuals who were known to be hostile to the ministry never came before the Lord Lieutenant but were weeded out by his subordinates.[19] The local Deputy in Scotland was almost always the guide of the Lord Lieutenant.

Sometimes there was no reliable guidance. The Solicitor-General, whom we saw investigating Berwick, found great difficulty as it was in a remoter part of the county and the gentry in any case did not care to have much to do with its low townsman.[20]

Partizanship was a serious danger in this work of recommendation and the government told Lord Lonsdale that he must not suppress offers but must always transmit them, though with adverse comment if he pleased.[21] The government did not reject many offers until 1798, when it was picking and choosing according to principle, and the fear of being too partizan is one reason why. Another is certainly that most offers were inspired to the extent of not being made without the Lord Lieutenant's approval in advance.

The more general task of planning the size and shape of the force in each county was undertaken in a rudimentary way by any committee with a county subscription to spend on Volunteers. Devon naturally went much further and the committee secured the services of an artillery officer to survey the coast.[22] On his recommendations was based the plan of where artillery corps were to be encouraged.[23] Cornwall consulted officers in the locality in rather the same way. In 1798, the government's request to know what force was necessary in each county forced every Lieutenancy to take up the work. Estimates of loyalty were made. Gloucestershire was thought to be safe except for a few dissenters among the textile workers.[24] In Warwickshire, the bigger towns were safe but the county town and rural areas were not.[25] West Lothian needed only half its volunteers for internal purposes.[26] Derbyshire and Staffordshire needed them all. So the work of estimation went on, covering mainly the internal situation but in coastal counties dealing also with the external threat. In 1799, the Devon Committee took it upon itself to say that no more Volunteers should be raised in the county - partly because the number of persons exempt from the militia was too large.[27]

When the Lieutenancy of Somersetshire declared itself unable to give guidance on the forces needed there, the government wrote back sharply to say that no one could be expected to judge properly of the local situation if it was not the authorities of the county.[28]

The part of the county in raising the men that they called for was small as yet. Subscriptions and meetings set things going and encouragement could be given. The Duke of Gordon in 1797 gave his commendation as Lord Lieutenant to the efforts of Aberdeenshire to raise forces according to the plans prepared by the meeting of the county some wee ks previously. This was expressed in a newspaper advertisement.[29] As we saw in the first chapter, there were three general enrolments of the men of Scotland willing to serve and there was one under the Defence Act in England. There was no general attempt to follow this up by putting the men into a count-y-wide organization. In Scotland some counties like Renfrew[30] had almost from the start Regiments of Volunteers that were a virtual sub-militia. Argyleshire proposed at one point to raise eight regiments of this kind[31] but her position was exceptional. The Duke of Argyle was so completely preëminent there that he claimed to be hereditary Lord Lieutenant,[32] and the Volunteers were a single body under his auspices.

In England, the Yeomanry was raised to some extent on a county-wide basis. There was talk in, for instance, Lancashire[33] about calling out the posse and the plans of Dorset for "driving the county" by a county organization sprang from this.[34] There were various individual schemes for a more general organization than that of the many distinct corps. Major Knight suggested to Lord Bute, Lord Lieutenant of Glamorgan, a general array of which the existing Volunteers would be the nucleus to be financed out of the county rates.[35] In practice as we shall see, the very necessary build-up of the Volunteers into larger corps was done by <u>ad hoc</u> amalgamations and without the interposition of the county.

What the county could do was to inspire some degree of uniformity in the

terms on which offers were made. As the Lord Lieutenant had to approve corps and there was a chance of their getting help from the county subscription, such influence was natural enough. It is revealed by certain shared oddities in the offers from certain counties. Cheshire's had a clause forbidding (as an economy measure) the wearing of full uniform save on special occasions.[36] Gloucestershire's for the same reason specified that there were to be no convivial meetings.[37] In Essex there was a promise to inform the authorities of all seditious activities,[38] while Norfolk men voiced their suspicion of things military by stipulating that they were not to be drafted.[39]

To sum up, the activity of the counties was uneven and nebulous but on them fell - and in the end was forced - the duty of advising the government what volunteers it was necessary and practicable to bring forth in each locality. With the general decisions taken at the centre, this advice made up a strategy for recruiting the Volunteers.

(c) Types of Leadership.

The main power behind the raising of Volunteers was, as in the case of other forces, the connections produced by association in sundry civil affairs and the leadership which this conferred on certain groups. We must now describe the different types of influence which were used to promote the Volunteers and which the machinery described above was used to set going and control.

The rulers of the county possessed as such the power to lead and for the Volunteer Cavalry, they tried to draw out the men of property within each county. In 1794, a printed scheme based on that sent out by the government was adopted in many counties and such Deputies as were interested in the work proceeded to canvass the substantial farmers in each district. In Cambridgeshire there was no success until 1796. Lord Hardwicke found it essential to canvass in person:

in September that year he sent out eighty letters, held various meetings and spoke individually to a good many farmers. Fifty were persuaded to enrol in six weeks.[1] At Dereham in Norfolk in May 1794, the local gentry held a meeting which none of the farmers attended. This was put down to the absence of any advance explanation, and so the meeting was adjourned and two gentlemen went round canvassing. The second meeting was well attended and when some gentlemen had led the way in signing the engagement, a number of farmers followed.[2]

The Yeomanry was intended to be spread evenly over the country. Berkshire intended to have one Troop in each petty sessional division[3] and Wiltshire was divided into ten districts, each of which was to produce a Troop.[4] The uncertain business of canvassing was a poor basis for such uniformity and the raising of Yeomanry in lieu of the Provisional Cavalry enabled a further effort in this direction to be made. Lord Buckingham induced his county to exonerate itself completely from the levy[5] in this way and managed the gentry with some skill. When Lord Inchiquin withdrew his support because he had not been made Major of one squadron at once, Sir William Young was told to persuade Lord Kirkwall to step forward and get him nominated without prior notice for this post, so that Lord Inchiquin could not start an agitation against those in control of the Yeomanry withdrew with a view to getting the commission for himself.[6]
To get a squadron for his brother William, Lord Granville, the Marquess proposed to augment the Amersham troop, where an influential man must be put in as second in command over the existing Lieutenant, who was not of a calibre to object.
He mentioned two or three gentlemen who would be able to bring men and said that he could get some himself in that area.[7]

It was not only men of substance and their relatives who were admitted to the Yeomanry. The rules usually provided for substitutes or volunteers to serve at the expense of individuals who chose to provide them. They had to be approved of by the better-off members of the corps, often by a two-thirds majority, and it was usually stipulated that they were not to be domestic

servants but most have a fixed residence of their own in the county; the stated object of this restriction was that persons were not to be brought into the Yeomanry who might enlist in the army.[8] Auxiliary troops of servants attached to the main body was sometimes proposed, as for instance by the Royal Edinburgh Volunteer Light Dragoons.[9] Sir William Erskine thought such bodies were very necessary to the efficiency of the force because gentlemen were not capable of looking after their own horses properly. It was therefore necessary to face and surmount the dangers of intercourse on equal terms between masters and men.[10]

When the voluntary efforts of the humbler people are examined, there is less sign of a desire to act on a county wide basis. The local king-pins acted independently of each other in calling out their less prosperous neighbours. At the same time, these would often be the local Justices and Deputies, deriving from their office, the right of initiative. The chain of command downwards was thus unbroken. Even in 1794, Berkshire told its Deputies to enrol those who offered in each locality,[11] and the Defence Act made it a duty. In pursuance of this, one Cambridgeshire Deputy tried to bring the people of the Wisbeach area together to form a corps. He found it a thankless task because the shopkeepers of Wisbeach could not serve at as great a distance from the town as the farmers round it would. There were hard words, and the farmers taunted the Wisbeach men with cowardice and produced a plan for a corps which would only defence Wisbeach if a certain number of men joined.[12]

In Scotland as we have said, the Deputies very generally took the initiative. The town council of Arbroath was waited on by the local Deputy and decided to raise a corps, although confident that order could be maintained without it.[12] In Harris, the Deputies assembled the chief inhabitants who pledged their loyalty, adding that they would bring forward the tenantry on the island.[13] The Deputy resident on Barra pledged the same, but he was also the sole proprietor there.[14]

The parish clergy, whether they were Deputies* and Justices or not, played a great part in bringing forward volunteers, Two thirds of the Royal Highland Volunteers in Edinburgh were said to have been brought forward by the clergymen who acted as their chaplain.[15] The Vicar of Northallerton sent a plan of a rifle corps approved by the local gentry. Poor in all but children, he had sent four sons to serve in the army and had tried to encourage a money contribution from his richer neighbours.[16] In Cambridgeshire, the Reverend Mr Harvey tried to get the men of Willinton to enrol. They agreed with everything he said to them but were afraid to enrol, for fear of unwittingly committing themselves too far.[17] The clergy of the archdeaconry of Newport Pagnall, Buckinghamshire, were anxious to serve in person and bring forward the people to maintain order should the Yeomanry be called out of the county. In that event, they regarded it as their duty to be responsible for maintaining the peace.[18] Lord Buckingham was anxious to use the clergy everywhere to lead the people, as the farmers in this county were too low in the social scale for the work.[19]

In order to make their initiative effective, the clergy often needed to take command of the men they had brought forward. This naturally caused some debate. The two Archbishops and eleven bishops issued a statement saying that the clergy were bound to give every help in repelling Invasion, but meantime they must not accept commissions in the Volunteers but confine themselves to auxiliary functions.[20] This manifesto was widely challenged. The Vicar of Petersfield said that it was inconsistent to imply that the clergy might fight in an invasion but must not make preparations to do so. The people would think the clergy were being given a privilege and would become hostile.[21]

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* Clergymen participated in militia business (example in Add.34303) and were appointed Deputies in fair numbers (page 141 note 2)

The Reverend Mr Story, who lost the chance of a commission in a Leicestershire corps, did not see why he could not serve God in two ways; he had eleven children and "every little is an object".[22] In some cases it was a choice between a clerical commander and no corps at all. The Vicar of Horsford said that the corps he was raising would have to be commanded by himself however odd it might look.[23] Wuth such cases in mind, the Archbishop of Canterbury made an exception in favour of clergy in his own see whose services were indispensable in gaining those of others.[24] There are several cases of clergymen commanding corps.[25]

More generally the clergy contented themselves with taking the chair at meetings and drafting the offers of service. Traces of such activity are very numerous. It was not universally popular. Lord George Lennox reported that in Devon the gentry were not active in the Volunteer Movement because it was so largely dominated by the clergy and the churchwardens, their social inferiors.[26] But no doubt the factors which led to the rise of the clerical Justice[27] at this time led equally to their prominence in the military movement.

Landlords naturally had a great part to play in organizing their tenants. So far, the influences that have been described have not been directly economic The parson and the squire usually did take the lead and so it was now. The people of Hitchin, for instance, wishing to form a corps, were advised on the proper terms by Mr Wortham of Royston who sent the terms of the corps in that village together with his opinion on what was wrong with it.[28] He had been Lieutenant-Colonel of the Cambridgeshire Militia and might be presumed to know.* But the territorial bond underlay all and sometimes obtruded. Lord Derby atoned for his earlier coolness by forming a corps among his tenants at Knowsley.[29]

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* Confidence probably mislaced. His successor in the regiment called him "The Oracle of Upper Royston" but found him fainthearted and unco-operative in county military affairs. Add.35666: 147,308

Sir Thomas Boughton raised one from his dependents near Nantwich and not only took command but controlled every detail of its administration.[30] The eccentric Mr Beckford of Fonthill in Wiltshire offered a corps of 500 soldiers and 450 pioneers drawn from his tenants and workmen in six villages.[31] The Duke of Northumberland offered a Legion of 1000 or more. His tenants had been circularized and with two bailiffs still to report, 931 had already agreed to join. He feared he would have to command in person, and if so would insist on not being under the command of the local general, Musgrave, who had served under him in America.[32]

Naturally it was in the Scottish Highlands that the landlords played the largest part in the Movement. Dundas even sent out a plan early in 1797 to array the Scottish clans. He told the Duke of Argyle that the old system of trying to destroy Highland institutions was outmoded.[33] The Plan envisaged a force of 14000 men divided into nine brigades each of which would comprise the clans centred in a certain area under the command of their chiefs, one of the more eminent of whom was to command the brigade. It was noted that the Highlanders were the only large body of men in Great Britain who were "absolute strangers to the levelling principles of the present age".[34]

The proposed brigade commanders were given the task of sounding the clans. The answers received by the Duke of Gordon suggest that ordinary recruiting had drained the land to such an extent that such a scheme as this was too ambitious.[35] It was also said that the men would not accept service throughout the British Isles as proposed.[36] In the end the scheme was dropped and the militia replaced it at the centre of the government's attention.

The efforts made by the Scottish noblemen were nevertheless very considerable. We have already noticed the offer of the Duke of Argyle. In

Banffshire, the twentyone companies that were raised each consisted entirely or mainly of the tenants of Lord Fife, Lord Findlater or the Duke of Gordon.[37] In Caithness by 1798, all the landowners except two had entered corps with their men.[38] Outside the highlands but characteristically Scottish was Lord Capellis' raising of a corps at Maybole, a burghof which he was the feudal superior.[39] Sir James Grant offered two Battalions in Strathspey in 1797[40] and at the inspection in 1799 of the rather smaller force sanctioned, he commented "it is a pleasant scene to see seven hundred and sixty three tenants and men of good character come forward with such spirit cheerfulness and good order".[41]

Cheerfulness no doubt was the rule when a landlord asked for his men's services. Lord Macdonald assembled his followers in Skye early in 1795 and asked them to join, whereupon more came forward than were needed.[42] Should difficulties arise, however, the landlord was ready for them. In 1798, Lord Breadalbane circularized his tenants (through the "ground officers") with a draft offer of service which they were to be told he expected them to sign. It was an offer of service to him, as he might direct, under the command of himself or a member of his family. The tenants in fact, however, were to have a choice of how to serve.[43] Killin failed to acquiesce in this offer and a number of its men failed to attend the Earl when he made a progress to receive replies. Within a very short time Killin had repented and was ready to sign anything.[44] The Earl was advised to allow them to sign (with the exception of some ringleaders) if they did so on behalf of their sons and servants as well. A paper records the order in which they came to sign and who was allowed to.[45] Excuses were made for not attending the Earl; sheep shearing, rumours of a cancelled meeting, and so forth.[46]

The punishments inflicted show the quality of the threat that must have brought Killin to heel. Of those who failed to attend the Earl, the villagers living between the bridges of Dochart and Lochy were to be removed from their

"pendicles" at once. Those elsewhere had leases, but these were not to be renewed and they were to be removed next year. All would be represented to government as enemies of their country and treated accordingly. The Earl felt it his painful duty "to make examples of those who by their conduct may not appear to deserve the protection of government or any possession under it".[47]

We have now considered the channels through which the population, from highest to lowest of the countryside and the smaller towns was brought into service. The more populous areas were largely roused by the means that follow, though the distinction is a very rough one. Parallel to the landlords' corps were those of factories and offices. Matthew Boulton thought the men of his factory would serve best in a corps of their own. They would not waste working time travelling to a place of drill and they would be on the spot in a body in any sudden emergency. They had mostly been with the firm for many years and this had bred a strong "esprit de corps" (Boulton's own expression). As they lived scattered through four parishes, they could not be combined in any other way.[48]

In Preston, a manufacturer formed a corps of 300 from his men. There was already a corps in the town, but he thought a second one necessary because there were factories in two opposite directions to be defended from the mob.[49] Canal builders made some offers. One, Pinkerton in the West Riding, suggested that his men should become pioneers in an invasion - when work would stop through lack of money. Lord Fitzwilliam said this was a good scheme as the men were of fine physique but would never enlist.[50] Similar offers were made by Telford in Shropshire and by the workers on the Grant Junction Canal to Lord Buckingham who notices that the Duke of York had said that this type of service was very useful.[52] The East India Company raised two regiments to protect its warehouses,[53] and when they offered to undertake duty at a distance a third

was raised to replace them. Any employee unwilling to join this last was to get the sack.[54] From Liverpool it was reported that employers were driving their men into the Volunteers.[55]

An odd variant of these corps was the Knight Marshal's Volunteers formed by Sir John Bland Burgess from the officers of the Marshalsea court and the various departments of the royal household.[56] The Customs Board was going to turn its officers at headquarters into a corps, but the East India Company offered to protect all the bonded warehouses as well as its own.[57] There was a suggested scheme, be it noted, to enable Members of Parliament and officials to rush from their posts to the scene of an invasion and then be sent to suitable units and serve on horse or foot as they wished.[58]

Municipal Corporations naturally took their share in promoting corps. Coastal Artillery was their especial province because forts were commonly put up at private expense. Thus at Whitehaven in 1797, when a body of townsmen attempted to form a corps to man the forts and broke into a store of arms kept there, they were stopped by Lord Lonsdale, who said that a corps would be organized by the Harbour Trustees to whom the forts and the arms belonged.[59] So we find that at Scarborough the Artillery Crops was raised under the auspices of the Bailiffs.[60] At Liverpool, the rais on the Welsh coast in 1797 caused the Mayor to institute a patrol for the coast and form a Committee of Safety.[61] Later a large body of infantry was raised, batteries were built at the town's expense;[62] a body of well-to-do citizens who had all formerly been sailors had offered to man them.[63]

Municipal offers were not confined to artillery or to the coast. Woodstock and the Forst Hamlets formed a corps run by committees of the magistrates of the borough and franchise.[64] Portsmouth started an infantry corps by a

resolution of its grand jury and invited enrolments at the town hall.[65] In most boroughs where a corps was formed, the Mayor at least took the chair at the initial meeting. There was even a sense of duty about the connection. At Aberdeen the Volunteers at one of their meetings declared that those who enjoyed the sweets of office should help to defend them and that more of those who had the freedom of the city should be in the corps.[66]

Where there was no Corporation, the Vestry sometimes took a hand. This was especially the case with urban Middlesex. Action against sedition had started before war began. In Hackney, an association had been set up to distribute tracts among the people and to come forward in aid of the magistrates as early as December 1792.[67] In the spring of 1794, there was a meeting of chairmen of associated parishes which noted the need for defensive action and particularly a plan drawn up by the parish of St. James to oppose riots. The committees set up in 1792 were asked to consider plans for Volunteer Corps.[68] Soon after this, the London and Westminster Light Horse Volunteers was formed (or rather revived) and asked the support of this organization.[69] It remained the only cavalry corps in the area, but infantry units were raised in large numbers by the action of the individual Vestries. There does not appear to have been any official connection once they were formed.

In default of official initiative, various local associations were the usual nucleus in towns. At Ipswich, an anti-leveller association formed in 1792 became a Volunteer Corps in 1794.[70] The Constitutional Society at Leaminster decided in 1797 to start drilling and invite others to join in.[71] A friendly society at Newbury offered its services. A Quartermaster of the Berkshire Provisional Cavalry was willing to train them.[72] Friendly Societies in arms are found in the Isle of Man.[73] The Order of Masonic Knight Templars (founded by the Black Prince) made an offer as early as 1793.[74] The Scottish Society in

London wished to form a corps of expatriate Scots[75] and there were similar plans for the Welsh and the Irish[76] and even the Swiss and the emigrés.[77] Windham was especially anxious that these should be armed, lest it be said they were not trusted.[78] Most of those colourful schemes came to nothing, but they are symptomatic of the mode of co-operation needful when there was no influence at work from above. How such spontaneity might step into the breach is shown in the case of Ripon where the lesser men formed a corps without the help of the Corporation or larger landowners.[79]

We have noticed that the government in 1798 decided that the urban poor were not to be armed.[80] Their way of specifying this was to say that urban corps should be made up of respectiable householders or persons recommended by two such - a stipulation that had already appeared in the plan for Armed Associations in 1797.[81] The factory corps clearly were not on this pattern and there were a good many others that were not. Sometimes on the other hand, the poor were excluded completely. The Armed Association of Chepstow was to contain no labourers.[82] The more general arrangement - especially for Armed Associations - was to follow the government's intention and admit the poor under the special tutelage of the rich.

The men of an artillery company formed in Edinburgh were divided into Privates and Matrosses. The former (with the officers) used their pay and subscriptions to pay for the clothing of the latter and to relieve their families when they were unable to work.[83] The Rochdale corps formed in 1794 had 100 members who served at their own expense and 100 more who were paid for by subscription.[84] The Armed Associations usually provided for two categories of members in this way; those who could not serve in person joined in the subscription.[85] The poorer members had to be recommended by two householders but also had, as a rule, to be accepted by the committee[86] or by a meeting of

the whole corps; alternatively they might be expelled by such processes.[87] Sometimes majority voting was used, sometimes there was a system of black balls. There was thus an effective system of control which applied in most cases to the paying members as well. But the composition of a corps depended on the standing of its initiators and when we hear a Penzance corps described (by an enemy) as composed of shopkeeping Jews, butchers and blacksmiths,[88] we need not expect too high a standard.

(d) The Motives for Forming and Joining Corps

The government's reasons for wanting Volunteer Corps have been explained elsewhere. It is interesting to compare these with the motives of those who took the initiative in forming corps in the manner just described, and of those who followed their lead.

Defence and police were the primary functions of the Volunteers and local circumstances might make apparent some special need under one head or the other and so inspire action. This was particularly so on the coast. The inhabitants of Appledore in Devon were thrown into a panic one day by seeing a strange ship in their harbour. It proved to be friendly, but they resolved to form a corps and be ready next time.[1] Dunbar, at the mouth of the Forth, was the refuge of ships chased by the privateers which tried to intercept the trade of the estuary.[2] A corps was formed to defend the harbour.[3] Many other corps were inspired by the threat of privateers, among them Peterhead and Rothiemay.[4] The raid on Wales in 1797 was the origin of many corps. We have noticed the case of Liverpool. At Bristol, the principal inhabitants came out to patrol the town and afterwards decided to form a corps.[5]

In spheres nearer to police work, a good many corps were formed for the very proper purpose of taking over the duty of troops normally stationed in the

vicinity should they be called away to oppose the enemy. Bolton, Peterborough, Daventry and Lewes[6] provide examples. In some cases the Volunteer Corps of a place would itself undertake to serve at a distance in an invasion and a new corps would then be formed to replace it at home: we have seen the East India Company do this.[7] A type of service increasingly offered was the escorting of prisoners[8]; escorting the townspeople should they have to flee before the invader was sometimes an object as at Canterbury.[9] Dymock in Gloucestershire offered to convoy the barges on the canal.[10] Notable objects in the neighbourhood called sometimes for special protection, such as the government's powder mills at Waltham.[11]

When corps were formed for police purposes, or even if that was not their sole object, local unrest often provided the motive. The town of Oswestry was surrounded by an area in which many colliers, lime-kiln workers and so forth lived. The local dissenters were suspected of making trouble among them. Serious riots in December 1795 were quelled by troops, who stayed till October 1796. Three weeks after they had gone, there were further riots against the militia augmentation. The troops returned, but as they were expected to leave in the spring, it was proposed to form a Troop of Yeomanry.[12] There were corn riots at Chichester in 1795 and the better-off inhabitants were active in patrolling the town; afterwards they decided both to start a subscription to relieve the poor and to form a Volunteer Corps.[13] New Galloway was one of a few places that startedcorps as a result of militia riots.[14] Clapham formed one for fear of the debased poor of London who might sally out in an invasion to plunder.[15]

The smooth running of the economy was a thought in the minds of many Volunteers. Tavistock claimed that as a result of the activities of its corps the market was safe from the mob and the farmers brought their corn to be sold without fear, to the profit of the town.[16] In Aberdeen even in 1792, the

merchants broke a dangerous and violent strike of seamen by the mere threat of forming a corps. This incident was adduced as evidence of their usefulness by the Volunteer regiment that actually was formed later.[17] An area round the Wash was afraid of the "bankers" or workers building dykes and canals round the fens. Wisbeach finally formed a corps for protection against them[18] and Stamford wanted one in case the men refused to receive their pay in paper instead of specie.[19] Ashburton in Devon considered Volunteers necessary because of "a number of laboring (sic) manufacturers who are occasionally deprived of their usual employ, over whom some control may be very necessary."[20]

To be ready against sedition was almost always an object. Rochdale, impressed by a sudden spirit of activity by the disloyal, responded by forming a corps in May 1794.[21] Knutsford declared that it was itself loyal but needed a corps to oppose areas round about that were not.[22] In Essex as we have seen, the Volunteers pledged themselves to report all treasonable doings and give strength to the law by example.[23] The Lieutenant of Renfrew said that the Volunteers there "have been the principal means of crushing that seditious and democratic spirit which so much prevails in the county of Renfrew".[24] The Lord Advocate thought that the Royal Edinburgh Volunteers had preserved the quiet of Scotland.[25] Conversely we find statements like that of Lord Moray that as that county was loyal it was not necessary to raise many Volunteers.[26]

In combatting sedition, the Volunteers were as much a political as a military weapon and we must now consider the purely political motives behind the Volunteers. They were useful not only to frighten the disloyal but to form a rallying point for the supporters of the ministry and win over the waverers. In Warwick, the growth of new industries had led to a growth in the power of the radical elements in the town who largely owned those industries. A Volunteer Corps would act as a counterweight on the other scale.[27] An army officer reported

that the district round Pomfret was thick with Presbyterians. A number of rich members of the sect had settled there after the American War and subsidized the building of a chapel and an expensive mission. Their sympathizers were republican. Again, the founding of a Volunteer corps was expected to divert enthusiasm to other channels.[28]

We have seen how anti-levelling societies sometimes took the lead in forming corps. The Loyal Association of Lancaster said they were stepping forward in this way to give some practical help to the ministry.[29] At Wantage it was simply said that the friends of government would join the corps.[30] In 1797, the Manchester Loyal Associations and others joined together to form a corps and foreswore all party feeling.[31] But the enrolment on Lord Breadalbane's estate at that time excluded certain "covenanters" whose views on political matters were exceptionable,[32] and some Exeter Volunteers who were ministerialists objected strongly to being combined with other corps formed at a later date by men who were cooler towards the government.[33] The word "Loyal" which comes so often in the titles of Volunteer Corps had a meaning that was often extremely pointed.

Sometimes a corps was intended to combine the friends of authority into a solid phalanx against the rabble. The Kilmarnock corps was intended to check the worse sort.[34] That of Bolton was composed of men whose influence was strong in checking democracy and for that and other reasons the corps should not leave the town.[35] Sometimes the idea was rather to win over the lower classes and keep them loyal. A small businessman who wrote to Dundas offering the services of his workmen as Volunteers said that an invasion would stop business and throw many out of work. If they were in Volunteer Corps they could be taken into pay and marched off to the front; while their masters, formed into other corps, stayed at home and kept order.[36] The use of material inducements to tempt

the working class to follow the lead will be more fully considered later on. From Skye it was even suggested that emigration could be stopped in this way.[37]

Mr. Geddes, a glass manufacturer of Edinburgh, desired to form a corps in his factory. Knowing the principles of each of his men, he could pick out a body of the more loyal. His clerks, anxious to become officers, were zealous for the scheme. If this plan were adopted in all factories, the disloyal would not only be overawed but they would envy their loyal mates in their fine uniforms and would be anxious to mend their ways and be let in. The clerks would be stirred into zeal in the way that his own had been.[38] The ideas of Mr. Geddes are reflected in action taken elsewhere, notably in Inverness where there were two large factories. The local corps brought in at its own expense some selected workmen "as pledges for the good conduct of the others" who "value themselves much on the propriety of their conduct as members of the company and by their example have visibly improved the morals of the other workmen."[39]

Naturally the radicals did not take all this lying down. In the parish of St. Andrews, Norwich they were accused of spreading slanders about the loyalty of those who were offering a corps, which held up its being sanctioned; this in turn caused a loss of enthusiasm and absenteeism among the members.[40] At Ashton under Line, the democrats succeeded in manoeuvring themselves into control of the corps and nominating officers friendly to themselves.[41] Bitter local feuds are suggested by the desperate pleas of certain places that their offers should be accepted. In 1797, when the government decided to accept no more offers from Scotland, it was represented that the rejection of the offer of Melvill (in Fife) would be a triumph for the local opposition.[42] In Kilwinning, the rejection of the local offer was the signal for a storm of derision:[43] The Lord Advocate reported a similar danger if an offer to augment the Royal Edinburgh Volunteers were rejected.[44] When all else failed, the seditious could always tell prospective

Volunteers that they would be made into soldiers (as at Kettering)[45] or even (as at Inverness)[46] that they would be sent to the West Indies.

The Volunteer Movement really seems to have started the work of rallying the nation that was to be undertaken more widely and successfully by the Evangelical Movement. Wilberforce took an active interest in the origins of the Volunteers in the West Riding towns[47] and told Dundas that taking up arms had a most inspiring effect on the well-affected.[48] Sir James Grant (Lieutenant of Inverness-shire) thought the Volunteers, though expensive considering the service they rendered, were a powerful means of keeping up public spirit.[49] At Kettering, the corps caused the burden of war taxation to be forgotten (aided by the fact that there were 3000 unruly tanners in the area who were often heard to say that their friends the French would soon come and give them justice).[50] The Uist Corps was felt to be the means whereby many who would have fallen a prey to seditious propaganda were kept firm.[51] In Renfrew, the Volunteers not only kept down disorder but "caused the most happy change in the ideas and sentiments of the people".[52] The Committee of the Chiswick Association summed it up by saying that the Movement "have encouraged and restored a due principle of subordination amongst the different classes of the people....induced the heedless to reflect fairly upon the advantages they actually enjoy and the doubtful issue of innovation....rendered disloyalty unfashionable, sedition dangerous and insurrection almost impossible".[53]

The motives indicated so far were all of a patriotic sort, one way or another. Others were of a grosser or more dangerous kind. Great advantages of one sort or another were to be had from control of a Volunteer Corps. We have seen the seditious trying to penetrate them: Atkinson the London banker thought that a great many had succeeded.[54] Sometimes they tried to offer corps of their own. They did a certain amount of private drilling - at Nottingham they were said to be more efficient than the Volunteers.[55] This the government

was determined to stop, as it mentioned in one of its circulars in the Spring of 1798.[56] It was safe to form a corps for cover. At Inverness, the Volunteers inflicted a total defeat on the mob in the provision riots of 1795. The democratic party (whom we last saw telling the Volunteers they would be sent to the West Indies) now swore revenge and offered to raise a corps, saying that in the next battle they would win. A townsman wrote to warn the government of the plot, referring them to the Magistrates and Deputies who had not been consulted.[57]

In the Isle of White, a rifle corps was offered by a man who had fought in America - on the wrong side.[58] In Portsmouth, an offer was declined because the person concerned had supported the mutiny at Spithead - though that was not the reason given.[59]

As time went on, supporters of the constitutional opposition came in increasing numbers into the movement. The Duke of Montrose noted in 1798 that the majority were doing so.[60] Some had pure motives, such as Mr. Musgrave who told Lord Hardwicke that he was opposed to the war but thought there should be no question of party in national defence.[61] Others were clearly anxious to catch up on their ministerialist rivals in gaining influence from this source. Mr. Scale of Mountboon in Devon had been active for the opposition and against the war when he was sheriff. In 1798 he repented and offered to form a regiment. Lord Fortescue was anxious that this new loyalty should be encouraged.[62] Now it transpired that the Dartmouth area where Scale's influence was had been too well tapped by other corps to supply a regiment. Scale therefore asked other existing corps at a distance of twenty or thirty miles to join him. This rather deceitful method meant that the regiment would seldom meet as a body and the men would lose much time from work when it did. It was represented that this would bring the valuable practice of amalgamation into disrepute.[63] Scale was not suffered to continue.[64] The authorities were always in a dilemma over offers from the opposition. When the Duke of Bedford suggested having a regiment on his Devon

estates,[65] it was made a cabinet matter.

The Self-interest in commanders was often more palpable. Command of the Volunteers could be useful in municipal politics. Thomas Hall, Mayor of Berwick, raised a corps there at his own expense - as a reward for which he later asked to be made naval and military Agent in the town.[66] At an election for the mayoralty in which his party was hard pressed, he caused a number of Volunteers who were going to vote on the other side to march out of the town.[67] It is not surprizing that in 1797 it was rumoured that a group of radicals were trying to form a corps.[68] No one who has read the account of Berwick given by the Webbs will be surprized at this state of things.[69] The Mayor of Cambridge, whom we have seen trying to make himself independent of the Lord Lieutenant, attempted to raise a municipal corps in rivalry with one started by Professor Harwood, who was friendly to the county authorities. To give himself an advantage, he proposed (with the other borough magistrates) to finance it out of the rates if need be. His opponents decided to test the legality of this in the courts. In the end, he found he could get no one to join his corps.[70]

Vanity was sometimes the motive force. Dr. Pegge was described as the father of the Oxford Armed Associations. He was Professor of Anatomy there and his object (or rather his wife's) was to get a knighthood and so be the equal of the Professor at Cambridge.[71] Sir Charles Marsh was said to have taken advantage of the enthusiasm at a banquet held to celebrate the victory of Lord Howe to get pledges to serve in a corps commanded by himself. His associates withdrew when they saw he intended to be in complete command and thereafter the corps consisted of a floating population of low social origin and absentee officers. Out of this Sir Charles got the rank of Colonel and his son the Paymastership. A strong reply was written, denying this last charge, admitting that two officers were permanently absent and saying that many of the men had entered the line - a virtual admission of the first charge.[72] Vanity could well, of course, be a

hindrance as well as a help. Lady Dacres flatly refused to countenance or even allow a corps to be formed by the tenants on a portion of her estate. They had never shown her any sign of respect.[73]

Straightforward financial gain was a common enough motive. Major McKerril of the Paisley Volunteers asked for allowances from the government when the corps wished to continue to rely on subscriptions. He did this to conceal how extravagantly he had spent the funds. He flouted the committee set up to supervise him and later caused a crisis by striking some members and leading one section to withdraw - which to their mortification was declared illegal by the local Justices.[74] Charles Herries who commanded the London and Westminster Volunteer Light Dragoons went bankrupt and compounded with his creditors. He refused to recognise the representative of the French East India Company, who accused him of extravagance in the conduct of the corps. This seems likely despite his denials.[75]

Commanders and members of corps alike were concerned to make a bit commercially through the corps. The St. Anne's (Westminster) Association sent out a circular in which was included the hope that anyone joining would find the friendships and connections formed in the corps would contribute "to his interest and happiness for the Rest of Life".[76] The Commandant of the St. George's Hanover Square Corps was a tailor who took all their pay and supplied them with uniforms. When members resigned, he would not pay any surplus owing unless they cared to spend it in his shop.[77] The Banff Volunteers were supplied with cloth by a local firm.[78] An insurance broker joined the Royal Edinburgh Volunteer Light Dragoons and got the insurance business of the whole corps.[79] Perhaps it is not surprising that one consignment of arms turned out to have been insured twice.[80] At least one man - Edward Hughes - built up a fair business as Agent solely to Volunteer Corps.[81] Interests grew up steadily around the corps and it could not well be otherwise. The Bailiff of Birmingham was allowed at his request to furnish arms for the Warwickshire Yeomanry, in order to conciliate him.[82]

Careers might be forwarded in the Volunteers. The Edinburgh Light Dragoons provide two good examples. Major Maitland the Commandant had been invalided out of the army and had apparently hesitated between joining the militia or the Volunteers. The Corps asked the Commander in Chief in North Britain to give him a post on his staff and gained the support of the Lord Advocate. It proved impossible to do this while he commanded the corps but the members were determined to get him a post at the peace.[83] Lt. Adams, the (paid) Adjutant, was first borrowed and then taken over from the Cinque Ports Fencible Cavalry. He became Adjutant also to the Midlothian Yeomanry and riding master at the Royal Academy where he broke members' horses free - doubtless a good way of founding a private practice. As Fencible officers only had temporary commissions, he had improved his position considerably.[84]

In a humbler way, the Sergeants who were lent by the army or militia to teach the Volunteers also had prospects. The Prince of Wales sent one to his friend Coke of Holkham and said he hoped this would enable him to gain some permanent position for himself; he occasionally drank too much but was always penitent and usually behaved well.[85] A sergeant of the Cambridgeshire Militia sent to teach the Volunteers at Wisbeach was anxious to stay there as he expected to end up settled for life. He was ruptured and therefore liable to discharge from the Militia and desired to provide for his family.[86] Another man, formerly an N.C.O. in the Fencibles, was a candidate for the Adjtancy of the Leicestershire Yeomanry.[87]

We are now dealing with motives that affected mainly the ordinary members, the joiners of corps. Vanity played its part here too. The Chard corps more or less collapsed because to save money it was proposed to wear very plain clothing and caps. The men demanded a full-blown uniform.[88] Mr. Vachell, a Cambridgeshire Justice, was of the opinion that a simpler organization would do as well as the present Volunteers. They pleased mainly the publicans for the young men

congregated and spent their money freely debauching themselves and profiting only the innkeeper.[89] A Rutland Yeomanry advertisement was rather less harmful in appealing simply to gentlemen who liked a good ride.[90]

Money as an incentive is a difficult problem to discuss. No one doubted the need for pay to the poorer members of corps - we shall consider that separately - but that is not to say that pay was the motive for joining. Inverness-shire,[91] Berwick[92] and Montrose[93] gave bounties to their Volunteers - in the last two cases £2-12 and £13 a man respectively - but this was against the spirit of the institution. The Tivyside Volunteers in South Wales engaged themselves to their various masters for lower wages in consideration of the fact that they would serve part of their time with the corps and be paid by it.[94] Pay was essentially for time taken off from work. A corps might however create a financial incentive by turning itself into a friendly society. The Knaresborough Volunteers were suffering from absenteeism. This was attributed to the failure of the officers to make proper use of the subscription money and their refusal to ask the War Office for pay as the corps desired. The men told their officers in a petition that pay should be drawn and part of it "funded in the bank" and a "final dividend" paid at the peace. The result would be "strict discipline and obsequious subordination. Such conduct would redound to the glory of the town .... and the terror and utter confusion of our foreign and domestic enemies! ..... accept for us the offered gratuity as it becomes every cordial patriot to receive and your petitioners in duty bound will ever fight".[95]

The Renfrewshire Yeomanry (a county regiment of infantry) had a highly evolved scheme. The pay was put in a fund from which benefit was paid to members unable to work from "sickness or unmerited misfortune". There was also a funeral benefit of £2 and provision for the families of men left destitute. Each company was to try and save £300 in four years, so that the scheme could continue when the corps had been disbanded. It was then to be formed into a Society of Loyal Renfrewshire Yeomanry and continue as a friendly society. Meanwhile committees

on which all ranks were represented administered the schemes.[96] We have already seen something humbler of the same sort done by the Edinburgh Artillery. Of course, regular pay for weekly exercises was in itself a standby in times of unemployment. The pay given to the Volunteers thus played its part in binding the poor to the established order.

Selfish motives are most apparent in the desire of many to enjoy the various exemptions, espicially that from militia service, which the Volunteers had been given. John Bevan, a Justice residing at Swansea, revived in 1796 a corps which he had had in the previous war and the arms of which he had kept. At once there was a storm of protest. Bevan was a decrepit old man of disreputable character. He had long been imprisoned for debt, living by his wits until his creditors had mercifully released him. He had once been a militia officer but had been turned out as soon as anyone better could be got.[97] His officers included a seditious innkeeper, a stupid young boy and a poor attorney who was now ashamed of his part in the affair. The men had joined solely to escape the ballot for the expected new militia; they were laughed at and all looked shamefaced.[98] It was said that besides imposing an unfair burden on others, the corps would intensify the existing shortage of labour;[99] in the outcome, the Deputies refused exemptions and complaints began on the other side.[100]

A corps in Herefordshire was nipped in the bud by the Lord Lieutenant (a man unfriendly to these exemptions as we have seen) when he refused to approve of it unless it waived its rights and submitted to the ballot.[101] Some Yeomanry in the Isle of Wight were anxious to have their offer approved in time to claim the Horse Tax exemption.[102] In Surrey, a Militia officer who had made a special study of the deficit in the Militia reported that the Volunteers were joined solely to escape the ballot. One Volunteer who had been ballotted (for the Supplementary Militia doubtless) said on coming to enroll that he did not know

what Volunteers were for if not for this.[103]

Some exemptions of a novel kind were claimed or sought. Kendal wished to raise a Volunteer Corps at municipal expense instead of levying the Supplementary Militia.[104] Auchterarder asked to be excused from the militia because an offer of Volunteers from the town had previously been rejected.[105] Castle Cary and King's Lynn asked and apparently sometimes got exemption from billetting troops on the ground that with the Volunteers it was not necessary to have any in the town.[106] At Castle Cary too, a member claimed the soldier's right of not being arrested for bankruptcy, as the corps had been alerted by the Sheriff and was ready for instant duty.[107] A Herefordshire poacher said he would join the Volunteers if the law against a man's carrying a gun was repealed.[108]

The argument in defence of the exempted was that their burdens were in fact just as heavy. Members of the Aylesford Corps who thought themselves exempted had spent more on their equipment than they would have done in insuring against the ballot.[109] The Islington Corps thought there should be exemption from the Supplementary Militia ballot for all Volunteers who were unpaid. It was unfair to make tradesmen who had met their own expenses pay a further £6 for a substitute.[110] The conclusion which this suggests is that it was the poor, who were paid to join the Volunteers and who might otherwise have had to serve in person or dig deep in their savings, who used the Volunteers as a soft option. The cases of Swansea and Surrey are in line with this. As the militia laws tended to favour the poor, it could be claimed that their spirit was adhered to.

We may fittingly end this section, in which the varied and devious motives in the breasts of the Volunteers have been exposed, by pointing to some of the dilemmas which they placed the government in, when there was need to decide who might safely be armed. As already noted, it was difficult to decide if the gentlemen in opposition might bear their share. How many, too, of the poor were

to be armed? Sir George Onesiphorus Paul, the distinguished magistrate of Gloucestershire, found the cloth manufacturers of the area very anxious to bring forward their workpeople. He told the government that he saw dangers in this measure although the employers felt it was safe enough. The workers would certainly fight the French loyally but when the danger was past they would probably turn their arms against their employers and ask for higher wages.[111] In 1797, the year before this letter, a similar one had come from an ex-Provost of Glasgow. The corps there was designed "to keep in order those designing and turbulent manufacturers who take advantage of every opportunity to raise their wages". If the corps was augmented as now proposed, it would not improbably assist the other side.[112]

There were those who held the view expressed by George Home in a letter to the Lord Advocate. The French Revolution, he said, had made the cardinal innovation of setting the poor against the rich. It was above all necessary to put arms only in the hands of the latter and the excuse could be made that to arm the people at large would be too expensive. The small shopkeepers were a particularly dangerous lot and ought also to be excluded.[113] As against this policy, it was maintained in Roxburghshire that the Volunteer Movement enabled it to be shown that the war was not one between rich and poor.[114]

Volunteer Corps were a form of gratification which the government could allow its supporters to have. Wilberforce complained that he was losing ground in his constituency and sent a request from Lord Hawke to get an officer of his son's Yeomanry Troop into either the army or navy.[115] The government must have had many corps it did not want. Lord Titchfield was told that though there was enough infantry in the Middlesex, more cavalry would be invaluable and so offers which comprized both must be accepted.[116]

As if all this was not enough, religion added to the governments'

difficulties. The Jews of Portsmouth were kept out of the local corps. They complained that they had been admitted elsewhere and their patriotism would be suspect if they were not allowed to join - unless it was declared that this had been done as a general rule. The local military commander, who had made the objection because there were some undesirable persons in the Jewish community, waived it when these had gone elsewhere.[117]

The Roman Catholics had the worst difficulties. Sir Edward Smythe was a pillar of order in Warwickshire, but his religion debarred him from holding a commission in the Volunteers and he could not form his tenants into a corps. Despite disappointment he resisted the blandishments of the disloyal, who were very numerous in the area.[118]

The government endeavoured to help the Catholics by maintaining that it was no part of a minister's duty to satisfy himself that the persons who were to have commissions were of the right religion.[119] This did not help when the religion of a Volunteer was so notorious as to be known to the King. Lord Petre raised a corps but George III refused to sign his commission. The Duke of York said there were many Catholic officers even in the regular forces. The King replied that at anyrate he did not know them to be so; he would not knowingly break the law. Lord Petre retired and the corps was commanded by someone else - who was possibly a Catholic too.[120] Once the ministers tried a battle of wills with the King. A Mr. Weld was one of the prime movers of the Dorset Volunteers and it was most necessary to reward him. His commission was prepared and lay unsigned for a year before the ministers gave up.[121] The real disqualification for office was thus to be known as a Catholic to the King.

Such were the difficulties which beset the government in carrying out its policy for the Volunteer Movement.

(e) The Acceptable Conditions of Service.

We have now seen why and how men were got to join the Volunteers. If they

had been prepared to do so on any terms, there would have been no problem of recruiting. As it was, no social pressure could lead them to offer save with qualifications. These must be explained in order to make clear the degree of usefulness which the force might have.

The Volunteers always put a strict limit to the distance from home which they were prepared to go. The lower classes were less fussy in this respect, though even on Lord Breadalbane's estate there were some who were dissuaded from enrolling by their families because they were to be called to serve outside their county.[1] Any corps with an appreciable upper class element was likely to be fairly static. Yeomanry corps tended to be formed with the provision that a certain proportion should always remain in the county - in Huntingdonshire and Oxfordshire a quarter,[2] in Leicestershire a third.[3] The Norfolk corps was not to leave the county unless two thirds of the members agreed.[4]

The motive behind this restriction was largely a desire to leave reliable persons at home to keep order. Business men in the town corps had the additional need to be near their businesses and give them constant attention. The insurance broker who joined the Edinburgh Light Dragoons wrote to the committee to say that his business would never let him go so far from the town, though he had not publicly objected to the limit of the corps so as not to damp enthusiasm.[5] Later it was agreed that only one member of the partnership need even attend the drills as someone had always to be on duty at the office.[6] Many bodies of business men stated in their offers that prolonged absence from home would mean ruin and consequently distress (leading to riot) among their workpeople.[7] Town corps of middle-class membership therefore only agreed to serve in the immediate vicinity. This was another reason for dividing corps into those for defence and those for police.

The amount of drill which might be done was limited, with effects on the

efficiency of the Volunteers. Some corps drilled on Sundays, like that at Highgate.[8] This was generally frowned on. Wilberforce was assured by Windham that the War Office totally disapproved of it.[9] The result is well demonstrated by the experience of the Manchester Volunteers. In the summer, they were able to drill in the evenings; in winter, it was necessary to drill in working time on weekdays.[10] For a corps with working-class members (whichthis was) pay from some source was therefore inevitable. Nor was this all. Bideford, noting that corps roundabout were receiving pay but drilling on Sundays said that the farmers were threatening to dismiss men belonging to the corps, saying that their work suffered through this weekday drill.[11] The Volunteers were regarded not as a spare-time force but as competitors for labour. A project for a corps at Sudbury in Devon was given up because labour was short on the farms.[12]

Many corps especially Yeomanry, did not drill at harvest time.[13] The hay harvest was sometimes included in this abstention, which therefore covered much of the summer. Some corps continued to receive pay at harvest time and there were cases of their making up by extra drills for some weeks before.[14] Odd interruptions of drill by work are found from time to time. The Barra corps took some time off when the members all sailed to Glasgow to sell their fish and while the fishing season was on they did only half the usual amount of drill.[15] The Edinburgh Light Dragoons were virtually quiescent during the summer for the opposite reasons to the above - the members were mostly lawyers and went to the country seats of their families for the summer vacation.[16]

There was a decided shyness of discipline and a military character altogether. A small business man wrote to Lord Hardwicke that Volunteering involved a certain amount of idleness and much eating and drinking. They would destroy the frugal habits necessary to earn a living in trade and so he could not think of joining.[17] The Volunteers were not under military discipline unless they were called into

service. Some of the earlier corps attested the members as if they were soldiers but at Bolton some who joined refused to sign attestations and the War Office told the corps there was no means of punishment.[18] Similarly two Drummers at Fishguard "deserted" and made trouble by saying that they were not under military law.[19] The corps often instituted a system of fines for various offences but there was no legal force behind these and no way to levy them unless they could be stopped from pay.[20] When a member of Colonel Orchard's regiment in North Devon assaulted an officer, there was nothing to be done about it but prosecute in the civil courts.[21]

All corps claimed and were automatically allowed to nominate their own officers, which was done in the same way as offering service - through the Lord Lieutenant and subject to his approval. The government are sometimes blamed for having countenanced this system but it was probably the only one possible. Only the Lord Lieutenant could readily find out who was eligible and he could scarcely avoid choosing those who had brought the Volunteers forward and under whom more were likely to enroll. When a corps was formed at Blandworth in Hampshire, the Lord Lieutenant was advised to make the richer farmers and tradesmen officers as they would be so pleased at their increased importance that they would be eager to bring forward the poorer people.[22]

What the government did discourage whenever it could was the election of officers by a formal ballot. This might be construed as an ultimatum to the Lord Lieutenant to accept the choice of the corps, or even as an attempt to dispense with the King's commission.[23] The government was also against the election of N.C.O.'s as being likely to weaken discipline.[24] These things happened nevertheless, on occasion, and often with the bad results anticipated. There was a hotly contested election at Fishguard between a deserving old officer and a rich man without experience who tried to buy his way in with beer and other

largesse.[25] A fierce contest at St. Andrews was prolonged by charges that some votes cast were invalid. One man was kidnapped on that occasion, and sick men were dragged to the poll.[26] At Kirkcaldy, the command was vested in the Mayor for the time being.[27] One incoming mayor was persona non grata to the Lieutenancy. In this case, a schism in the corps resulted, while at St. Andrews one company (under the influence of one of the rivals) seceded.[28]

As to the finances of the Volunteers, there were very few corps which could keep going for more than a certain time without government help. In 1795, the Royal Edinburgh Volunteers consisted of 700 men who had paid for their own clothing. The expenses of permanent staff and N.C.O.'s were such that they had nevertheless built up debts of £899 of which £450 had been met by a special payment from the government. They reckoned the annual provision which they needed at £1262.[29] At St. George's Hanover Square it was found that members of the corps had to be paid whether they attended drill or not if they were to be kept from resigning. An annual fund of £5200 was necessary.[30] The Hackney Corps consisted of two sections, one paid and the other not. The expense was met by a subscription, but when this was exhausted in 1799 the paid corps was disbanded.[31] The Hull Volunteers felt able to renounce their pay in 1795 but asked that it might be applied to the upkeep of other corps in the area as they had very little money from subscriptions.[32] These items will indicate the costliness of Volunteers and the inadequacy of their resources, especially when pay was required.

Sometimes there was trouble in raising funds even at the outset. At Cowbridge in Glamorgan, it was hoped to raise £100 in 1797 and clothing was bought at £2-10 a man. Actually only £80 was subscribed.[33] For another corps, Lord Carysfort wrote anxiously asking for allowances and pay: the local tradesmen had supplied all its needs on credit.[34] More usually a corps would

run out of funds later in its career and be obliged to ask for pay. Ambition to improve efficiency could have financial repercussions.[35] The Sheffield Volunteers (among others) asked for permanent pay for an Adjutant. This was refused as it might create a dangerous precedent.[36] Later, corps of Yeomanry were allowed to dismiss a proportion of their permanent N.C.O.'s and apply their pay (which they continued to draw) to the support of an Adjutant.[37]

Requests for pay sometimes arose from jealousy and competition. From Exeter and Manchester it was reported that members of an unpaid corps would leave it forthwith and join those that had been formed on better terms if equal advantages were not accorded.[38] When the government found it necessary, at the end of 1797, to scale down the financial provision for Volunteers, there was some talk of withdrawing pay from those corps that had originally done without it. Lord Rolle protested that these older corps were the best trained and most useful and it would be wrong to condemn them to disbandment in this way.[39] From North Devon, Colonel Orchard said that the newer corps in the area were mostly formed of men who had been expelled from his own corps and ill deserved such favour.[40]

The expense of the Volunteers was a deterrent to their formation. At Leigh in Lancashire a project was abandoned after a meeting had failed to reach any conclusion about how the expense was to be borne.[41] At Hemdsworth, the man who had initiated a corps and was to have been its Captain resigned when he saw the expense that would be entailed.[42] Many sets of resolutions for the forming of corps contained references to economy and particularly tried to reassure members that clothing was to be simple and cheap.[43] But although there were some corps who promised to meet all their expenses and even buy their own arms,[44] the government was normally called on at least for arms and the pay of some N.C.O.'s from the start. Except for the Armed Associations, which were little more than bodies of special constables, it normally found itself ere long meeting on a

considerable scale the costs of Volunteering.

(f) The Fruits of Volunteering.

The usefulness of the Regular Army and even of the Militia can be taken for granted within certain easily expressed limits. The usefulness of the Volunteers, product of such higgledy-piggledy action and hampered by the timidest restrictions, cannot be taken for granted. It would be unreal not to consider whether the government had troubled itself to no purpose.

The Artillery Corps were probably the most useful. They were often not very military in character. They were not allowed to have field guns because they would not be skilled enough to spike them if the enemy attacked in strength and the enemy was likely to be in dire need of artillery.[1] Thus these corps might be reduced to the care of the forts (often local property) and other quite static duties. At Sunderland a body of men turned up to practice with the guns but had no officers.[2] The government did not seem to mind - as a rule they would have objected strongly.

Whether military, or not, these corps did good service. Hartlepool was the only haven for many miles where ships could shelter from privateers. Early in 1798, three of them chased a convoy into the harbour and for some days the forts were permanently manned and the foe kept at bay. It was estimated that during its existence the corps had saved 100 sail from destruction.[3] The Wick corps drove away the "Lion" lugger in October 1797.[4] The corps at Ullapool proposed to maintain a permanent guard at the narrow harbour mouth, so that enemy ships would never be able to get in.[5] When the Oxfordshire Militia plundered the market at Seaford near Newhaven and sold corn below the ruling price, the local Justice called out the Artillery Volunteers whom he commanded and they manned

the fort, keeping safe there a good quantity of provisions and arms.[6]

Also for the defence of the coast were the Sea Fencibles. The plan for these emanated from the Admiralty early in 1798.[7] Previous to this there had been various offers of an amphibous kind. The fishermen of the Lothians were ready to serve on gunboats in the Forth.[8] One ulterior object had been exemption from the Press, which the government had declined to grant.[9] It was now proposed to raise a force of 18,800 men from those who followed maritime occupations and give them the coveted exemption. A Post-Captain was to command in each county and under him a number of Commanders were to be responsible for so many beaches each. These Fencibles were to serve in forts and also in gunboats against privateers. They were organized much as Volunteers but were not allowed to be absent from home without leave. An attempt was made to divert seamen in existing Volunteer Corps into the new body.[10] It was not a strictly land force and is more or less outside our subject but it is mentioned here as part of the attempt to introduce more system into the irregular forces. Mahan does not speak highly of it[11] and the price (of exemptions) was probably too high.

It was noted in the first chapter that the government made an attempt in 1796 to have a compulsory levy of gamekeepers.[12] A body of sharpshooters derived from this or some other source was greatly desired by the army who were fully alive by now to the increased importance of Light Infantry. Major Thomas Reynolds for instance, in a report to Lord Cornwallis on the defence of the Eastern District dated August 1796 mentioned the need of a large body of "rangers" and suggested that the officers should be young gentlemen of the area, the N.C.O.'s gamekeepers and the privates poachers! In April 1798 therefore, Dundas sent out a special circular asking the Lord Lieutenants to make a census of gamekeepers willing to serve as Volunteer reflemen, noting what specialized arms were available for them locally.[14] The response to this circular was probably not encouraging. In

Lancashire such gamekeepers as were not already in the Volunteers were mostly either too old or had never used firearms, relying on nets and snares.[15] From Fife came similar reports.[16] However, in Kent and Sussex, corps of Guides each sixty strong were formed at the request of the Local Military Commander, Sir Charles Grey. They were given the princely sum of £12 a head to equip themselves.[17] Here and there about the country, Volunteer offers took the form of corps of riflemen, rangers and so forth. Of these corps we may say that they were wanted by the military and probably did not suffer too much from lack of formal discipline.

The bodies of pioneers and drivers are barely within our subject, but we may note that in the South at any rate a full organization was created. Itineraries were worked out over which the provisions and livestock could be conveyed out of the enemy's reach. In the south-east the system was particularly complete, thanks to the indefatgable industry of Sir Charles Grey.[18] All was ready to create temporary depots for the receipt of cattle and stores. Superintendents were appointed to act under the Official Commissaries.[19] They were mostly clergymen.

Of the mass of the corps of infantry and cavalry it can at least be said that in many instances they were instrumental in keeping or restoring order. In Inverness and Peterhead, meal riots were suppressed by the local corps.[20] The Sheffield Volunteers strove hard against local disturbance and their Colonel had his horse shot under him.[21] The Stockport Volunteers put down a riot.[22] The Plymouth Volunteers guarded property saved from fires and instituted a regular nightly patrol of the streets.[23] The Honourable Artillery Company suppressed part of the recruiting riots of 1794.[24]

Among the cavalry, the London and Westminster Light Horse Volunteers were a source of strength on several occasions, notably in overawing the great meetings called by the London Corresponding Society in 1796.[25] The Buckinghamshire Yeomanry defended stocks of corn moving along Watling Street in 1795 and arrested

the leaders of a riotous attempt to impede them.[26] In Birmingham and Stratford on Avon the Yeomanry were active in the same year, cooperating with and learning from the regular troops in the area.[27]

There were a few grave cases of insubordination in the infantry. The Dingwall corps did not stand the test of the meal riots as well as its neighbours in Inverness. It joined the rioters and although very penitent afterwards had to be disbanded. A new corps was formed which most of the members were allowed to join.[28] The Teignmouth Corps in 1797 refused to quell a riot and took to meeting in taverns and discussing the fixing of the price of corn. It was ordered to be got rid of.[29] Some trouble was caused at the War Office in 1799 by a member of Professor Harwood's corps at Cambridge who had, while drunk, proposed seditious toasts. There was no means of subjecting him to any punishment, it seemed; his intoxication was regarded as a mitigating factor.[30]

The Yeomanry were safe from sedition but they and the infantry alike suffered from every form of faint-heartedness and inertia. The Derbyshire Yeomanry could not be relied on against the riots because it was harvest time.[31] The Edinburgh Light Dragoons had to be warned that hunting was no excuse for absence from drill.[32] Their minute book contains many exhortations to attend drill regularly, but the corps slid steadily down from the early good attendance until only a third of the members were normally present each time.[33] When asked for a return of his troop of Sussex Yeomanry in 1795, Lord Egremont said that some members never attended and others were gout-ridden and could not; something better would be needed to face an invasion.[34]

The Rochdale Volunteers stood up well at first to the hazard of riots but "the devil in the shape of women is now using all his influence to induce the Privates to break their attachment to their officers and ..... has already debauched three from their duty".[35] In Liverpool a corps nominally 1500 strong could only muster 900 at drill. It was complained that "mechanics" had no permanent

homes and it was difficult to keep a hold on them.[36] At the inspection of June 1797, that old established corps the Fishguard Volunteers showed themselves very unsteady in the few evolutions they ventured to perform; their clothing was poor and they had lost some of their bayonets.[37]

The Armed Associations were sometimes so ephemeral that they could scarcely be said to have any discipline at all. The Lincolnshire corps which had neither uniform or drill was to be disbanded in six months time unless specially renewed.[38] At Marylebone, those who would not drill were given pikes.[39] St. Andrews Holborn also had pikemen, together with a body of attached special constables who patrolled the streets according to a set plan.[40] These bodies were sub-divided, according to the plan of 1797 into groups of neighbours who each had a list of the others' names and addresses, to facilitate coöperation.[41] Herries of the Light Horse was contemptous of these bodies. He recalled that in 1780 one such had been shot up in mistake for the rioters.[42]

What judgment are we to pass on the Volunteers? The Yeomanry had a good basis in association with the county - nearly thirty counties formed such a corps in 1794.[43] The compounding for the Cavalry levy solidified this basis and provided financial support. More elaborate training was encouraged. The Edinburgh Light Dragoons went away to camp in 1799 at Musselburgh. Good work was done and they thoroughly enjoyed themselves.[44] Here was the way to efficiency and enthusiasm.

Infantry and Cavalry alike were improved by the Acts of 1799[45] which, while making militia exemption universal, provided for a comprehensive system of returns and made regular attendance of the individual at drill and attested proficiency of the corps conditions of exemption. Perhaps exemption was not too high a price for this. An extensive reorganization now took place which may be regarded as the fruit of past endeavours. It was as advertisements for the military life that the Volunteers did the most obvious good. Once got in, the members were

ready to offer more ambitious service - as we shall see in the next chapter.

The Volunteers had two great functions. They added in various ways to social cohesion and they acted as a last line of reserve. No very great degree of efficiency was likely to exist in any force with the latter function while the former entailed a fragmentation of the whole into a myriad parts formed by local influence and existing for local purposes. A letter printed by the Annual Register in 1799, protesting against the tendency to battallionize the Volunteers states (though it reads like a caricature) a real case. Each Ward in the City of London needed its own system of drill. The "gentlemanlike tactics" of the merchants and bankers of Broad Street would be no good among the Docks. The oblique alignment useful in Crooked Lane would not serve on the heights of Castle Barnard. Each corps should defend its own area, fighting on ground intimately known to all. The oldest inhabitants would be found the most skillful in choosing positions "some recommending to fortify the vestry and others to keep a strong detachment in the public house". In the Volunteer Movement, the love of one's immediate locality, the most intense of human loyalties, was to find zealous and effective expression.[46]

CHAPTER X : VOLUNTARY EXTENSION OF SERVICE : THE VOLUNTEERS AND FENCIBLES

(a) The Volunteers.

It may be stated as a general rule that such Volunteer Corps as survived for any length of time almost always extended the limit of territory in which they were prepared to serve if called out. No reason is normally assigned for their willingness to do so, but it is fair to suppose that experience taught them that the perils of military service were less than they had supposed. In the Spring of 1798, the government put the screw on by asking what corps were willing to serve in the "military district" and by restricting, at any rate for the future, pay and allowances to those corps that would go that far.[1] A considerable number of corps thereafter went on record as extending in order to get pay.[2]

The process was by no means without its trials. Some corps were very vigomously treated to produce the desired result. A company at Helston having refused to extend, their commandant dismissed them and formed his corps afresh.[3] More generally, there was argument about the terms and extent of the new offer. The Volunteers of Ross-shire demanded pay for as long as it took them to get home when their services were no longer required.[4] Those of Thurso and Tivyside desired assurances that their families would be looked after; in Sheffield, a promise was made to that effect by the townspeople.[6] At Blackenham in Suffolk, a corps of labourers extended their services to the "military district" for the sake of the pay and were very mortified when they found this area to be greater than the county.[7] In South Wales, trouble was caused by a map which showed the "military district" larger than had been described.[8] Lord Radnor said that in Berkshire they wished to know at what point the Volunteers would be called from home. He was told that if not needed for the county police, they would be called

on when the enemy appeard and "driving the county" started.[9] The last circumstances was stated by some corps as determining when their offer would apply. All precautions were sometimes unavailing. The Culloden Volunteers withdrew their offer, feeling that somehow they were surely being deceived.[10]

There were attempts to escape the consequences of extension or offer something as good. The Duke of Richmond complained that one artillery company in Sussex had extended its services, with great benefit to itself, although it could be sure of never being called away from the important point which it had been raised to defend.[11] Some corps, as at Dundee, Haverfordwest and Pendamis in Cornwall[14] offered to do the "garrison duty" of the place as a fair equivalent. Kettering found itself penalized financially because the corps was described inadvertantly as an Armed Association. It was pointed out that it had obliged itself to convey prisoners to the next corps, which as things were meant going thirty miles or more.[15] By contrast with all this, the Nairnshire Volunteers extended their services without making any claims on government. The Lieutenant of the county had to write and say that they had been brought to this step by pride, and could not really afford to leave home without further financial help.[16]

The efficient organization of the Volunteers was greatly helped by extension of service. Major Knight wrote to Lord Bute concerning the steps necessary to put the Volunteers in a state to take over the army's duty. The corps must extend their services and then enough units would be pledged to operate in the same wide area to enable battallions to be formed out of them. Problems arose from this battallionizing. Knight pointed out that trouble would be caused by any arrangement of rank which did not respect the gradations of civil life. Lord Cawdor was only a Captain; he must not remain so in any rationalization. Knight was ready to waive his rank for such a purpose.[17] The views of Lord Cawdor himself are available on the question of battallionizing the Pembrokeshire Volunteers. The senior rank in them was held by the commanders of the town corps,

which were more larger than the more scattered bodies in the countryside. Lord Cawdor regarded them as a poor lot and objected to being put under them, not so much for himself as for the retired army officers serving in the Volunteers.[18] In Ross-shire, the matter was more nakedly put. It was undesirable that gentlemen should be under the command of mere town magistrates.[19]

Despite these hindrances to amalgamation, the movement for a more uniform and stable force went on. As early as 1795, Lord Dormley called attention to the disparities in the drill and methods of the fourteen troops of Kent Yeomanry. Formed into two regiments they might be able to afford a permanent adjutant for each, to their great benefit.[20] In 1800 the amalgamation took place of the Midlothian Yeomanry and the Edinburgh Light Dragoons - a project initiated by the Lord Advocate who hoped in this way to provide permanently for the peace of the Scottish capital.[21] In Devonshire, it was proposed by amalgamation to produce two regiments each from three to five old corps. The supervision of the various corps was made a task of the Deputies.[22] In Cumberland, the corps refused to combine as bodies but it was hoped that the young men of each would extend their services and come together in another corps.[23] The Duke of Atholl proposed the analogous plan of a Battallion of twenty companies, half always to stay in the county and half to be a reserve for the Militia.[24] Although this interesting principle was not adopted, his county of Perthshire eventually had 2500 men organized into seven battallions.[25] Thus the movement of 1799 towards battallionizing was turning the Volunteers gradually into a new irregular militia, standing behind the embodied forces as a worthy final reserve.

That Volunteering made many look more kindly on a military life may be seen from this willingness of almost all Volunteer Corps to extend their services more widely after a time. There is some evidence that men were sometimes encouraged by their participation in the Volunteers to wish to enter the army. The Royal Edinburgh Volunteers were reported to have turned the heads of the

local youth and made them military enthusiasts. One young member wished to become a Lieutenant in the 78th then being raised - and officers to a regiment in that state meant recruits or at least money.[26] In Pembrokeshire a whole company followed its commander into the Cambrian Rangers, a Fencible regiment being raised in 1798-9.[27] At Fishguard, it was complained that the Colonel had seduced some of his men to join the Rangers and then refused to pay or drill the rest in the hope of forcing them in.[28] The Colonel admitted there had been recruiting for the Rangers but said the accusation of sharp practice was invented by a rival for command of the Volunteers who supported it with bought evidence.[29]

Unfortunately, attempts to enlist Volunteers were almost always stoutly resisted by their officers and other superiors. It is from their complaints that most of our knowledge of the practice is derived. The grounds for objection were as follows. It was naturally the poorer Volunteers who enlisted. Their expenses had been met by the better off members of the corps who disliked losing their money. The Rochdale Volunteers had been clothed by subscription and the townspeople had also paid for N.C.O.'s to drill them.[30] The members of the Chew and Cheriton Corps (near Bath) received pay and took an oath. The officers fancied that they could not enlist and certainly the corps would be destroyed if it was allowed.[31] The men of the Berwick corps, who had been enlisted for a bounty in the first place, proceeded to join the Royal Artillery. Discipline again was threatened.[32]

A milder attitude is exemplified by Bolton, which objected to its men joining the regiment of Fencible Infantry raised by Lancashire. There would have been no objection to their joining the regulars but one defensive corps should not steal from another.[33] The Cheshire Fencibles enlisted some men of the Denbigh Volunteers who had received their clothing allowance as bounty. It was felt that if these men would go to the Fencibles, the regulars might have (and as things were, ought to have) enlisted them.[34]

It was the N.C.O.'s and Drummers kept in constant pay by the Volunteers who were most frequently the cause of trouble. Originally the government had supplied these but they soon took to issuing the pay and letting the Volunteers recruit the men, who were more or less soldiers. Sir James Grant complained in 1799 that Drummers and Pipers for the corps of Inverness-shire were brought in from a distance and cost a good deal to train. No sooner were they serviceable than they embezzled their clothes and enlisted.[35] Lord Fortescue made the same complaint from Devonshire.[36] In Glasgow, three Drummers taught at great expense enlisted, one stealing his clothes. This corps was a striking case all round. 200 out of 600 had enlisted. Their clothing was usually a total loss because Volunteers were too vain to wear second hand uniforms. Employers were afraid to let their men join the corps because they tended as a result to become soldiers.[37] The officers were thoroughly disheartened.

The corps took some direct action to recover their men. The Whitby Volunteers browbeat an officer into surrendering a man of theirs.[38] At Glasgow they found that recruiting officers were accomodating but the many uncontrolled Sergeants took no notice of them.[39] Lord Seaforth's regiment of militia enlisted one of the Banff Volunteers who later absconded and was put in the guard house. A Volunteer officer (a carpenter in civil life) came to the rescue and swore he would have him out of there. The Major commanding the militia had been prepared to release the man but hardened before these threats. The ensuing conflict was carried right up to the Lord Lieutenant and finally to the Commander in Chief in North Britain.[40]

The War Office was consulted in a great many instances of this kind. Windham laid down the rule that the enlisting of Volunteers was legal but to be deprecated. The zeal of the Volunteers and the expense to which they were put entitled them to consideration.[41] Their ardour might otherwise be dampened. This view was communicated in 1797 to the office of the Commander in Chief and

apparently accepted there. In 1799, the War Office thought that the Duke of York disapproved of the enlisting of Volunteer Drummers and Fifers but had not prohibited it.[42] Lord Fortescue in the letter cited earlier said that the regular army had ceased enlisting these categories but the militia had not.[43] Thus the issue remained undecided. The failure to make the most of this contribution which the Volunteers might have made to the other services was a distinct and unfortunate flaw in the system.

(b) The Fencibles - By Units

The Fencibles raised in Scotland in 1793 in lieu of a militia were enlisted for service in North Britain. They might only be marched into South Britain in the event of an invasion.[1] In 1794, when invasion had begun to look possible, there was a move(noticed in Chapter I) to bring these regiments south. The Lord Advocate thought that 3000 could safely be sent, leaving 1200 to keep order within the country. He considered that the men would not feel any objection to going while there was no threat to Scotland itself.[2] Lord Adam Gordon finally produced a plan to send 500 from each of four regiments, thus allowing for the desire of the Highlanders to keep together.[3] Each man got one guinea bounty.[4]

The regiments were consulted by their officers in March 1794 as to their willingness to submit to this service. Even those from the Lowlands objected.* Thus the West Regiment raised the typical Highland objection to a voyage by sea. Rumour had it among them that they were "sold" and troops of Horse were waiting to force them on board. They broke into a riot. Finally, they were convinced of their error, repented and put peacefully to sea.[5] The South regiment was little less reluctant. 181 were willing to go by sea or land and 150 more by

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* See Stewart of Garth II : lxxxii

land only. They flatly refused to go via Fort George, where the West regiment was (they were themselves at Banff). This fort, the habitation of so many recruits sent from the Highlands to distant climes, may have had a baleful effect on these two regiments. The officers of the South were so far disturbed as to throw the regimental ammunition into the sea. In the end, this regiment also changed its mind and went to England by land.[6]

Of the Highland regiments, the Sutherlands and the two battalions of the Breadalbane s refused outright and were never sent.[7] The Argyles were equally recalcitrant at the time but changed their minds later in the year.[8] The Gordons were commanded by the brother in law of the Duke, an English guards officer named Woodford. The regiment suspected that he would sell them once he got to his own country.[9] There were stories of attempts to corrupt their loyalty. They were called on to go by sea and as the Duke had feared, they refused. The Duke in person now came and pleaded with the men. Thanks to his efforts they finally consented to march on to the ships, the Duke being present to lead them on.[10]

The most violent reaction was from Sir James Grant's regiment then at Linlithgow. The trouble there was caused by a company composed of Macdonnells, who were Catholics and much afraid of being victimized.[11] Two requests were made to the regiment to extend its services - a great reluctance being shown on the first occasion to going by sea. At the second parade the Macdonnells suddenly broke ranks and rushed off to Linlithgow Palace, where there was a store of ammunition. Others joined them until there were 300 locked inside. They fired at the rest of the regiment, which was apparently on the opposite side of the lake on which the Palace stands and when two officers came to parley, they seized them as hostages. These officers kept them out of mischief by persuading them to do some drill and parleys began. A written promise was demanded that the matter would be dropped. Eventually the Colonel and the Major came in person and gave assurances. The news that the Gordons had sailed also had a sobering

effect and the mutineers returned to duty.[12]

Although Sir James continued his efforts and even offered money out of his own pocket to persuade the men, this mutiny turned out to have been decisive and the regiment stayed at home.[13] The irony of it was that the Macdonnells were transferred at the end of the year to a regiment raised by their chief (Glengarry) and which was pledged to serve not only in England but in Ireland as well.[14]

The government had got the four regiments it had settled for, but had apparently reached the limit of success. No wonder then that they turned henceforth as we shall see to plans for the recruiting for extended service of individual soldiers in these Scottish regiments. A preternatural barrier of suspicion had to be crossed here, associated in many cases with a language barrier. A curious tale is recorded by the historian of the Reay (Mackay) Fencibles. The grandson of one of the privates in the regiment recalled hearing it said that one day the men had been addressed (in English) by Sir Robert Sinclair. At the end of his speech, he called for three cheers, which were given because British soldiers always did cheer when asked. Later the men found that they had consented in so doing to an extension of service. Much upset, they asked finally for three privileges as a reward for their offer (what these were had been forgotten in the course of oral transmission). The request was granted and the men had to be content.[15] Such was the character of extension of service in the Highlands.

The various regiments of Fencible Cavalry raised in England and Scotland offered from time to time to serve in Ireland. The Ancient British Fencibles made such an offer in 1795 for example[16] as did the Rutland Fencibles in 1796.[17] From 1798 onwards all the Fencibles (including the infantry raised in 1794 to serve in the British Isles) began to offer to serve in Europe (like the Dumbartonshire, Midlothian or Durham regiments)[18] or anywhere in the world (like those of

Essex or Somerset).[19]

These offers were essentially a by-product of the process of disbanding Fencible regiments in whole or part and enlisting individuals from them that we shall consider next. Sir Thomas Wallace Dunlop's regiment of Fencibles - one of those raised in 1798 - was found to contain too many boys for effective service and was on the verge of being broke. The officers induced the men to offer to serve anywhere in the world and then proposed that the regiment should be sent to a station so distant that the boys would have grown to a proper size before arrival.[20] Thus regiments hoped to preserve their identity by supplying more effectively the government's needs.

In 1799, the final decision was made that regiments must either agree to serve at least in Ireland or else be disbanded.[21] Once out of Scotland, the regiments of that country seem to have been pliable enough. The Second Battallion of the Rothesay and Caithness Fencibles were sounded by their Colonel Sir James Sinclair who reported them willing to leave Britain if they might just have time to go home and see their families and settle their wives. He played on their desire to be rewarded with farms after the war.[22] The regiments at home were mostly still obstinate. The First Battallion of the Breadalbanes was not able to produce more than 200 men to go to Ireland. 300 were demanded. Proposals were made to give a substantial bounty or to recruit the men for another battallion under the same colonel.[23] In the end the regiment was dismissed, to the anger of Lord Breadalbane who attributed the failure simply to the number of willing recruits the regiment had already provided for more distant service.[24]

The Fencibles, unlike the militia, did not present much of a problem when once they had extended their services. The West Lowland Fencibles were very desirous of going home in 1797 and their Colonel made efforts on their behalf.[25]

■ c.f. p. 112-113

The Durham and Essex Cavalry regiments complained in 1799 at being made to serve in Ireland upon the terms laid down for the Irish establishment rather than the better British terms (this was a militia grievance too as we shall see). Threatened with reduction, they quickly subsided. Lord Darlington resigned from the Colonelcy of the Durhams. Colonel Burgoyne of the Essex said that his men had been tampered with.[26] The undisciplined condition of all the troops in Ireland is reflected in the Fencibles - nothing more.

The Fencibles then are seen to consist of a large body willing (either at first or later) to serve in a wider field than at first planned, and a smaller one unwilling to do any such thing.

(c) The Fencibles: By Individuals

The recruitment of Fencible men by other corps raised for more extensive service began with a scandal in the autumn of 1793. Alan Cameron of Errecht was raising the 79th regiment of foot, as it was to become. Lord Breadalbane offered to supply him with some men from his Fencibles. Cameron approached Dundas through the invaluable Cochrane and Dundas declared that "the volunteering spirit of our countryman ought not to be crushed". He gave his blessing and proposed to show the correspondence to the King.[1] On this authority sixty two men were enlisted by Cameron from the first battallion at Aberdeen, early in November. They had previously been given their discharges from the regiment.

As soon as he heard of it, Lord Adam Gordon the Commander in Chief in North Britain declared the whole transaction improper and ordered the men to be restored to their former regiment, from which he did not consider them discharged. The expenses of the operation were to be borne by Cameron.[2] There now ensued an involved struggle. Dundas said that Cochrane had been very precipitate in communicating his views. The scheme would have required a proper order and

had turned out to be inadmissable. Lord Huntly and others had made offers to raise regiments of the Line from Fencibles. They had been rejected because no one would ever enlist in Fencibles once they became mere depots for supplying the line.[3]

Cameron regarded the whole affair as a plot of the house of Gordon against himself who had raised a regiment of the Line and Lord Breadalbane who had raised two Fencible battalions "while perhaps a certain family has found it inconvenient to do either". He thought the Duchess was especially displeased at the failure of Huntly, her son, to get permission to raise a regiment. He advised Lord Breadalbane to stand firm "feeling as he does independent of the whole creation". Supporters were mobilized in Scotland and the Earl was advised to go south and see the King.[4] Meanwhile the men had returned to the Fencibles and refused to do duty. They claimed to be discharged. They were imprisoned. Henry Erskine, the Dean of the Faculty of Advocates was brought in, with some other leading counsel, to give an opinion on the legality of the discharges. They were unequivocal in their favour and said that the men could be released by application to the civil court.[5]

The authorities in London were anxious to smooth things over but Lord Adam Gordon acted with a high hand. He caused a paragraph hostile to Lord Breadalbane to be published in the Edinburgh newspapers. This greatly displeased Lord Amherst. He also refused the Earl (who as Colonel of the Fencibles was under his command) leave to go to London to see the King. The Earl's temper began to get worse.[6] Dundas and Lord Amherst now stepped in. In January 1794, the fact of the men's discharge was admitted and they were let out of prison. The question of the transgression of the officers in discharging them remained to be smoothed over but on the main issue Cameron and the Earl had won.[7]

This incident has been recounted at some length because it is an instructive piece of recruiting politics. It is placed here because it shows Dundas' early advocacy of extensions of service and the obstacles that stood in the way.

In the following autumn, Dundas was able to apply this policy for the first time. A circular was sent to all the Scottish Fencible Colonels, saying that new Fencible regiments were to be raised to serve in Ireland and release the regular troops there. They were invited to nominate someone to raise such a regiment and enlist men for it from their own, as well as from outside. The men extending their services were to receive a bounty of five guineas and their old regiments were to recomplete with a bounty of ten guineas a man. Another circular was sent out to influential persons who might choose to raise regiments on these terms.[8]

A large number of Fencible regiments were raised both in Scotland and England that autumn of 1794. A small but useful part was played by extension of service.[9] Major Baillie got a few men from the Northern (Gordon) Fencibles for the Inverness Fencibles.[10] Glengarry as we saw earlier took the Macdonnells out of Grant's into his new Corps.[11] Sir James Grant was willing to raise a further Fencible regiment for his son only if it was not made dependent on recruiting from the old one.[12] In the end, his son went into a new line regiment. At some point Dundas had written to him privately asking if he could spare eleven men of his regiment for Colonel Dundas (of the Scotch Brigade).[13] Using this as an authority to send his men to the line, Sir James set to work disposing of such as were willing to his son's regiment and to the 97th which he had raised himself.[14] Here was a new and accidental development of the principle.

It was Lord Breadalbane, very suitably, who made the most use of the new principle, raising a third regiment largely from his other two. He made his

original proposal as far back as June 1794 but encountered some opposition from Lord Amherst.[15] The military authorities remained watchful and it was stipulated that no regiment being recruited from was to fall below 500 at any point.[16] In spite of this, the Mayor of the second battalion complained that his men had been "picked and picked from" and recruiting sergeants remained behind after the appointed time was over, disturbing discipline and snapping up the few good men left. The regiment was reduced to some 300 men together with the recruits and it was found that the agents of the new battalion would take none of the latter but only seasoned soldiers.[17] From the other battalion 100 men went to the new corps.[18]

There is no clear indication on the matter, but simple feudal influence seems to have been the only agent in this extension of service. The Gordons again were unfriendly. The Duke felt that his pledges to the men's families would be violated and it would not be easy to replace the men.[19] Above all, both he and Colonel Woodford[20] felt that the wounds made by the extension of service in the spring would be re-opened. The Breadalbanes had refused to extend their services as a regiment, they were now brought to do so as individuals. The two ways were essentially complementary.

In the late summer of 1795, with a large expedition to the West Indies pending, the army was beginning to feel the pinch for men. It was the Duke of York who now pressed for enlistment from the Fencibles.[21] A circular was sent out in August permitting the privates of all Fencible regiments to enter whatever regular regiment they pleased and receive a bounty of five guineas. As before, their old regiments were to get ten guineas to replace them.[22] Trouble soon arose. The Ancient British Fencibles were approached by recruiters for the line before they had received any orders and were much bewildered. They were stationed in the West Riding and it was feared that the many crimps of the area would get among them.[23] The men were plied

with drink and discipline was impaired.[24] Sir Watkin Williams Wynn protested, as we saw earlier, against a measure that would destroy his credit in the area where the regiment was raised.

The Cinque Ports Fencible Cavalry wrote to ask that the scheme should end after a definite date and that the permission of the Commanding Officer should be obtained by each man wishing to go.[25] The latter request was granted[26] and it was later announced that the scheme had been laid aside save when it had the Commanding Officer's approval.[27] One officer of the Fencibles who hoped to get himself a commission in the Line by enlisting men from Colonel Parkyn's regiment was mortified to find himself put under arrest - he had not heard of the new order.[28] In Guernsey (where many of the Fencibles were) Governor Small found that only the Glengarries co-operated and gave some men.[29] In Scotland the regulars got 85 men, it seems, before the fresh orders.[30]

Their plan, having proved abortive, the authorities at the end of the year caused all the Fencible regiments to reduce their strength by a certain amount. The infantry regiments not over 700 strong were reduced to 500 and the cavalry from 71 to 50 rank and file per troop.[31] A circular was sent to the regular regiments of Light Dragoons telling them to recruit from the disbanded men of the Fencible Cavalry and giving details of where they were being dismissed from their present corps.[32] As for the infantry we have noted already how abody of the West Lowland Fencibles marching home from the south were expected to enlist on the way.[33]

Occasional disbandment of Fencibles to allow of recruiting now became a recognized policy. In 1799-1800 there was an orgy of it, reflecting the general encouragement of extension of service at that time. A number of regiments were disbanded altogether; in 1800, almost all the Fencible Cavalry was got rid of.[34] Arrangements were not lacking to absorb the men. When one battalion of the Sutherland Fencibles was reduced, General Wemyss was commissioned

to raise a regiment of the line from them and from the county. For men from the Fencibles he got ten guineas levy money and for civilians £15.[35] Sir James Grant's Fencibles were reduced at Edinburgh and he proceeded to recruit them for a second battalion to serve in Ireland. Parties from other regiments swarmed round, but against their competition he got half his old regiment to join the new one.[36]

For the rest, the authorities ordered various regiments suitably placed to try and get the men. The 46th and 79th were advised to recruit those in Scotland.[37] The Fencible officers were told to assist.[38] The local connections evident in the raising of the two regiments noted above were apparent throughout. The Perthshire Fencible light Dragoons were approached by Lieutenant Colonel Dalton of the 4th Dragoons who said that he had been brought up in Perthshire and there were many Scots in his regiment.[39] Considerable success appears to have attended all these efforts, though there appears to be no very ready way of measuring it. The policy of granting an absolute discharge to the men before trying to enlist them has been criticised by Stewart of Garth[40] and certainly seems a retrograde step, leading to disorderly recruiting and a leakage into civil life. However, the government had no use for the services of these men save in the Line and there was no machinery for disbanding them and then recalling them as there was for the Militia - a further indication of the value attaching to the organization of the latter.

CHAPTER XI : VOLUNTARY EXTENSION OF SERVICE : THE MILITIA

(a) By Units

In 1798, with rebellion and invasion brewing the demand for troops in Ireland had become desperate. In May Lord Buckingham, who was thought by Dundas to echo the views of many, called for legislation to enable up to 10,000 men of the militia to serve in Ireland or on the north coast of France. He had consulted his officers and thought he could get his regiment to perition for such a measure.[1] These sentiments were conveyed to Dundas by Grenville, to whom he replied with three objections: the "principles of the militia" would be undermined; the offers would not really be voluntary since anyone not offering would be deemed a coward; the feeling of security on which a resumption of the offensive depended would be destroyed by breaking into the militia which was the only force intact for the defence of Britain except the Guards. He added wistfully that they would have been "on velvet" if only the Lords Lieutenant had not been so unfriendly to the scheme of recruiting the army from the Supplementary Militia.[2]

Lord Buckingham acquiesced in this line of reasoning but said he would be ready to organize an offer whenever wished.[3] On June 10th having consulted his officers again, he repeated the offer of his regiment and urged the need of sending "10,000 men of all sorts" to Ireland. The government warmed to the idea and he urged them to introduce a bill only after receiving petitions from the regiments. He wished them luck against the more obstructive Colonels and Lords Lieutenant.[4]

On June 18th a Royal Message informed the House of Commons that the officers and men of certain militia regiments had offered to serve in Ireland and asked them to consider legislation to make this possible for a limited time.[5] In the ensuing debate, the opposition explored very fully the first two grounds of objection mentioned by Dundas. That Mr Pierrepoint and Sir Lucius Palk declared that they would nevertheless go with their own regiments if they offered was held by Sheridan to be an added proof that this was no voluntary affair. Mr Taylor said he would think it braver to stay at home. Sir Lucius pointed to a further danger; the country gentry would become unwilling to serve as militia officers. Wilberforce agreed with this and admitted that the offers might not be strictly voluntary. But the initiative had come, it seemed, from the lower ranks in the regiments and the needs of the government were very great. He therefore supported the measure. A hostile amendment having been defeated by 118 votes to 47, a suitable Address and a bill giving effect to the new scheme were agreed to.[6] What became of the arguments in this debate we shall see in due course.

The Act now passed[7] enable 12,000 militia men to serve in Ireland. Their offer was to be voluntary and their commanding officers were obliged to tell them beforehand that they were under no obligation to make it. The duration of the Act was limited to a period ending one month after the start of the next session. Vacancies by death or desertion in Ireland were not to be filled by the counties. In the execution of the act there was a muddle caused by an apparent decline in danger - the victory of Vinegar Hill. Regiments were embarked and then disembarked.[8] Then the French landed and they had to start again. On September 2nd the Home Office was informed that 12,410 militia in four brigades had been ordered to Ireland.[9] As the Buckinghamshire

and Warwickshire regiments had already gone over,[10] the limit in the Act was being generously interpreted.

How voluntary were these offers? As a rule, they were not unanimous - detachments of each regiment refused to go and were left behind. Most of them were eventually concentrated in a body at Norman Cross.[11] In the Lancashire regiment, there happened to be a shortage of new clothing. The men who were going to Ireland therefore set upon the party who were staying at home and stripped them almost naked.[12] The officers apparently did nothing to interfere. Lord Rolle found the South Devon regiment very reluctant to embark. He went aboard the ship and appealed to them to follow. When they would not, he paraded them and went along the ranks asking each man why he would not go, correcting their misconceptions and hearing greivances. Finally a good body was embarked and he suggested a spell of really hard duty for the rest; they had better leave their present station in any case, for the regular troops in the area were threatening to lynch them.[14] Three hundred of the Leicestershire regiment who refused to embark at Liverpool were similarly sent out of the way to Holywell, but the reason there was to prevent their contaminating other regiments which came to embark with their views.[15] Despite all efforts, there were signal failures. Only half the East Suffolk could be got to make any offer.[16]

The officers found some resistance to be due to specific greivances which they could remove. Lord Rolle's regiment was one of those that had been previously embarked earlier in the summer and were called on later a second time. When on shipboard before, they had found the conditions to be appalling and they resented the stoppage of 6½d. a man to pay for the voyage. Lord Rolle remitted the stoppage.[17] A precisely similar case was that of the North Hampshire regiment which had taken a rooted dislike to the guardship

"Alkmaar" in which they were again called on to embark. They also complained that the increase of family allowances promised by the Treasury had been interpreted in a miserly spirit by the magistrates. The Colonel succeeded in placating the men and a great many who had at first objected ended by going.[18]

At the end of the year the Act was due to expire but the services of the militia were still wanted. Dundas sent out a circular to the regiments in Ireland. They were asked for the information of Parliament whether they were willing to extend their offers.[18] The answers being favourable, an Act was passed in December[19] extending the previous one until a month after the opening of the next session.

It is in the attempts to get the men to stay in Ireland that we see most clearly how the system was made to work. From the West Suffolk and Warwickshire regiments[20] came complaints of the unwisdom of Parliament in not fixing a term of service or merely extending the Act without a fresh appeal to the regiments. A desire to go home had now been excited in the men which would not otherwise have been there. The West Kent regiment should not be consulted, its commander wrote, unless they would be needed for longer than the rest of the winter.[21] Six of the regiments asked were willing to stay for an unlimited time but seven more fixed dated upon which they were to return, ranging from the end of March to the beginning of June.[22]

An appeal to the regiment necessitated some consultation among the men. This was all very well in cases like that of the Leicestershire regiment, when the Colonel (the Duke of Rutland) addressed the men and asked them to reply after deliberation; a respectful letter was sent by the Sergeant Major in response declaring that the men had told their Sergeants they were willing to stay as long as desired.[23] In the South Lincolnshire regiment however, a more

deliberative spirit prevailed. To keep it in mind that they were British Militia, the men limited their offer to a period of six minths and made their Colonel promise that they should stay no longer, save of their own free will.[24]

The longer a regiment had been in Ireland, the more difficult it was to make it stay. The Warwickshire and Buckinghamshire regiments had done first and in December they were the most anxious to return. Lord Buckingham thought that Lord Hertford had allowed the Warwickshires too much linen. They in turn corrupted his own regiment who at first refused to stay.[25] He thought one reason lay in rumours of other regiments deciding to go home when the Act expired and said that in any case they would not stay longer than the spring.[26] He opposed what was apparently the opinion of Lord Cornwallis,[27] that the regiments who had once offered might be compelled to stay as long as the law permitted them to be there. Instead he used his powers of suasion upon his men to such effect that they apologized for behaviour so insulting to their colours, their guns (which had been bought by a county subscription) and himself. They agreed to stay until April.[28] "Lord Hertford has allowed the Warwick men to run riot and they tainted ours till they found me more sturdy than his Lordship" was his summing up.[29] Similar work was done on the Warwickshire by Lord Hertford's brother[30] and they all renewed their offer except a few, who refused to be sent home but asked to do guard duty in Dublin.[31]

Throughout 1799 fresh minor crises arose as the allotted terms of regiments expired. When Parliament met early in September to legalize further enlistment of the militia into the line, it had the effect of bringing forward the date of expiry of the second Act permitting the militia to serve in Ireland.

A new Act was later passed, extending the duration of the original Act still further - to six weeks after the start of the next session.[32] But meanwhile the Cambridgeshire had been moved to demand repatriation by Christmas. They were told it would be more liberal to stay until February, when the Act of December 1798 would have expired if Parliament had met at a more normal time. Finally they decided to do whatever seemed best to Sir Edward Nightingale their Lieutenant Colonel. The Oxfordshire regiment who also began to murmur were won back partly by threats and partly by lavish supplies of ale.[33]

Various motives prompted a decline in enthusiasm. Lord Rolle and Lord Buckingham both instanced the failure of the enemy to appear.[34] They also agreed that the troops expected those who came out first to go back first, Lord Buckingham thought it essential to apply this principle fairly and promptly if any more regiments were to be induced to come out.[35] Lord Rolle instanced departures from the proper order of relief.[36] According to Lord Buckingham, the regiments felt they were being kept on to force through the Union.[37] There was a financial grievance over various allowances to the troops which were lower in Ireland than in England. Lord Rolle here made himself the spokesman of all the regiments. His own, he said, had been promised English allowances by Sir William Pitt as a condition of its offer. A representation had been drawn up which he forwarded privately to London while representations were also made in Dublin.[38] Detailed answers were returned; it was agreed that the Irish cost of living was lower and allowances could therefore be lower too. Concessions were made on two points (one being the stoppage for transport which had already caused trouble) and the others, which affected mainly the officers, were apparently allowed to drop.[39]

The duties in Ireland were irksome. Order had to be kept in a country full of sedition and murderous outrage. There were no pitched battles after the defeat of Humbert, but three men of the Worcestershires (for instance) were murdered in their beds.[40] Many regiments were cooped up in Dublin and got tired of it. Fever broke out among them and raged through the winter, causing the death of some officers.[41] The withdrawal of martial law (which was a protection to the soldier against outrage) was a source of trouble in the autumn of 1798.[42] Officers and men were equally disgruntled. Lord Buckingham was not allowed to take command of a detachment of his regiment sent against the rebels.[43] He at once became the implacable foe of Lord Cornwallis the Viceroy, having tried to resign his command and was with difficulty dissuaded from laying the whole matter before the King.[44] Later, he disclaimed all connection with the Irish government which had sent him a paper he should have received from England. He passed on the unflattering views which Generals Lake and Nugent (the latter his relative) had of their superior.[45]

The great desire, uniting officers and men, was however simply to get home quickly. The Oxfordshire Militia at one point promised to stay until Christmas 1799 on condition that they were then given a spell in the home country.[46] The men wished to see their families. The Bedfordshire regiment was given this indulgence.[47] The officers showed the strongest desire to return. Many in Lord Rolle's regiment were so anxious to attend to their private affairs that they told him they would resign if any attempt was made to keep the regiment in Ireland beyond Midsummer 1799.[48] The officers' point of view is best expressed by some gentleman who served in the Berkshire Provisional Cavalry (an analogous force) in a memorandum on the proposal that their regiment should offer its services overseas. Comfortably situated at home, they had entered the service from patriotic motives only to find themselves "pressed to extend our services beyond our abilities or inclinations by adopting

a line of life which ought to have commenced at an earlier period when we might have seemed an interest in the Profession if such had been our object". The alternative of refusal would probably attach a stigma to their names.[49]

In January 1799, Dundas asked the regiments who had previously offered but not been made use of if they would renew their offer and relieve such regiments as wished to come home and look after their county concerns.[50] All replied in the affirmative.[51] The Tower Hamlets Militia later withdrew its offer - it was thought to have been tampered with[52] - and only half the North Lincolnshire was prepared to go.[53] But a fair body was willing and the prospect of a regular system of reliefs was opened up. The system, however, had become distinctly unpopular. Lord Cornwallis understandably had told Lord Buckingham not to make any special efforts to get his men to stay.[54] He told Dundas in March 1799 that the extension of service of the remaining Scottish Fencibles was vital, in order to replace the Militia held by a "precarious tenure". The Leicestershire regiment which had offered to serve indefinitely now clamoured to be home by June.[55] Dundas promised to do his best and said that he had not expected the Leicestershires to stay as soon as there was any prospect of going home. In the event, 6863 militiamen came home down to Midsummer 1799 and were replaced by 3468 militiamen and 3300 other troops.[56]

The shortcomings of extended service by the militia thus served to promote steps to make the Fencibles available abroad. It also opened up another vista. Lord Buckingham had - again understandably - been convinced by experience that extension of service by militia regiments would not work.[57] He therefore became a fervant partizan of recruiting the Line from the militia. As he had previously been an opponent even of the detachment of the Flank Companies of militia for service within Britain,[58] it is difficult to imagine his espousing

the new policy save after the trial and failure of his own. He might have added great weight to the opposition on this question and embarrassed the government severely.

Apart from giving a stimulus to other forms of extension of service, the appearance of the English militia in Ireland set a precedent. Although a languishing experiment at the end of our period, it was the shape of things to come. Cornwallis and Dundas discussed the possibility of sending some Irish militia to England in 1799.[59] The King was afraid that the English militia would be offended but thought the Irish might go to the Channel Islands or America.[60] The Union gave an impetus to the interchange of the two militias, which became the accepted practice in the next decade.[61] The same advance was then made by the Scotch militia as the Duke of Montrose foresaw in 1799.[62] The expedient of 1798 was thus the start of a valuable reform, it gave succour to the Irish government at a perilous moment and it provides interesting evidence for us that the men who entered the militia (to say nothing of their officers) cannot be regarded merely as soldiers of the Line who had taken a wrong turning. They were not willing save in a very limited degree to do the work of the Line and but for the existence of the Militia they would have been lost to the war effort.

(b) By Individuals : The Earlier Schemes

The enlistment of militia men by the army had to be approached very slowly and cautiously. The Constitutional Force was jealously guarded by its officers from any attempt to make it subordinate to the army. The government could not interfere with it arbitrarily without arousing much hostility among the landed gentry. The passion that might be aroused by attempts to put

militia men into units other than their county regiments was shown in the affair of the Flank Companies in 1798.* Infantry regiments at this time normally had a company of Light Infantry and one of Grenadiers who were supposed to be skilled in skirmishing and the other duties of light troops. In order to make a reality of this supposition, the Flank Companies had to be taken from their regiments and put together in special battalions for training and perhaps for action too. In April 1798 the Commander in Chief gave instructions for this to be done to the Flank Companies of the militia.[1]

There was at once an outcry led by Lord Buckingham, who said that it was illegal to put militia men under the command of officers not their own. The Law Officers gave a contrary opinion - the two sides of the question were put to a meeting of militia colonels. Lord Buckingham thought his views had been misrepresented to the meeting and was angrier than ever.[2] Though protesting his desire not to make trouble in public, he said he would disobey any order to detach his Flank Companies and fight hard if called to account. If the question was settled by fresh legislation, he would resign.[3] The government received a mass of correspondence on this subject and were loath to have recourse to the Legislature because there would be wide differences of view revealed between different militia officers and the men would get to hear of it and become unsettled.[4] Eventually the trouble was smoothed over and the plan was carried out but it did not cease to be disliked by many officers.[5]

The more radical measure of turning men out of the Militia altogether was likely to be even less popular. The Duke of Richmond wrote in January 1799 to oppose any project of enlistment from the militia. He said it would produce

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* Described from the Dropmore Papers by Fortescue (IV 885-6)

few men and would further disgust the officers who were already upset over the Flank Companies; a great many would probably abandon the service when peace came.[6] Lord Dundas writing to advocate enlistment of militia men a few months later begged that his views might be kept a secret - otherwise he would lose all influence with the officers of the regiment of which he was Colonel.[7]

The government had therefore to proceed warily. Their first move was in 1795, in connection with two special shortages of men, which the militia might be able to remedy. The Artillery had suffered from a shortage since the war began.[8] It did not have recourse to any of the novel methods adopted for the other arms and its demands were stringent because it required men who were at least 5'7" tall.[9] The militia contained some men of this height and moreover its regiments had battalion guns and some of the men were trained to their use. The quest for sailors in 1795 has already been mentioned in this study.[10] The army was ordered to give up the sailors who happened to have entered its ranks.[11] A circular was sent to the Fencibles in February asking the number of seamen in each regiment and they were later order to discharge them.[12] A similar circular was sent at the same time to the Militia; the Lords Lieutenant in this case were asked to suggest how the men could best be transferred.[13]

A good many regiments, such as the Berkshire and the Buckinghamshire,[14] reported that they had very few seamen. But the Dorset for instance had 104, the Essex 52 and the Wiltshire 23 and the Middlesex regiments 112.[15] A similar The Cambridgeshire had about 20 - the Adjutant was surprised to find so many.-[16] The Hampshire return was thought to be defective because dislike of the sea service caused many to disguise their origin[17] (in the Cambridgeshire the sailors

were said to be indistinguishable from the rest)[18]. On the other hand, the enquiries in one of the Norfolk regiments were made very quietly by the Adjutant Sergeant Major and Sergeants for fear that undesirable characters in the regiment should pose as seamen in the hope of getting something out of it.[19] The seamen in the Middlesex Militia had mostly offered to enter the navy already[20] but the Sussex regiment was not told that there was any such prospect for fear of causing a panic.[21] The Wiltshire men were expected to demand extravagant terms to enter the navy if they saw any prospect of a discharge instead.[22]

Several Lords Lieutenant were prepared to suggest that men should be enlisted straight from the militia by offering a bounty. Lord Hardwicke said that to dismiss them and then cause them to be Pressed would be construed as a breach of faith. He adopted the idea of the Adjutant of the Cambridgeshire that the regiment should get £20 for each man (as did the captains of merchant ships giving recruits to the navy) half to go to the seaman and the rest to the man got to replace him.[23] Lord Townshend thought that compensation should be paid to the principals when their substitutes turned out for the navy and had to be replaced.[24] Lord Berkeley wanted the seamen provided to count towards the quota which each county and parish had lately been obliged by Parliament to raise for the navy.[25]

In June 1795 an Act was accordingly passed allowing men who had been three years at sea or trained as gunners to volunteer for the Navy and Artillery respectively. The number of gunners who might volunteer was limited to one fiftieth of the regiment and the total number of volunteers to one tenth.[26] They were to be replaced by their regiments which were given ten guineas a man and permitted to raise recruits by ordinary enlistment like the army for the purpose.[27] When a regiment was complete, more men were to volunteer until all the seamen and gunners in the Militia had left it.[28]

The passage of this measure was the subject of a Protest by Lord Radnor who from now on was the most implacable opponent of recruiting from the Militia. He objected to the use of the Militia as a fund to recruit other forces. The recruiting of replacement by ordinary enlistment was entirely contrary to the existing militia law. To suggest that the militiamen had a right in certain circumstances to a discharge from their present service was to undermine discipline. Above all, the Act contained no time limit and nothing to prevent the establishment of a precedent.[29] Lord Radnot had earlier agreed to the transfer of the seamen, but he had wished them to be replaced in the ordinary way by ballot, the chosen man to be paid the cost of a substitute by the government.[30] He rightly saw recruiting by the militia regiments as a departure of some importance.* As for recruiting from them, "the militia contains a fund for recruiting not only the artillery but every other corps in His Majesty's Service, much too good not to be ardently coveted and (however the intention be disclaimed at present) I fear resorted to ..."[31]

The Act appears to have gone smoothly into effect. The only incident which caused anxiety to the military authorities was when Colonel Pattison, recruiting for the Artillery in the south-east, attempted to force the militia Colonels to give up more than the stipulated maximum quota. This was put a stop to; Colonels might be asked to strain the letter of the law in certain respects but they were in no case to give up more than the proper number of men.[32] The total yield of the operation was small; figures received by the War Office show 463 entering the Artillery and only 106 the Navy.[33]

The enlistment of the Supplementary Militia in the Line was the next scheme to be considered. In the autumn of 1797, this force was trained but unembodied. Colonel Anstruther presented a plan for bringing it into service

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* See page 148

against the impending danger from the French. There were 24 skeleton regiments in Britain, representing a great waste of the professional skill of their officers. Twenty of them should recruit from the militia and Fencibles. Each regiment should operate in its own county and the Lords Lieutenant and militia Colonels would be pressed to help. This should be the beginning of a genuine county basis for all recruiting. Low bounties would be the rule and 18,000 troops should be procured "composed not of the dregs of the human race but of robust active men such as form the bulk of the people of Britain". On the other hand, it would be necessary to offer a limited engagement - in time to five or six years, in extentto His Majesty's European dominions other than Gibraltar - and discharge in the county where the men were raised. It ought to be possible to get the men to extend their services further before then. Anstruther appears to have envisaged recruiting largely from the old militia, the gaps in which would then be filled from the supplementary.[34]

Some objections were put up to his case, probably by a very senior officer, which he proceeded to answer. The main ones were that recruiting from the embodied militia was politically impossible (Anstruther thought the Colonels might be placated by making the scheme optional for them) and that it was most dangerous to recruit men for the regulars to serve in Europe only. A limited period of service was a justifiable gamble because the war was unlikely to last many more years. Limitation of extent however would make the relief of colonial garrisons difficult and would diminish the desire for foreign service and concede that it was unpleasant - whereas the glamour of foreign parts was regarded as a recruiting asset. Anstruther replied in effect that there was no other way of getting men and that foreign service could retain its prestige by (for instance) appointing NCOs only from men enlisted without limitation. Anstruther and his critic agreed that there must be no undue pressure on the men to enlist.[35]

An anonymous memorandum of December 1797 envisaged enlisting from the Supplementary militia instead of, or as well as, from the old. The support of the county magistrates and the municipal authorities was to be secured and regiments were to be sent to recruit particular areas after their nominal county attachments, their normal recruiting grounds and the areas where their field officers had influence had been taken into consideration.[36] In January 1798, General Dundas told the government that the Supplementary Militia was the only source from which the army might hope to get men.[37] Meantime the government found that many Supplementary Militia men had joined the army. The law officers reported that this was illegal even if they provided substitutes.[38] There was a tricky problem here now that it had been decided to embody the Supplementary Militia and the government devided to legislate, allowing the men concerned to stay in the army and exonerating their parishes from replacing them.[39]

The short Act passed in January 1798 allowed regiments authorized by the King to enlist from the Supplementary Militia to the extent of 10,000 men or one fifth in any county. The recruits were to get such bounty as might seem fit and were to serve in Europe only and for six months longer than the duration of the war.[40] Thus recruiting from the militia was linked with limitation of service - in the debate General Fitzpatrick for the Opposition advocated the extension of some time limitation to the whole army.[41] A later Act legalized all enlistments from the Supplementary Militia down to May 15th 1798.[42]

The application of these measures was closely linked with the embodiment of the Supplementary Militia. Eleven regiments* were appointed to enlist them, and were told what counties to send parties to and how many men were to be taken from each.[43] They were to send one Captain and two junior officers for every 130 men they hoped to get, and as many NCOs as possible. First of all, a party was

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* The 5th, 9th, 20th, 31st, 35th, 44th, 46th, 48th, 55th, 62nd, 85th Foot

to go to each county rendezvous where the militia men were to assemble for embodiments and stay four days. The bounty was to be seven guineas and one to the bringer. Having recruited as many of these men as possible before they were marched off, the party was to turn to recruiting that half of the force which was still at home, unembodied.[44] They were to go to wherever they or the regiment possessed recruiting influence in the county.[45] The Lords Lieutenant were instructed to help them in every way possible.[46]

The measure was not a great success. The Lords Lieutenant were in general unfriendly.* There were exceptions to this rule. Lord Milford in Pembrokeshire offered two guineas extra bounty to each man out of his own pocket but could only induce two to go.[47] Lord Lonsdale similarly offered an extra guinea to the men of Cumberland and Westmoreland and got the old Militia to help in the recruiting but with poor results.[48] When the second half of the Supplementary Militia was embodied, a circular was sent to the Lords Lieutenant expressing disappointment with the progress so far and ordering them to keep the men four days at the rendezvous to give an opportunity to recruit from them.[49] The Lieutenancy of Cheshire tried to help matters by offering a pardon to the many men who had failed to appear at the rendezvous and were deemed deserters if they would come forward and enlist in the line.[50]

The Lords Lieutenant in general were probably put off by the disorder attendant on recruiting. The Duke of Richmond said that those who had enlisted were mostly drunk and were sorry afterwards. The officers had tried to help the 55th regiment but were disgusted to find that the best men had been weeded out and the Militia was left with the refuse.[51] Several parties had to be told not to enlist any more when the men were actually on the march from the rendezvous to their regiments.[52] Men were apparently refusing to repay their marching guineas/

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* See page 299 / See page 140

when enlisted[53] - thus causing a charge to fall on the regiments. The enlisting of men not yet ordered to be embodied gave some trouble. Lord Derby was much bothered by men joining regiments not authorized to enlist them. Proper returns were not sent and it seemed doubtful if the county could be exonerated.[54] Lieutenant Colonel Acourt of Wiltshire was told that 29 men in unauthorized regiments were to be included in the permitted maximum from the county but they were only to count towards exoneration if they had enlisted before it had been announced which regiments were authorized to enlist such men.[55] The amending Act, abolished this distinction, but it was still difficult to find out if a man had enlisted.

Even had the Lords Lieutenant been friendly, the experiences of Lord Milford and Lord Lonsdale suggest that few men would have entered the army. Why the Supplementary Militia was so reluctant to do this is discussed in an earlier chapter and further evidence will be presented in the next section. It is probable that those who did now join the army were men who would have done so had there been no Supplementary Militia. Once in the army a good many made a further offer to serve as ordinary soldiers without limitation. This was accepted and they were given three guineas extra bounty.[56] These men were allowed to stay in the regiments they had originally joined. The remainder were put together in three regiments.[57] Of the former category there were for instance 188 in the 55th and 278 in the 44th.[58] Altogether returns from twenty-five counties show 1241 men enlisting in the army.[59] These returns cannot be regarded as complete even for the counties in question, but the total yield is unlikely to have been more than about 2,500 - a very long way short of the projected 10,000.

(c) By Individuals : The Events of 1799

The approached had now been tested to the great matter of enlisting from the embodied militia, particularly the old militia. This idea had been present in the memoranda of late 1797 but had not found favour. In the autumn of 1798, when the danger of invasion had clearly subsided, the planners returned to the charge. General Lord Fielding held a command in the north and had raised a regiment of cavalry in 1794.[1] He had advocated recruiting from the Supplementary Militia. In September he wrote to suggest why the scheme had failed. The militia officers should have been given a free hand and it was wrong to lay down which regiments the men were to join - the "jealous suspicions and whimsical temper which is inseparable from the lower classes of this country" had to be borne in mind. While the Army of England remained partly broken up it was safe to disembody, subject to recall, a third or even a half of the new militia. This should be done during the winter and they should be allowed to enlist in any regular regiment. By now they had become used to living without having to work, and half of them would readily join the army to perpetuate this happy condition.[2]

Lord Fielding was told that there was no intention of disbanding the new militia.[3] He wrote again, conceding that disbandment would be objected to by the militia officers' clique but economy was "a word naturally agreeable to the ears of country gentlemen". Furthermore the lengthy embodiment of the militia was driving this class out of it - probably only half the Captains in the force possessed the necessary property qulification.[4] The question of the officers also interested the Duke of Gloucester, who spoke from several years' experience as an officer on the Staff. He said that the militia could never be entirely relied on because its officers were not sufficiently skilled. He wished to recruit 20,000 men for the army by compulsory levy and ballot like the militia -

the men to serve in Europe only and be discharged at the peace. At the same time, the Provisional Cavalry and part of the militia would be disbanded and form a fund to be recruited from for the new levy.[5]

It was on May 1st 1799 that Henry Dundas finally presented his own variant of these ideas as a memorandum to the cabinet. He favoured the scheme of a ballot for the regular army, coupled with permission to supply the quotas wit volunteers from the Militia who would be brought forward by the people of each county and not recruited by the regular soldiers direct. If this was considered too much of an innovation, they could simply permit enlistment from the Militia by the army. In any case, the men were to get at least ten guineas bounty , were to be put in regiments on a county basis and were to serve in Europe only and for five years or until the peace, whichever period was longer. The counties would be placated by the reduction in the number of men they would have to find (the militia was not to be recompleted[1/4] and in the burden of militia men's familie The militia Colonels were to be placated by doing away with the battalionizing of their flank companies.[6] 28,000 men were hoped for from the measure.

When the cabinet was consulted, Windham produced his general scheme for a limited term of service which we have already described.[7] As he favoured a large reduction of the militia in order to recruit from them, he cannot be said to have opposed the measure. Lord Grenville said that all depended on the Lords Lieutenant and militia Colonels. Whatever scheme they favoured ought to be adopted. A measure which they refused to support would be futile even if it was possible to carry it through the two Houses of Parliament.[8] Dundas took the same view and called a meeting of Lords Lieutenant and Colonels late in May. The plans were put before them and they were invited to a further meeting to give their views.[9]

Some of them sent their views in writing instead and it is clear that they had come to accept enlisting by the army as a proper plan. Colonel Eliot of Staffordshire said that it was a bitter experience for them and "opposition will chatter" but patriotism must come first.[10] Lord Dundas thought the Supplementary Militia were now used to idleness and if faced with the alternative of disbandment and working for a living they would enlist.[11] Colonel Strutt of Essex said that the officer commanding each militia regiment should read the Orders containing the scheme to the regiment and then try to enlist them. If he failed, a suitable number should be given furlough without pay to coerce them.[12] Lord Buckingham tried to insist that the Colonel should have the right to refuse discharges to men who wished to volunteer. Dundas after consulting with Pitt, refused this concession.[13]

After these consultations came theAct of July 1799 which reduced the militia from some 90,000 to some 66,000 men by reducing the Supplementary Militia quotas.[14] Men might enlist in the army to the number of one quarter of the new quotas, on the terms Dundas had suggested and were not to be replaced.[15] If the Militia of a county was incomplete even to the new quotas, one quarter of the actual strength might volunteer.[16] The King was empowered to disband further portions of the militia (subject to recall) who might also enlist in the same way.[17] The King was to designate regiments to enlist from which the men might not be drafted.[18] The Commanding Officer of the militia was to explain the terms to his men within two months and discharge men who volunteered. They might choose any of the regiments designated and automatically became regular soldiers on their discharge from the militia. One third of the bounty was to be paid them at once and the officer sent to collect them was to get a guinea for their necessaries. The rest was to be paid when they joined their new regiment. Deserters from the Militia might be pardoned if they enlisted in the army.[19]

Instructions were sent out at once to put the Act into effect. The commanding officers were to read the Order explaining the scheme on three successive days after roll call. The government hoped that they would not refuse to give discharges (the Act did not specifically compel them to). One most important concession to the militia officers was included at this stage. At Dundas' suggestion, whenever sixty men in any militia regiment offered to go together to the same regular regiment, one of their officers might go with them with the commission of Ensign in the army.[20] Colonel Eliot had suggested a scheme of this sort[21] and raising men for army rank by the militia officers was henceforth a dominant theme in the discussion of future plans.

The offensive plans of the government revealed by the summer made the army's need of more men clearer. Lord Buckingham wrote in September that his high experiences had convinced him that it was impracticable for whole regiments of the militia to extend their services, but he thought detachments might enter the army en bloc.[22] Colonel Eliot offered to enter the army with his entire regiment[23] and Greville was struck by the possibilities of such offers.[24] A paper was put before the Colonels at one point suggesting new regiments to be formed out of militia men, their old Colonels to nominate the officers in proportion to the number of men supplied.[25] Dundas decided that the case against the extension of regiments (explained elsewhere) was too strong, but there could be grants of Ensigncies as last time, with promotion for militia officers already in the army, and another idea of Grenville's - individual companies of militia going together - might work.[26]

Lord Buckingham and others pressed another form of reward for militia officers. They could not be expected to press the men to turn out if the consequent reduction in their regiments resulted in their own dismissal. A large number of officers who might appear redundant should therefore be kept on.[27]

Dundas agreed with this reasoning and thought that good treatment of the officers should be made conditional on the Colonel's co-operation in the levy.[28] As to the men, Lord Buckingham and Colonel Eliot[29] had always held that there should be no complete discharges from military service during harvest time, when the men might easily find work. Lord Buckingham suggested waiting till October and then disbanding a good many men, subject to recall.[30] Lieutenant Colonel Elford of the South Devonshire thought this clever but dangerous. The men, being subject to recall, would be unable to find steady work and would be driven to despair. The intention of course was that they would be driven to enlist.[31] Lord Buckingham was strongly opposed to any complete Colonel's veto on discharges and was ready to see the peremptory reduction of any regiment whose Colonel was unco-operative.[32]

Enlisting from the Scottish militia was mooted, but Lord Dalkeith reported that the men were too raw to make it worth while and the force was so small that a further reduction would cause it to disintegrate.[33]

The Act of October 1799 was passed at a session of Parliament held specially for the purpose. It followed the lines of the earlier measure. Two fifths of the quotas of July had to be kept embodied but above that all the men might enlist or be disembodied subject to recall.[34] Commanding Officers were to explain the scheme to the men within a month and might not refuse to discharge men (other than musicians and armourers) save by an appeal to the General Officer commanding who was to decide.[35] Where a minimum of eighty men wished to go to the same regiment, officers from the same militia regiment might be given commissions to command them as a company. They were to have the same temporary rank as their militia rank and whatever permanent rank (with right to half pay) the King might assign.[36] Within the militia, the King might retain as many supernumerary officers as he chose.[37]

The second Act mentioned the Foot Guards and Artillery as being entitled to enlist.[38] The latter had been permitted to enlist one man per 140 in each regiment and even to enlist men in excess of the total permitted to volunteer - paying £10 to the militia to replace each one.[39] In October, the Guards were meant to enlist 5000 and the Artillery 4000.[40] The circulars sent out noted the Line regiments that had been least successful in July and asked the militia officers to help them catch up.[41]

Apart from the constructive criticism in the light of which policy evolved, there had also been an inveterate opposition conducted by some stalwarts of the militia interest. One of the periodic meetings of Lords Lieutenant and militia officers with seats in Parliament had in June condemned recruiting from the embodied militia although they were prepared to tolerate it if the men were disembodied first. Lord Fitzwilliam was in the chair and there were seven other Lords Lieutenant and two Colonels present.[42] Dundas made a polite reply but said the method proposed was too slow.[43] Colonel Bastard of the East Devonshire attempted to mediate by suggesting that a portion of the militia be disembodied and enlistment be allowed nevertheless from the rest.[44] Dundas said this might be fitted into the existingscheme. Opposition was persisted in by Lords Fitzwilliam, Radnor and Carnarvon who signed a Protest against the July Act.[45] In October, Lord Spencer reported that Fitzwilliam had shown himself quite crazy on the subject in debate and Carnarvon had declared himself absolved from his allegiance.[46] These two, with Lord Buckingham-Shire signed a further protest.[47]

It will be seen that the opposition was extremer in expression than in views. Lord Radnor produced a plan very like Dundas' original one for the raising of quotas of men for the army to be coupled with a reduction of the

militia.[48] The trouble was partly caused by the clauses in the July Act which had nothing to do with recruiting the army but were intended to fill the existing deficits in the militia. They directed that if a deficit was not filled after three months, a fine of £10 a man was to be levied by county rate or on a particular area if that seemed more just.[49] To hasten the dispatch of the men provided, they were in future to receive no pay till they reached the regiment and if they failed to join they were deemed deserters and might be sentenced to serve in the regular army.[50]

The Protest of July complained that the militia would be destroyed by taking from it all but the sweepings which the army would not have and by driving the gentry out of it, since they would be required to act as mere drill sergeants for thearmy. There was reference to the "grating instructions" to Commanding Officers of militia to crimp for another service their "associated and fellow soldiers". But there was also the charge that by refusing men pay until they joined and deeming them deserters if they were late, the government was conspiring to send them into the army. They could not join if they had no money and they would all be put in the army as a punishment. The new quotas ought not to have been fixed before the new annual lists of men liable were made and the system of fines for the deficit was a new burden on the landed interest.[51] A paper by Carnarvon covering the same ground stressed that men were to be raised at great expense by the landed interest and then seduced from their original service at public expense. Experienced sergeants were much better able to get men than parish overseers; the system of fines would cause these to offer higher bounties. The landlords bore a heavy burden from which placemen were exempt and the whole of Scotland largely so. Thus the oppoisition movement was largely a general grouse against the cost of the militia to the land.[52]

As to the execution of the measures, we have noticed elsewhere that the "supplementary" men were much less forward than those of the old militia. By August 1799 it had been found that some regiments had come much nearer to turning out their maximum numbers than others. A circular was sent to the less successful ones telling them that the original Orders were to be read three times more to the men and further progress reported.[53] Then and in October, regiments usually gave a high proportion of "supplementary" men as reason for failure In the Norfolk area the new men were mostly married.[54] In the Northamptonshire those that were unmarried were too short for the army.[55] The Lancashire men were afraid of what might happen to their families.[56] The 4th Devonshire regiment was in its own county and the men were with their friends and not wishful to leave.[57] On the other hand, Colonel Elford of the South Devon thought that if the "supplementary" regiments were broken up, the men (who hoped to stick together) would enlist.[58] Colonel Eliot said the same.[59] Colonel Elford thought that a spell of leave would revive the spirit of the men and induce them to turn out.[60] The same was reported from the East Riding.[61]

Recruiting was disorderly, even when within military precincts. "We had a dreadful scene of riot and confusion for ten days" said the commander of the 5th Lancashire regiment, "and the regiment was completely disorganized - I don't think anything will restore the militia during the present war".[63] Colonel Bastard remitted all punishments in his regiment and the men were personally canvassed by the officers. After a time, he asked if he might cease because discipline was deteriorating.[63] The men sometimes demanded the whole of their bounty at once. The regiments were told not to accede to this request if possible[64] (it was in fact illegal). A party of recruits from the Leicestershire militia refused to march without their money; they were to be told that others had not objected.[65]

Transport was a problem. The men might choose their own regiment from those sanctioned but it was hoped they would choose one near at hand.[66] Depots were set up to collect the men and dispatch them to their chosen regiments - the one at Hatfield was in chaos for a time because someone had forgotten to appoint an officer to take charge.[67] They had mostly to be moved to Kent, where the forces of the Helder assembled on Barham Downs. Carts were used to move them quickly along the south coast and canals to bring others from the north.[68] When they joined their regiments, they got more bounty and there was more indiscipline. Pitt and Dundas, attempting to review the new force, found the men so intoxicated that they could only manage a very ragged feu de joie.[69]

An occasional source of trouble was that men arrived at a regiment and were found to be unfit. They were then sent back to their former regiments but having been discharged it was not clear if they could be taken back.[70] One militia very reasonably refused to receive back men who were considered unfit for the army.[71]

Disorder was undoubtedly increased by the participation of the army in recruiting. The intention was that the militia officers should do the work and a circular to the regular regiments in October pointed this out and told them not to interfere.[72] Lord Lonsdale complained however that the Cumberland regiment had been stationed in barracks and plied with beer by the army.[73] The East Norfolk reported that a recruiting party had come to ingratiate itself and corrupt the men.[74] The army had to be warned not to start work till the Act came into force.[75] Lord Radnor was infuriated when General Sir William Pitt sent a regular officer to explain the scheme to the Berkshire Militia in his absence. He also contended that he could receive orders on discharged only from the Secretary of State, not from the military authorities. The government would not accept this.[76]

There was naturally some obstruction from militia officers - though Lord Radnor for instance executed the scheme loyally despite his feelings. Lord Buckinghamshire was rebuked for giving orders that only men of poor quality should be let out of his regiment, the 3rd Lincolnshire. Colonels were giving latitude on both occasions to refuse discharges in certain cases but not generally. The Lieutenant Colonel of the Warwickshire ordered recruiting to stop on a certain day, but was prevailed on to give up a man enlisted after that time.[78]

The most striking case of obstruction was that of Colonel Lord Rolle of the South Devonshire. He was on bad terms with Elford, his Lieutenant Colonel, apparently because he and other officers had insisted on the regiment coming home from Ireland but were now ready to see it recruited from.[79] (This was certainly cause and effect to some extent, as we have seen). Rolle, in explaining the scheme to the men, made a political speech against it. Elford was obliged to make another in its favour.[80] Lieutenant English having induced a body of men to volunteer, Rolle accused him of indiscipline and refused to recommend him for an Ensigncy in the line.[81] The young man's guardian was Rolle's steward and acquiesced in this, but Elford wrote to Dundas and secured his interposition.[82] Rolle later went to see the King and Elford at once asked for an audience too. He was afraid that his supporters (he was M.P. for Plymouth) might desert him if it was thought that Rolle was his enemy and enjoyed royal favour.[83] Subsequently Rolle sulked and obstructed the proceedings by neglecting to sign discharges for the volunteers.[84]*

The giving of army rank to militia officers who brought in men naturally led to a good deal of bargaining. Officers wished to bring recruits from other regiments than their own, which was not allowed.[85] One wished to raise three

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* See Walrond p.169

companies for a temporary Majority but no rank was given above that of Captain.[86] One company was delayed because the men demanded that their NCOs should go with them.[87] A Captain who had raised his company was permitted to go on half pay at once instead of joining a regiment.[88] An Adjutant wished to have the half pay to which retired militia adjutants were entitled as well as that of his prospective army rank.[89] Another Adjutant said he could raise men if they might go to the cavalry.[90] A surgeon begged to be considered eligible for a Lieutenancy. He had been a Captain but had accepted a vacant surgeoncy to oblige the regiments.[91] Commissions were begged for one or two civilians who had brought forward militia men with whom they had special local influence.[92] A Captaincy was asked for a Lieutenant who had been kept out of a militia Captaincy by lack of a property qualification.[93]

The most weighty negotiation was concerned with Colonel Lord Grenville Leveson Gower who offered to raise a regiment chiefly from the militia of Staffordshire of which he commanded the fourth battalion. He hoped to get men particularly from the Second regiment and the 2nd Shropshire regiment. Few of his present officers were likely to go with him and the rest would come from the half pay list.[94] He was given a letter of service similar to that under which General Wemyss recruited from the county and Fencibles of Sutherland* and began raising the men.[95] Unfortunately by an oversight on the part of Sir William Fawcett in charge of the Horse Guards while the Duke of York was in Holland, the matter had not been laid before the King for his approval.[96] He was very displeased when he finally was informed and objected to the permanent rank of Lieutenant Colonel being given to the raiser. The high officers supported him as they always did in matters of this kind.[92] Pitt and Dundas were firm on the other side and Dundas was incensed

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* Ante p. ~~480~~ 297. The Countess of Sutherland was his sister-in-law. The corps was to have been the second battalion of the 52nd.

to the point of resignation.[98] Lord Stafford, alarmed at the peril to the ministry at such a juncture, advised his son to go very warily.[99] He finally withdrew.

There was an attempt to continue the levy without its originator but the men raised an outcry that they had been "sold" and put crepe on their hats as a token of their sorrow.[100] It was agreed that all who wished should return to the militia and special discharges from the army countersigned by the Adjutant General were procured for them to prevent trouble.[101]

We may conclude by remarking that the militia enlistment scheme of 1799 was made to work largely by the efforts of militia officers and by the offer of commissions in the army to stimulate those efforts. The value and product of the measure are noted in the first chapter. It must be asked in conclusion if there was any idea of having a permanent system of recruiting on this basis. Lord Buckingham certainly had such an idea. As early as August 1799, he proposed that militia regiments should enlist men by ordinary recruiting and at the expense of government. Periodically, an equivalent number of men would be invited to enlist in the line.[102] He made this proposal part of the justification for asking to retain a large establishment of officers in the militia. He was prepared himself to open an account with the government to recruit men at seven guineas each. BY June 1800, he could be almost 300 over strength when men could be allowed to volunteer for the army.[103]

A good many militia officers with whom Lord Buckingham discussed this plan gave it their approval.[104] So did Lord Grenville and Lord Fortescue.[105] Dundas found it interesting and wished to have further details. Lord Buckingham was thinking in terms of some permanent reorganization of the militia at the peace[106] - but by then there was another government. The development of the militia as a permanent school and reservoir of soldiers was delayed for several years, until Castlereagh became Secretary of State for War. A valuable chance to develop a permanent system had been lost.

CHAPTER XII : SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

The object of this study has been to show the limitations within which the government operated in the field of recruiting at the end of the eighteenth century and to describe the social forces which it was able to bring to its aid. A thoroughly ramshackle system is revealed, but nevertheless it just succeeded in being a system. There is a strong probability that no government, with the defective organization of society then prevailing, could have done significantly better.

The subject of recruitment has not received very much systematic attention from the military historians. For our period, the rather cursory account by Fortescue in his general History has not really superceded the work of Clode, now over eighty years old. In "The County Lieutenancies and the Army" Fortescue has covered much of the subject for the period of the Napoleonic War proper. This work, however, is essentially a fragment, grudgingly written - as the rather curious Preface explains. General historians pay little attention to how the forces were raised. In the Revolutionary War particularly, the futility and unimportance of so much of the Army's work has led them to neglect the analysis of the land forces. This seems wrong on two grounds. Firstly, the defensive operations and preparations both in the British Isles and in the West Indies had an importance and value greater than is sometimes implied. The threat of the Negroes and Irish to the stability of the Empire and of the French, aided by the seditions, to Credit and the Constitution, have not always been fully understood.

Secondly, the years after 1793 saw an expansion of the land forces to an unprecedented size. On this war footing they remained for a longer time than ever before, and they remained permanently much longer than they had been before 1793.[1] The Pitt government was faced with a new and difficult problem in supplying men and this is at once an excuse for the mistakes they made and a reason for studying their efforts and experiments.

Fortescue condemns the recruiting policy of this time root and branch "... within a month of the declaration of war there were already three distinct forces, the Army, the Fencibles and the Militia, all bidding against each other for the recruits which only the Regular Army could turn to efficient account".[2] We have endeavoured to show in the first place that there was good reason for maintaining large defensive forces and secondly that men could be enlisted for them who would never have entered the Regulars. It is of course true that there was plenty of competition and overlapping between the different types of force, but the army by itself would not have secured an appreciable proportion of the men who as it was went into the other forces. Finally, the system of extension of service, the cardinal invention of our period, enabled the defensive to feed the offensive force and become a true instrument of military education and factory of recruits for the army.

Fortescue is on the side of the army against the civilians. Of the authorship of "raising men for rank" he rightly says "assuredly it was not Lord Amherst, nor is it credible that it can have been any soldier. It is safe to assert that it was the work of civilians". He goes on to convict Henry Dundas and Sir George Yonge of "tried conceit, unwisdom and incapacity".[3] Upon them he places the blame for the failure of the

augmentation of the old regiments in November 1793. They "believed themselves to have found true economy in a clever and specious scheme ... for defraying the cost of new levies by the sale of commissions. ... the scheme failed completely as is the common fate of all projects which aspire to obtain a costly article at a trifling outlay".[4] Here he is on unsafe ground. The cost of the scheme, despite the sale of commissions, was not trifling (as he shows himself) - it was greater than that of previous levies.[5] It was a measure designed to please the army. It gave them strikingly better terms than heretofore. Yet the army failed. The established military hierarchy could not deliver the goods. The civilians, with their less reputable soldier helpers, had to step in.

"Lord Amherst was a worthy respectable old man", said Dundas, "and nobody shall hear me say a disrespectful thing of him; but the mischief he did in a few years will not be repaired by the unremitting attention of many". He thought that the troubles of the army dated from the death of the old Duke of Cumberland and expected the Duke of York to achieve striking improvements because he had the advantage of being a prince of the blood.[6] Whatever substance there may be in Dundas' defence, it is undoubtedly true that the ministers did not have the authority to overrule the military caste - with its close connections with the throne - and were hampered at every turn by its interests and intrigues.

Fortescue complains that Pitt "never passed an Act for National Defence without an amendment to substitute 'you may serve' for 'you must serve' ... An Act to compel men to voluntary service, which (absurd as it may seem) was the purport of (several) of his measures, in an Act to enable man to evade service."[7] The militia riots show all too clearly the

reaction of the poor to even a very mild new measure of compulsion. Had there been true conscription, they would have sold their lives dear. On the other hand, the power of the upper class over the middling and lower sort was very great, and if they were united and zealous and the compulsory measure not too extreme, they might impose obddience or cajole their dependents into voluntary offers. Compulsory volunteering meant volunteering for the upper class and compulsion for the rest. The government set a target; the extent to which it was reached depended on the zeal that could be excited in each locality. Absurd or not, the principle of compulsory volunteering is surely one very evident in British life at all times.

Relying on the help of the rulers of the countryside in all kinds of levies from Regulars to Volunteers, the government encountered no fewer obstacles and opposing interests than it did from the military caste. Their experiences in trying to get the Militia to extend their services either in units or individually show this more clearly than anything else and have been described at some length for this reason. What the government could undertake depended on how many of the gentry were in opposition or neutral. Measuers failed when the government miscalculated the amount of support they would receive.

The government's policy was well based and the difficulties were great. Nevertheless, plenty of scope remains for criticism. Dundas admitted that the army had been ruined by injudicious economy before the war and that there was need to guard against this at the peace.[8] The atmosphere of intrigue and shuffle, the delays and vexations attending all transactions with the government were excessive and discreditable. One regimental officer declared himself "as little inclined as any person can be to trust to the promises of Mr Dundas - I know from experience how shallow they are".[9] Lord Buckingham was very angry at one point because

Dundas asked the advice of the Lord Lieutenants and then proceeded to make up his mind without waiting for their replies.[10] The order and regularity which the Duke of York introduced into the business of his office should have started earlier and extended more widely.

More serious than habitual inefficiency was the lack of thought given to military problems and the lack of organization for stimulating and perpetuating thought. Staff work was in its infancy. Policy was shaped by scattered individuals, thinking perfunctorily and disconnectedly. One of Dundas' few letters on policy (quoted twice in this chapter) ends not with the conclusion of the argument but with the summoning of the minister to breakfast. Another was only written because he was at home with a "headack".[11] Above all, the absence of a true staff and of permanent officials adequate in numbers and calibre meant that the Executive had an appallingly short memory. The mistakes of Pitt were repeated by Addington. The balanced system of offence and defence in the forces which had been built up by 1798-9 was not again in existence and improved upon until the ministry of Castlereagh in 1808.[12] It was only then, too, that it became a system in the eyes of its creator. In the Dundas era, it was a series of connected measures but their relationship is largely implicit.

Despite its grave shortcomings, the Pitt government displayed both vision and determination in the matter of increasing the forces. Its work here is fit to stand beside the great achievements of reconstruction in the government of the Empire and the commercial system on which Pitt's fame so largely rests. It was the triumph of British arms in the ensuing years that obscured this fact. After 1815, Britain was able to keep her army relatively small and to avoid the necessity of a real national military system. Had Britain been forced to adopt full conscription, the events

of 1798-9 - the great expansion of the compulsory levy and the recruitment of the Army from it - would have been looked back to as the key event in the creation of such a system. The great national systems of education or factory inspection had much less auspicious beginnings. Victory fortunately blighted this prospect and the military strivings which we have described led in a large degree to a dead end.

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NOTES:

MSS are referred to by class or volume numbers when these are given in the List of Sources: otherwise by the name of the collection.

Letters in unpaginated collections are identified by date. The writer is named if he is not mentioned in the text. The letter in which the letter cited is enclosed is frequently mentioned to help fix the sequence in the bundle or volume.

Books, etc. given in the List of Sources are referred to by their authors; Abbreviations:-

Ann.Reg.	:	The Annual Register
Dropmore	:	MSS of the Hon. J. B. Fortescue preserved at Dropmore
Fortescue (L)	:	J. W. Fortescue: The County Lieutenancies and the Army
J.S.A.H.R.	:	Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research
Minutes	:	Minute Book of the Royal Edinburgh Volunteer Light Dragoons
P.R.	:	Parish Records
Parlt.Hist.	:	W. Cobbett: History of the Parliamentary Debates

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13. HO 50/335 : 21.5.94 J. Price, etc.
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20. Seaforth VII : 13.12.93 enclosed in 13.12.93 (A. Brodie)
21. WO 4/157 : 185: WO 4/162 : 2: WO 4/163 : 459
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27. WO 4/165 : 84 e.g.

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28. WO 4/161 : 123
29. Grey and Willcox : letters of T. Evans, October 1798 to April 1798
30. Seaforth XCIII : 102
31. Seaforth VIII 1.12.96 C. Mackenzie
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33. Add 43770 : 11
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40. Lyndoch 3596 : 39-97; and see Lyndoch 3644; 3595 : 72, 167, 270
41. Lyndoch 3597 : 102-14
42. Ann. Reg. (1795) 165; (1796) 50
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44. WO 1/1096 : 469
45. Cuninghame 520 : 26.1.99 (Sir W, Johnstone) in 26.1.99 (E. Gardner)
46. ibid : 24.1.99; 10.4.99 E. Gardner
47. HO 50/4 : 513
48. Grey and Willcox : Memorials to Lord Amherst and the Duke of York, etc. WO 4/165 : 34
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51. ibid

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22. 39 Geo. III c.109

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30. Dropmore IV 85
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32. 34 Geo.III c.16 s.6
33. Laing II 646
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35. Adam 312
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44. Gardayne I : 11, footnote
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30. 37 Geo.III cap.22 s. 6.
31. WO 4/824 : 50-184.
32. HO 50/26 : 31.12.96.

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33. HO 50/28 : 5. 4. 97.
34. Add 35667 : 233,239,241,243,247.
35. ibid. : 317,321,333.
36. e.g. WO 4/824 : 1.
37. HO 50/31 : Paper no. 3.
38. " " : 26.1.98.
39. HO 50/313 : drafts of Feb.1798.
40. 38 Geo.III cap.18 s.2.
41. HO 50/31 : 26.1.98.
42. 38 Geo.III cap.19.
43. 38 Geo.III cap.18 s.7.
44. " " " s.11.
45. " " " s. 5.
46. HO 50/31 : Draft circulars of January 1798.
47. HO 50/31 : Paper no.3.
48. " " : Paper no.7; drafts to Lieutenants of Jan.1798.
49. ibid. : 22.2.98. Sir. W. Fawcett, 24.2.98. R. Brownrigg.
50. HO 50/39 : 27.3.98. Lord Dundas, etc., and 29.4.98. Lord Fauconberg.
51. 38 Geo.III cap.18 s.3,6.
52. HO 50/313 : 9.2.98. Lord Hardwicke
53. 37 Geo.III cap.22 s.14.
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55. HO 50/30 : 11. 2.98. T. Bayley L.M.1. : 31.
56. HO 50/30 : 11. 2.98. T. Bayley.
57. HO 50/7 : 6. 7. 98. Petition.
58. WO 6/188 : 1.
59. 38 Geo.III cap.18 s.15-6.
60. WO 6/188 : 218-29.
61. WO 4/776 : 310-24.
62. HO 50/35 : 25.8.99.
63. ibid. : 13.11.98.
64. ibid. : Lord Derby, endorsed 1799.
65. WO 6/189 : 6,28.
66. WO 4/776 : 310-24.

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1. McGuffie, chap 86, 11.
2. HO 51/8 : 208.
3. HO 50/19 : 13.1.93.
4. " " : 6.1.92 (sic) Lord Rollo; 10.1.93 C.Sisted 28.1.93 Lord Cook.
5. HO 51/8 : 222.
6. 33 Geo.III cap.8 ; HO 51/8 : 350.
7. 33 Geo.III cap.8.
8. HO 50/19 : 28.1.93. T. Gould
9. " " : 13.1.93.
10. " " : 2.2.93.
11. HO 51/9 : 64 but c.f. WO 4/774 : 431.
12. HO 50/20 : 10.4.93.(res. of Devon Quarter Sessions) in 25.10.93 (E. Bastard).
13. 34 Geo.III cap.47 ; 35 Geo.III cap.81 ; 36 Geo.III cap.114.
14. HO 50/30 : 19.7.99. J. Mitford, etc.
15. 35 Geo.III cap.81.

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16. WO 4/774 : 337 ; HO 50/28 : 13.6.97. (W. Price) and enclosure; HO 50/30 undated memorandum on the case.
17. WO 1/1102 : 385.
18. HO 50/39 : 26.12.98. W. Lygon.
19. HO 50/30 : 26.5.99. and 27. 6. 99. (A. Onslow).
20. WO 4/774 : 337.
21. 39 Geo.III cap.106 s.15.
22. Burgoyne : 42.
23. HO 50/30 : 29.2.99. H. Sloane.
24. WO 6/169 : 99 ; HO 50/30 :- 12.7.98. G. Rose (two letters).
25. WO 6/169 : 142.
26. p. 61-2
27. HO 50/31 : 1.5.99.
28. ibid. : marginal notes.
29. HO 50/31 : 27.5.99.
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31. " " : 19.6.99. W. Wood.
32. p.230-2.

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3. Tullibardine 149 ; HO 50/355 : 12.4.97. Duke of Atholl.
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5. HO 50/348 : resolutions of 2.3.97. in 14.3.97 (Lord Home) HO 50/351 : resolutions of 7.3.97. in 8.3.97 (Lord Cranford). HO 50/352 : resolutions of 7.4.97. in 18.4.97. (Sir J. Grant).
6. HO 50/355 : 12.4.97.
7. Ann. Reg. (1797) : 126.
8. Melville 7 : 170.
9. HO 50/29 : 26.12.98. draft to Atholl.
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11. 37 Geo.III cap.103. s.15,17.
12. " " " s.16.
13. " " " s.25.
14. Melville 45 : 34.
15. 39 Geo.III cap.62 s.1.
16. 37 Geo.III cap.103 s.20,55.
17. 39 Geo.III cap.62 s.4.
18. 37 Geo.III cap.103 s.21.
19. " " " s.2,3.
20. " " " s.39.
21. " " " s.40-1.
22. WO 4/775 : 411.
23. HO 50/29 : draft circular of March 1798.
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25. WO 4/775 : 411,417.
26. " " : 411.
27. HO 103/2 : 390.
28. HO 50/29 : draft of May 1798.

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30. HO 50/29 : 31.7.98.
31. Seaforth XCIII 1,63,65.
32. " " 181. see e.g.,p.103.
33. HO 50/29 : 10.5.99.
34. " " : 14.5.99.
35. Seaforth XCIII 17.
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43. HO 103/2 : 374.
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47. Seaforth XCIII 9,23.
48. Seaforth IX : undated note by P. Fairbairn.
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50. Seaforth XCIII 87.
51. " " 27.
52. Seaforth IX : 11.10.98. Lord Seaforth ;19.10.98. Mary Mackenzie;20.10.98. G. Simpson;22.10.98. P. Fairbairn. Seaforth LXI : 13.12.98. P. Fairbairn.
53. Seaforth XCIII 130.
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8. " " : 11.11.96. Sir J. Banks.
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12. HO 50/26 : 27.11.96 Lord Townshead.
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20. " " : 3.12.96. Lord Clive and J. Mytton etc.
21. " " : 23.11.96. E. Corbet.
22. HO 43/8 : 470.
23. HO 50/26 : 22.12.96. W. Lowther.
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26. ibid. ; HO 50/26 : 10.11.96.(draft to T. Coltman.).
27. HO 50/26 : 11.11.96. Sir J. Banks.
28. " " : 11.11.96. T. Coltman ; 14.11.96. Sir. J. Banks.
29. " " : ibid.: 13.11.96. T. Coltman. and Sir J. Banks ; 14.11.96. T. Coltman ; 15.11.96. Sir J. Banks.
30. " " : 25 and 28.11.96 T. Coltman.
31. " " : 19.11.96.
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33. " " : 5.12.96. J. C. Villiers.
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35. " " : 13,17 and 18.12.96. Lord Buckingham.
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42. " " : 7.11.96. T. Coltman.
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45. HO 50/6 : 227.
46. HO 50/29 : 30/8/97.
47. HO 102/14 : 17.8.97. in Lord Adam Gordon's, 23.8.97.
48. ibid. : 23.8.97. (R. D. Saunders) in 24.8.97. (Lord Home).
49. HO 102/14 : 22.8.97. Duke of Roxburgh.
50. " " : 23.8.97. Duke of Roxburgh, Weir 5.
51. Weir 5.
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53. Weir 5.
54. Weir 4.
55. HO 102/14 : 23.8.97. (2 letters).
56. " " : 25.8.97.
57. Laing II 613.
58. HO 102/15 : 8.9.97 (C. Bosnelly) and 6.9.97. (Lord Crawfurd) in 9.9.97 (R. Dundas).
59. HO 50/354 : 29.9.97 (Lord Hopetoun) 8.10.97 (H. Dundas).
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61. " 615.
62. HO 102/14 : 26.8.97.
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64. " 617-8.
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68. HO 102/14 : enclosures of 26.8.97. in R. Dundas, 27.8.97.
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71. " 612-4.
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81. Weir 5 ; HO 50/29 : 26.8.97. - W. McDowall.
82. HO 50/29 : 27.8.97 ; HO 102/14 : 27.8.97.
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95. HO 102/15 : 2.9.97. ; HO 50/29 same date. Both by the Duke of Roxburgh.
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97. HO 102/15 : 8.9.97. (C. Bosnelly) in 9.9.97. (R. Dundas)
98. HO 50/29 : R. Dundas (endorsed) 2.9.97. ; 9.9.97.
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102. Laing II 623.
103. " " 631.
104. HO 102/15 : 25.8.97. Duke of Montrose (two letters).HO 102/15 : 7.9.97. Duke of Hamilton.
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12. ibid; Bundle 16
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44. HO 50/36 : papers dated March 1799
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44. ibid; HO 50/32 : 15.3.98 O. A. Poole
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LIST OF THE SOURCES AND PRINCIPAL WORKS CONSULTED

Primary Sources - MSS

Public Record Office

WO 1 War Office : In letters (Secretary at War, Secretary of State)

WO 3 War Office : Out letters : Commander in Chief

WO 4 War Office : Out letters : Secretary at War

WO 6 War Office : Out letters : Secretary of State

WO 17 War Office : Monthly Returns

WO 25 War Office : Registers ; Various

WO 27 War Office : Inspection Returns

WO 30 War Office : Miscellanea - Various (Defence)

WO 40 War Office : Selected Unnumbered Papers

WO 47 War Office : Board of Ordnance : Minutes and Correspondence

HO 43 Domestic (Entry Books)

HO 50 Home Office : Military (In letters)

HO 51-2 Home Office : Military (Entry Books)

HO 102 Home Office : Scotland (In letters)

HO 103 Home Office : Scotch Correspondence

British Museum

Rainsford Papers : Relevant Volumes : Add 23655

Pelham Papers : Relevant Volumes : Add 33101-3, 33120

Minute Book of the Forest Subdivision, Berkshire : Add 34303

Hardwicke Papers : Relevant Volumes : Add 35663 - 73, 35894

Windham Papers : Relevant Volumes Add 37842, 37844-7, 37874-8, 37891, 37903, 37922-3, 37928-9

Melville Papers : Relevant Volumes : Add 40100-2, 41085, 43770

Grenville Papers : Relevant Volumes : Add 41851-5, 42058

National Library of Scotland

Melville Papers. Abbotsford MSS.

Lyndoch Papers. Minute Book of the Royal Edinburgh

Watson Collection. Volunteer Light Dragoons,

Register House, Edinburgh

Seaforth Papers

Breadalbane Papers

Abercairney Muniments

Cunninghame of Thornton Muniments

Birmingham Central Reference Library

Grey and Wilcox Collection:-

6698 (L) B.A.IR. 533 (Papers relating to the 113th Regiment)

Bedfordshire Record Office

Quarter Sessions Rolls

Parish Records

Hertfordshire Record Office

Militia Records

Papers of the Hitchin Volunteers

Lancashire Record Office

LC Lieutenancy : Correspondence

LM Lieutenancy : Minutes of General Meetings

LV Lieutenancy : Miscellaneous

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LXL Subdivision of Leyland

PR Parochial Records

DD Pr. Miscellaneous:-

132 Papers of Nicholas Grimshaw

137 " " the Preston Volunteers

DD X Miscellaneous:-

190 Langton of Kirkham MSS

Middlesex Record Office

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Primary Sources - Printed

Statutes of the Realm

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39 Geo.III cap.36 (Fencibles permitted to be raised)

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36 Geo.III cap.116, annually renewed (Increased financial provision for officers, etc.)

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36 Geo.III cap.16 (militia purposes in certain places

(d) 37 Geo.III cap.103 (Scottish Militia)

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38 Geo.III cap.74 (A Militia in the Stanneries)

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39 Geo.III cap.90 (Special system for Middlesex and Surrey)

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37 Geo.III cap.24 (Parochial Levy : England - amendment)

37 Geo.III cap.39 (Parochial Levy : Scotland - amendment)

(c) 37 Geo.III cap.6 (Provisional Cavalry)

37 Geo.III cap.23 (Provisional Cavalry - amendment)

38 Geo.III cap.94 (Provisional Cavalry - amendment)

39 Geo.III cap.23 (Provisional Cavalry abolition)

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34 Geo.III cap.31 (Enabling them to be raised)

38 Geo.III cap.27 (Defence Act)

38 Geo.III cap.51 (Extra allowances to the Yeomanry)

39 Geo.III cap.14 (Exemptions and returns)

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38 Geo.III cap.17 (Enlistment from the Supplementary Militia)

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39 and 40 Geo.III cap.1 (The Line to enlist from the Militia)

Historical MSS Commission

Argyle Papers (in the VIth Report)

MSS of the Hon. J. B. Fortescue preserved at Dropmore

Laing MSS

Other Printed Sources

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C. T. Atkinson: The Dorsetshire Regiment

N. Bannantyne: History of the 30th Regiment

J. M. Burgoyne: Records of the Bedfordshire Militia

Historical Records of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders (collective authorship)

R. C. Dudgeon: History of the Edinburgh or Queen's Own Regiment of Light Infantry Militia

R. B. Dunn Pattison: History of the 91st Highlanders, now Princess Louisa's Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders

J. F. Edmeades: Historical Records of the West Kent (Queen's Own) Yeomanry

G. Fellows and B. Freeman: Historical Records of the South Nottinghamshire Hussar Yeomanry

B. Freeman (ed Earl Fortescue): The Yeomanry of Devon, 1794-1927

A. D. Greenhill Gardyne: The Life of a Regiment (The Gordon Highlanders)

R. Gurney: History of the Northamptonshire Regiment

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C. H. Markham: History of the Northamptonshire and Rutland Militia

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D. Sinclair: History of the Aberdeen Volunteers

G. H. Lloyd Verney: Records of the Militia Battalions of the County of Southampton

G. Goold Walker: The Honourable Artillery Company, 1537-1926

H. Walrond: History of the First Devonshire Militia

R. W. Weir: History of the Scottish Borderers Militia

W. Will: The Huntly Volunteers

R. J. T. Williamson: The Old County Regiment of Lancashire Militia

NOTE: A large number of Regimental Histories have been consulted but are not entered here as they contain very little bearing on the subject of this study. A few of them, together with one or two other works, appear in isolated references, where the titles are given in full. Generally speaking, it is only the histories of home defence forces that consider recruiting thoroughly - having little else to talk about.